


















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 












UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 





The Impact of the 2004 Election Campaign on the Quality of 




Thesis Presented for the Degree of 
 
 
























I, Cherrel Jane Africa, hereby declare that, that apart from the normal guidance from 
my supervisor, this thesis is my own unaided work, both in concept and execution. 
Neither the substance nor any part of the above thesis has been submitted in the past, 
or is being, or is to be submitted for a degree at this University or at any other 
university. Each contribution to, and quotation in, this thesis from the work(s) of 
other people has been attributed, and has been cited and referenced. I am now 
























The loving memory of my parents, Daniel Francis and Delia Jane Thebus, who died 





My husband John and my sons, Joshua and Daniel: Your presence, encouragement 


















Despite the critical relationship between election campaigns and the quality of 
democracy, it is an understudied phenomenon. Moreover, in South Africa, there has 
never been a systematic study of an entire election campaign. In this thesis I assess 
whether the 2004 election campaign hindered or enhanced the quality of South 
Africa’s democracy. I adapt Lasswell’s model of persuasive communication (which 
views the source, content, medium, recipient and effect as crucial parts of the 
communicative process) as well as concepts set out by Diamond and Morlino (2005), 
Powell (2005) and Buchanan (2001) to develop an integrated analytical model to 
assess how an election campaign can contribute to the quality of democracy. 
 
I bring together a wide set of data, much of it original, into a unique body of evidence 
which I use to evaluate the extent to which South Africa’s 2004 campaign contributed 
to or detracted from the quality of democracy. I thus provide a systematic assessment 
of the caliber of information and choices offered by political parties to voters in 2004 
election. 
 
Juxtaposing my empirical findings against my analytical model reveals a bleak 
picture of campaigning in South Africa. Every component of my model received a 
predominantly negative assessment.  A substantial body of voters without firm 
partisan attachments (but with low levels of internal efficacy and largely negative 
images of opposition parties and their leaders) had unprecedented access to the mass 
media and were available to be persuaded by political parties. However, parties failed 
to provide distinctions between their policies, instead promising similar outcomes 
without adequately communicating their strategies. Campaign messages therefore 
blurred rather than illuminated the choices for voters. The poor communication by 
parties was further compounded by the media’s pre-occupation with conflict and 
hostility between party leaders. I therefore find that in the 2004 election the campaign 















This thesis would not have been possible without the generous financial support of 
the A.W. Mellon Foundation; the National Research Foundation (NRF); the 
Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD); the Democracy in Africa 
Research Unit (DARU) at the Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR) and the 
Centre for African Studies at UCT. 
 
I owe particular appreciation to my supervisor, Professor Robert Mattes, who has 
mentored me for more than a decade, who has always pushed me to go one step 
further and whose high standards, expertise and overall guidance have i spired me. I 
am also especially appreciative of the substantive feedback and assistance given to 
me by Dr Per Strand.  
 
I would also like to express my appreciation to: 
 Washeelah Kapery and the staff at Citizen Surveys for their professionalism, 
willingness to “go the extra mile” and for producing a set of good quality focus 
group discussions;  
 Wadim Schreiner and the staff at Media Tenor, who faced a colossal task during 
the compilation of the content analysis data-set, for their attention to detail and to 
Wadim in particular, for his willingness to answer my continuous stream of 
questions;  
 My husband John Africa, who proof-read several versions of both my proposal 
and thesis;  
 Gavin Davis for his valuable input into the conceptualization phase of this study, 
the groundwork that he did on the Comparative National Elections Project and 
the use of the interviews that he conducted with political party media strategists; 
 Collette Schulz-Herzenberg, Mary Kinney, Glen Mpani, Danga Mughogho, Joao 
Pereira, Carlos, Shenga, Kimberly Smiddy and Dadisai Taderera at the 
Democracy in Africa Research Unit for their insights and support during this 
long journey; 
 The staff at the Centre for Social Science Research, UCT, particularly Libby 











Zerina Davis, for their administrative and logistical support; 
 Dianne Steele from UCT library for her referencing expertise. 
 
I would also like to express my gratitude to family, friends, colleagues and fellow-
students, too many to mention individually, who encouraged and supported me in 
various ways.   
 
Finally, I am thankful to Almighty God for sustaining me and enabling me to 














ANC   African National Congress 
DA    Democratic Alliance  
CNEP   Comparative National Elections Project 
COSATU  Congress of South African Trade Unions  
CSSR   Centre for Social Science Research 
DARU   Democracy in Africa Research Unit 
ID    Independent Democrats  
IDASA   Institute for Democracy in South Africa  
EISA   Electoral Institute of South Africa  
IEC    Independent Electoral Commission  
IFP    Inkatha Freedom Party  
MMP    Media Monitoring Project 
MT    Media Tenor 
NNP    New National Party (National Party before1997)  
PR    Proportional Representation 
PAC   Pan Africanist Congress  
PEB    Public Education Broadcasts  
SABC    South African Broadcasting Corporation  
SACP   South African Communist Party  
SAARF  South African Advertising Research Foundation 
SETA   Sector Education Training Authority 
UCT    University of Cape Town 
UDF   United Democratic Front 
UDM    United Democratic Movement 












TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DECLARATION ....................................................................................................................................I 
DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................................... II 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................ III 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................................... IV 
ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................................................. VI 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................ 1 
1.2 TOPIC .................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT ............................................................................................ 5 
CHAPTER TWO: ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY ....... 11 
2.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 11 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE .......................................................................................... 11 
2.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY 13 
2.4 ASSESSING CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATIONS ......................................................................... 15 
2.4.1 The Message Source ...................................................................................................... 17 
2.4.2 Campaign Messages ...................................................................................................... 19 
2.4.3 Campaign Strategies and Media Coverage .................................................................... 21 
2.4.4 Voters ............................................................................................................................ 23 
2.4.4.1 Cognitive Awareness ......................................................................................................... 23 
2.2.4.2 Partisan Identification.................................................................................................................. 24 
2.2.4.3 Consumption of Political Information ......................................................................................... 25 
2.2.4.3 Political Efficacy ......................................................................................................................... 26 
2.4.5 Campaign Impact ........................................................................................................... 26 
2.4.6 The Election Campaign Assessment Model .................................................................. 27 
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................... 29 
3.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 29 
3.2 THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT MODEL APPLIED TO THE 2004 SOUTH AFRICAN 
ELECTION CAMPAIGN ........................................................................................................................ 30 
3.2.1 Perceptions of Political Parties and Leaders .................................................................. 30 
3.2.2 Choices Offered to Voters in the 2004 Election ............................................................ 30 
3.2.3 Campaign Strategies in the 2004 Election ..................................................................... 31 
3.2.4 Media Coverage of the Campaign ................................................................................. 31 
3.2.5 Profile of the Electorate ................................................................................................. 32 











3.3 DATA .................................................................................................................................. 33 
3.3.1 Survey Data ................................................................................................................... 33 
3.3.1.1 Idasa Post-Election Study (1994) ....................................................................................... 34 
3.3.1.2 Opinion 99 (1998 and 1999) .............................................................................................. 34 
3.3.1.3 Afrobarometer (2000 and 2004) ......................................................................................... 34 
3.3.1.4 Comparative National Elections Project (2004) ................................................................. 35 
3.3.1.5 SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004 (2004) ............................................................................... 35 
3.3.2 Content Analysis Data ................................................................................................... 35 
3.3.3 South African Advertising Research Foundation Data .................................................. 36 
3.3.4 Nielsen Advertising Expenditure Data .......................................................................... 36 
3.3.5 Media Reports ................................................................................................................ 37 
3.3.6 Qualitative Interviews with Media Officers in Political Parties .................................... 37 
3.3.7 Campaign Material ........................................................................................................ 37 
3.3.8 Focus Group Discussion Data........................................................................................ 38 
3.4 LIMITATIONS ....................................................................................................................... 39 
CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL PARTIES IN SOUTH AFRICA ................................................ 41 
4.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 41 
4.2 PARTY FORTUNES ............................................................................................................... 41 
4.3 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................... 42 
4.3.1 The ANC........................................................................................................................ 42 
4.3.2 The DA .......................................................................................................................... 43 
4.3.3 The IFP .......................................................................................................................... 43 
4.3.4 The UDM ....................................................................................................................... 44 
4.3.5 The ID ............................................................................................................................ 45 
4.3.6 The NNP ........................................................................................................................ 45 
4.4 PERCEPTIONS OF PARTY LEADERS ...................................................................................... 47 
4.5 PERCEPTIONS OF COMPETENCE ........................................................................................... 53 
4.6 PERCEPTIONS OF INCLUSIVENESS ........................................................................................ 57 
4.7 PERCEPTIONS OF TRUSTWORTHINESS .................................................................................. 62 
4.8 THE NEED FOR VISIBILITY .................................................................................................. 64 
4.9 GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICIANS............................................................................. 65 
4.10 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 67 
CHAPTER FIVE: CAMPAIGN MESSAGES IN THE 2004 ELECTION .................................... 70 
5.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 70 
5.2 OVERVIEW .......................................................................................................................... 71 
5.3 CAMPAIGN MESSAGES ........................................................................................................ 74 
5.3.1 The ANC’s Campaign Messages ................................................................................... 74 
5.3.2 The DA ’s Campaign Messages ..................................................................................... 83 











5.3.4 The UDM ’s Campaign Messages ................................................................................. 99 
5.3.5 The ID’s Campaign Messages ..................................................................................... 103 
5.3.6 The NNP’s Campaign Messages ................................................................................. 108 
4.4 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 111 
CHAPTER SIX: COMMUNICATING THE CAMPAIGN MESSAGES .................................... 114 
6.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 114 
6.2 PARTY FUNDING AND SPENDING ....................................................................................... 114 
6.3 THE “PAID” CAMPAIGNS ................................................................................................... 117 
6.3.1 The ANC...................................................................................................................... 117 
6.3.2 The DA ........................................................................................................................ 118 
6.3.3 The IFP ........................................................................................................................ 119 
6.3.4 The UDM ..................................................................................................................... 120 
6.3.5 The ID .......................................................................................................................... 121 
6.3.6 The NNP ...................................................................................................................... 122 
6.4 CONTACT WITH VOTERS ................................................................................................... 123 
6.5 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 124 
CHAPTER SEVEN: MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE 2004 CAMPAIGN ................................... 126 
7.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 126 
7.2 PROFILE OF THE MEDIA IN SOUTH AFRICA ........................................................................ 126 
7.2.1 Radio ............................................................................................................................ 127 
7.2.2 Television .................................................................................................................... 129 
7.2.3 Newspapers .................................................................................................................. 130 
7.3 CONSUMPTION OF NEWS ................................................................................................... 132 
7.4 COVERAGE OF THE CAMPAIGN .......................................................................................... 134 
7.4.1 All Media ..................................................................................................................... 134 
7.4.2 Radio Coverage ........................................................................................................... 136 
7.4.3 Television Coverage .................................................................................................... 136 
7.4.4 Print Coverage ............................................................................................................. 137 
7.5 COVERAGE OF THE PARTIES .............................................................................................. 138 
7.5.1 All Media ..................................................................................................................... 138 
7.5.2 Television Coverage .................................................................................................... 141 
7.5.3 Print Coverage ............................................................................................................. 143 
7.6 MESSAGES COMMUNICATED BY THE MEDIA ..................................................................... 145 
7.6.1 Media Messages about the ANC ................................................................................. 145 
7.6.2 Media Messages about the DA .................................................................................... 151 
7.6.3 Media Messages about the IFP .................................................................................... 159 
7.6.4 Media Messages about the UDM ................................................................................. 164 
7.6.5 Media Messages about the ID ...................................................................................... 167 











7.7 MEDIA COVERAGE OF VOTER CONCERNS ......................................................................... 177 
7.8 MEDIA BIAS IN THE 2004 CAMPAIGN ................................................................................ 181 
7.8.1 Citizen Perceptions of Media Bias ............................................................................... 182 
7.8.2 Political Parties Views of Media Bias ......................................................................... 183 
7.8.3 Content Analysis .......................................................................................................... 185 
7.9 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 187 
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTORATE .................................................. 191 
8.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 191 
8.2 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE .................................................................................................... 191 
8.3 EDUCATIONAL PROFILE .................................................................................................... 194 
8.4 POLITICAL INTEREST ......................................................................................................... 196 
8.5 CAMPAIGN INTEREST ........................................................................................................ 198 
8.6 ATTENTION TO CAMPAIGN NEWS ..................................................................................... 199 
8.7 PARTY IDENTIFICATION..................................................................................................... 200 
8.8 PARTISANSHIP AND POLITICAL INTEREST .......................................................................... 201 
8.9 POLITICAL EFFICACY ........................................................................................................ 203 
8.10 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 204 
CHAPTER NINE: THE IMPACT OF THE 2004 CAMPAIGN ON THE QUALITY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA ............................................................................................. 205 
9.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 205 
9.2 ASSESSING THE 2004 ELECTION CAMPAIGN...................................................................... 206 
9.3 PARTICIPATION PATTERNS ................................................................................................ 209 
9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................... 212 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. 218 
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES ............................................................................................................... 246 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................... 256 
APPENDIX 1: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ........................................................................................ 256 
APPENDIX 2: FOCUS GROUP METHODOLOGY NOTES....................................................................... 258 
APPENDIX 3: FOCUS GROUP RECRUITMENT FORM .......................................................................... 259 
APPENDIX 4: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDES ........................................................................... 260 
APPENDIX 5: FOCUS GROUP CONSENT FORM .................................................................................. 262 
APPENDIX 6: FOCUS GROUP TRANSCRIPTS ...................................................................................... 263 
APPENDIX 7: MEDIA TENOR METHODOLOGY NOTES ...................................................................... 334 
APPENDIX 8: CODING FRAME FOR RECODE OF MEDIA TENOR ISSUES ............................................. 336 
APPENDIX 9: MEDIA MONITORING PROJECT METHODOLOGY NOTES .............................................. 339 
APPENDIX 10: SOUTH AFRICAN ADVERTISING RESEARCH FOUNDATION METHODOLOGY NOTES .. 340 
APPENDIX 11: NIELSEN MEDIA RESEARCH METHODOLOGY NOTES ................................................ 341 











LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 1: PARTIES TRUSTED TO DEAL WITH ISSUES, 2004 (MULTI-MENTIONS ALLOWED) .................... 54 
TABLE 2: GENERAL PERCEPTIONS OF POLITICIANS, 2004. ..................................................................... 66 
TABLE 3: PARTY MANIFESTO TITLES, 2004. .......................................................................................... 72 
TABLE 4: KEY ELECTION SLOGANS, 2004. ............................................................................................. 72 
TABLE 5: PARTY INCOME AND EXPENDITURE: 2003/2004 FINANCIAL YEAR ....................................... 116 
TABLE 6: ANC ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ...................................... 117 
TABLE 7: DA ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ......................................... 119 
TABLE 8: IFP ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ......................................... 120 
TABLE 9: UDM ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ..................................... 121 
TABLE 10: ID ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ........................................ 122 
TABLE 11: NNP ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004)..................................... 123 
TABLE 12: REPORTED PARTY CONTACT DURING 2004 CAMPAIGN PERIOD. ........................................ 124 
TABLE 13: LISTENERSHIP OF RADIO IN 1,000'S [PAST 7 DAYS], FEBRUARY - APRIL 2004 .................... 128 
TABLE 14: TELEVISION VIEWING [PAST 7 DAYS] 1,000'S 2004 ............................................................. 130 
TABLE 15: READERSHIP OF NEWSPAPERS IN 1,000'S 2004 ................................................................... 131 
TABLE 16: CONSUMPTION OF NEWS MEDIA, 2004 (AFROBAROMETER) ............................................... 133 
TABLE 17: CONSUMPTION OF NEWS MEDIA, 2004 (COMPARATIVE NATIONAL ELECTIONS PROJECT) . 134 
TABLE 18: COVERAGE OF THE CAMPAIGN IN ALL MEDIA TYPES .......................................................... 135 
TABLE 19: HIGHEST COVERAGE OF CAMPAIGN .................................................................................... 135 
TABLE 20: CAMPAIGN COVERAGE BY RADIO STATION ........................................................................ 136 
TABLE 21: CAMPAIGN COVERAGE BY TELEVISION CHANNEL .............................................................. 137 
TABLE 22: CAMPAIGN COVERAGE BY PRINT MEDIUM ......................................................................... 137 
TABLE 23: COVERAGE OF PARTIES IN ALL MEDIA TYPES ..................................................................... 139 
TABLE 24: COVERAGE OF PARTIES BY RADIO STATION ....................................................................... 140 
TABLE 25: EXTENT OF COVERAGE OF PARTIES ON TELEVISION (ALL STATIONS) ................................ 141 
TABLE 26: TELEVISION NEWS COVERAGE OF PARTIES BY CHANNEL ................................................... 142 
TABLE 27: EXTENT OF COVERAGE OF PARTIES IN ALL PRINT MEDIA .................................................. 143 
TABLE 28: PRINT NEWS COVERAGE OF PARTIES  BY PAPER ................................................................. 144 
TABLE 29: OVERALL CONTENT OF COVERAGE – ALL MEDIA .............................................................. 178 
TABLE 30: CONTENT OF PARTY COVERAGE – ALL MEDIA ................................................................... 179 
TABLE 31: PROPORTION OF POLICY-RELATED STATEMENTS IN COVERAGE OF PARTY CAMPAIGNS ..... 180 
TABLE 32: CITIZEN PERCEPTIONS OF MEDIA BIAS ............................................................................... 182 
TABLE 33: EXTENT OF TRUST BY CITIZENS IN NEWS MEDIA ............................................................... 182 
TABLE 34: EDUCATION PROFILE IN SOUTH AFRICA, 2004 .................................................................... 195 
TABLE 35: INTEREST IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS ............................................................................................. 197 
TABLE 36: EXTENT OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION .................................................................................... 197 
TABLE 37: INTEREST IN THE CAMPAIGNS (MARKINOR OPINION 2004)................................................. 198 











TABLE 39: DISCUSSION OF CAMPAIGN ISSUES,  2004. .......................................................................... 199 
TABLE 40: ATTENTION PAID TO CAMPAIGN NEWS,  2004. ................................................................... 199 
TABLE 41: INTEREST IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION .................................................. 202 
TABLE 42: EXTENT OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION ......................................... 202 
TABLE 43: INTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY, 2000 AND 2004. .............................................................. 203 
TABLE 44: ANC OUTDOOR MEDIA ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ........ 342 
TABLE 45: ANC RADIO ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ......................... 342 
TABLE 46: ANC ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE, PRINT MEDIA (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ............. 343 
TABLE 47: DA OUTDOOR MEDIA AND DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - 
APRIL 2004)................................................................................................................................ 343 
TABLE 48: DA RADIO ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ............................ 344 
TABLE 49: DA PRINT ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ............................. 345 
TABLE 50: IFP PRINT ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ............................. 346 
TABLE 51: IFP RADIO ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ............................ 346 
TABLE 52: UDM OUTDOOR MEDIA ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ....... 347 
TABLE 53: UDM PRINT ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ......................... 347 
TABLE 54: UDM RADIO ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ........................ 347 
TABLE 55: ID PRINT ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) .............................. 348 
TABLE 56: ID RADIO ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ............................. 348 
TABLE 57: NNP PRINT ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE (JANUARY 2004 - APRIL 2004) ........................... 349 















LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1: THE LASSWELL MODEL OF PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION ................................................... 16 
FIGURE 2: THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT MODEL .................................................................. 28 
FIGURE 3: IMAGES OF PARTY INCLUSIVENESS, 1998-2004. .................................................................... 57 
FIGURE 4: INDEPENDENT VOTERS’ IMAGES OF PARTIES INCLUSIVENESS-EXCLUSIVENESS .................... 58 
FIGURE 5: INDEPENDENT VOTERS’ IMAGES OF PARTIES TRUSTWORTHINESS ......................................... 63 
FIGURE 6: MEDIA USAGE IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1994-2004 ..................................................................... 132 
FIGURE 7: COVERAGE OF PARTIES ON RADIO DURING 2004 ELECTION CAMPAIGN .............................. 140 
FIGURE 8: COVERAGE OF PARTIES ON TELEVISION DURING 2004 ELECTION CAMPAIGN ..................... 142 
FIGURE 9: COVERAGE OF PARTIES IN NEWSPAPERS DURING 2004 ELECTION CAMPAIGN .................... 144 
FIGURE 10: VOTER PERCEPTIONS OF MOST IMPORTANT CAMPAIGN ISSUE .......................................... 177 
FIGURE 11: EXTENT OF POLICY-RELATED COVERAGE IN THE 2004 CAMPAIGN ................................... 180 
FIGURE 12: RATINGS OF CAMPAIGN COVERAGE IN 2004 ELECTION (MEDIA TENOR) .......................... 186 
FIGURE 13: RATINGS OF CAMPAIGN COVERAGE IN 2004 ELECTION (MEDIA MONITORING PROJECT) . 187 
FIGURE 14: NUMBER OF ADULTS (16+) IN EACH PROVINCE - 2004 ....................................................... 192 
FIGURE 15: LANGUAGE GROUPINGS IN SOUTH AFRICA - 2004 ............................................................. 193 
FIGURE 16: TRENDS IN EDUCATION 1995-2004 ................................................................................... 194 
FIGURE 17: FUNCTIONALLY LITERACY: 1994 -2004 ............................................................................ 195 
FIGURE 18: POLITICAL DISCUSSION AND POLITICAL INTEREST, 1995 -2004 ........................................ 196 
FIGURE 19: LEVELS OF PARTISANSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1994 -2004 ................................................. 200 
FIGURE 20: THE 2004 ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN SOUTH AFRICA. .......................................................... 208 
FIGURE 21: TURNOUT IN SOUTH AFRICAN GENERAL ELECTIONS, 1994-2004 ...................................... 210 











 LIST OF FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOXES 
 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 1: POSITIVE PERCEPTIONS OF PATRICIA DE LILLE ................................. 49 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 2: POSITIVE COMMENTS ABOUT GENERAL HOLOMISA ......................... 50 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 3: POSITIVE COMMENTS ABOUT CHIEF BUTHELEZI .............................. 50 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 4: NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF PATRICIA DE LILLE............................... 51 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 5: NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF CHIEF BUTHELEZI ................................. 52 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 6: NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF TONY LEON .......................................... 52 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 7: NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF THE ANC .............................................. 54 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 8: NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS OF THE DA’S COMPETENCE ....................... 56 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 9: POSITIVE PERCEPTIONS OF THE DA’S COMPETENCE ......................... 56 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 10: HISTORY OF THE ANC .................................................................... 58 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 11: PERCEPTIONS OF THE IFP’S REPRESENTATIVENESS......................... 59 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 12:  PERCEPTIONS OF THE NNP’S REPRESENTATIVENESS...................... 61 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 13: PERCEPTIONS OF THE UDM’S REPRESENTATIVENESS ..................... 61 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 14: PERCEPTIONS OF THE DA’S REPRESENTATIVENESS......................... 62 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 15: PERCEPTION THAT POLITICIANS SHOULD BE MORE VISIBLE .......... 64 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 16: PERCEPTION THAT THE ID AND PATRICIA DE LILLE SHOULD BE 
MORE VISIBLE .............................................................................................................................. 65 
FOCUS GROUP COMMENT BOX 17: PERCEPTIONS OF EMPTY PROMISES MADE BY POLITICIANS ........... 66 


















CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Campaigns are a means of choosing leaders, but they are also a way for 
the governed to connect with each other. They tell us what we should 
expect from our leaders, how we should evaluate them, which actions are 
good and which are bad, and what constitutes success or failure. In this 
sense, among others, campaigns matter (Jamieson, 2000:17).    
  
To be sure, many important aspects of society have nothing to do with 
election campaigns, but in a democracy’s electoral practices are found the 
influence and imprint of much that makes a culture as it is. Thus election 
campaigns speak beyond themselves (Swanson and Mancini, 1996:247). 
 
Campaigning is a good thing because [the politicians] come to the people, 
they make the point to go to the people and sit on their mats, just to 




In this thesis, I explore the relationship between election campaigns and the quality of 
democracy. In particular, I focus on the ways in which election campaigns can enhance 
or hinder democratic responsiveness and vertical accountability. I conduct my study in 
South Africa since it provides a particularly useful setting to examine how campaigns 
affect the quality of democracy. While South Africa’s young democracy is entrenched in 
a celebrated constitutional framework it is plagued by questions about its responsiveness. 
The central question which I answer in this thesis is: “Did the 2004 election campaign 




There is consensus among scholars that competitive elections are an essential component 
of a democratic political system.
1
 If competitive elections are an essential component of 
                                               
1 Dennis (1970:819), for example, notes that “if any single institution serves as popular democracy’s sine qua non it is 
that of elections”. Lijphart (1994) contends that “the electoral system is the most fundamental element of representative 
democracy”. Kavanagh (1995:1) argues that free competitive elections are inseparable from representative democracy 
and according to Ward (2004:5), “elections are one of the central instruments employed by nation-states to ensure that 











democracy and such elections require good quality campaigns, then, by extension, good 
quality election campaigns are also critical to the quality of democracy. A good quality 
election encompasses more than smooth running administrative systems and a free and 
fair process. Competitive elections require a national conversation about salient political 
issues, how the government has been addressing these issues, what the government 
should be doing to resolve them and which party or political leader would be best placed 
to do so. Such a national conversation typically occurs during election campaigns. Often 
it is the only time that such issues are discussed more broadly within the polity.   
 
An election campaign is a process in which competing parties try to influence public 
opinion (Holbrook, 1996:43-56). Through their election campaigns, politicians and 
political parties seek to persuade the voting public to vote for them; to keep them in 
office or to put them there. It is an active process, in which political institutions 
communicate information in an effort to convince voters that it will be worth their 
trouble to vote for them. Schnur (1999:144) argues, “the success or failure of political 
parties and candidates depends on their ability to reach, engage and persuade voters”. 
Political parties thus need to persuade citizens to vote for them. And as Swanson and 
Mancini (1996:1) assert, politics is “always persuasive, forcing us consciously or 
subconsciously to interpret, to evaluate and to act”. Persuasion also inherently involves 
agency on the part of the recipient, as they need to assimilate and consider the 
information being presented to them.   
 
How do election campaigns relate to democratic responsiveness and accountability? 
Powell (2005:62) indicates that “democratic responsiveness is what occurs when the 
democratic process induces the government to form and implement policies that the 
citizens want”. Broadly speaking, accountability can be defined as “the obligation of 
elected political leaders to answer for their political decisions when asked by citizen 
electors or other constitutional bodies”, and more specifically, vertical accountability is 
“that which citizens as electors can demand from their officials in the course of 
campaigns and elections” (Diamond and Morlino, 2005: xix). By allowing citizens to 
make informed choices and competing parties to articulate themselves (Street, 2001:253) 
and giving citizens unfettered access to alternative sources of information including 
independent media and divergent opinion (Diamond, 1996:11), election campaigns can 











vertical accountability both require the same supporting contextual conditions: high 
turnout levels combined with the credible threat of electoral alternation. This is made 
possible by: information on political actions, knowledgeable and engaged voters, 
institutionally strong parties which offer pragmatic alternatives and an independent 
pluralistic mass media (Diamond and Morlino, 2005: xx).  
 
Effective campaign messages and carefully-devised campaign themes are critically 
important to voters, particularly to voters without party loyalties, because in and of 
themselves they may persuade voters to support a particular candidate or party.  Voters 
are cognitive misers without the time or inclination to sort through each and every 
campaign appeal. They seek cognitive shortcuts that help them make rational choices 
with limited effort. A carefully constructed campaign theme serves as such a cognitive 
link (Marquette, 1996: 148-149). This has been confirmed by empirical studies. Miller, 
Wattenberg and Malanchuk (1986: 523) show that mental schemata can and will be 
evoked during campaign periods as specific stimuli trigger people’s pre-existing 
cognitions. Rhan (1993) also demonstrates that voters can and do respond to the 
implications of candidate messages. Schmitt-Beck (2004:318) concludes that “the 
reception of persuasive messages, carrying evaluative content, from the mass media can 
indeed be consequential for individual electoral behaviour”. 
 
Campaigns matter because voters reason about parties, candidates, and issues, using low-
information rationality or “gut-reasoning” by combining information gained from 
experiences, daily life, the media and political campaigns (Popkin, 1991; Sniderman, 
Brody and Tetlock, 1991 and Lupia, 1994). While people forget most of the campaign 
information to which they are exposed, they develop an overall evaluation which is 
adjusted in response to their immediate assessment of campaign messages and events 
(Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau, 1995). Thus, people with limited information use 
reasoning shortcuts to make prudent political choices (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 
1991 and Lupia, 1994). As Popkin (1991:70) argues, “if voters had full information and 
no uncertainty, they would not be open to influence from others and hence there would 
be no campaigns”. Achen (1992: 198) also aptly argues “voters do not ignore information 
they have, do not fabricate information they do not have, and do not choose what they do 












Ideally campaigns should provide incentives for people to vote. However, campaigns 
also have the potential to harm democracy. Campaigns can be used as platform to evoke 
prejudices and fears (Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000). They can also overload voters with 
irrelevant information which blurs the distinctions between parties. In these situations 
campaigns can turn people off politics, resulting in them abstaining from voting, thus 
reducing the quality of democracy. Like money which can be used for noble or terrible 
purposes, campaigns, depending on their format, can exert a positive or negative 
influence on democracy.  
 
Despite the critical relationship between election campaigns and the quality of 
democracy, it is an understudied phenomenon. By and large, studies of campaigns 
proceed from a marketing perspective while analyses of electoral competition and voter 
turnout tend to focus on individual behavioural motivations and decision-making 
processes.  
 
These micro-level analyses fail to take cognizance of the quantity and quality of 
information and choices offered to voters by political parties. This pre-occupation with 
individual decisions is flawed because, as Sniderman (2000:68-69) argues, political 
institutions - rather than voters - fix and organize the confusion of politics. Viewing 
political participation as primarily dependent on the characteristics of the voter (i.e. 
levels of education, political knowledge, efficacy and cognitive engagement) is 
problematic. Even if voters were highly educated, keenly interested in the campaigns and 
took time to consider the policies and programmes of competing parties, such factors 
alone are insufficient to ensure voter participation. Voters would still need political 
parties to offer them a good reason to actually go out and vote. While individual 
decision-making processes are critically important, voters are only one part of the 
electoral equation; political parties and the choices they offer constitute the other part.  
 
Clearly campaigns are important for democracy. They “select decision-makers, shape 
policy, distribute power, and provide avenues for debate and socially approved 
expressions of conflict” (Mancini and Swanson, 1996: 1). They also allow voters to hear 
politicians defend their records, criticize those of their opponents and propose policies 











would best represent their interests, and parties need campaigns to harness support from 
voters.  
 
If campaigns do matter, we should pay far more attention to the quality of choices offered 
to voters via campaigns. We should ask questions about the extent to which they provide 
voters with the basis to make informed choices and scrutinize the conditions under which 
campaigns enhance the quality of democracy. 
 
In this thesis I use Lasswell’s model of persuasive communication (which views the 
source, content, medium, recipient and effect as crucial parts of the communicative 
process) as well as concepts set out by Diamond and Morlino (2005), Powell (2005) and 
Buchanan (2001) to develop an integrated analytical model with which to assess whether 
election campaigns contribute to the quality of democracy. 
 
1.3 The South African Context 
 
There is widespread consensus that South Africa is now a democracy: South Africa has a 
democratic constitution, a Constitutional Court, an extensive judicial system, transformed 
political institutions as well as a wide range of political and socio-economic rights. South 
Africa has also conducted a series of free and fair democratic elections and electoral 
contestation has been “relatively free” (Friedman, 2005:3) with the election in 2004 the 
best administered and the freest and fairest to date (Piper, Hendricks, Masterson and 
Letsholo, 2004: 1)   
 
Campaigning in the country’s first three national elections in 1994, 1999 and 2004 was 
by no means docile, with fierce competition displayed by all parties. In contrast to what 
might have been expected, given the results of the 1994 and 1999 elections in which the 
African National Congress (ANC) won landslide victories, political parties did not 
appear to take the 2004 election results as a foregone conclusion. They spent vast sums 
of money to mobilize and persuade voters (Davis, 2005: 231). Moreover, these 
campaigns were characterized by extensive news media coverage, widespread direct 
canvassing, numerous events and rallies organized by a range of political parties, as well 











improvement in media access, with an increase in radio sets from 10.4 million in 1994 to 
33.7 million in 2004, and an increase in television sets from 5.4 million in 1994 to 8.1 
million in 2004 (Allerman, 2004).  
 
In South Africa election campaigns are particularly important given the negative effects 
of the country’s closed list Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system for 
elections to national and provincial assemblies. In this electoral system, voters elect 
parties and not party representatives. A party contests an election after establishing a list 
of its candidates, and party candidates get awarded seats in the assembly depending on 
the percentage of votes won by the party. Voters elect “slates of candidates rather than 
individuals” (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2005:7-8). The PR system ensures that a broader 
range of minority political parties can gain representation than what would be the case 
under a majoritarian electoral system. This is a positive effect in a country as culturally 
heterogeneous as South Africa. However, the system has link between voters and their 
elected representatives since no Member of Parliament owes his or her seat to a specific 
geographical constituency. As a way of strengthening such bonds between MPs and 
voters, MPs in the South African parliament are allocated a “constituency” on the basis 
of other criteria. But research has found that there is limited direct contact between voters 
and ‘their’ allocated representatives between elections.
2
 During the campaign period, 
which starts in earnest once the election date is announced by the President, political 
party representatives and leaders make a concerted effort to connect with communities. 
During this period they make face-to-face contact with voters and find out more about 
the challenges and problems which they face. The media also turns the spotlight on 
political matters and political parties, media houses, research companies and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) often collaborate to conduct surveys and other 
research projects to assess the mood of voters.  
 
At face value, it would appear that election campaigns constitute an integral and valuable 
part of South Africa’s democratic system. However, South Africa’s election campaigns 
are not seen to play the role of helping voters discern which party would best represent 
their interests. Analysts assume that campaigns fail in this role because of their 
                                               
2 For a comprehensive assessment of the PR system in South Africa, please see Southall, 2004b as well as Southall and 












interpretations of the behavioural motivations of the voting public. Many analysts (for 
example, Giliomee, 1994; Schlemmer; 1994; Johnson, 1996; Giliomee, 1998; Giliomee 
and Simkins, 1999; Schlemmer, 1999 and Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer, 2001) see 
South African voter motivations as “determined by symbolic or identity concerns” 
(Schlemmer, 1999: 288). These analysts tend to see campaigning primarily as a process 
of mobilizing voters based on their ethnic or racial identity by playing on their fears of 
majority domination.  
 
According to Mattes and Piombo (2003:102), prevailing analyses of voter motivations in 
South Africa see voting as a desire to express communal solidarity with political parties, 
or maintain/obtain government patronage. Alternatively, they argue, these analyses view 
voting as the result of a fear of communal pressure or cultural norms or predispositions 
hostile to the larger concept of political pluralism, multi-party politics and opposition in 
general. Concerns around voting behaviour have also been linked to the electoral 
dominance of the African National Congress (ANC) and the potential for democratic 
erosion via the emergence of a one-party state. In Giliomee’s (1998:133) words “if a 
liberal democracy is about capturing an “undecided middle”, party alternation, and 
minorities with a real hope of becoming part of a new majority, then the prospects of 
such a system evolving in South Africa are distinctly unpromising”.  
 
Friedman (2004) argues that while South African elections are not simplistic ethnic 
censuses, elections are not determined by policy issues. South Africans vote on the basis 
of race, language and religion. According to Friedman (2004:3) “voter preferences are 
shaped by considerations other than competing technical solutions to economic and 
social problems”, and to “claim that a ballot will be decided by this or that ‘issue’ is to 
misunderstand the electorate and the campaign”.  
 
Others have argued that a primarily racial analysis of voting behaviour is too crude, as 
values, perceived interests and judgments as well as many other factors have important 
effects on partisan support (Mattes, 1994; Eldridge and Seekings, 1994; Mattes and 
Gouws, 1998; Mattes, 1995; Mattes and Piombo, 2000; Mattes, Taylor and Africa, 1999; 
Habib and Naidu, 2004 and McLaughlin, 2007). Feree (2006:814) presents a more 
nuanced view, concluding that racialized party images play a critical role in shaping 











incumbent party’s performance. Some analysts, such as Daniel (2004), have begun to see 
issues as playing a role in voter deliberations. Daniel predicted that the job situation in 
South Africa, the President’s position on HIV/AIDS, the government’s position on 
Zimbabwe, and service delivery issues related to housing and utilities could influence 
voter preferences in the 2004 election.  
 
This debate around voter motivations and preferences has important ramifications for the 
conduct of election campaigns and the way parties convey messages to voters. Identity-
based interpretations of voting behaviour leaves little room for information and 
campaigns to play a role in voters’ decisions, other than to reinforce racial modes of 
behaviour. If Friedman is correct that considerations other than competing solutions to 
economic and social problems shape voter preferences, then parties need not provide 
information on how they would deal with the problems facing the electorate and the 
nation. Furthermore, if those who argue that election outcomes in South Africa are 
essentially pre-determined by the demographic composition of the electorate are correct, 
then the prospects for cultivating a culture of accountability and responsiveness between 
the electorate and elected representatives are slim.   
 
Studies of elections in South Africa generally focus on the character of opposition parties 
and or the electoral dominance of the African National Congress; explore the impact of 
various factors on individual-level voting behaviour and party choice or focus on the 
campaigns of one or two parties.
3
 To date, there has been no single study of an entire 
campaign. In this thesis I aim to reduce the gap in our knowledge of how South African 
campaigns work and how they build or undermine the quality of democracy by providing 
a systematic assessment of the caliber of information and choices offered by political 
parties to voters in the 2004 election. My focus is thus on the “supply” side of election 
campaigns. I assess what South African voters “had to work with” in the 2004 election.  
 
                                               
3 See for example Lodge, 1994; Welsh, 1994; Giliomee, 1994; Mattes, 1994; Schlemmer, 1994; Mattes, 1995; Johnson, 
1996; Mattes, Giliomee and James, 1996; Seekings, 1997; Giliomee,1998; Mattes and Gouws, 1998;  Puta-Chekwe, 
1998; Sadie, 1998; Southall, 1998; Booysen, 1999a; Friedman, 1999; Habib and Naidu, 1999; Habib and Taylor, 1999; 
Humphries, 1999; Khosa, 1999; Mattes, Taylor, and Africa, 1999; Mare, 1999; Lodge, 1999a; Lodge 1999b; Muthien, 
1999; Muthien and Khosa, 1999; Rule, 1999; Schlemmer, 1999; Welsh, 1999; Breytenbach, 1999; Maseko, 1999;  
Giliomee, 1999; Piper, 1999; Butler, 2000; Camay and Gordon, 2000; Giliomee, Myburgh and Schlemmer, 2000; 
Schire, 2001; Southall, 2001; Taylor and Hoeane, 1999; Nijzink, 2001; Mattes and Piombo, 2001;. Brooks, 2004; 
Southall, 2004; Hamill, 2004; Mattes, 2005;  Lodge, 2005; Booysen, 2005; Piper, 2005; Schulz-Herzenberg, 2005; 












In contrast to previous analyses of electoral dynamics in South Africa, I view South 
African voters as active agents and presume that voters, whatever level of access they 
have to the campaign, actually interpret and evaluate the campaign as well as other 
politically relevant stimuli. Needless to say, I do not discount the historical context in 
South Africa in which many voters decide which party they will vote for and whether in 
fact they will vote well prior to the election campaign. Clearly, imaginative and well-run 
campaigns that resonate with voter concerns would not necessarily cure all of South 
Africa’s electoral ills, but at the very least voters should be provided with adequate 
information and incentives to vote. 
 
Based on my adaption of the Lasswell model, which views the source, content, medium, 
recipient and effect as crucial parts of the communicative process, I consider the 
perceived credibility of political parties, the quality of campaign messages, the 
accessibility and credibility of media through which these messages were conveyed, the 
attentiveness of the electorate and finally whether the campaign process “drew voters in” 
or “turned them off”. I argue that for campaigns to make a meaningful contribution to the 
quality of democracy: Political parties perceived as competent, trustworthy and inclusive 
by the voting public must transmit a high volume of comparative policy-relevant 
campaign messages through a widely accessible and credible range of media to an 
interested and efficacious electorate, providing them with an incentive to go to the polls 
and cast their ballot. The unique set of data that I have collated on parties, voters and the 
news media in the 2004 campaign enables me to assess the 2004 campaign using these 
evaluative criteria.  
 
I start my overall assessment by looking at voter perceptions of political parties and then 
evaluate the key campaign messages, themes and strategies used by ANC, DA, IFP, 
UDM, ID and NNP. I extract the key campaign messages and examine the main thrust of 
each party’s campaign, looking specifically at its internal consistency and consistency 
with previous campaigns. I examine the channels through which the parties conveyed 
their campaign messages and describe their campaign strategies (in particular the “paid” 
components of these strategies). I also consider the information communicated by the 
media about these parties. In this section I give an overview of South African media and 
media use patterns in 2004.  I then present a profile of the South African electorate and 











political efficacy among voters. Finally, I provide an overall assessment of the quality of 
the 2004 campaign, outlining the potential consequences of the way the campaigns were 
conducted, and ask whether it contributed to or detracted from the quality of democracy 
in South Africa.  
 
In conducting my investigation I analyze several different sources of data. The data 
includes (1) a comprehensive content analysis data-set consisting of campaign-related 
print, television and radio material for the period 9 February to 14 April 2004, compiled 
by Media Tenor; (2) the Idasa 1994 post-election survey, (3) the Opinion 99 surveys, (4) 
the 2004 Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) post-election survey; (5) the 
Afrobarometer surveys; (6) the SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004 survey; (7) data on media 
use from the South African Advertising Research Foundation (SAARF); (8) Nielsen 
Media Research campaign expenditure data; (9) the Media Monitoring Project’s (MMP) 
analysis of campaign material; (10) campaign-related electronic news articles; (11) 
campaign material  namely manifestos, posters, and speeches available on party websites 
and (12) qualitative interviews conducted by the MMP and a University of Cape Town 













CHAPTER TWO: ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND THE 




In this chapter, I look at the ways in which the literature can help us understand the 
relationship between election campaigns and democratic quality. In particular I focus on 
the complex relationships that exist between voters, political parties and the media. The 
interactions between these key actors are integral to both election campaigns as well as 
the institutional arrangements that characterize a responsive democratic system with high 
levels of accountability. I also develop an integrated analytical model by which to assess 
how an election campaign can contribute to the quality of democracy.  
 
2.2 Overview of the Literature 
 
There is a rich volume of literature on micro-level voting behaviour. Many studies 
explore the impact of campaigning on individual-level political choices.
4
 Most prominent 
of the various theoretical perspectives are the party identification approach, rational-
choice approach and cognitive awareness approach. Within the party identification 
approach Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960:143-149) indicate that “for many 
voters the details of the political landscape may be quite blurred until they are brought 
into sharp focus during the campaign period”. Rational choice theorists like Downs 
(1957: 38-45) argue that election campaigns must make voters aware of the benefits they 
will receive and that it is possible to change a voters mind by “providing him with better 
information”.  The Downsian model rests on voter comparisons of competing political 
parties by voters - a comparison enabled in part by campaigns. According to the 
cognitive awareness approach campaigns provide cues that enable voters to make sense 
                                               
4 See for example Downs, 1957; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960; Fiorina, 1981; Kinder, 1986; Roseman, 
Abelson and Ewing,1986; Popkin, 1990; Achen 1992; Lodge and Stroh, 1993; Wyer and Ottati, 1993; Ottati and Wyer, 
1993; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1993; Jervis, 1993; Popkin, 1993; Tetlock, 1993; Bartels, 2000; Dalton, Greene and 













of candidates and their messages (Rhan, 1993).   
 
In their work Political Persuasion and Attitude Change, Mutz, Sniderman and Brody 
(1996) provide an impressive overview of past research and conduct an empirical 
assessment of the impact of campaigning on individual attitude change, focusing on the 
mass media, political elites and individual citizens.  
 
At a macro-level, many other scholars have explored the place of the media and media 
practices in democracy and contemporary society.
5
 These studies often stem from 
divergent perspectives.
6
 Some, for example Herman and Chomsky (1988), begin from 
the premise that mainstream media exists solely to serve powerful interests that control 
and finance them. Others see the media as at least having the potential to play a positive 
role in a democratic system. They believe that the media can be a critical intermediary 
(Selnow,1994:5) which can provide a platform for interest groups [such as political 
parties] to publicize their claims and concerns (Street,2001:253) contributing to 
mobilization into the political system (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 2004:8). Indeed, 
Gunther and Mughan (2000:421) argue that, as the major vehicle for communication 
between the governors and the governed, it is the responsibility of the media to maximize 
the opportunities for voters to make political decisions and cast ballots on the basis of 
informed choice. 
 
Another school prefers to focus on the changes in the nature of campaigning due to 
technological advancements, or what Pfetsch and Esser (2004:5) call the “fundamental 
transformation of media systems” caused by changes in information technology and 
communication infrastructure. A substantial number of these works analyze the 
developments and challenges posed by modernization and globalization and outline the 
rise of professional election campaign specialists. These studies usually focus on the 
transformation of campaign communications in advanced industrial democracies.
7
  
                                               
5 Herman, and Chomsky; 1988; Selnow, 1994; Cook, 1998; Chesney, 1999; Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Norris, 2000; 
Cook, 2001; Street, 2001; Jacobs, 2004; Word, 2004; Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 2004; Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 
2007 and Richardson and Beck, 2007. 
6 Scholars from a range of disciplines have studied the media resulting in a contradictory literature with conflict over 
theory, assumptions, foci and methods of analysis (Williams,2003:17). While I draw on material from various 
disciplines, my study is located within Political Science as a discipline and therefore the theories which draw on are 
primarily normative in nature. For a comprehensive overview of theoretical approaches in media and communication 
studies, please see Tan, 1985, Hardt, 1992, Williams, 2003, Baxter and Babbie, 2004 and Laughey, 2007. 
7 See for example Mickiewicz and Firestone, 1992; Selnow, 1994; Kavanagh, 1995; Shea, 1996; Ansolabehere and 












There is however an absence of knowledge on the link between the “supply side” of 
election campaigns (i.e. the quality of choices offered to voters) and the quality of 
democracy. While “the underlying assumption throughout the literature of individual 
political behaviour is that citizens have a storehouse of political information they can 
draw on to inform their behaviour” (Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau, 1995:309), most 
studies attempt to understand individual political behaviour without paying sufficient 
attention to the basis of this “storehouse of political information”.  
 
A notable exception is James Stanyer’s study of the relationship between election 
campaigns and the quality of democracy, undertaken by in the United States and the 
United Kingdom in which he examines how political advocates, media organizations and 
citizen audiences adapt to changes in political communication systems. Stanyer 
(2007:182) concludes that political communicators have no incentive to pay attention to 
the health of the broader political system and that these communicators are motivated by 
the aim of achieving particular objectives which have unintended and detrimental 
impacts on the system as a whole. 
 
2.3 The Relationship between Election Campaigns and the 
Quality of Democracy 
 
A democracy encompasses many features such as regular, competitive free and fair 
elections, individual rights and freedoms, adherence to the rule of law, equality of all 
citizens and an accountable and responsive system of government.
8
 With regard to 
                                                                                                                                            
1996; Rospir, 1996; Caspi, 1996; Mayobre, 1996;    Mancin, 1999; Wring, 1999; Butler and Collins, 1999;  Kinsey, 
1999; Lebel, 1999; Mitchell and Daves, 1999; Hofrichter, 1999; Varoga and Rice, 1999; Falkowski and Cwalina, 1999; 
1999; Norris, 2000; Carpini and Williams, 2001; Cook, 2001, Neuman, 2001; Jamieson, 2001; Bennett and Entman, 
2001; Dahlgren, 2001; Sparks, 2001; Underwood, 2001; Slater, 2001; Bennett and Manheim, 2001; Plasser and 
Plasser, 2002; Norris, 2004; Lang, 2004; Holtz-Bacha, 2004; Zittel, 2004; Esser and Pfetsch, 2004a. Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004; Swanson, 2004; Rogers, 2004; Donsbach and Patterson, 2004, Foot and Schneider, 2006; Worcester 
and Baines, 2006; Jackson, 2006; Carlson and Strandberg, 2007;  Van Os, Hagemann, Voerman and Jankowski, 2007; 
Oblak and Zeljan, 2007; Gregor, 2007; Foot, Schneider and Dougherty, 2007; Mirandilla, 2007; Tekwani and Kluver, 
2007; Ward, 2007; Tekwani and Shetty, 2007; Aquilla, 2007; Hameed, 2007; Kim and Park, 2007; Foot, Schneider, 
Kluver, Xenos and Jankowski, 2007;  Schneider, Kluver, Jankowski and Foot, 2007  and Stanyer, 2007). 
 
8 Modifications to the term democracy have not occurred in uncontested fashion with vigorous disagreement and 
debate about what democracy is (Diamond, 1996 and Collier and Levitsky, 1997). Democratic theorists distinguish 
between “electoral ” and  “liberal ” democracy. The former meets only the most basic requirements of regular elections 











elections, all citizens should have the universal right to vote and predictable rules 
governing elections and campaigns (Diamond, 1996). Diamond and Morlino (2005:x-xii) 
differentiate between an ordinary democracy and a “quality democracy” which provides 
its citizens with a high degree of freedom, political equality and popular control over 
public policies and policy makers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of stable 





Diamond and Morlino identify eight dimensions of democratic quality that interact and 
reinforce each other, ultimately converging into a whole system. Democratic 
responsiveness and vertical accountability are the dimensions of democratic quality that 
relates most directly to election campaigns. Vertical accountability requires genuinely 
competitive elections in which the performance of the incumbent is reviewed, policy 
alternatives are debated and voters reward or punish incumbents (Diamond and Morlino, 
2005: xix). Powell (2005:63) asserts that democratic responsiveness is a complex process 
involving the systematic eviction of unresponsive or inept policy makers. Vertical 
accountability and the chain of democratic responsiveness is strengthened when citizens 
take the opportunity to gather and process accurate information, parties develop a 
nationally coherent policy agenda and there is an active independent mass media 
(Diamond and Morlino, 2005: xxi and Powell, 2005:64-71).  
 
Thus, three sets of actors are critical to both election campaigns and the quality of 
democracy. According to Buchanan (2001:365), the behavioural exchanges between 
candidates, the media and voters are likely to generate instrumental consequences such as 
fostering community or alienation as well as policy consensus or confusion.   
                                                                                                                                            
 
9 Diamond and Morlino list the following procedural dimensions: The rule of law: All citizens are equal before the law; 
laws are clear, publicly known, universal, stable, non-retroactive and fair and consistently applied to all citizens by an 
independent judiciary; Participation: All adult citizens are granted formal rights of political participation; Competition: 
Regular free and fair electoral competition between different political parties;. Vertical Accountability: The obligation 
of elected political leaders to answer for their political decisions when asked by citizen-electors or other constitutional 
bodies; and Horizontal Accountability: Office-holders are answerable to other institutional actors that have the 
expertise and legal authority to control and sanction their behaviour. The substantive dimensions include:   Freedom: 
Political rights: the rights to vote, to stand for office, to campaign and to organize political parties; civil rights: personal 
liberty, security and privacy; freedom of thought, expression and information; freedom of religion; freedom of 
assembly, association and organization; freedom of movement and residence and the right to legal defense and due 
process; and social or socio-economic rights: the rights to private property and entrepreneurship as well as the rights 













Both Buchanan and Powell note that reality seldom matches the ideal. According to 
Buchanan (2001:365), the actors rarely meet ideal expectations due to the interplay of 
differing candidate, media and citizen incentives. Buchanan (2001: 366-368) notes that 
the candidates incentive of electoral victory combines with certain traits of the electorate 
(such as voter ignorance) and the media (such as aggressive prying) to invite and offer 
rationalizations for the use of manipulation and deception.  Three principle types of 
subversions threaten citizen’s choices in working democracies: 1) defects in the 
willingness or ability of citizens to gather and process accurate information; 2) parties 
that are incoherent when it comes to national policies; and 3) limitations on alternatives 
(Powell, 2005:68).   
 
How can the relationship between election campaigns and the quality of democracy be 
empirically assessed? This is a complex matter. Powell concludes his chapter by saying 
“…I suggest a more complex research agenda, involving multiple, context-sensitive 
measures of procedure, substantive content, and citizen evaluation. Impatience with so 
ambitious an agenda is understandable but overlooks the rich dividends that such 
research could yield, not only for our ability to describe and compare this dimension of 
democratic quality in and across new democracies but also for our understanding of the 
possibilities and limits that reside within the nature of democracy itself”  (Powell, 
2005:75).   
2.4 Assessing Campaign Communications 
 
In order to empirically examine campaigning as it relates to the broader issues of 
democracy and the deepening of the quality of democracy, it is necessary to have an 
effective tool to look at the different components of the campaign process.  Lasswell’s 
model of persuasive communication provides the basis by which to develop a 






                                               
10A model is a drastic simplification of the critical elements of the complex reality we are interested in. It gives a 
general picture of the various instances or manifestations of a system or structure by abstracting the formal properties 
of the object it describes. It does not refer to or represent reality but, rather, aims to provide an analytical tool with 











The Lasswell model ties in well with the three critical actors (political parties, the mass 
media and citizens) identified by Diamond and Morlino, Buchanan and Powell as being 
important for elections and election campaigns.
11
 In his work on the structure and 
function of communication in society, Lasswell (1949:102) stated that: “A convenient 
way to describe an act of communication is to answer the following questions:  
Who 
Says What 
In Which Channel 
To Whom  
With What Effect?”  
 
This question formed the basis for the Lasswell Communications model. This has been 
transformed into the graphic model depicted below. 
 































Source, McQuail and Windahl (1981) 
 
The Lasswell model thus consider the characteristics of the source of the message; the 
content of messages; the channels through which messages were conveyed; the features 
of the audience and the effect of the messages. By adapting the Lasswell model of 
persuasive communications, I develop an election campaign assessment model to 
evaluate how election campaigns can contribute to the quality of democracy, specifically 
the ways in which political parties, the mass media and citizens can strengthen the chain 
of democratic responsiveness.  
                                               
11 The Lasswell model has been criticized for a range of reasons (Mutz, Sniderman and Brody, 1996, Marsen, 2006 and 
Laughey, 2007), however, I view it as appropriate because my emphasis of my thesis is on the “supply side” of the 
campaign process of a single election campaign. For an outline of the various communication models see McQuail and 















2.4.1 The Message Source 
 
The “who?”  component of the model focuses on political parties and political leaders as 
the source of campaign messages. 
 
According to Newman and Perloff (2004:27) “persuasion experts unquestionably agree 
that the source of a message can significantly influence political attitudes”. Indeed, the 
literature reveals that in most situations, people accept or reject persuasive messages 
based on their evaluation of the credibility of the source of the message. (Hovland, Janis 
and Kelly, 1954; Milburn; 1991; Lupia and McCubbins, 2000; Iyengar and Valentino, 
2000; Popkin and Dimock, 2000 and Newman and Perloff, 2004). In the context of 
election campaigns, party competence perceptions of trust and inclusiveness are 
particularly important.  
 
Lupia and McCubbins (2000:48) assert that “without trust there is no persuasion, without 
persuasion, people cannot learn from others and without learning from others it is very 
difficult for citizens to learn what they need to know”. Farrel and Web (2000:124) also 
emphasize that “it is one thing to think that a politician has a good policy for alleviating 
unemployment, but it is quite another to believe that he or she is likely to (a) keep their 
word if returned to office or (b) prove competent to follow through on the promised 
intent of the policy” and “therefore it is rational and important for any organization 
campaigning for office to concentrate part of its efforts on fostering a reputation for 
integrity, veracity and competence”. Perceptions of competence are also important for 
voters because they are likely to care more about which party or candidate can deliver the 
most than about an ideal match with their policy preferences (Popkin, Gorman, Phillips 
and Smith, 1976: 793). 
 
Within the South African context, images of “inclusiveness” or “exclusiveness” are also 
important. Feree (2004) finds that in South Africa, people seek to find parties who will 
look after the interests of all groups and are unlikely to vote for a party they perceive as 
being exclusively concerned about the interests of another group. According to Mattes 











Africans to vote for a party.  
 
Perceptions of campaign leaders are also important because in many instances, 
campaigns centre on the style and personalities of party leaders. Character traits (such as 
competence, warmth, activity, strength, integrity, honesty and empathy) of leaders are 
considered important to voters political attitudes (Page,1978; Kinder,1986 and Masters 
and Sullivan,1993).  
 
The logical extension of these arguments is that voters will be less likely to pay attention 
to campaign messages coming from a party or leader they see as exclusively concerned 
about the interests of another group, or which they see as being incompetent or 
untrustworthy. Negative perceptions of parties and leaders can lead voters to question the 
content of campaign messages, rendering the most compelling campaign strategies 
ineffective. Indeed, if the message is inconsistent with the party’s previous actions, voters 
could reasonably question whether it makes sense to believe the message. 
 
Thus, campaigning is of little worth if the recipients of the campaign see the messages as 
“tainted” by the characteristics of the source of the message. Messages from an 
untrustworthy source will either be interpreted through a negative mental schema or 
simply ignored. The result will be rejection or limited engagement with the substance of 
the message. This, in turn, shrinks the space available for reasoned debate. There is also a 
more severe consequence of negative perceptions than not engaging with campaign 
content. If voters perceive all or most political parties as incompetent, exclusive or 
untrustworthy, they could disengage from the entire process and decide to not vote at all.  
 
On the other hand, voters are more likely to engage with campaign messages if they trust 
the political party issuing the message and see it as competent and inclusive. This, in 
turn, contributes to the quality of political debate because voters can engage more with 
the content of the message, ultimately enhancing the electoral process because robust 












2.4.2 Campaign Messages 
 
The “said what?” part of the model relates to the content of the campaign messages. 
 
Beyond the characteristics of the key actors, any examination of the relationship 
between election campaigns and democratic quality must consider the actual 
information transmitted to voters. The content of the messages delivered by 
political parties is of critical importance for political decision-making processes 
(Pennings, Keman and Kleinnijenhuis, 1999:244) because choices about parties and 
candidates requires information about desired policies and representatives and also 
to assess whether incumbents have delivered on what they promised (Street, 2001). 
Indeed Gunther and Mughan (2000:422) see information as being “the lifeblood of 
democracy”. 
 
Mattes and Bratton (2003:30) indicate that “information about incumbent political 
leaders creates a point of vicarious contact between citizens and the political 
system, as well as a means by which they can better follow the process of decision-
making”. And according to Druckman (2005:517) “there is clear evidence that the 
amount of information one possess shapes attitudes and behaviour, including such 
things as participation, voting behaviour, tolerance and information processing 
strategies”.  
 
However, as noted previously, politicians may present messages not distinct from each 
other isolated, unrepresentative facts and frame issues tendentiously (Kuklinski and 
Quirk 2000:168). What, then, makes for a good campaign message?  
 
There are three types of messages: positive, negative and comparative. In positive 
messages the candidate introduces himself or herself to voters, reminds them of past 
achievements or outlines future plans. Negative messages involve a critique of opposing 
parties and/or candidates. Comparative messages present contrasting information about 
the party and/or candidate and the opposition (Schnur, 1999: 148-149). Schnur argues 











that “although there is nothing wrong with accurate, fair attack, contrast is a form of 
communication that is more helpful to voters” because it relays the relevant information, 
voters prefer it and are more readily mobilized by them. Buchanan (2001:368) indicates 
that “aggressive campaign rhetoric, even when it conveys factual information potentially 
useful to voters, reinforces the well- documented public distaste for candidates, politics, 
parties and government”.   
 
A more contentious issue is the array of information to be provided to voters. On one 
hand, some analysts feel that parties should give voters an expansive assortment of 
information. For example, Wheeler (1997) argues that voters should be provided with the 
broadest range of information, interpretation and debate over public choices. Richardson 
and Beck (2007:198) describe multiple sources of information as “one of the hallmarks 
of democracy” and Gunther and Mughan (2000:421) argue that voters need a 
considerable volume of accurate, policy-relevant information about politics. On the other 
hand Mutz (2004:14) argues that exposure to those with differing political views is more 
likely to lead to ambivalence, delayed voting decisions and lower levels of political 
participation in general, while exposure to like-minded views appears to spur people on 
to political activity. Thus, too many dissenting messages could paralyze voters.  
 
Therefore, while voters need competing information to make choices between parties, 
each party should keep their campaign messages short, simple and direct (Schnur, 
1999:144),  consistent, i.e. not at odds with each other (Weaver, 1996: 204), and 
integrated by means of a carefully-devised campaign theme (Marquette, 1996). 
According to Marquette (1996: 151-153) a theme should rarely change and should fit all 
salient issues into an overarching message and should focus on on unifying rather than 
divisive concerns. According to Marquette, the best themes are often emotive as well as 
urgent and once established must be used to formulate a clear and simple thematic 
statement. This will allow voters to have an adequate sense of what each party is saying. 
 
Taken together, the literature teaches us that campaign messages are effective when 
the party weaves its messages together into a well-blended and internally consistent 
theme congruent with previous campaigns using comparative messages. Moreover, 
voters should be able to distinguish between political parties on the basis of the 











another, they do not provide the basis on which voters can choose a political party 
and then competitiveness of the electoral process is hampered. 
 
2.4.3 Campaign Strategies and Media Coverage 
 
The “through which channel?” component of the model relates to the mechanisms by 
which information is conveyed to voters. Aside from the characteristics of the source and 
the content of the messages, persuasive and compelling campaign messages drafted by 
parties perceived as trustworthy will have little effect if voters cannot hear them. As 
Wheeler (1997) indicates, citizens require universal access to information to pursue their 
rights. Thus, widespread access by voters to media that convey political information is 
vitally important for election campaigns. There are several media or channels through 
which campaign messages can be communicated to voters. This part of the model is 
divided into two components namely the strategies of political parties and the mass 
media’s coverage of the election. 
 
Party communications should be well co-ordinated via the prior development of a 
campaign plan or strategy. A campaign plan is a written blueprint for winning elections 
(Marquette, 1996:159). This plan should define what needs to be done, when it should 
occur, who should be doing it and what resources are needed. It should create order out 
of an otherwise chaotic process filled with scores of details, deadlines and changing 
circumstances (Denton, 1996:19). 
 
Party communications generally include what analysts call “paid media”. Paid media 
encompasses “any form of message dissemination that incurs a direct financial cost to the 
communicating agency” and includes advertising on radio, television, news magazines, 
newspapers and the internet”. The advantage of paid media is that political parties have 
control over it, messages are delivered precisely as intended without interference or 
distortion (Schnur, 1999: 145) and it allows candidates to communicate the superiority of 
his or her attributes over those of opponents (Kaid,1999:423). The disadvantage of paid 
media, according to Schnur, is that voters often do not treat the information provided as 












In addition to paid media, parties can use party volunteers to communicate campaign 
messages. According to Weaver (1996:241), direct voter contact is more effective per 
voter because it allows for two-way communication and humanizes the candidate but is 
less efficient in reaching large numbers of voters.  
 
The mass media also plays a critical role in disseminating campaign messages. To a large 
extent, it is the mass media that integrates the vast array of activities and events, defines 
the important issues and themes of the campaign, differentiates the positions of the 
political parties and assesses the performance of the parties (Kavanagh, 1995:177). The 
media can provide a vital stage for the presentation of party ideologies as well as provide 
the public with the opportunity to scrutinize and gather information on a broad array of 
manifestos (Word, 2004:5). 
 
Media coverage of party activities or messages is classified as “free media” because the 
transmitting agent does not receive direct financial compensation (Schnur, 1999: 146). 
Free media is not necessarily more independent than paid media.
12
 The notion of 
objective “news” coverage of a campaign has been widely challenged. According to 
Johnson-Cartee (2005:146) the news media plays “an increasingly powerful role in the 
process of constructing political reality”. The media can “highlight, underplay or 
diminish particular features of a candidate or a candidate’s position on issues, casting 
these in a positive or negative light” and “these images become powerful symbols that 
identify and/or define a candidate…”(Kotler and Kotler, 1999: 5).  
 
There is also a lack of consensus around the relationship between media “objectivity” 
and democracy. On the one hand Gunther and Mughan (2000:420-428) argue that media 
impartiality, which they consider to be the balanced reporting of competing news with a 
minimum of partisan bias, is an important component of a quality democracy. Others do 
not see an “unbiased” media as being beneficial to democracy or voter participation. 
Lemert (1984) argues that when the press in America moved from promoting partisan 
goals to non-partisan coverage, it discouraged political activity. Similarly, Mutz 
                                               
12 It is widely recognized that there is an ongoing battle over which information should be presented to voters. Graber, 
McQuail and Norris (1998:1) argue that this conflict centers on the substance of news, the stories to be covered, the 
framing of the news and the perspectives into which it should be cast. “News” then is socially constructed (Johnson-
Cartee, 2005:146). It is not a mirror of reality but a selective representation of the world (Schudson, 2003:33). 
O’Shaughnessy and Stadler (2005:59-72) also explore how language structures and demonstrate that language is not 











(2004:11) argues that professional norms of objectivity by journalists who opt for an 
"informational" approach promotes politically bland news that fails to expose people to 
forceful political arguments from any particular party.  
 
Irrespective of this debate, the acceptance or rejection of persuasive messages based on 
an evaluation of the credibility of the source of the message (Hovland, Janis and Kelly, 
1954; Milburn; 1991; Lupia and McCubbins, 2000; Iyengar and Valentino, 2000; Popkin 
and Dimock, 2000) is as applicable to the news media as it is to political parties. The 
news media not only conveys information but is also a political actor in its own right 
(Kavanagh, 1995; Mazzoleni and Schultz, 1999 and Kriesi, 2004). Audiences will have 
tarnished views of messages delivered through media which they regard as biased or 
untrustworthy.  
 
Thus, to contribute to the quality of the democratic system campaign messages should be 




The “to who?” component of the model concerns the recipient of the messages. Mattes 
and Bratton (2003:12) indicate that “democracy works best” when citizens are well 
informed and involved in the political system. Indeed, for campaigns to have any worth, 
they cannot simply fall on “deaf ears”.  
 
2.4.4.1 Cognitive Awareness 
 
Clearly, voters who are more interested in political matters are more likely to take note of 
campaign material. Kuklinski and Quirk (2000) point out that “central processing”, used 
when attention and motivation are high, employs more mental resources and enables 
people to think more systematically, allowing data to shape their inferences. Peripheral 
processing, used when attention and motivation are low, employs fewer resources and 
relies on simple heuristics and stereotypic inferences. Thus, the level of cognitive 
mobilization among voters has important consequences for their receptiveness to political 











impotent, while cognitively mobilized voters are open to persuasion.  
 
2.2.4.2 Partisan Identification 
 
Partisan identification can have important implications for both the assimilation of 
campaign material and voter participation.
13
 Campbell et al (1960:121-122) define party 
identification as “a psychological identification which can persist without formal 
membership and even without a consistent record of party support.” They argue that 
“party identification has a wide range of intensities in each partisan direction and that 
national politics are deeply affected by the individual’s enduring party attachments. 
According to Campbell et al (1960:133) ‘identification with a party raises a perceptual 
screen through which the individual tends to see what is favourable to his partisan 
orientation”. 
 
The earlier literature held a predominantly negative view of non-partisans or 
independents in which they were seen as uninvolved and uninterested in elections 
(Dalton, 2000:31). Dalton (1984) has advanced a more refined view by developing four 
categories of voters namely ritual partisans, cognitive partisans, apartisans and 
apoliticals. Dalton classifies as ritual partisans those who vote habitually for the same 
party due to strong partisan attachments and are less educated and interested in political 
matters while cognitive partisans identify with a party but are cognitively engaged. 
Apartisans are free of affective party ties, well-informed and have the political resources 
to follow the complexities of politics. Apoliticals are not attached to any party but are 
less educated and are uninterested in the political process (Dalton 1996: 213-216).  
 
Partisanship is an important voter characteristic because as Wattenberg (2002:37) argues, 
it provides a highly effective tool by which to organize political information, evaluate 
                                               
13 There has been considerable debate about what partisanship is as well as the merits of its use as an explanatory 
indicator. Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk (1986, 552) argue that “the notion of a perceptual screen is seen as a 
static and limited view of cognitive processes” and that the assumption that people have a need for consistency has 
been challenged. Dalton (2000:20) on the other hand argues that “a strong case can be made that the concept of party 
identification is the most important development in modern electoral behaviour research. Many analysts adapted the 
concept of party identification into a far more cognitive one. For example, for Fiorina (1981) party identification is 
based on an evaluation of political parties past performance and for Popkin (1991) party identification is used as an 
informational shortcut. Roseman, Abelson and Ewing (1986:294) also investigated the relationship between emotions 
and political cognition and found that “political issues have natural emotional structures that people can evaluate in 

















2.2.4.3 Consumption of Political Information 
 
It is relatively well-established that voters obtain information about political parties, 
leaders and the broader political system through the consumption of mass media 
products. The operative word here is consumption.  
 
Voters can choose to ignore information. Having persuasive and compelling campaign 
messages drafted by parties perceived as trustworthy presented in widely accessible 
formats cannot ensure that voters will actually consume or engage with that information. 
Indeed consuming political information has a cost attached to it. As Popkin (1991: 22) 
indicates the process of procuring, analyzing and evaluating information requires the 
investment of time and energy.  
 
While democratic theorists search for signs of voter interest based on an appreciation of 
voting as part of their civic duty, marketing analysts simply assume that voters are 
unlikely to be motivated to consume political information. For example Kotler and Kotler 
(1999:14) assert that “voters rarely get to know their candidates because they lack the 
time or interest to explore their political choices”. Schnur (1999: 143) argues that “the 
most difficult thing for most candidates and campaign workers to remember is how little 
interest most people have in what they are doing”. And according to Marquette 
(1996:146), “it is a serious mistake to assume that voters are paying close attention to 
your election or any election”. Given these assumptions, the onus lies with the party to 
outdo the competition and attract the attention of the voter. 
 
In light of the importance of information about political parties and their leaders (Mattes 
and Bratton, 2003 and Druckman, 2005), the consumption of campaign media by voters 
                                               
14 According to cognitive psychologists, partisan identification consists of rich cognitive categories which contain 
valuable information about performance, competence and reliability and helps voters sort through the confusion 
created by the volumes of campaign messages provided by parties (Marquette, 1996; Popkin, 1991 and Rhan, 1993). 
According to this approach, individuals cope with the complexity of the world by relying on processes of classification 
using informational shortcuts, schemas or cognitive structures in which new people, events or issues are treated as an 
instance of an already familiar category (Fiske, 1986; Kinder, 1986; Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk, 1986; 
Conover and Feldman,1986; Sears, Huddy and Schaffer,1986; Miller,1986; Brody, 1986; Lane,1986; Jervis,1986; 












is clearly a critical component of competitive elections and healthy democracies. 
 
2.2.4.3 Political Efficacy 
 
Once persuasive campaign communications have been consumed, voters who feel 
efficacious about voting are most likely to be mobilized to vote. Internal efficacy refers 
to the citizens’ feelings of personal competence ‘‘to understand and to participate 
effectively in politics’’ (Morrel, 2005:51).  Pateman (1970:45) connected political 
participation and political efficacy when she argued that “the experience of participation 
in some way leaves the individual better psychologically equipped to undertake further 
participation in the future” and indeed empirical studies (Finkel, 1985; Finkel, 1987; 
Rudolph, Gangl and Stevens, 2000, Morrel, 2005 and Pinkleton and Austin, 2004) have 
demonstrated the importance of a sense of internal efficacy for engagement in democratic 
processes. As Morrel (2005:50) asserts, citizens without a sense of internal political 
efficacy will “likely become apathetic about, indifferent to and disengaged from the 
democratic process”.  
 
Thus, recipients’ who are interested in and engage with campaign messages; who 
participate in an overall debate about policy and performance and who reason about the 
information enhance the quality of democracy. Ideally then, recipients’ of a campaign 
should be interested in, consume and engage with campaign messages as well as feel a 
strong sense of internal political efficacy.  
 
2.4.5 Campaign Impact 
 
The “with what effect?” section of my model deals with potential consequences of the 
preceding components of the model. In particular, I focus on the extent to which the 




                                               
15 Of course, there are many other potential campaign effects. Campaigns can increase party identification, kindle an 
interest in political matters, enhance political efficacy and stimulate electoral fluidity which occurs when people vote 













Participation in the political system is seen a key component of a healthy democracy. As 
Dalton (1988:222) indicates, “Democracy should be a celebration of an involved public. 
Democracy requires an active citizenry because it is through discussion, popular interest 
and involvement in politics that societal goals should be defined and carried out in a 
democracy. Without public involvement in the process, democracy lacks both its 
legitimacy and guiding force.” And if, as Popkin (1991:8) argues, “campaigns 
temporarily change the basis of political involvement from citizenship to partisanship; 
and in the process attract interest and votes from people who generally find politics 
uninteresting and remote” then well-run, imaginative campaigns transmitted by 
trustworthy political parties through accessible and credible media should draw voters 
into the electoral system by providing them with an incentive to vote. 
 
Campaigns which motivate large proportions of the electorate to vote enhance the quality 
of democracy. As Diamond and Morlino (2005:xvi) note “democratic quality is high 
when citizens participate in the political process”. 
 
2.4.6 The Election Campaign Assessment Model 
 
Putting all the previously discussed steps together, I generate the following ideal model 
which demonstrates how an election campaign can contribute to the quality of 
democracy. For election campaigns to enhance the quality of democracy: 
 
Political parties perceived as competent, trustworthy and inclusive by the voting 
public must transmit a high volume of comparative policy-relevant campaign 
messages through a widely accessible and credible range of media to an 
interested and efficacious electorate, providing them with an incentive to go to 








































A broad range 






































To restate, the central and over-arching research question to be addressed in this thesis is 
the extent to which South Africa’s 2004 election campaign contributed to the quality of 
democracy provided voters with an incentive to vote.
16
 I thus attempt to answer a chain 
of research questions that test different parts of an integrated analytical model. This chain 
of research questions involved assessing the images South African voters had of political 
parties, the content of the choices on offer, the accessibility and credibility of the 
mechanisms through which this information was communicated, the levels of interest and 
efficacy among voters as well as the extent to which the campaigns provided voters with 




As Babbie and Mouton (2001:388-389) indicate, researchers often face a choice between 
depth and specificity of understanding and they conclude that “the best solution to this 
dilemma is to use both methods”. To capture both specificity and depth, I used both 
qualitative and quantitative data-analysis techniques. Thus, this thesis rests on a 
remarkable amount of “methodological pluralism”, which characterizes much of the 
research on political persuasion (Swanson and Mancini, 1996:3).  
                                               
16 While I recognize that campaigning occurs during the entire period between elections, in this study I will limit my 
focus to the period between the announcement of the election date and the Election Day. 
 
17 Social constructivists, for example Louw (2005:4), would argue that attempting such an assessment is naïve because 
“all observation of the world is subjectively guided” and that “people using different paradigms are effectively living in 
different worlds”. According to Johnson-Cartee (2005:2) social constructivists argue that by naming, labeling and 













3.2 The Election Campaign Assessment Model Applied to the 
2004 South African Election Campaign 
 
3.2.1 Perceptions of Political Parties and Leaders 
 
I start this section by briefly sketching the history of the ANC, DA, IFP, UDM, ID and 
NNP. I then look at perceptions of the leaders of these parties. Using post-election focus 
group discussions as well as a series of surveys conducted in South Africa between 1994 
and 2004, I look at perceptions of these parties. Given that I have argued that 
competence, inclusiveness and trustworthiness are critical components of how parties are 
viewed, the primary consideration in examining “the who” i.e. political parties will be 
citizens’ perceptions of party competence, inclusiveness and trustworthiness.   
 
3.2.2 Choices Offered to Voters in the 2004 Election 
 
 
This section focuses on the content of the campaign messages delivered by political 
parties to South African voters in the 2004 general elections. I use a content analysis 
data-set of media statements compiled by Media Tenor to examine the messages 
communicated and which political parties communicated them. Overall I assess whether 
parties articulated their messages in a way that could enable voters to distinguish between 
competing parties. To extract the key campaign themes and campaign messages of the 
above-mentioned parties I examine party-issued campaign material.
18
 There was a vast 
amount of campaign material (some of which differed by geographical region). To be 
even-handed, I examined each party’s campaign manifesto; prominent slogans and 
posters as well as the content of their websites, specifically published press releases; 
speeches and newsletters.
19
 I also supplemented this analysis by drawing on the work of 
other analysts who also reviewed campaign material to obtain a more comprehensive 
                                               
18 Parties, to differing degrees, tailored their messages to different audiences in different areas; however, all parties 
delivered key central messages at a national level. 
 
19 Brochures and paid advertisements were specifically excluded because I had no way of developing a systematic 












picture of each campaign.
20
  For each party I outline the main thrust of the campaign (i.e. 
its theme) and evaluate their messages using the following questions:  
 
1. What was the nature of the messages i.e. was it primarily positive, negative or 
comparative? 
2. Did the party weave the messages together into a well-blended and internally 
consistent theme? 
3. Was the overall theme congruent with previous campaigns? 
 
3.2.3 Campaign Strategies in the 2004 Election 
 
Next I consider campaign strategies of the political parties. In this section, I describe the 
campaign strategies (in particular the paid components of these strategies) used by the 
ANC, DA, IFP, UDM, ID and NNP to convey its messages to voters. To gain insight into 
the campaign strategies of parties, I use data which details spending on campaign 
advertising compiled by Nielsen Media Research. I also carry out secondary analysis of 
interviews conducted with the media officers of political parties by the Media Monitoring 
Project and CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis. Finally I consider survey data on the extent 
of reported contact between voters and political parties during the campaign period.  
 
3.2.4 Media Coverage of the Campaign  
 
In this section I turn to the media’s coverage of the campaign. I start by giving an 
overview of South African media and media use patterns during 2004. I then ask how 
extensive the mass media’s coverage of the campaign was, which media gave the 
coverage, what messages were communicated, whether the media was biased in its 
coverage and what the extent of policy-related coverage was. I also ask whether this 
coverage was provided via media that are easily accessible and regarded as unbiased by 
voters.  
 
                                               
20 These analysts may have referred to campaign material, such as brochures and paid advertisements, which I have not 











To examine the media’s coverage of the campaign I again analyze the Media Tenor 
content analysis data-set. I also utilize the Media Monitoring Project’s (MMP) content 
analysis data. To further evaluate the information communicated by the media about 
political parties, I did a close reading of reports available on Independent Online (IOL), 
news24, Business Day and the Mail and Guardian. This was done to complement Media 
Tenor’s comprehensive content analysis data which answered questions about the extent 
of policy-related coverage and media bias. I also analyze political party and voter 
perceptions of media bias.  
 
3.2.5 Profile of the Electorate  
 
 
This section examines the characteristics of voters in the 2004 election.
21
 I ask whether 
voters felt competent to play an active role in politics, whether they were interested in 
following the campaigns and paid attention to the campaign messages. I look at patterns 
of partisanship and ask whether voters in 2004 were open to persuasion by political 
campaigns and campaign stimuli. I also look at the education profile of voters as well as 
the frequency with which they reported paying attention to campaign news.  
 
3.2.6 Impact of the Campaign  
 
Firstly, to answer the question of whether the campaign provided voters with an incentive 
to cast their ballot, I re isit the findings of each component of my analytical model. I 
then look at trends in participation and at the insights provided by the focus group 
discussions.  
                                               
21 Given that the Comparative National Election Project and Afrobarometer surveys were both done after the elections 
had taken place I will also present longitudinal data which demonstrate that perceptions of political parties and leaders 













3.3 Data  
 
3.3.1 Survey Data 
 
I used a series of surveys conducted in South Africa between 1994 and 2004. The survey 
data includes the following nationally representative studies: the Institute for Democracy 
in South Africa’s (Idasa) 1994 post-election study; study, Opinion ’99; Afrobarometer 
South Africa rounds 2000, 2002 and 2004; the 2004 Comparative National Elections 
Project (CNEP) and SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004.  
 
Interviews for these surveys were conducted in the language preferred by the respondent. 
Questionnaires were translated into languages relevant for the surveys and interviewers 
were proficient in all languages of the areas in which they conducted their fieldwork. The 
samples for these surveys were designed as representative cross-sections of all citizens of 
voting age in South Africa, namely, all South African citizens 18 years and older.  
 
The goal of the samples was to give every adult citizen an equal and known chance of 
selection for interview. Samples were selected in four stages: the primary sampling units 
(PSUs), starting points, households, and individual respondents. Primary sampling units 
were randomly selected with probability proportionate to population size and were 
disproportionately stratified by province, population group and community size (metro, 
city, large town, small town, village and rural). In some cases a gender quota was used at 
the stage of individual selection. Due to the disproportionate sampling, it was necessary 
to weight the data-sets up to the universe, i.e. the South African voting public. The 
samples were weighted according to province, type of area and race and then projected 
onto the universe i.e. the electorate at the time.  
 
Thus, each sample is representative of the wider South African population at the time that 
the surveys were conducted. Sturgis (2003:15) points out “if a sample is collected 
properly, it is possible to make valid and reliable generalisations to the broader 












3.3.1.1 Idasa Post-Election Study (1994) 
 
This survey was conducted after the 1994 general election and examined issues such as 
voting intention, attitudes towards democracy and economic evaluations. Fieldwork was 
conducted between 26 August and 16 September 1994 by Market and Opinion Surveys 
(Pty) Ltd. Face-to face interviews were conducted with   2517 respondents.  
 
3.3.1.2 Opinion 99 (1998 and 1999) 
 
This series of surveys were undertaken by a consortium consisting of the SABC, Idasa, 
Markinor (Pty) Ltd and the Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA). They examined 
South Africans’ views of the political, social and economic developments since 1994 as 
well as key issues related to the conduct of free and fair elections, voter participation, and 
other economic, political and partisan trends.  
 
1. 1998: 2200 face-to-face interviews were conducted by Markinor (Pty) Ltd from 1 
to 30 September 1998; 
2. 1999: 3384 face-to-face interviews were conducted by Markinor (Pty) Ltd from 6 
April to 30 April 
 
3.3.1.3 Afrobarometer (2000 and 2004) 
 
The Afrobarometer surveys form part of a larger comparative series of public attitude 
surveys in countries across Africa. The surveys measure public attitudes to democracy, 
governance and economic performance, perceptions of the consequences of democratic 
governance on people’s everyday lives and a range of actual and potential economic and 
political behaviours. In each round 2400 face-to-face interviews were conducted.  
 
1. 2000: Fieldwork was conducted from 6 July until 6 August 2000 by Research 
Surveys. 













3.3.1.4 Comparative National Elections Project (2004) 
 
The South African CNEP survey was also part of a larger international project. The 2004 
survey examined public attitudes to political parties and elected representatives as well as 
the impact of media bias on electoral behaviour. A range of complementary questions 
measured the frequency with which respondents were exposed to political information 
through television, radio, newspapers and magazines during the campaign period as well as 
perceptions of partisan bias by each specific medium. Fieldwork was conducted between 7 
October and 27 November 2004 by AC Nielsen. Face-to-face interviews were conducted 
with 12 00 respondents. 
 
3.3.1.5 SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004 (2004) 
Fieldwork for the SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004 survey was undertaken from 29 January 
to 20 February 2004 and personal in-home interviews were conducted with 3500 
randomly chosen respondents.  
3.3.2 Content Analysis Data 
 
The CNEP project also included a content analysis data-set consisting of transcripts of 
radio and television news, as well as newspaper clippings collected during the months 
preceding the elections (9 February – 14 April). This comprehensive content analysis 
data-set was compiled by Media Tenor, a research institute which specializes in the 
analysis of media content. The data-set consists of 57953 individual campaign-related 
print, television and radio media statements across all languages. The content analysis 
data-set allowed for a systematic account of the issues which were raised, who raised 
them, which media focused on which parties and candidates, and whether it was done in 
a neutral way. For more details on this data, please see appendix 7. Where applicable, I 
supplemented this analysis with material from the Media Monitoring Project (MMP) 
which also conducted content analysis. For more details on the Media Monitoring Project 












3.3.3 South African Advertising Research Foundation Data 
 
I used data on media use from the South African Advertising Research Foundation to 
provide an overview of media use in South Africa. SAARF specializes in media audience 
and product consumption measures. I used SAARF AMPS, the SAARF All Media and 
Products Survey; SAARF RAMS, the SAARF Radio Audience Measurement Survey and 
SAARF TAMS, the SAARF Television Audience Measurement Survey. The television 
monitoring technology of SAARF provides television viewing information, minute by 
minute, using so-called ‘peoplemeters’ an electronic device that is connected to a 
households’ television to record television viewing time automatically (SAARF, 2004d). 
For more details on this data, please see appendix 10. 
 
3.3.4 Nielsen Advertising Expenditure Data22 
 
I used advertising expenditure data from Nielsen Media Research to gain insight into the 
campaign strategies of political parties. Nielsen Media Research is a division of the 
Nielsen Company which specializes in media research and analysis. The AdEx division 
of Nielsen Media Research provides industry standard data on advertising expenditure 
across all main stream advertising media. These figures capture gross expenditure by 
political parties, and excluded discounts negotiated between political parties and media 
owners. The data includes the amounts spent by parties on radio, print, direct mail and 
outdoor advertising (Nielsen Media Research, 2004). For more details on this data, please 
see appendix 11. 
                                               
22 These figures were made available to me by the Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU) which purchased them 












3.3.5 Media Reports 
 
I made use of 147 electronic articles published on Independent Online (IOL), News24, 
Business Day and the Mail and Guardian between the 9
th
 of February and 13
th
 of April. 
IOL and News24 are South Africa’s largest news websites. News24 is operated by 
24.com and includes articles from Beeld, Daily Sun, Die Burger, Son, Witness, 
Volksblad, City Press, Rapport, Sondag, Sunday Sun, and Media24 community 
newspapers. IOL consists of a compilation of articles printed in Independent News & 
Media’s national and regional newspapers and includes articles from The Cape Argus, 
The Cape Times, Daily News, Isolezwe, Post, Pretoria News, Sunday Independent, 
Sunday Tribune, The Independent on Saturday, The Mecury, The Star, Saturday Star, 
Saturday Argus and Sunday Argus. Business Day is a daily publication and The Mail and 
Guardian is published weekly.  
 
3.3.6 Qualitative Interviews with Media Officers in Political Parties 
 
I used qualitative interviews conducted by the Media Monitoring Project and CNEP 
researcher, Gavin Davis, with media officers in parties to gain the perspective of parties 
on the campaign process. 
 
3.3.7 Campaign Material 
 
In South Africa political parties develop a campaign manifesto for each election. I 
examined campaign manifestos, posters, speeches as well as internet sites to extract their 
campaign themes and key campaign messages.
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3.3.8 Focus Group Discussion Data 
 
The focus groups were used to complement the survey data i.e. to gain a deeper 
perspective into the views of voters. Recruitment for the focus groups was facilitated by 
the research company Citizen Surveys. I used the principles set by Krueger (1998) to 
guide the structure of my discussion guides (see appendix 4 for the discussion guide).  
 
The groups consisted of different types of voters who expressed some level of interest in 
the campaigns and were used to gain insight and understanding into the underlying 
reasons for non-participation; the reasons parties were unable to convince people to vote 





1. Voted ANC across all elections  
2. Voted IFP across all elections  
3. Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999 but did not vote in 2004 
4. Voted for an opposition party in 1994 and 1999 but did not vote in 2004 
5. Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999 but changed to UDM in 2004 
6. Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999 but changed to DA in 2004 
 
All groups were presented with a campaign picture of the parties that they had not voted 
for (non-voters were provided with pictures of all six parties considered in this study). 
They were then asked why each particular party was unable to convince them to vote for 
that party. The focus group data yielded detailed and nuanced information and added a 
considerable amount of depth to my analysis.  Please see appendix 6 for the transcripts of 
the six focus groups.  
                                               














Elections and election campaigns are extra-ordinary multi-faceted events which take 
place in complex political environments and a research project which attempts to capture 
the vibrancy and texture of such an event inherently means that much of the richness of 
what actually occurred will be lost during the representation of the event.  Mancini and 
Swanson (1996:3) correctly point out that election campaigns are complicated to study 
because they “reflect a single coming together of history, opportunity, circumstance, 
tradition, personality, political culture and other things”. 
 
One of the vexing questions in planning a project such as this is deciding whether to 
concentrate on one or two parties and going into a significant amount of detail or 
choosing several parties and going into less detail. In this study I decided to focus on the 
parties who took the top six places at national level. While focusing on a single party 
would have allowed me to go into considerable depth, I would have lost the overall 
picture which an examination of several parties provides. Furthermore, by focusing on 
several parties, I could give a more holistic view of campaigning in South Africa.  
 
A particular limitation within the quantitative component of the study is that the concepts 
are constrained by the comparative nature of the study. In order to ensure comparability, 
the wording of questions must conform to that which occurs within the larger study. 
 
A further limitation is the fact that my examination of campaign material was, of 
necessity, conducted in English. While parties generally followed a national strategy, 
South Africa has eleven official languages and some messages were communicated in 
these languages. The Media Tenor clippings included all languages but were coded using 
an English code-frame. Furthermore, all the campaign material and media articles which 
I analyzed were English. Language groupings in South Africa often parallels different 
locations and target groups, for example, Zulu-speakers living primarily in Kwa-Zulu 
Natal and this may have resulted in messages in Zulu being tailored to deal with the 
concerns of voters in KwaZulu-Natal. Therefore, there may have been nuances between 












Despite the above-mentioned limitations, a systematic empirical examination of the 
campaigning in South Africa is an important task to undertake because of its critically 













CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL PARTIES IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
As previously indicated, perceptions of the characteristics political parties and party 
leaders are critically important. In the absence of relevant information, these perceptions 
are used as informational shortcuts to make far-reaching political decisions. Furthermore, 
as the source of campaign messages, they assist voters to make judgments about the 
authenticity and persuasiveness of those messages. Campaign messages delivered via 
political parties and leaders perceived as competent, trustworthy and concerned about the 
needs of all groups will be received in a more positive way, allowing voters to engage 
more with the content of the message. This, in turn, contributes to the quality of 
democracy.   
 
In this chapter, I present a short profile of the ANC, DA, IFP, UDM, ID and NNP and 
then assess the extent to which they were viewed as competent, inclusive and trustworthy 
by South African voters in 2004. These parties hold 380 of the 400 or 95 percent of the 
seats in South Africa’s National Assembly. I also present survey ratings of the leaders of 
these parties as well as comments made about them by the focus group participants.  
 
4.2 Party Fortunes  
 
The ANC won all three national democratic elections by overwhelming majorities. The 
ANC’s proportion of the vote, taken as a proportion of total votes cast, increased from 62 
percent in 1994 to 66 percent in 1999 to 70 percent in 2004. The DA steadily improved 
in its performance in the three national democratic elections. The DA’s proportion of the 
vote increased from 2 percent in 1994 to 10 percent in 1999 to 12 percent in 2004. This 
consistent improvement resulted in it becoming the second largest party and the “official 
opposition” to the ruling party. The IFP emerged as the second largest opposition party in 
all three elections. However, the IFP has seen a steady decline in its performance in the 











percent in 1994 to 9 percent in 1999 down to 7 percent in 2004. Furthermore, in 2004 the 
IFP lost power to the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal. The UDM increased its position to fourth 
in the National Assembly but was unable to improve on its initial performance of 3 
percent in 1999, obtaining 2 percent in 2004. The ID competed for the first time in the 
2004 elections and received 2 percent of the votes. The party that saw the most dramatic 
decline in its performance in the three national democratic elections was the NNP. The 
NNP’s proportion of the vote decreased from 21 percent in 1994 to 7 percent in 1999 to a 
mere 2 percent in 2004 and subsequently disbanded (Piombo, 2005:251-279). 
 
4.3 Historical Overview  
 
4.3.1 The ANC 
 
The ANC has been South Africa’s ruling party since 1994. Initially named the South 
African Native National Congress, the ANC was founded in 1912 (Lodge and 
Scheidegger, 2005: 10) and was the key agent of South Africa’s political transition 
working in the second half of twentieth century as an exile movement to liberate South 
Africans from apartheid rule (Butler,2007: 35). For the ANC, the task of transforming 
itself from a liberation movement into a political party with a coherent organisational 
structure was a particular challenge (Dubow, 2000:12).   
 
The ANC perceives itself as a liberation movement with a historical mission to “unite all 
the people of South Africa, Africans in particular, for the complete liberation of the 
country from all forms of discrimination and national oppression” (Deegan, 1999b:40). 
The ANC is often characterized as a “broad church” accommodating diverse views and 
interests seeking inclusivity through alliances such as the Tripartite Alliance between 
ANC, Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and presenting itself as a “strongly multi-racial and multi-
ethnic party” (Lijphart, 1998:148). The ANC succeeded in accumulating enormous 
reserves of symbolic capital because of its longevity as a resistance movement, its 
position of inclusivity, moderation and its accommodation of a range of social groups 












4.3.2 The DA 
 
According to Lodge and Scheidegger (2005:12), the historic roots of the DA can be 
traced to the defection in 1959 of 12 United Party Members of Parliament, who 
supported common role African enfranchisement, to form the Progressive Party (PP).  
Only Helen Suzman survived the 1961 election, however, the party’s ranks were 
augmented in 1975 and 1976 by floor crossing from the United Party. The party, 
renamed the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) in 1977, and later the Democratic Party 
(DP) in 1987 advocated federalism, power-sharing and proportional representation 
during the 1980s (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2005:12). The Democratic Party and New 
National Party announced in June 2000 that they would join together as the Democratic 
Alliance with the aim of building a political movement that would effectively challenge 
the ANC for political power. However, the merger was never institutionalized and by 
November 2001 the alliance had sprung apart primarily due to former NNP office-
holders dissatisfaction with the leadership of Tony Leon (Lodge, 2002:157). Kotze 
(2001:123) indicates that the DP and NNP had no shared historical roots and very little 
ideological common ground. The name Democratic Alliance was retained by the DP.  
 
4.3.3 The IFP 
 
The Inkatha Freedom Party, previously the the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation 
Movement, was formed by Chief Mangosotho Buthelezi in 1975. By July 1990, the 
movement had transformed itself into a political party. However, by the time of the 1994 
election, Chief Buthelezi’s aspirations for national leadership had been shattered by 
extensive media exposure of the IFP’s extensive and intimate collaboration with 
apartheid security forces (Southall, 1998: 460). As the 1994 election drew nearer, the IFP 
turned increasingly to Zulu nationalism, endorsing the Zulu king’s call for a sovereign 
Zulu state (Piper, 2005:151). After 1994, requests for a special status for KwaZulu/Natal 
were viewed as antagonistic to the renewed constitution-making process and withdrawal 
from the Constitutional Assembly served only to isolate the IFP (Southall, 1998:461). 
 
After 1994 the IFP was the leading party in KwaZulu-Natal. It joined the ANC at the 











government. Despite continued ANC/IFP rivalry, the ANC focused on constructively 
engaging and including the IFP in government and embraced a more strategic 
constructive orientation resulting in a period of pragmatic engagement from 1996 to 
2002. In 2004 the ANC managed to elect ‘Sbu Ndebele as provincial premier by 
obtaining the support of the United Democratic Movement, the African Christian 
Democratic Party and the Minority Front. At a national level, Thabo Mbeki offered two 
deputy positions to the IFP but awarded the positions to others after being frustrated with 
waiting for the IFP’s response (Piper, 2005:150-162).  
 
According to Piper (2005:148-149), the IFP’s strategic movement toward inclusive 
liberal-democratic politics was incomplete because of its nature as an organization as 
well as the fact that most South Africans think of the IFP as a party for traditional Zulus. 
Piper therefore argues that “the IFP’s post-apartheid politics has not so much transformed 
from militant Zulu nationalism to an inclusive conservative-liberalism as it has become 
trapped between the two”. 
 
4.3.4 The UDM 
 
The United Democratic Movement was established in 1997 by General Bantu Holomisa 
and Roelf Meyer.  
 
General Holomisa was part of the Transkein Bantustan government and built up contacts 
with the ANC leadership when it was unbanned in 1990. In May 1994, General Holomisa 
was appointed as the Deputy Minister of Tourism and Environment and in 1996 he was 
expelled from the party because of his testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and for his public criticism of the ANC. General Holomisa then formed the 
National Consultative Forum (Koeble, 1998: 156-157).  
 
Roelf Meyer was a member of the National Party but gained a reputation as a reformer 
due to his central role in developing the interim constitution and the negotiation process 
that brokered the demise of apartheid. Meyer had internally advocated the dissolution of 
the National Party and the formation of a coalition movement made up of all opposition 











resignation. He subsequently formed the New Process Movement (Ndletyana, 1999:183). 
 
The United Democratic Movement was established in September 1997 out of a merger of 
the New Process Movement and National Consultative Forum. However, in 2000, Roelf 
Meyer came to the conclusion that the UDM was not a credible opposition party and left 
the party (Ndletyana, 1999:183).  
 
4.3.5 The ID 
 
The Independent Democrats (ID) was formed about a year before the 2004 election in 
March 2003 by Patricia De Lille.  
 
Patricia De Lille is a former trade unionist and was a long-time member of and MP for 
the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) (www.southafrica.info, 2006). In 1989, she was 
elected into the National Executive Committee of the Pan Africanist Movement, a wing 
of the PAC. When the PAC and other political organisations were unbanned in 1990, she 
was appointed as foreign secretary and relief and aid secretary of the party. During the 
negotiations, Ms De Lille led the PAC delegation and after the first democratic elections, 
she was appointed as a member of parliament. Between 1994 and 1999, she was the 
chairperson of the Transport committee and the chief whip for the PAC in parliament. 
She also served in various portfolio committees including Health, Mineral and Energies, 
Trade and Industry, Communication and the Rules Committee (www.sahistory.org.za, 
2006). Ms De Lille then left the Pan African Congress to form the Independent 
Democrats.  
 
4.3.6 The NNP 
 
The National Party (NP) dominated South African government without interruption from 
1948 to 1994.  The New National Party thus “has an uneasy past as the architect of the 
apartheid system” (Deegan, 1999:58). The National Party was established in 1914 by J.B. 
Hertzog and was involved in a series of splits and mergers that date back to pre-world 











(Eaton; 1999:11). In the 1960’s and 1970’s, the National Party’s image was that of a 
monolith prepared to sacrifice the rule of law and international respectability in its 
attempts to crush the forces of African nationalism (Southall and Daniel, 2005: 47).  
 
When P.W. Botha came to power in 1983, the National Party began a process of limited 
change in South Africa. In September 1989, F.W. De Klerk succeeded P.W. Botha as the 
President of South Africa and at the opening of parliament on the 2
nd
 of February 1990 
introduced sweeping reforms when he announced the unbanning of the ANC, the PAC, 
the SACP and the imminent release of hundreds of political prisoners (Dubow, 2000:100-
101). The NP engaged in a process of continuous and difficult negotiations with 
significant disagreement within the party about the extent of compromise with the ANC 
(Sisk: 1995). In March 1992, De Klerk held a white referendum to approve constitutional 
change and received overwhelming support for change. Its participation in the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) symbolized its commitment to national 
reconciliation. However, once the new constitution had been promulgated, tensions 
within the party became apparent (Southall, 1998: 462).  
 
In September 1997, F.W. DeKlerk resigned and was replaced by Marthinus Van 
Schalkwyk (Southall, 1998: 462). The National Party changed its name to the New 
National Party in 1998 (Kotze, 2001:119). The party faced a series of crises and in June 
2000, the NNP joined with the DP, to form the DA. The DP’s Tony Leon became the 
national leader and NNP’s Marthinus Van Schalkwyk became the deputy leader.  The 
objectives of the DA were to present a challenge to the ANC’s electoral dominance and 
to strengthen opposition politics. As the stronger party in the alliance, the DP set the 
terms of the merger, which led to a struggle for control between the leaders. These 
tensions were exacerbated by differing values and philosophies and the fact that they 
operated as separate parties at provincial and national level. In October 2001, the NNP 
exited the DA. The merger and subsequent split with the DP had stretched its resources 
and the DA had effectively absorbed the NNP’s grassroots structures. Shortly after its 
withdrawal from the DA, the NNP decided to enter into a cooperative agreement with the 













4.4 Perceptions of Party Leaders  
 
As previously indicated, voters often look to characteristics of party leaders to help them 
make important political decisions. Positive or negative character traits are inferred to the 
party which these leaders represent. In South Africa, party leaders play a pivotal role in 
the life of a party. Perceptions of parties are integrally linked to perceptions of the party 
leader. As a result of this, campaigns often revolve entirely around the national party 
leader. Given the inter-relatedness of perceptions of parties and party leaders, it is useful 
to assess what the prevalent view of party leaders was in 2004.  
 
How then were party leaders perceived in 2004? Looking firstly at the approval ratings of 
President Thabo Mbeki, leader of the ANC; Tony Leon, leader of the DA; Chief 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the IFP; General Bantu Holomisa, leader of the UDM; 
Patricia De Lille, leader of the ID and Marthinus Van Schalkwyk, leader of the NNP, it is 
evident that South African voters had negative perceptions of all opposition party leaders. 
 
By 2004, President Mbeki remained the most popular party leader, receiving the best 
average rating. President Mbeki was the only politician who was rated higher than 6 on a 
scale of 0 to 10 with a rating of 6.7. All the other leaders scored continually low scores 
and thus South African’s feelings towards these leaders can be described as being more 
negative than positive. Of the leaders rated in table 1 below, Marthinus van Schalkwyk 
was the least liked political leader with a low rating of 2.8. Chief Buthelezi’s rating of 3.6 
and General Holomisa’s ratings of 3.3 are actually an improvement of their consistently 
low ratings. Patricia De Lille received higher ratings than other opposition leaders. 
However, although Patricia DeLille ranked second, her rating was actually negative at 







































Mbeki 6.2 6.2 6.2 5.5 5.6 6.0 5.9 6.3 6.5 6.7 
 
6.7 6.9 6.7 

















3.1 3.1 3.6 






3.6 3.4 3.2 3.3 
De Lille NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 3.7 
Van 
Schalkwyk 
NA NA 4.7 3.8 -- 3.0 3.1 2.8 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 
Sources: Markinor and Opinion 99. 
And now, using a scale (where 0 means you strongly dislike and 10 means you strongly like), I’d like 
to ask you how much you like or dislike some political leaders.  Again, if I come to a leader you 
haven’t heard of or you feel you do not know enough about, just say so. 
**How would you rate XXXXXX on a scale from 10 to 0, where 10 means you are totally in favour of 
him/her and 0  means you are totally against of him/her? 
 
 
Markinor in their 2004 survey also included an item which measured the extent to which 
voters could trust these politicians to be a leader of a political party. With regard to trust, 
the patterns were fairly similar to the general ratings. President Mbeki was the most 
trusted as the leader of a political party, with a rating of 6.7. Marthinus van Schalkwyk 
was the least trusted with a rating of 2.7 followed by General Holomisa with a rating of 
3.1. Both Chief Buthelezi (3.4) and Tony Leon (3.4) scored slightly higher than Patricia 
De Lille who scored 3.4 on this dimension. 
 
Table 2: Politicians Trusted To Be A Leader of A Political Party 
  Average 
Thabo Mbeki 6.69 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi 3.42 
Tony Leon 3.41 
Patricia De Lille 3.36 
Bantu Holomisa 3.13 
Marthinus van Schalkwyk 2.71 
Source: Markinor, 2004. 
Question: To what extent do you trust XXXXXX to a leader of a political party on a scale from 10 to 
0, where 10 means you are trust him/her totally and 0 means you do not trust him/her at all? 
 
I now turn to the comments made by focus group participants about these leaders. It 
should be noted that these comments were unprompted. No comments were made about 
President Mbeki. Positive comments about Chief Buthelezi and General Holomisa came 
only from those participants that had voted for the IFP and UDM respectively. Some 











2004, had positive views of the ID and Patricia De Lille. Participants were very vocal in 
giving negative comments about Tony Leon, Chief Buthelezi, General Holimisa and 
Patricia De Lille. 
  
Participants who had positive comments about Patricia De Lille mentioned the fact that 
she had exposed fraud in the government’s controversial armaments contract, commonly 
referred to as “the arms deal”. One said that he would “give her a fair chance” in future 
elections. Participants who voted for the ANC in all three elections also had some 
positive comments about her, citing the fact that she had “an impeccable history” and is a 
strong woman. They also expressed concerns about other leaders in her party. The 
participant who made the comment about her impeccable history also said that she 
showed signs of opportunism. Some comments related to aspects of her personality – 
saying for example, that she is “direct”; that she “stands up for what she believes in” and 
that she is “a strong person”. One felt that she could bring about change for women and 
children.  
 
Focus Group Comment Box 1: Positive Perceptions of Patricia De Lille 
I think, look, she is a personality, and she exposed a lot of fraud, like you said.  [Voted Opposition in 
1994 and 1999,  but did not vote in 2004] 
 
I do like her, I like what she stands for, she is very direct.  The reason why she did not get my vote is 
because it is a new party, and casting my vote for a new party is a bit tacky.  But I do like her, I think she is 
wonderful, she is great, and I do think she can make a change, giving her the opportunity she can make a 
change, especially for the women and children [Voted Opposition in 1994 and 1999, but did not vote in 
2004] 
 
I just think people like Patricia De Lille; I have got to give her a fair chance.  And through a vote of mine, 
it is going to put her into a seat of power, and for the next elections I definitely will educate myself more 
onto the different parties, their stances, what they offer, what they believe in, the core, the core of our 
country.  So I have really got to educate myself more and not just vote this one or this one because they are 
the bigger party [Voted Opposition in 1994 and 1999, but did not vote in 2004]. 
 
When I look at the leader of the ID, Patricia De Lille, yes she is a strong woman and a very promising 
person but looking at the leadership in her party, its worrying. She can die tomorrow as an individual. I’m 
wishing the Lord might give her many many years.  She might make ordinary citizens view the country in 
another way…she’s a strong woman [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004]. 
 
If you take Patricia, she can come far.  She stands up for what she believes in.  This whole armament deal 
that is going on in Durban she is the one that started it.  She wanted to know what is happening to the 












Positive comments about General Holomisa related to the fact that he was frank in his 
dealings; was approachable and had a good track record in the Transkei. 
 
Focus Group Comment Box 2: Positive Comments About General Holomisa 
…there was that time that General Holomisa took over from Matanzima, everybody in Transkei was very 
happy, and there was a time when peoples could get, when they were underpaid they could get a lot of 
bonus, and it was through funding that Transkei was prospering at that time. So now I decided in 2004, no, 
what Holomisa was doing in the former Transkei, in that little Transkei he does have the capability to do 
such thing in this big South Africa, if he can be given a chance. That is why my X goes straight to next to 
Holomisa [Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999, Voted UDM in 2004]. 
 
In 1994, I was working in Transkei, and then that time then Bantu General Holomisa was the leader of that 
country, and we were very free[Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999, Voted UDM in 2004]. 
 
The reason why I voted for UDM, I saw many things were not going, Holomisa used be someone who 
speak frank and freely, and he was discovered during his time in Umtata, a welcome was freely and now I 
say, and now I decided to vote for UDM, the General, he is frank [Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999, Voted 
UDM in 2004]. 
 
he was a ruler in the former Transkei, and that is why I’m saying that he must be given a chance and he can 
be seen, and judging from the things that he did in the past[Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999, Voted UDM in 
2004]. 
 
I never saw him with body guards, he was not as if he was a big person, he was just alone, one man, now 
you can see these people have a lot of body guards[Voted ANC in 1994 and 1999, Voted UDM in 2004]. 
 
Positive comments made about Chief Buthelezi were that he is consistent in his 
approach; did not make promises that he could not keep and encouraged people to be 
self-sufficient. 
 
Focus Group Comment Box 3: Positive Comments About Chief Buthelezi 
I voted the IFP because its leader speaks one language; he does not speak this today and tomorrow 
changes. He stands for the truth. What he said in the past years, is what he is saying today, he does not go 
off the line. I love IFP because it has humanity (Ubuntu), it respects. I go to church on Sundays and I am 
respected, but when there is a rally for IFP, I do not go to church if that rally is on Sunday; I go to attend 
the rally. We are taught of respect at all times. IFP is able to look after its people and the nation. When he 
speaks, at all times he likes people to be happy and live a good life [Voted IFP in 1994, 1999 and 2004]. 
 
On my side, Baba Shenge is the only person I see, he has a good record for governing people.  He speaks 
one language, he promises a better life to all people [Voted IFP in 1994, 1999 and 2004]. 
 
When Shenge speaks, Baba Shenge has spoken, even if he is in other places he makes no promises, IFP has 
nothing, it makes no promises but he encourages people to make things for themselves [Voted IFP in 
1994, 1999 and 2004]. 
 
I now turn to the negative comments. Several participants had negative views of the ID 
and Patricia De Lille. These negative views were primarily linked to her relations within 
the PAC and the fact that she had left the PAC. One participant felt that she was 












Focus Group Comment Box 4: Negative Perceptions of Patricia De Lille 
She belonged to a very radical party.  The PAC.  Now if you belong to a radical party and you are a radical 
person, then my belief is you stick to your radical views.  You don’t try to use the housewives of Mitchell’s 
Plain to forward a party that forms after that, because that, I believe, is only for personal gain.  She formed 
this party for personal gain.  Because if you are really a radical and your heart is really in being a radical 
and being a member of the PAC, not even being a member of the ANC, and then you move over and try to 
woo the housewives of Mitchell’s Plain, which are the underprivileged people and the people of Guguletu 
and Bonteheuwel and all that to vote for your party because you are going to be the fairy godmother.  That 
is my opinion about that [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and DA in 2004]. 
 
The only thing is she is really opportunistic, because, firstly she was in the PAC, she was speaking a lot 
and then she just, and then she go to the top structures of the PAC, then she decided, and then she just 
decided to cross the floor, and then you could see, that the only thing that she want is to gain from the 
politics, financially. And the second problem then they criticise a lot, and she criticise and provides no 
solution to the problems. She cannot express what must be done, or say what must be done [Voted ANC in 
1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004]. 
  
really she is not reliable [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004]. 
 
And she is always involved in this political gossip in parliament, but you could really you could see that 
when she always uses this gossip to put her on the top[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004]. 
 
This Patricia De Lille, she decided to quit her own party to form another party…so from that point I see no 
reason to vote for her because she never even made right in her own party. [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and 
2004]. 
 
On my side when I analyse, when you analyse the Independent Democrats, you could see, for me, you 
could see that this person would not be will not be willing to listen to other people’s views, because she 
would be independent, she would not appreciate the support, now you could see even from what she did in 
the PAC, she spoke a lot from within the PAC, and she was mobilising within the PAC, then she decided to 
move out [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004]. 
 
when she was campaigning and people were asking her certain questions, and she couldn’t come up with a 
direct answer, for me it is pointless going to vote for somebody that can’t give you a direct answer, so once 
they are in Parliament, what are they going to do to the public, they are undecided.  So for me it is not 
voting for somebody that can’t give you an answer direct [Voted Opposition in 1994 and 1999, but did 
not vote in 2004]. 
 
Another thing, I think she wanted to outdo UDM.  Because while she wasn’t kicked out of them, she left.  
And now she goes for another party.  Why?  Because it’s still the same thing.  She will preach what this 
guy preaches and this guy preaches, trying to outdo the ANC, but nothing happens [Voted for ANC in 
1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
Participants felt that Chief Buthelezi was like the biblical “Judas” because they believed 
that he had worked with the apartheid government and felt that he was used by it to kill 
ANC supporters. They also mentioned that he was primarily concerned about the needs 












Focus Group Comment Box 5: Negative Perceptions of Chief Buthelezi 
Here, the problem here is Gaja, he was working with a Batete, before 94, he had some police protection, 
this police people, they were fighting against the UDF, they didn’t want to see the members of the United 
Democratic Front, his police guards, Gaja’s police guards, were working with the apartheid regime, and I 
could see that this person was not really, he is the same as Tony Leon, [Voted for the ANC in 1994 and 
1999, Voted UDM in 2004].  
 
he likes the Zulu people, the culture, the tradition of the Zulu, he did not want anything that would destroy 
the Zulu nation, and the nationality [Voted for the ANC in 1994 and 1999, voted for the UDM in 2004]. 
 
Gatcha was used by the then regime…you see… to kill ANC supporters…this guy…there is nothing good 
about him [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004].   
 
For Mangosuthu my feeling or opinion with him is that he was an informer…he betrayed his people…you 
know he was like Judas…when I think of the IFP, I just see his face and I think of impimpi [Voted for 
ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004].    
 
Participants felt that Tony Leon was only concerned about the interests of white 
communities; that he criticized without presenting alternatives and that he was an 
opportunist. One participant questioned Tony Leon’s logic in expecting him, as a voter, 
to believe that the DA would bring change just because he said so. 
 
Focus Group Comment Box 6: Negative Perceptions of Tony Leon 
 
…I’m asking myself what was Tony Leon doing in 1993…to me he is like an opportunist…and he is 
misleading people because one…he is the opposition…he is a person who…like…always criticizes you 
know…if he criticizes he doesn’t come with constructive criticism. For instance, when they were saying to 
the Minister of Transport…saying that he must resign…he was not coming with an alternative…you must 
come with alternatives [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004].   
 
I even heard about something about DP on the TV, I could see Tony Leon is a bit of a racist [Voted for the 
ANC in 1994 and 1999, voted for the UDM in 2004]. 
 
I want to say that…he is said to be a custodian of white privilege…that’s the first thing. [Voted for ANC 
in 1994, 1999 and 2004].   
 
What he is, is a custodian of white privilege…and he’s just going to stay like that. I was listening to the 
stats…if you look at the voting patterns…Rondebosch, Carlton, Constantia, Sea Point, Muizenberg, Camps 
Bay…they know that if they vote DA someone is going to fight to preserve their privileges [Voted for 
ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
I think he’s there for people from the white communities [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004].  
 
To sum up then, the focus group data is congruent with the survey ratings. Sentiments 
about opposition leaders were more negative than positive. In some cases very strong 
opinions with terms such as opportunistic, unreliable, “custodian of white privilege” were 












4.5 Perceptions of Competence 
 
I now turn to perceptions of competence. Did South African voters view political parties 
as competent? President Mbeki and the ANC-led national government received positive 
evaluation ratings. Government’s performance was also seen in a generally optimistic 
light. On the other hand, all opposition parties were seen as insufficiently competent to 
run national government.  
 
In 2004 the ANC enjoyed the position of being the incumbent party. With regard to 
approval of presidential performance, more than three quarters (76%) in 2004 indicated 
that President Mbeki was doing his job “very well” or “fairly well”. Two thirds of South 
Africans (66%) approved of the performance of national government. 
 
In some policy areas, voters were extremely critical of government. In 2004, less than 
one in three (30%) said that it was performing well in attempts to “fight employment by 
creating jobs” and only 38% said that it was performing well in attempts to keep prices 
stable. Negative evaluations were also given in the area of narrowing the gap between 
rich and poor, only a third (35%) said it was performing well in this regard. Another key 
area of criticism related to efforts to control crime and fight corruption. Less than half 
(40%) saw the government as performing well in controlling crime and 37% thought they 
were doing a good job of fighting corruption.  
 
However, positive evaluations were given in other policy areas. Almost three quarters 
(73%) felt that the government was performing well/very well in distributing welfare 
grants. Majorities also indicated that the government was doing a good job of delivering 
household water (68%); addressing educational needs (58%) and combating HIV/AIDS 
(55%). Overall, 58 % gave a positive evaluation of the governments’ management of the 
economy. South Africans were also generally positive about the promotion of affirmative 
action (57%) and national unity (64%), with majorities giving positive assessments.  
 
Thus, as Mattes (2005: 51) argues, South Africans did not turn a blind eye to the 
problems of joblessness or criminal violence, but rather in some way balanced these 











areas. Indeed, an SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004 poll revealed that the ANC was still 
seen as the party most trusted to successfully address these challenges.
 25
 Majorities said 
that they trusted the ANC to “eradicate unemployment”, “lower the crime rate”, “clean 
government of corruption” and “maintain a competent civil service” compared to less 
than a fifth who trusted the DA to do so.    
 











ANC 54% 57% 54% 59% 
DA 18% 19% 18% 15% 
IFP 6% 8% 7% 7% 
UDM 2% 1% 2% 1% 
NNP 11% 12% 10% 9% 
ID 3% 3% 4% 2% 
OTHER 4% 6% 6% 4% 
NONE 15% 11% 9% 6% 
Don’t Know 7% 6% 8% 12% 
SOURCE: SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004. 
Question wording not given.  
 
At the same time, focus group participants raised the issue of nepotism, poor service 
delivery and unfulfilled promises by the ANC. These comments are given in the box 
below. 
 
Focus Group Comment Box 7: Negative Perceptions of the ANC  
What the ANC is doing is promising us things and then after that not doing it.  But when the ANC want us 
to vote these things are coming forward before and then after that – nothing. [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 
but did not vote in 2004]. 
 
…they promised housing, and up till today a lot of people are still struggling, for 12 years, been living on 
the ground, struggling for toilets, there’s no water, there are no toilets, up till today they still don’t have a 
house[Voted for Opposition Parties in 1994 and 1999 but did not vote in 2004]. 
 
The whole thing is just in reverse.  I mean the ANC are doing the exact thing that the NNP did years ago.  
So we are living back in Apartheid, but in a nice way, you know what I am saying.  Because now the 
Blacks are getting work, and the Whites are not getting work.  And the Indians and the Colored might get 




                                               
25 SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004. Party Performance. Released 1 April 2004. Fieldwork for this study was undertaken 
from 29 January to 20 February 2004. Personal, in-home interviews were conducted with a random representative 













Focus Group Comment Box 7 continued: Negative Perceptions of the ANC  
One other thing that made me not to vote for ANC is their promises.  Not all of their promises, but some of 
their promises were not met with things that were expected to be met.  And other things, is this thing of – I 




 floor, you will find they are all 
chommies (friends) [Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
  
…the ANC didn’t actually fulfill what they always said they were going to do [Voted for ANC in 1994 
and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
They promised me a house, and I am still sitting without a house.  That is ten years ago.  And to be honest, 
I became very frustrated.  I am so full of - on the news I see it:  ANC will build houses, ANC will do this, 
ANC will do that – they did nothing for me yet [Voted for the ANC in 1994, 1999, voted DA in 2004]. 
  
Their token was ‘Vote ANC’ and then this will be done and this will be done and all of this.  But in the ten 
years nothing happened [Voted for the ANC in 1994, 1999, voted DA in 2004]. 
 
The ANC promised us a lot of things, but we never got it [Voted for the ANC in 1994, 1999, voted DA in 
2004]. 
 
The majority of South Africans did not view the other opposition parties as being 
sufficiently competent to run national government. Less than one in five voters expressed 
confidence in the competence of these parties. Only 16% saw the ID and the NNP, 15% 
the IFP and 14% the UDM as competent to run national government. Majorities or a 
significant proportion felt that the IFP (60%), NP (55%), UDM (53%), ID (48%) and DA 
(43%) would do a “poor” or “very poor” job of running the national government. Voters 
generally demonstrated an inability to rate opposition parties on their levels of 
competence. About a third of the electorate was not able to formulate an opinion on how 
the opposition parties might perform. Overall 36% said that did not know whether the ID 
would do a good job of running national government or not. The NNP did not fare much 
better at 32%, the UDM at 31% and the DA at 29%. 
 
Table 4: Perceptions of Opposition Party Competence to Run National Government, 1998-2004. 
  September 1998 April 1999 October 2004 


















DA 21% 34% 45% 23% 41% 36% 28% 43% 29% 
IFP 14% 61% 25% 13% 62% 25% 15% 60% 24% 
UDM 10% 29% 61% 14% 38% 48% 14% 55% 31% 
ID NA NA NA NA NA NA 16% 48% 36% 
NNP 28% 55% 17% 23% 57% 21% 16% 53% 32% 
SOURCE: Opinion 99 and Comparative National Elections Project 2004 
Question: Regardless of whether you agree or disagree with their views, please tell me whether you 
think each of the following political parties would do a good or poor job of running the national 












By 2004, a plurality of voters (43%) said that the DA would do a “poor” or “very poor” 
job of running the national government. Just over a quarter (28%) said that it would do a 
“good” or “very good” job. Another quarter could not offer an opinion on the 
competence of the DA. As seen below, focus group participants felt that the DA needn’t 
wait until they were voted into office to make a difference. 
 
Focus Group Comment Box 8: Negative Perceptions of the DA’s Competence 
There was one part where the DA stated ‘we’ve got a plan to bring down crime’ I think something like that.  
But now if he has a plan to bring down crime, why must he hold it till he gets his vote to be President?  
Why make this promise that he can make this promise if he becomes President.  Only if he becomes 
President.  So that’s empty promises [Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
 
I wanted to vote for them, seriously, but now, for the past ten years I have been following these politics just 
a little bit.  But they don’t come with constructive things.  Like maybe if the Government says this thing, 
they always oppose, every time.  They will come with their own initiative, something that they came up 
with and then they said ‘no, here is this thing, let’s do this thing’.  For me to be convinced by hearing the 
fighting, it is really putting me down instead of making me want to be their follower.  It doesn’t help me in 
order to be their follower [Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
Focus group participants who gave positive comments about the DA mentioned that that 
they “keep their promises”, are a strong party to vote for and are taking control of 
corruption. 
 
Focus Group Comment Box 9: Positive Perceptions of the DA’s Competence 
one thing about the DA, it keeps its promises, because he has money. He is not using the states money, he 
has money.  It is in the news, they will go to Atlantis, and they will bring blankets, groceries for all the 
poor people.  The ANC will just go there and will be eating at the table and the poor people will be 
watching them eat.  That is one thing, the DA does deliver. [Voted for Opposition Parties in 1994 and 
1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
 
The DA is the next strongest party to vote for.  At least when they decide a thing, they are trying to solve 
your problem.  They are not just doing this or doing that, they are trying [Voted for ANC in 1994 and 
1999,  Voted DA in 2004]. 
 
Probably because the DA is taking control of the corruption that is going on [Voted for ANC in 1994 and 
1999,  Voted DA in 2004]. 
 
 
While perceptions of the NNP’s competence deteriorated between 1994 and 2004, the 
majority of South Africans had consistently negative opinions about the IFP in this 
regard. In 1994, 61% felt that the IFP would not perform well in running the national 
government and this figure increased to 62% in 1999 but then dropped to 60% in 2004.  











competence decreased from 61% in 1998 to 48% in 1999 down to 31% in 2004. This 
indicates a “firming up” of opinions about the UDM’s perceived competence. At the 
same time, there was a steady increase in negative perceptions of the UDM.  
 
This data shows that while voters had a broadly positive view of government 
performance, their image of the competence of opposition parties were largely negative.  
 
4.6 Perceptions of Inclusiveness 
 
Overall, only the ANC was seen by a wide majority voters as an inclusive party. Since 
1994, the majority of South Africans have viewed the ANC as being an inclusive party. 
At any given point, not less than 70% of South Africans saw the ANC as an inclusive 
party although this represents a slight drop compared to the 77% who in 1994 felt that the 
ANC represented the interests of all South Africans.  
 





























1994 1998 1999 2004
ANC DA NNP UDM IFP ID
 SOURCE: Idasa 1994, Opinion 99 and Comparative National Elections Project 2004 
Do you think that _______________ (READ IN NAME OF PARTY) looks after the interests of all in 













The history of the ANC was an important component of focus group participants’ views 
of its representativity. One focus group respondent indicated that he would vote for the 
ANC “for the rest of his life” because it is “committed to” all races.  
 
Focus Group Comment Box 10: History of the ANC  
…looking at the history of the ANC…when it formed it was named ANNC, African National Natives 
Congress, it was predominantly for blacks. So now seeing the fact that the ANC is committed to other 
races I feel ANC…I see that as…I am not a racist so then this is the party to vote for, for the rest of my 
life…because I like that we are a multi-racial country so we must have a multi-racial party. So I am still 
voting ANC because it is looking out for all Africans and all South Africans. [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 
and 2004]. 
 
the ANC was the only organisation that was central and vocal, fighting for the liberation of our 
country[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004]. 
 
the ANC, it has worked hard, and now at least now all people are equal and have rights, and they have 
shown some of the improvement[Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004]. 
 
It is important to note that it not only people who identify with the ANC that say the 
ANC represents the interests of all South Africans. A majority of those who do not feel 
close to any party felt that the ANC looks after the interests of all South African.  
 
Figure 4: Independent Voters’ Images of Parties Inclusiveness-Exclusiveness 
58
38




















ANC DA IFP UDM ID NNP
All One Group Only Don’t Know Enough About Them
Source: Comparative National Elections Project 2004 
Do you think that _______________ (READ IN NAME OF PARTY) looks after the interests of all in 














The majority of South Africans simply did not know whether opposition parties were 
concerned about the interests of all groups or not. Not surprisingly the highest level of 
uncertainty related to the ID with 71% saying that they could not offer an opinion on its 
inclusiveness. By 2004 more than two-thirds (68%) were also unable to articulate an 
opinion about the inclusiveness of the NNP. Two-thirds of voters (66%) were unable to 
offer a response about the UDM’s representativeness. This is actually an improvement – 
in 1998 three quarters (74%) could not offer an opinion on this matter. A majority of 
South African voters (57%) also could not offer an opinion on whether the IFP and the 
DA takes into account the needs of everyone in South Africa 
 
Table 5: Perceptions of Party Inclusiveness: 1994 - 2004 
  September-October 
1994 
Sep-98 Apr-99 Oct-04 
















ANC 77% 17% 6% 71% 25% 4% 75% 21% 4% 70% 14% 17% 
DA 39% 14% 47% 24% 20% 56% 28% 22% 49% 33% 11% 57% 
IFP 16% 54% 30% 6% 36% 57% 8% 36% 55% 26% 18% 57% 
UDM NA NA NA 7% 34% 59% 9% 46% 46% 28% 6% 66% 
ID NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 25% 4% 71% 
NNP 39% 38% 24% 32% 44% 24% 35% 37% 28% 27% 10% 63% 
SOURCE: Idasa 1994, Opinion 99 and Comparative National Elections Project 2004 
Do you think that _______________ (READ IN NAME OF PARTY) looks after the interests of all in 
South Africa or after the interests of one group only, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say? 
 
The IFP was seen by one in four voters (26%) as inclusive of all South Africans. Focus 
group participants felt that the IFP and Chief Buthelezi were only interested in the 
interests of Zulu people and that of KwaZulu/Natal:  
 
Focus Group Comment Box 11: Perceptions of the IFP’s Representativeness 
he likes only the Zulu’s, he is not interested about everyone in South Africa [Voted for the ANC in 1994 
and 1999, voted for the UDM in 2004]. 
 
On my side I could say without the political leader the Zulu National itself could not mix to the Xhosa. I 
don’t know from what side that came from, if you are Xhosa and you go to Gauteng, they look as if you are 
someone who is, who is a skelm, or who is a crook, there is nothing to come out good from a Xhosa 
person, when what about you as a Xhosa person, when you get under the Zulu’s? [Voted for the ANC in 
1994 and 1999, voted for the UDM in 2004]. 
 
I decided not to vote for IFP, because they are for the Zulu [Voted for the ANC in 1994 and 1999, voted 













Focus Group Comment Box 11 Continued: Perceptions of the IFP’s Representativeness 
they are not in the Western Cape, they are more in Natal.  He grew up in Natal; he doesn’t know what’s 
happening where we come from, where we call it the Cape Flats.  So it’s pointless if people are going to 
vote for the IFP [Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
I think the IFP is very regional, you know, confined to Kwa-Zulu Natal  [Voted for ANC in 1994 and 
1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
his party is more focused for KZN, it doesn’t have interest for people living here in the Western Cape.  So I 
can’t vote for somebody whose interest is in KZN and doesn’t have interest in other parts of South Africa 
[Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
this guy doesn’t have the interests of the people, he sees only now the people of Natal, he has been too long 
in that province[Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
One other thing about this party, he does have members here in the Western Cape, but only a few 
members.  I know of one person, he is living in my street, he is a member of the IFP and one other 
member, it is a family, and they all come from KZN  [Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 
2004]. 
 
If you look at the history of the IFP…culturally… it was an organisation  that was there for cultural 
purposes, to say ‘us as Zulus, we need to remind ourselves of who we are”…it was an identity kind of 
thing…I think its difficult to evolve into a political party that would encompass other people…because as a 
political party you have to encompass all. In 1994 I did see a few posters in the Eastern Cape of the 
IFP…they were struggling to become an all-encompassing political party. That was their biggest problem 
and they’ve not been able to transcend that and…the destructive nature …just recently people were 
watching TV…this area Ulundi…it has significance to the King Shaka…it was almost a no-go area for the 
ANC…the Minister of Defence and Correctional Services had to go there because the IFP did not want the 
ANC to go canvass…that is part of their destructive nature [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004].    
 
They say a leopard never changes its colours…the thing is…this guy (Mangosuthu Buthelezi) his whole 
party…his zulu party…they don’t accommodate other people, that’s why I don’t vote for them [Voted for 
ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004].    
 
 
The NNP was seen by about one in four voters (27%) as inclusive of all South Africans. 
Some focus group respondents indicated that the NNP had not changed, that it was racist 
and only concerned about the needs of white voters. As seen in the box below, some 












Focus Group Comment Box 12:  Perceptions of the NNP’s Representativeness 
Because part of the NNP was still the old order.  Even though they tried to recruit some other faces, like 
our faces, in order to get the people to vote.  But the core was still the old kind. [Voted for ANC in 1994, 
1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
the NNP is racist, the majority of the people in the NNP are the white people, and the majority of them did 
not care much about other on the feeling of the non-white people[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not 
vote in 2004]. 
 
the majority of the people in the NNP are the white people, and the majority of them did not care much 
about other on the feeling of the non-white people. Now this party wanted to fulfil the interests of the white 
people [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004]. 
 
My point with the NNP it’s worse than slime, getting all it’s people, then joining the ANC [Voted for 
ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
I don’t care if it is changed or not, but I hate that name; National Party [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did 
not vote in 2004]. 
 
there is no way I can go back to Pharaoh, I never saw any change. [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM 
in 2004]. 
 
To me the NNP is a waste of time.  The guy can’t make up his mind where he wants to be.  He jumps from 




Just over a quarter (28%) felt that the UDM represented the interests of all groups. Focus 
group participants felt that the UDM and Bantu Holomisa were primarily concerned 
about people in the Eastern Cape:  
 
Focus Group Comment Box 13: Perceptions of the UDM’s Representativeness 
his (Bantu Holomisa) support, if you can say support – for the mines – people who are coming from the 
Eastern Cape and the people who are staying in Lower Crossroad, they are also coming from the Eastern 
Cape.  It doesn’t have people who were born and bred here  
[Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
he is only focusing for the people who are living in the Eastern Cape, not on the people who are living in 
other parts of South Africa [Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
He (Bantu Holomisa) wants power, he is fighting for power more than the interest of the people. [Voted 
for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
This is also a party that was actually established in the Eastern Cape.  So to me, in the Western Cape it 
doesn’t make sense to go and vote for somebody in the Eastern Cape, because at the end of the day if he 
should come in, he is going to see more to the Eastern Cape, like Transkei and Ciskei and Umtata and so to 
me, it doesn’t interest me to vote for somebody that is not going to look after our province [Voted for 
Opposition in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
To me a party must be popular in all provinces, not only one.  Because then it is not going to matter [Voted 













By 2004 a third of voters (33%) felt that the DA was representative of all groups in South 
Africa. Focus group participants were particularly vocal in expressing their opinions 
about the DA’s representativeness. Some felt that the DA was protecting white privileges 
and merely included people from other race groups to appear representative of all.  
 
Focus Group Comment Box 14: Perceptions of the DA’s Representativeness 
 
I think the DA is a racist party.  It appeals to the White upper middle class, even if the Deputy Chair of the 
DA is an African [Voted for Opposition Parties in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
I just see white faces! [Voted for ANC in 1994 and 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
 these things, more work, less crime…these are issues that are being raised by Civil Society and NGOs and 
we find that Tony Leon…the opportunist that he is…capitalizing on these things…create more jobs, less 
crime…50 000 police on the streets…these are the issues…he’s playing on the emotions of the people… 
[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004].   
 
That thing about the DA…part of the problem of the DA…white people oppressed us for all these years 
and now I’m seeing a white man saying “Vote for me, I’m going to bring change”. I ask myself, does he 
think that I’m crazy…that he wants me to believe that he will bring more jobs. That is part of the 
baggage…the majority of South Africans are blacks and as long as that’s the case, white parties are going 
to suffer. I’ve noticed…they are the official opposition largely because white people voted for them…and 
they are still voting for them…they are privileged. Transformation is taking place in this country…because 
of that, the ANC is stepping on their toes. So I’m saying that all of these changes are not to the favour of 
those having privileges, unfortunately [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999 and 2004].   
 
 
4.7 Perceptions of Trustworthiness 
 
 
It is important to note that while voters reported that they did not know whether 
opposition parties were inclusive or exclusive, majorities had an opinion about the 
trustworthiness of parties. Two thirds (66%) of the South African electorate saw the 
ANC as being trustworthy “always” or “most of the time” compared to majorities who 
saw all opposition parties as being trustworthy “only some of the time” or “never”.  
 
As with perceptions of representativeness, it is not only people who identify with the 
ANC that say the ANC is trustworthy. Among independent voters, a majority of 54% felt 
that the ANC is trustworthy while majorities simultaneously viewed all opposition parties 





































ANC DA IFP UDM ID NNP
Not at all/Not very much Quite a lot/A great deal Don't know enough about them
SOURCE: Comparative National Elections Project 2004 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say?   
 
South African voters saw opposition parties as untrustworthy. Majorities said that they 
could trust the DA (58%), ID (60%), UDM (63%); IFP (64%) the NNP (65%) only be 
some of the time or not at all.  Less than a fifth said that they could trust the DA (25%), 
ID (18%), UDM (17%), IFP (17%) and the NNP (16%)  “always” or “most of the time”. 
On average, about one in five said they did not know whether the party in question was 
trustworthy or not.  
 
Table 6: Perceptions of Party Trustworthiness: 1998 - 2004 
























ANC 57% 41% 2% 65% 32% 3% 66% 28% 6% 
DA 12% 45% 43% 14% 73% 33% 25% 58% 18% 
IFP 9% 67% 24% 8% 70% 22% 17% 64% 19% 
UDM 7% 34% 59% 9% 46% 46% 17% 63% 21% 
ID NA NA NA NA NA NA 18% 60% 23% 
NNP 18% 66% 16% 14% 68% 19% 16% 65% 20% 
SOURCE: Opinion 99 and Comparative National Elections Project 2004 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 












One focus group respondent made a comment about Chief Buthelezi saying “This is the 
one person I don’t trust!  He just doesn’t give me that – something about this man just 
doesn’t give me the impression that I can…” Two focus group participants also 
specifically mentioned that the DA was not trustworthy saying that the DA had “a hidden 
agenda” and another simply that she “did not trust them”.  
 
 
4.8 The Need for Visibility 
 
A key theme that emerged from the focus groups was that politicians need to be more 
visible in communities. Participants felt that political parties and their leaders only 
emerge during the run-up to the elections and then disappear when they no longer need to 
canvas for votes. This perception was the source of much disillusionment among these 
participants with some indicating that it was for this reason they had decided to not vote 
in the 2004 election. Indeed, as seen in the previous section, large proportions of the 
voting public had insufficient information to form opinions about key attributes of 
opposition parties.   
 
Focus Group Comment Box 15: Perception That Politicians Should Be More Visible  
They must come to the townships, or let me put it this way, they must be visible in order to convince me 
(to vote) [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
I will vote if the politicians become more visible in our areas.  And not for one or two weeks or once in a 
blue moon, they must be very active in the communities [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 
2004]. 
 
…they must start being more involved in the community [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 
2004]. 
 
as a leader, you need the people’s support, you must mingle, get involved.  Not just do your speech and 
then leave as if you don’t care [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
they are only visible when they need your vote.  After that, quiet, nothing happens [Voted for ANC in 
1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].  
 
Don’t come only when it is time for election, and then you come. You must always be part and parcel of 
people’s actions [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004].  
 
they mustn’t just be visible when there is an election [Voted for Opposition in 1994, 1999, but did not 
vote in 2004]. 
 
They must be visible throughout.  They should be visible; I mean after all, they are our leaders Voted for 













Given its short history, it is unsurprising that voters did not have a firm opinion about the 
ID. However, besides mentioning a general lack of visibility of politicians, focus group 
participants singled the ID out in this regard. They felt that Patricia De Lille did not mix 
sufficiently with ordinary people. These sentiments are expressed below. 
 
Focus Group Comment Box 16: Perception that the ID and Patricia De Lille Should Be More Visible 
I never saw her (De Lille) addressing problems, in our areas [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 
2004]. 
 
This is one person I wanted to vote for, but she didn’t come to the township as well [Voted for ANC in 
1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].   
 
I have seen Patricia De Lille at my niece’s valedictory.  She was the main speaker there, and she spoke 
nice, but again, she just sat there at her table, she didn’t mix.  You know, it was a hall, with everyone in it, 
and she didn’t go around and greet the people.  I mean she doesn’t have to know everybody’s name, but go 
around and greet the people  [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].   
 
She was elected by the school to be a main speaker, so she felt honored, but then thing is, show back the 
support, sit among the people.  Move from table to table.  She delivered her speech, handed out the awards, 
and left.  With the bodyguard. [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004].   
 
On my side, I didn’t hear anything, her (De Lille) campaigning, I don’t want to lie, really, I never saw this 
lady in Guguletu [Voted ANC in 1994, 1999 and UDM in 2004]. 
 
She is a friend of a friend of mine.  And then she came to me and she said to me I must vote for her 
friend…Yes, and she said I must vote for Patricia.  So I said ‘who’s Patricia, I don’t know Patricia’ and she 
said she’s ID and all that.  So I said no, I don’t vote for someone that I don’t know. [Voted for Opposition 
in 1994 and 1999, but did not vote in 2004]. 
 
 
4.9 General Perceptions of Politicians 
 
The 2004 Afrobarometer survey asked a series of questions about politicians and election 
promises. The data also revealed widely negative perceptions of politicians. A large 
majority of more than three quarters (86%) felt that politicians “always” or “often” make 
promises simply to get elected. 71% indicated that politicians “rarely” or “never” keep 
their campaign promises after the elections. Furthermore, 70% said that politicians 












Table 7: General Perceptions of Politicians, 2004. 
  Politicians simply make 
promises to get elected 
Politicians keep their 
campaign promises after 
elections 
Politicians do their best to 
deliver development after 
elections 
Never 4% 37% 33% 
Rarely 8% 35% 37% 
Often 27% 16% 19% 
Always 59% 9% 6% 
Don't know 3% 4% 4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Afrobarometer, 2004. 
Question: In your opinion, how often do politicians do each of the following?  Make promises simply 
to get elected; Keep their campaign promises after elections; Do their best to deliver development 
after elections 
 
The notion that politicians make promises simply to get elected was a sentiment also 
expressed by the focus group participants. No specific question on this issue was posed 
but participants spontaneously raised the issue at various junctures. Focus group 
participants indicated that politicians are not concerned about ordinary people. They felt 
that they make a concerted effort to connect with them during election times but that 
“nothing happens” thereafter.   
 
Focus Group Comment Box 17: Perceptions of Empty Promises Made By Politicians 
They make promises to the people, and they don’t fulfill their promises, and I think that is very unfair 
towards the man in the street…[Voted for opposition Parties in 1994, 1999 but did not vote in 2004]. 
 
There are a lot of promises being made, and as far as I have seen it hasn’t been laid on the table, I don’t see 
anything; it is just talk, talk, talk, but no doing.  I want to see doing, not just talking [Voted for opposition 
Parties in 1994, 1999 but did not vote in 2004]. 
 
They go out of their way, they even go to your home or houses to see how you live and give you big 
promises, and at the end of the day nothing happens.  But they got the vote and nothing happens after that 
[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
But no matter how many parties there are, it is still going to be the same, the same promises. [Voted for 













Another view was that the primary goal of politicians is to enrich themselves and become 
“fat cats”. The following are some statements made regarding this:  
 
Focus Group Comment Box 18: Perceptions of Personal Enrichment By Politicians 
It’s like a little game they play, they don’t worry about the next person.  It’s like playing monopoly or 
something. [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
These people become fat cats.  That is what they are, they just want the money at the end of the day [Voted 
for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
 
It’s all about the money. [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
It comes back to power.  Power hungry.  [Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did not vote in 2004]. 
 
It comes back to power.  Power hungry.  I don’t know if they are already disbanded, but before they 
disbanded, they joined DA, ID, all these other parties, leaving their followers alone, you see.  And it is the 
leaders disbanding.  What about their supporters that are faithful to them, who are voting for them all these 
years.  Now they must follow them.  I mean it doesn’t work like that[Voted for ANC in 1994, 1999, did 
not vote in 2004]. 
 
From my point of view, is there is more millionaires in Parliament now than anything else.  [Voted 





As previously indicated, images of political parties and party leaders have far-reaching 
effects. In the absence of sufficient information these images are used by voters to help 
them decide which party to vote for and whether it is worth their while to vote at all. It is 
also the lens through which campaign communications are evaluated. Based on their 
perceptions of the source of the message, focus group participants made judgments about 
the credibility of their messages. This lends support to the view that negative perceptions 
can cause campaign messages to be tainted resulting in either a complete rejection of the 
message or limited engagement with it.   
 
It is against this backdrop that the prevalent images of political parties and their leaders 
should be considered. A large majority felt that most politicians simply make promises to 
get elected. The data also revealed widely-held negative perceptions of opposition parties 
and their leaders. All opposition party leaders received a negative rating in the series of 
surveys conducted between 1995 and 2004. Focus group discussions exposed strongly 











insufficiently competent to govern South Africa. Majorities or significant proportions felt 
that they would do a “poor” or “very poor” job running the national government and saw 
them as being untrustworthy.   
 
Furthermore, large proportions of the electorate were unable to offer opinions about 
many of the attributes of the opposition. The majority of South Africans simply did not 
know whether opposition parties were concerned about the interests of all in South 
Africa. Some focus group participants saw Tony Leon and the DA as predominantly 
concerned about the interests of white voters, Chief Buthelezi and the IFP as concerned 
about the interests of Zulu people and those living in KwaZulu/Natal, General Holomisa 
and the UDM as concerned about the interests of people living in the Eastern Cape and 
Marthinus Van Schalkwyk and the NNP as still being part of the “old order”. These 
negative images of opposition parties formed a critical component of the way in which 
their campaign messages were interpreted by the participants. 
 
Thus, with regard to opposition parties, the informational shortcuts provided by 
perceptions of parties were either negative or completely missing. Mattes (2006:113) 
correctly asserts that with the exception of the ID as a newly-formed party, survey results 
about the trustworthiness and exclusivity of opposition parties present “a damning 
indictment of opposition strategists’ failure to use the resources available to them to 
implant a clearer image in the minds of voters about who they are and what they stand 
for”. 
 
Simultaneously, voters generally approved of the ANC-led government’s performance 
and gave President Mbeki positive approval ratings. While critical of the government on 
some specific policy areas (such as job creation and crime reduction), voters commended 
it in others (such as welfare and development and gave a broadly positive assessment of 
overall government performance (Mattes, 2005). And in contrast to opposition parties, 
majorities of South Africans across all racial groups, including those who said that they 
did not feel close to any party, saw the ANC as an inclusive and trustworthy party.  
 
The finding that large proportions of the electorate lacked information or had a poor 











development of campaign messages.
26
 Opposition parties facing this situation needed to 
connect with voters and work out ways of undoing these negative perceptions. Then, they 
needed to present compelling evidence that they would deal with issues important to 
voters. The survey data revealed, voters were aware of these failures but still gave the 
government a positive evaluation overall. Thus, only criticizing the government for its 
failures would be insufficient to convince voters to vote (for them). Simply saying so via 
evermore sophisticated means would give voters little reason to believe that they would 
perform any better than the ANC. Additionally, merely critiquing the government would 
not help voters overcome their view that opposition parties are untrustworthy and lacking 
in competence. 
 
These findings pointed to a situation in which opposition parties would need to work 
hard to convince and persuade voters of the merits of voting for them. It also represents a 
poor score for the first component of my campaign assessment model because only one 
party was seen by a majority of voters in a positive light. A competitive election implies 
the existence of a choice between two or more alternatives - these results indicate that 
voters did not feel that there was more than one viable option.  Secondly, these negative 




                                               











CHAPTER FIVE: CAMPAIGN MESSAGES IN THE 2004 
ELECTION 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
As previously indicated, message content is critically important because it provides the 
basis for choice. A situation where voters do not have sufficient information about the 
intentions of parties hampers the competitiveness of the electoral process, thus harming 
the quality of democracy. At a macro level, campaign messages should enable voters to 
distinguish between parties. Candidates should propose and explain solutions to 
important problems as well as elect campaign themes and styles that inform and interest 
voters rather than repel or confuse them (Buchanan, 2001:365). A predominantly 
negative campaign turns voters off; a lack of consistency between the campaign 
messages of a party confuses voters and the absence of a coherent campaign theme 
leaves the voter to pull the strands of campaign messages together.  
 
Given the poor images of opposition parties outlined in the previous chapter, it is clear 
that these parties could not simply rely on broad appeals to mobilize voters. Rather, they 
needed to persuade voters of the merits of voting for them via credible and compelling 
messages. These messages would need to convince voters of their capacity to deliver on 
their promises. 
 
In this chapter I examine the “what” i.e. the content of the campaign messages the ANC, 
DA, IFP, UDM, ID and NNP sought to communicate to South African voters in the 2004 
general election. I ask whether the information provided to the South African public was 
sufficient to enable voters to select between the competing parties. I draw out these 
themes and messages via an examination of communications which they developed. For 
each party I consider the main theme and ask whether the messages were primarily 
positive, negative or comparative; whether the party weaved their messages together into 
a well-blended and internally consistent theme and whether the overall theme was 












5.2 Overview  
 
The evidence I reviewed shows that in general the top six parties all campaigned around 
the same issues and their aims around those issues were virtually identical. Various 
analysts, for example Davids (2004), Rankhumise (2004) and Kabemba (2004) 
highlighted the high level of consensus around the primary challenges facing South 
Africa. Parties promised to address the same major problems: unemployment; crime; 
poverty; HIV/AIDS; housing; education; health care and services such as electricity and 
water. According to these views, the real difference between parties related to the 
proposed solutions to these issues. Piper (2005:100) presents a more nuanced view and 
argues that the style of the ANC’s campaign did reflect a notable ideological difference 
from the major opposition parties, namely “a left-leaning concern with the poor, the 
unemployed and the working class”. For Piper, the ANC did not speak about these issues 
“in the neo-liberal register of the DA and IFP or, for that matter, of the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution Policy (Gear), but in the left register of its alliance 
partners”.  
 
My analysis of the campaign manifestos reveals that there was substantial differentiation 
between the parties in terms of their plans to deal with these problems. Yet, while the 
party manifestoes generally contained considerable detail of their strategies to implement 
their policy positions, the vast majority of voters are unlikely to read (or have access to) 
them. Furthermore, the general communications of campaign information via more 
accessible means failed to differentiate between the salient positions of parties. Manifesto 
titles, slogans and posters showed significant similarities because they tended to focus on 
the goals which, as indicated above, were basically the same.   
 
Slogans and poster content often echoed manifesto titles - it is therefore instructive to do 
a comparison of these. A rudimentary analysis of manifesto titles illustrates the point that 
parties failed to sufficiently differentiate their policy approaches to voters. All parties 
could essentially have had any of the titles listed in the table below as their manifesto 
title. The ANC primarily emphasized a partnership with voters and focused on the need 
to create work and fight poverty. The IFP also emphasized a partnership with voters with 
a more wide-ranging goal of “making a difference”. The DA and UDM’s title wording 











plan”. The ID’s title pointed to the need to overcome South Africa’s divisive past. The 
NNP’s slogan implied that some people were not receiving their deserved share of South 
Africa. With the exception of the NNP’s title, these slogans all talked about improving 
and/ or uniting South Africa and were forward-looking in nature.  
 
Table 8: Party Manifesto Titles, 2004. 
Political Party Manifesto Title 
ANC “A people’s contract to create work and fight poverty” 
DA “A better South Africa” 
IFP “Making a difference together” 
UDM “Better Future Plan” 
ID “Bridging the Divides: Uniting South Africa behind a Common 
Vision” 
NNP “You Deserve a Fair Share” 
 
The key slogan of the ANC attempted to convey the primary policy objectives of the 
ANC, i.e. that it would “create work and fight poverty” through “a people’s contract”. 
This broad slogan could subsume a host of interpretations. The DA’s chief slogan was 
that “South Africa deserves better” and could be interpreted as a critique of what other 
parties, primarily the ANC, had to offer. The IFP’s slogan echoed that of its manifesto 
title i.e. that they would “make a difference together”. Both the ID and the NNP’s 
slogans related to issues of representation.  The ID’s primary slogan said that they would 
give voters “more voice for their vote” while the NNP’s implored voters to “let us be 
your voice”. Only the UDM’s slogan was explicitly negative indicating that “ten years of 
unemployment undermined the people’s freedom”. All the selected slogans (except the 
UDMs) talk about working together, making a difference, improving South Africa or the 
party as being an effective voice for voters. 
 
Table 9: Key Election Slogans, 2004. 
Political Party Key Election Slogan 
ANC “A people’s contract to create work and fight poverty” 
DA “South Africa Deserves Better” 
IFP “Making a difference together” 
UDM “Ten years of unemployment undermine the people’s freedom” 
ID “More voice for your vote” 











Thus, an examination of key campaign slogans used by opposition parties during the 
2004 campaign did not reveal many clues as to what parties would uniquely do to 
advance their particular goals and objectives. 
 
Negative campaigning was a key feature of the campaign. All parties highlighted the 
shortcomings of their opponents. Some parties even launched scathing attacks on each 
other. The ANC lambasted opposition parties with the exception of the NNP due to the 
co-operative agreement between the two parties. This primarily involved President Thabo 
Mbeki’s newsletter which he used to assault the IFP and DA. The IFP was unable to 
refrain from being drawn into a reactive campaign in which it defended itself against the 
ANC. This was particularly evident in the heated exchanges between Chief Buthelezi and 
President Mbeki. Opposition parties also spent a considerable proportion of their energies 
critiquing the government’s performance and attacking each other.  
 
Aware of the increasing strength of the ANC in a context of declining voter participation, 
several opposition parties, most notably the DA, IFP and UDM, spent efforts making the 
general point that the dominance of the ANC was a danger to democracy in South Africa. 
The DA was virulent in pointing out that a vote for the ANC would increase the strength 
of the ANC and a vote for an opposition party, besides the DA, was a “wasted” vote. The 
DA also took pains to draw attention to the NNP’s alliance with the ANC. The DA 
delivered its messages about the ANC, NNP and ID in a particularly harsh tone. Tony 
Leon launched scathing attacks on Thabo Mbeki, Marthinus Van Schalkwyk and Patricia 
De Lille.  
 
The UDM’s entire campaign focused almost exclusively on the shortcomings of the ANC 
to the neglect of its own plans and policy preferences. The ID managed to keep out of the 
fray to some extent, but was also drawn into a reactive campaign with the DA. The ID 
argued that the DA was unpatriotic and opposed the ANC simply for the sake of doing 
so. ID messages countering the DA were relatively hostile and negative. This also 
detracted from the core messages the ID sought to communicate to voters.  The NNP 
devoted much time to painting the DA as an adversarial party which would not achieve 
much and was particularly harsh in their messages regarding the DA, with Van 
Schalkwyk aggressively tackling the DA and Tony Leon. Furthermore, as Schulz-











exclusion and this compromised the party’s call for nation-building and compromise. 
 
5.3 Campaign Messages  
 












The ANC ran its campaign around the themes of the celebration of ten years of 
democracy, emphasizing its achievements, acknowledging its shortcomings and drawing 
attention to their unique strength, experience and commitment as well as setting out their 
future plans. Incumbents face more restrictions when developing a theme – they need to 
find positive aspects of their record and focus on, for example, their strength, integrity, 
competence and legitimacy (Weaver, 1996: 152). The ANC performed well in this 
regard, weaving together its campaign messages into a simple well-blended and 
internally consistent theme.  
 
The main thrust of the ANC’s campaign was that it was the only legitimate party that had 
the competence to improve the lives of ordinary people in South Africa. A key message 
related to its partnership with “the people” in pursuing this goal. This is evident in their 
2004 election manifesto and primary campaign slogan ‘A people’s contract to create 
work and fight poverty’. Other posters simply stated ‘Create work - Vote ANC’ and 
‘Fight poverty - Vote ANC’. ANC posters featured a smiling Thabo Mbeki with the 
slogan ‘Vote ANC – A better life for all’.  
 
The ANC adopted a roughly 7-pronged approach in their communications. This included: 
 
 Outlining the apartheid past and the ANC’s contribution to overcoming apartheid; 
 Emphasizing the fact that the achievement of ten years of democracy, delivered 
by the ANC, should be celebrated; 
 The achievements of the ANC since coming into power; 
 Acknowledging challenges and shortcomings in relation to their goals (as well as 
providing reasons for them); 
 Highlighting the reasons that opposition parties lacked the capacity to deal with 
these issues;  
 Drawing attention to the ANC’s unique strength, experience and commitment to 
deal with the pressing social and economic challenges facing South Africa; and 
 Setting out their future plans for dealing with their stated goals. 
 
The ANC in their manifesto, entitled “A People’s Contract to Create Work and Fight 
Poverty”, gave an account of past performance indicating what they had done in the 











continuity with previous policy positions. It provided a 10-year plan of action for 
achieving their goals (African National Congress, 2004a). The manifesto was divided 
into the following sub-sections: 
 Message from the President  
 Celebrating Freedom  
 Celebrating South Africa  
 Actual progress gives us real hope for the future  
 Learning from experience: We can do more, better: Why a people's contract?  
 Vision 2014 - Forward to the second decade of freedom  
 The next five years: The practical steps  
 The next five years: How will this be done?  
 Confidence in the future  
The message from President Mbeki summarized and highlighted key aspects laid out in 
more detail in the manifesto. That South Africa was celebrating ten years of freedom and 
democracy was highlighted along with the fact that transformation had taken place as a 
result of struggle and sacrifice led by the ANC. In his newsletters, President Mbeki also 
gave extensive details of the ANC’s struggle against apartheid thus emphasizing a shared 
history of struggle. Mbeki asserted that through a protracted struggle led by the ANC, the 
apartheid system of white minority domination was defeated and the ANC would 
continue to do everything possible and necessary to eradicate the terrible legacy inherited 
from centuries of racist and apartheid rule.
27
  
A significant component of the ANC’s message was to outline their achievements of the 
previous decade. The ANC’s manifesto provided an extensive list of the government’s 
achievements during the first decade of democracy. These achievements were outlined 
with various statistics used to support the report card given. The manifesto indicated that 
in the ten years between 1994 and 2004 the government had given water and electricity 
to millions of households; built houses accommodating millions of South Africans; 
opened up access to quality education; removed discrimination in access to professions; 
turned the economy around to become more productive and globally competitive and 
placed South Africa in a strategic position to deal with international affairs. President 
                                               
 











Mbeki also reported that the ANC government “has transformed a fractured, poorly 
managed and badly resourced state into a single, coherent state which was progressively 
improving its capacity to meet the needs of all South Africans”.
28
 The party outlined the 
advances that had been made by the ANC-led government to address the challenges of 
poverty while stressing that significant work still needed to be done”.
29
 Extensive detail 
on programmes to deal with poverty;
30
 health care transformation;
31





 and crime prevention strategies
34
 was outlined 
in the ANC Today.  
A critical aspect of the ANC’s campaign was to acknowledge the shortcomings of their 
performance. President Mbeki in his newsletter stated that “We have achieved much, but 
we have also learnt a lot. And because we have this unique experience of leading a 
country through the first ten years of its transformation, we have the capacity to do more, 
and to do it better”
35
. As Booysen (2004) indicates the ANC’s campaign turned 
disappointments into continuous struggle, rather than a reason for sanction. The 
manifesto also offered an assessment of its own performance and noted problem areas 
and challenges which still face them. The ‘People’s Contract’ emphasized that 
government relied on partnerships to drive societal transformation. The manifesto argued 
that many of the things that needed to be done could not be carried out by government 
acting alone. It called on individual citizens, communities, trade unions and other 
organisations to help monitor and report violation of rights and claim their rights. It also 
asked citizens to co-operate with the police, provide information and refuse to buy stolen 
goods. With regard to employment, it called for strategies for growth in key sectors of the 
economy as well as the skills development and the provision of learnerships in both the 
public and private sectors to provide work experience. The manifesto requested the co-
                                               
 
28 See for example African National Congress, 2004v. 
 
29 See for example African National Congress, 2004g. 
 
30 See for example African National Congress, 2004g and African National Congress, 2004o. 
 
31 See for example African National Congress, 2004j.  
 
32 See for example African National Congress, 2004j. 
 
33 See for example African National Congress, 2004m.  
 
34 See for example African National Congress 2004r.  
 











operation of business, workers and all South Africans to promote the country's image and 
to provide good service to investors, tourists and others. 
In particular, the ANC sought to highlight the campaign message of its commitment and 
competence to solve the problems facing South Africa. President Mbeki asserted that: 
“The achievements of the last 10 years have confirmed that the ANC has the correct 
policies to progressively push back the economic and social legacy of apartheid. They 
also confirm that the ANC is the only party with the capacity to effectively implement 
these policies. While every party claims to be able to create jobs, only the ANC has 
shown the ability to effectively manage the economy; the capacity to start tackling 





Vision 2014 indicated that it aimed to reduce employment and poverty by half by 
developing skills, helping small businesses, providing social security, land reform and 
improving the asset base of the poor, paying particular attention to the following 
programmes: 
 A Growing Economy 
 Sustainable Livelihoods 
 Access to services 
 Comprehensive Social Security 
 Crime and Corruption 
 Constitutional rights and governance 
 Africa and the world 
A considerable proportion of the campaign messages related to opposition parties, 
primarily the DA and the IFP. The ANC’s strategy regarding the opposition was to 
marginalize the opposition’s campaign strategies and simultaneously elevate the ANC’s 
image of being the only competent and credible party in South Africa. As Lodge 
(2005:117) reports, the ANC refused to assign them the status of serious rivals.  
 
 
                                               
 











The themes that emerged from ANC campaign communications regarding the ANC’s 
view of opposition parties in South Africa included the following: 
 
 Their policy stances were at odds with the interests of voters while the policies of 
the ANC had the best interests of voters in mind; 
 They were simply interested in obtaining votes compared to the ANC which has 
always been there for voters; 
 They are right-winged in nature and wanted to retain apartheid privilege while the 
ANC wants to unshackle the country from its oppressive past; 
 They used the ANC to obtain media attention because they are too weak to 
generate it themselves; 
 They feared the free expression of the people’s will i.e. support for the ANC 
while the ANC welcomes a mandate from voters;  
 They were sowing division among the electorate while the ANC wants to unify 
South Africa into a non-racial, caring society;  
 They were destined to remain in the role of an insignificant and ineffectual 
opposition while the ANC would fulfill its historic mission; and 
 They are incapable of solving South Africa’s social and economic problems while 
the ANC has the commitment and experience to tackle these problems. 
 
In his newsletter, President Mbeki was at pains to distinguish between the policies of the 
ANC and opposition parties. According to Mbeki “the principal parties that are sworn to 
oppose us during the forthcoming elections” adopted different positions on issues that are 
central to the historic mission of the ANC i.e. “to build a people-centred and caring 
society”. He asserted that parties such as the DA, the IFP and the ACDP “agitate for 
wholesale privatisation of all publicly owned productive enterprises”… “which provides 
basic goods and services to the people as water, electricity, transport and telephones. He 
also criticized their support for "a flexible labour market” , a “free market” and a 
“minimal state” as well as their opposition to minimum wages and conditions for 
employment equity. “In reality”, he argued “what these parties, the DA, the IFP and the 
ACDP and others want is as faithful a return to the old system of unregulated capitalism 
as possible. In our situation, this is the real and undisguised meaning of such phrases as 















A recurrent campaign message of the ANC was that the IFP and DA are right-winged in 
nature and that those parties wanted to retain apartheid privilege. In ANC Today, vol. 4, 
no 12 President Mbeki wrote: “The anti-ANC ‘coalition for change’ … is, in fact, a 
coalition for backward change that would return our country to the days of tension, 
conflict and crisis”. Campaign messages against the IFP related to the IFP’s past history, 
intolerance and violence of the IFP as well as the party’s coalition with the Democratic 
Alliance. President Mbeki described in his internet newsletter how in 1992 and 1993 the 
IFP joined in alliances aimed at derailing the process of negotiations and was now again 




As the campaign heated up, the ANC launched harsh attacks on the opposition parties, 
particularly regarding their campaign strategies. President Mbeki stated that opposition 
parties feared the free expression of the people’s will, i.e. the massive support for the 
ANC and thus questioned their commitment and loyalty to the democratic system. In 
ANC Today, vol 4, no 9 President Mbeki argued that “Perhaps the most fashionable fear 
that is being peddled this time round is a fictional threat of a one-party state. In this 
context, some are marketing themselves as the best choice in the political supermarket, 
on the basis that a vote for them, and therefore a vote against the ANC, is a vote against a 
one-party state, and therefore a vote for democracy”. He further asserted that “Those who 
advance this argument must be exposed for what they are, people who mouth the 
principles of democracy but fear the very democracy they pretend to espouse”.  
 
In response to the DA’s request for a televised debate with President Mbeki, the ANC 
issued three direct statements. The ANC asserted that it would not waste its time in a 
“meaningless dialogue” with the DA and brushed off the request as “nothing more than a 
transparent attempt by the DA to elevate the profile and stature of its leader”. It argued 
that the request “reflects the DA's inability to find anything of substance to offer the 
South African people” and stated that “if the leader of the DA wants to improve his 
image and profile among South Africans, he should do so on his own account - and not 
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hang onto the coat-tails of President Mbeki”. The ANC also asserted that the “DA's 
posturing and grandstanding” was “nothing more than a façade” aimed at diverting 





A strong message that opposition parties were sowing division among the electorate was 
used as part of the ANC’s campaign. In his last newsletter before the elections, President 
Mbeki described opposition parties as undermining the ANC’s objective of building a 
non-racial South Africa: “The ANC is determined to unite our people in the struggle to 
build a non-racial society, speaking for all South Africans. However, some among the 
opposition are equally determined to emphasise our racial and ethnic divisions, to 
polarise our country along these lines, informed by the "prejudices and sectarianism" of 
the past. To this end, these opposition parties claim special status as representatives not 
of our people as a whole, but of particular ethnic or racial groups. They argue against 
affirmative action, such interventions as the Employment Equity Act, minimum wages 




Another campaign message regarding opposition parties was that they had the sole aim of 
being in opposition and/ or opposing the ANC, i.e. “cutting the ANC down to size”. 
President Mbeki argued that “the weakening of the ANC, "cutting it down to size", has 
become the beginning and the end of the campaigns of these opposition parties, rather 




Finally, the ANC sent out a message that opposition parties were destined to remain in 
the role of an insignificant and ineffectual opposition. Mbeki concluded in ANC Today, 
Volume 4, No. 9 that “we will leave the scaremongers and the tellers of false stories to 
define themselves as actors that have excluded themselves from this people’s contract, 
destined to be the permanent professional Opposition”. The ANC thus sought to 
highlight, alongside its own commitment and competence, that opposition parties were 
incapable of solving South Africa’s social and economic problems.  
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To sum up, the ANC’s campaign showed significant consistency with the preceding 
elections in 1994 and 1999. The theme of “a better life for all”, the presentation of the 
role of the ANC in ending apartheid as well as the importance of contracts and 
partnerships with various social actors was consistent with previous campaigns. As 
Lodge (2005:117) indicates, the language used also revived the “people centred” rhetoric 
of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. Piper (2005: 100) argues that 
“Election 2004 saw the ANC return to the left ground it occupied in 1994”. However, 
gradual changes were also evident. In the founding elections of 1994 a large focus was 
on the end of apartheid as embodied in the slogan ‘Now is the time’, whereas in 2004 a 
more practical and hands-on approach was used to present the ANC as competent within 
their role as the government of the day. The message that “the tide has turned” became 
institutionalized and indicated to voters that the ANC-led government was successful in 
ushering in change in South Africa (Booysen, 2005:131).  
 
Not only did the ANC develop a clear overarching campaign theme consistent with 
previous campaigns, it also used primarily comparative messages. A key characteristic of 
the ANC’s campaign was to contrast itself with the opposition parties. Shortcomings of 
an otherwise unassailable campaign was the aggressive way in which opposition parties 
were criticized and the fact that the p licy differences highlighted in the weekly 

























The DA ran its campaign primarily by asserting that it had the capacity and the 
appropriate policies to deal with South Africa’s key problems. The DA highlighted the 
fact that it was ready to take office because it had the means to deliver. It presented itself 
as an alternative government rather than just an opposition party (Booysen, 2005:137). 
The DA also contrasted itself against the ANC and other opposition parties. It 
communicated the message to voters that other parties lacked sound policies, competence 
and integrity or they simply served to fracture the opposition. The primary theme used by 
the Democratic Alliance during the 2004 campaign was “South Africa deserves better”. 
The party’s message strategy was three-pronged ranging from the projection of DA 
strengths and its policy alternatives, to highlighting ANC weaknesses with reference to 
integrity and policy as well as the weaknesses of other opposition parties (Booysen, 
2005:136).  
 
The DA emphasized the following key messages to the electorate: 
 
 That the DA had experienced and was continuing to experience significant 
growth since 1994; 
 That the DA had strengthened it’s position through its alliance with the IFP; 
 That it had a series of workable policies that would deal with South Africa’s 
social and economic problems; 
 That the democratic health of South Africa depended on a strong and powerful 
opposition; 
 That the ANC’s strength should be reduced so as to avoid the risk of sliding into 
one-party authoritarianism; 
 That the ANC’s policies are weak, they had performed poorly since coming into 
power and had failed South Africa in a number of key areas; 
 That the ANC lacked integrity as illustrated by high levels of corruption and 
through President Mbeki’s personal beliefs; and 
 That other opposition parties lack the capacity to deal with these issues and to 
tackle the ANC. 
 
The DA in their manifesto, entitled “A Better South Africa”, gave a detailed outline of 
their policy positions (Democratic Alliance, 2004a). They also provided a plan of action 











Tony Leon indicated that the Democratic Alliance spent two years drafting the manifesto 
in conjunction with the people of South Africa and the country’s top thinkers. He further 
stated that it represented a programme for real change that would deliver “to the people 
of our great country proper security and lasting prosperity; and bring opportunity and 
hope to their lives and justice into their midst”. The manifesto outlined how the DA 
would: 
 Create opportunities; 
 Fight crime;  
 Improve living conditions; 
 Build communities; and 
 Safeguard democracy. 
 
The manifesto set the DA out as South Africa’s only serious alternative to the ANC. It 
stated that they were the only political organisation in South Africa, other than the ANC, 
that had political reach in every province and were therefore capable of forming the 
central pillar of a democratic alternative. The manifesto acknowledged the progress and 
achievements of the past ten years but argued that “for millions of South Africans, these 
successes have been overshadowed by the ANC government’s broken contract with the 
people of South Africa: its failure to deliver the better life it promised in 1994”. The 
manifesto further criticized the ANC government for having “failed to achieve 
meaningful gross domestic product growth and to break the cycle of unemployment and 
bring down levels of violent crime”. It indicated that since the ANC government has been 
in office, “at least one million jobs have been lost; a quarter of a million South Africans 
have been murdered; and violent crimes like rape and child abuse have increased 
dramatically and disastrously”. Furthermore, it indicated “the disposable income of the 
poorest South Africans has fallen whilst a staggering 21 million South Africans still live 
in poverty”. The manifesto was also particularly critical of the ANC government’s 
response to HIV and AIDS. It argued that the ANC had accumulated power for itself 
while leaving the people of South Africa behind.  
 
In its manifesto, the DA set out its policies on how it would create a jobs-friendly 
environment with more investment and less regulation; develop skills for a booming 
economy; create harder-working schools with more effective teaching; conduct more 











that meant business; tackle corruption and provide justice for victims; provide access to 
water, food,  shelter, health services, welfare grants and a basic income grant; develop a 
new framework for healthcare, provide anti-retroviral treatment; provide care for AIDS 
orphans; alleviate poverty; end homelessness by building sustainable communities and 
develop a trustworthy transport system. The DA manifesto also argued that a culture of 
entitlement caused by the format of affirmative action would undermine democracy and 
that steps to overcome historical disadvantage should not help those who no longer 
needed it. The manifesto asserted that by interpreting affirmative action as discriminatory 
quotas, the ANC government had sown seeds of new bitterness in society, excluded 
many skilled capable people and placed severe constraints on economic growth. It 
indicated that the DA would amend the Employment Equity Act to make it more 
attractive to employers and incorporate sunset clauses into affirmative action laws so that 
they would automatically expire in 2010. 
 
The message that the DA wished to highlight through its “Coalition for Change”, entered 
into with the IFP, was that it could challenge the ANC for government over the next five 
years through a multi-identity liberal movement (Booysen, 2005). Tony Leon asserted 
“we are confident that we will make new and historic gains in every province. We will 
double our support from the 1999 election. Together with our allies in the Coalition for 
Change, we will win up to 30 percent of the national vote, and we will co-govern in the 
Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal… We will no longer just be the official opposition; 
we will become the core of an alternative government”.
42
  Tony Leon also argued in his 
weekly newsletter that “the Coalition for Change has sent a clear message of hope to the 
people of South Africa-hope for an end to one-party domination, and hope for a more 
prosperous and peaceful future. He argued that “Together, the DA and the IFP can win 
up to 30 percent of the vote. We can roll back the dominance of the ANC at the national 
level and win in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. We will use our growing power 
to push for strong alternatives to the governments failed policies. We will make sure that 
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Tony Leon in his newsletter explained that the DA would spend over R1,5bn to fight 
crime; R4bn to improve education and training; over R1bn for transport, infrastructure 
and land reform; and over R4bn on a basic income grant and opportunity vouchers. He 
also outlined proposals for tax breaks to encourage employment and investment. He 
argued that their proposed spending cuts would save over R16-billion which would 
impose a total additional fiscal cost of just under R1bn, which will see the budget deficit 
rise to only R42 billion, or 3,2% of the GDP. This, according to Leon, would have a 
stimulatory effect on the South African economy, would not require new taxation and 
would result in a significant decrease in the debt burden, thereby preserving 




Tony Leon and other DA members were virulent in their messages questioning the 
integrity of the ANC.
45
  The DA characterized the ANC as an intolerant and arrogant 
party.
46
 DA attacks on ANC integrity included the following: corruption in officialdom, 
provincial governments; enriching only the few; president seeking third term and a poor 
choice of international friends (Booysen, 2005). Tony Leon argued in one of his weekly 
newsletters that numerous ANC policy documents revealed a hunger for absolute 
power.
47
 Leon in another newsletter asserted that “the conduct of the President—around 
the issues of the third term, the succession, the fate of the Deputy President, the 
appointment of Cabinet ministers, and the nomination of premier candidates—has 
arrested the development of South African democracy. It will take years of hard work to 
undo the damage that this imperial presidency has done—to restore transparency and 
openness to South African political life”. He added that “The Democratic Alliance and 
the Coalition for Change will see to it that the third term never becomes a possibility. We 
intend marshalling enough votes to prevent that from ever happening”.
48
 In February 
2004, Tony Leon challenged Thabo Mbeki to a live televised debate.
49
 The DA asserted 
that Mbeki’s refusal to conduct the debate was a sign of arrogance and unaccountability. 
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Tony Leon stated that the “people are tired of a President who runs away from a 
debate…”
50
 Tony Leon also stated that President Mbeki is running scared. He continues 




The DA presented an extensive critique of the ANC’s performance. In addition to 
attacking the ANC’s integrity, the DA also had a series of campaign messages which 
highlighted the fact that ANC policies had failed, that poverty was rife, that the 
government didn’t care about the poor and AIDS sufferers and that the ANC refused to 
acknowledge policy failures (Booysen, 2005). Tony Leon asserted in his weekly 
newsletter that the ANC was creating poverty and fighting work.
52
 Leon argued that “on 
every major social issue facing the people of South Africa, the President and the ANC 
are in the wrong. And the DA has the right answers. The DA supports economic policies 
that will create millions of real jobs by unleashing the private sector and boosting growth. 
The ANC does not. The DA supports a basic income grant. The ANC does not. The DA 




The DA presented the message that small opposition parties lacked the capacity to deal 
with social and economic issues and the strength to tackle the ANC and so votes for such 
parties serve primarily to fracture the opposition to the ANC. These messages were 
primarily aimed at voters considering voting for the NNP and the ID. Thus, in addition to 
targeting messages against the ANC, the DA also developed a series of messages 
designed to swing voters away from other smaller parties. The DA pointed out that a vote 
for the NNP was in reality a vote for the ANC (Southall and Daniel, 2005). According to 
Booysen (2005), DA campaign messages regarding the NNP branded the party as 
bankrupt and a “lap dog” of the ANC and the Independent Democrats as a one-woman 
show lacking a comprehensive and well-researched policy platform. 
 
Overall, the DA’s campaign was consistent with its previous campaigns in 1994 and 
1999. Key elements of consistency with previous DA campaigns were the focus on the 
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electoral dominance of ANC, criticisms of ANC performance and the presentation of the 
DA as the only viable alternative to the ANC. The goal of having a basic income grant 
represented a key shift for the DA. Analysts also point out that the emphasis on policy 
alternatives was a new area for the DA (Davis, 2005; Hendricks, 2005 and Southall and 
Daniel, 2005). Furthermore, the DA did not give an adequate account of their past 
performance. 
 
An otherwise high-quality campaign was spoilt by the party’s continued preoccupation 
with attacking other political parties. The campaign style was marginally softer than the 
1999 ‘Fight Back’ campaign, however, the ambiguous subtext of the DA’s slogans and 
its messages about affirmative action are likely to have been offensive to many. While 
the DA probably meant to deal with change in the material living conditions of voters, 
the slogan “Vote DA for real change” raised questions such as what type of change had 
occurred prior to this and was the change from apartheid to democracy artificial.  
Furthermore, inherent in its theme (that South Africa deserves better) was a negative 
critique of the ANC. This slogan automatically raised the question: better than what? As 
Booysen (2005) argues these slogans were interpreted “as being polarizing”. Edigeli 
(2004) went as far as saying that the DA predicated its election campaign on “fear-
mongering” and “alarmism”.  
 
While the DA presented a series of comparative messages contrasting itself as a policy-
oriented alternative ready to sort out the ANC’s failed policies, this was marred by the 
lack of internal consistency between the messages. As Booysen (2005:132) indicates, the 
DA’s policy solutions were “overwhelmingly free market which constituted a policy 
environment that was essentially incompatible with the party’s proposal for a basic 
income grant”. Southall and Daniel (2005: 50) also correctly argue that adopting “an 
unconvincing, somewhat populist platform to attract blacks” while simultaneously 
campaigning “against black economic empowerment, affirmative action and minimum 
wages in favour of a largely unrestricted free market and more flexible labour laws” 

























The IFP set out to run its campaign by contrasting itself against the ANC around the 
theme of government performance, emphasizing the issue of HIV and AIDS. This was 
communicated in the campaign manifesto and official communications. The IFP’s 
campaign emphasized “making a difference together”. Campaign communications 
generally centred on Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who featured on most IFP election 
posters. Much of the IFP’s campaign messages focused on policy issues such as 
HIV/AIDS, crime, unemployment, corruption and education.   
 
The IFP emphasized the following key messages to the electorate: 
 
 That it had a series of workable policies that would deal with South Africa’s 
social and economic problems; 
 That the IFP had strengthened it’s position through its alliance with the DA; 
 That the ANC’s strength should be reduced so as to avoid the risk of sliding into 
one-party authoritarianism; 
 That the ANC had performed poorly since coming into power and had failed 
South Africa in a number of key areas most notably HIV/Aids, corruption, crime, 
unemployment and poverty;  
 That on previous occasions those that were dissatisfied with the ANC’s 
performance had abstained from voting but that they should not make the same 
mistake in 2004; and  
 That KwaZulu/Natal had performed better than other provinces under the 
leadership of the IFP and this demonstrated the capacity and the will of the IFP in 
dealing with critical issues. 
 
The IFP manifesto, entitled “Real Development Now: Let Us Make a Difference –
Together” (Inkatha Freedom Party, 2004a), was divided into the following sub-sections: 
 
 Introduction by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi 
 HIV/AIDS 
 Corruption 













 Foreign Policy 
 
In his introduction Chief Buthelezi indicated that South Africa’s democracy “is facing 
grave risks” and that a “democratic alternative is needed to win the wars against 
HIV/AIDS, unemployment, crime, poverty and corruption and prevent the consolidation 
of a one-party state”. The IFP in their manifesto presented an extensive critique of the 
ANC’s performance. The manifesto contended that the ANC abused its power by 
amending the constitution to allow for floor-crossing legislation to be introduced. The 
manifesto criticized centralized power as being an autocratic threat to democracy and 
indicated that the IFP would champion federalism and decentralisation of power. The 
manifesto was particularly critical of the ANC’s performance in its response to 
HIV/AIDS.   
 
The manifesto provided an extensive outline of the IFP’s policy positions. It also 
provided an in-depth outline of the steps the IFP would take to achieve their goals on the 
key issues of HIV/AIDS, corruption, job creation and economic growth, poverty, crime 
and foreign policy, if elected. In particular, the manifesto promises that the programme of 
providing anti-retroviral drugs for infected mothers and for all living with HIV/AIDS 
would be extended to other provinces. The manifesto set out three 'C's' to characterize the 
nature of the IFP: Caring, Capable and Clean. The manifesto argues that they had 
developed common-sense proposals to address HIV/AIDS, crime, unemployment, 
corruption and poverty. It outlined each component as follows: 
 
Caring - The IFP cares about how decisions taken by government affect people's lives. 
Capable - The IFP will provide capable, effective leadership in government.  
Clean - The IFP is committed to transparent and corruption-free government.  
 
With regard to their past performance, the manifesto outlined the position the IFP took in 
ensuring the distribution of Nevirapine to all HIV-positive pregnant women in 
KwaZulu/Natal and its defence of this decision against the central government in the 
Constitutional Court. Chief Buthelezi also outlined the policies of the IFP at the 
numerous rallies which he attended. He promised to provide anti-retroviral drugs for 











drug provision sites. He also indicated that the IFP would identify all children in 
exceptional need and promote support for their well-being in the community. 





At the end of March the IFP released a series of pledges. The IFP's Job Creation Pledge 
committed the IFP to “moving away from theory into action” and pledged to: promote 
investments in order to create jobs; ensure a free market economy; establish the 
necessary infrastructure and economic environment to allow industry and commerce to 
flourish; promote small business as the engines of employment growth; ensure that the 
participation of disadvantaged people in the active economy was not limited to a selected 
few; and implement programmes that would significantly reduce levels of 
unemployment. The programmes would include small business development, agricultural 
co-operative arrangements, cash-crops for export and public works programmes.
55
  
In the IFP's “Pledge for Clean Governance”, the party committed itself to clean, corrupt-
free governance and pledged to act quickly and decisively should any of its public 
officials be convicted of corruption. It also pledged to ensure that all IFP officials sign an 
anti-corruption pledge committing themselves to:  
 Upholding the highest levels of integrity;  
 Remaining above reproach in the execution of their duties and in their private 
lives; 
 Not accept material or financial gain arising from their public positions beyond 
their official positions;  
 Offer their immediate resignation from public office should they fail the public or 
the IFP in this undertaking; 
 Encourage a whistle-blowing culture, by civil servants, the public and the private 
sector, which acts as a watchdog and a deterrent; and   
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 Strengthen the protection of individuals who provide information on corruption.56 
In the IFP's “Pledge for a Safer South Africa”, the IFP pledged to: have a zero tolerance 
approach towards crime of any kind; use local government as an instrument to uproot 
crime; extend the role of communities in the Community Police Forums; establish Urban 
and Rural Crime Watches to enable the community to safeguard each other's and their 
own properties more effectively; support the establishment of a Crime Victim Fund to 
assist victims of crime in their respective expenses; have more visible policing and make 
police stations user and community friendly; upgrade the police service by providing 




The IFP also sought to communicate that it had strengthened it’s position through its 
alliance with the DA. At a rally in the Eastern Cape, Buthelezi said that “Our partnership 
with the DA has come together not because of issues of ideology, or race, but on the 
basis of concrete strategies, policies and solutions to deal with the issues of HIV/Aids, 
corruption, crime, unemployment and poverty. Together we can generate the million 
additional jobs that South Africa needs and put hundreds of thousands of law 
enforcement agents on the streets. Together we can run civic education programmes, not 
only in schools, but in communities, workplaces and all building blocks of our society, to 
ensure that the culture of crime is eradicated from the hearts and minds of our people.”
58
 
In a speech at a joint DA election rally, Buthelezi exclaimed that “as we stand together 
on this podium, our respective strengths are not just compounded, but they are indeed 
multiplied.  Today, one plus one does not make two, but makes three, and we need to 
bring the added value of this coalition into an electoral victory on April 14, not for our 
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The IFP also argued that the ANC’s strength should be reduced so as to avoid the risk of 
sliding into one-party authoritarianism. Buthelezi argued that “..the ANC is blinded by its 
desire of seizing control over KwaZulu Natal. There is no doubt that a one-party state is 
rapidly consolidating. The ANC will not rest until it has consolidated in its hands the 
totality of power in South Africa. The totalitarian Government is one which has the 
power of controlling any aspect of Government and civil society. We are now on the 
edge of a totalitarian government and only the IFP stands on its path. 
60
 At a rally in the 
Eastern Cape, Buthelezi said “the coalition for change is also about defending our 
democracy. I have often stated that there are powerful centralistic and authoritarian 
tendencies at work in our democracy. Our democracy is not moving forward but is 
moving backwards. The ANC has the unfettered power to change the Constitution, not 
only at will, but also at whim. The ANC must be cut down to a size where it cannot 
unilaterally change our Constitution. We need to ensure that our democracy is saved 
from the impending threat of a one-party state. We cannot move down the path like some 
countries north of us.”
 61
 At the signing of an agreement between the IFP and Freedom 
Front Plus, Buthelezi said that “the facts of our democracy are that in the past ten years 
we have witnessed an ever-increasing concentration of power, which has undermined the 
many promises contained in our Constitution and its scheme of provincial and local 
government autonomy. We may be witnessing the consolidation of a one-party State, if 




The IFP’s campaign messages regarding the ANC related mostly to poor government 
performance on key issues. The primary campaign message relating to the ANC was that 
it had performed poorly since coming into power and had failed South Africa in a 
number of key areas, most notably HIV/AIDS, corruption, crime, unemployment and 
poverty. At his campaign launch, Buthelezi acknowledged the successes of the past 
decade: “The past ten years have been a history of many successes. There is no doubt that 
the past ten years have seen one miracle after the other. Our country has grown in many 
respects”. He then outlined the five major crises facing South Africa: “They are the crises 
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of HIV/AIDS, crime, unemployment, corruption and poverty… The fact is that the 
majority of our people are much worse off now than they were in 1994”. He asserted that 
the IFP had the solutions and the political will to implement them: “For the past ten years 
the IFP has identified the existence of these problems and has pointed out the standard 
solutions which exist in order to solve them. We have the political will to match the 
required solutions with the necessary determination to implement them”.
63
  
The critique of ANC performance centered primarily on South Africa’s HIV/AIDS crisis. 
At the launch of the IFP’s AIDS pledge, Chief Buthelezi was harsh in his criticism of 
both government policy and performance saying that: “ Unfortunately, the real crisis with 
HIV/AIDS is that it became engulfed in a most pernicious and insane syndrome of 
denial, which has paralyzed government's actions. Only history will be able to explain 
why it had to take an order of the Constitutional Court to force government to save 
newborn children from premature and horrible deaths, because of their contracting 
HIV/AIDS from their mothers at birth”. He added that South Africa had for many years 
had the drugs capable of preventing mother to child transmission of HIV/AIDS and that 
hundreds of thousands of children had died because of government's laissez faire attitude. 
No sudden U-turn in the government policy can compensate for the cost millions of 
South Africans that have had to already pay, for the government’s apathy and failure”
 64
 
Buthelezi argued that “HIV/AIDS alone is an issue which demands and dictates a 
profound change in the leadership of our country. South Africa faces a holocaust and its 
leaders are complacent about it. We believe that South Africa needs an IFP led 
government at the national level to bring sanity, not only in the fight against HIV/AIDS, 




An analysis of Chief Buthelezi’s initial speeches reveals an effort to avoid overt general 
criticisms of the ANC. However, once the campaigns had heated up, the IFP was unable 
to refrain from being drawn by the ANC into a reactive campaign in which it 
simultaneously defended itself against Mbeki’s online accusations of intolerance and 
violence and harshly criticized the ANC. This is particularly evident in the interactions 
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between Chief Buthelezi and President Mbeki. Chief Buthelezi said at an IFP rally” “I 
did not attack the President even though he should have been held accountable for the 
shambles in which our hopes for industrial growth really are in due to a lack of long-term 
vision…Therefore I was flabbergasted when the President himself went out there for no 
rhyme or reason, to attack me personally in order to discredit the IFP. I could not 
understand why he would do a thing like that. Finally, I understood why he did it. He did 
it to move the attention of the South African people away from the real issues, which are 
those of HIV/AIDS, crime, unemployment, poverty and corruption…. I will not be 
dragged into responding to such lies, which belong to an age which we should have long 
forgotten and buried… The people of this region know that my conscience is clear, and at 
no point in my life have I ever spoken the language of violence or have I ever authorised, 
ordered, condoned or ratified any human rights violations…I only wonder how he can be 
such a hypocrite because if I was the man the TRC portrayed me to be then how could he 
have kept me for five years in his own Cabinet.” 
66
 Once civilities had ceased between 
the parties, the IFP National Spokesperson issued a statement which said: It is a little rich 
of the ANC to typify the essence of the Coalition for Change as 'right wing' and as about 
the maintenance of 'white privilege'. After all is it not the ANC that is saddled with the 





In all of his speeches at the numerous rallies which he spoke, Buthelezi implored voters 
to not abstain from voting if they were dissatisfied but to rather make their mark against 
the ANC, preferably for the IFP. For example, Buthelezi said at the IFP’s campaign 
launch: “It is essential that the South African people realize the urgency of voting and 
motivating as many people as they know to do the same. By not voting on election day, is 
indeed almost a crime and it is a vote to leave things the way they are, and the way in 
which they will not be solved. I urge all of you to urge other people to have the courage 
to hope and become motivated to motivate others to go and vote on election day. It is 
essential that all those who are politically aware, make arrangements, not only to go and 
vote on April 14th, but also to transport to the voting station, as many people as 
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  At an election rally Buthelezi also said that “If South Africa settles for the 
ANC, it settles for a future which will continue to be characterized in an ever increasing 
manner by the problems of HIV/AIDS, crime, unemployment, poverty and corruption”.
69
 
A key message of the IFP was that KwaZulu/Natal was in a better position than other 
provinces due to the leadership of the IFP. Buthelezi gave the example of how the IFP-
led provincial government of KwaZulu-Natal ensured the distribution of Nevirapine to all 
HIV-positive pregnant women in the province and how it defended this decision against 
the central government in the Constitutional Court. This, he argued, gave South Africans 
an opportunity to see how they would govern the entire nation.
 70
 The IFP also launched a 
tailored version of their national manifesto “Growth and development blueprint for 
KwaZulu-Natal” with specific plans for the province which indicated that the Office of 
the Premier would “take the lead role in working to create the framework to make 
KwaZulu-Natal an economic powerhouse, and a haven for direct foreign investment”.
 71
 
To sum up, the IFP’s campaign was internally consistent. The party presented its track 
record in KwaZulu/Natal and offered a series of comparative messages contrasting its 
policies against its critique of ANC policies. The IFP’s campaign of 2004 which 
emphasized “making a difference together” was consistent with its “a revolution of 
goodwill” campaign of 1999 (Davis, 2005). Key elements of consistency with the IFP 
campaign of 1999 are the focus on federalism and the focus on policy issues such as 
crime, unemployment and corruption. These two campaigns however, differed markedly 
from that of 1994 where the IFP had “imperiled the democratic transition by threatening 
to boycott the founding elections” (Southall and Daniel, 2005:51). Thus, the messages 
presented in 2004 were inconsistent with its previous public communication in 1994. 
And while the party could not necessarily do anything to undo this, as seen in chapter 
four, this would continue to tarnish any campaign messages which the IFP may devise. 
Furthermore, it is likely that building the campaign primarily around Chief Buthelezi was 
                                               
68 See for example Buthelezi, 2004a. 
69 See for example Buthelezi,, 2004h. 
 
70 See for example Buthelezi, 2004b. 











a strategically adverse decision. As Piper (2005:156) argues, the IFP was overly reliant 
on the statesmanlike appeal of Chief Buthelezi.  













In the 2004 election, the overall theme of the UDM’s campaign was its critique of the 
ANC, focusing on the shortcomings of the ANC’s performance. A key message was that 
the ANC had neglected voters and that its policies had shortchanged them. Naidu and 
Manqele (2005:217) note that “the focus of the UDM’s campaign was to attack the 
ANC’s electoral strategy and convince voters that the ANC had abandoned them through 
neo-liberal policies that tended to exacerbate poverty and unemployment”. Not 
surprisingly then the policy areas which the UDM chose to call attention to related to 
economic development and job creation. The campaign centred on party leader, General 
Bantu Holimisa. Some UDM posters included a photo of a disillusioned-looking General 
Holomisa simply stating “vote UDM”. Another widely used poster did not have any 
photo, indicated that ten years of unemployment had undermined the people’s freedom.   
 
The UDM emphasized that they had a series of policies which would focus on creating 
jobs, developing the economy and alleviating poverty. In the UDM manifesto, entitled 
‘Better Future Plan’, the UDM presented its policy positions and plan of action. The 
manifesto stated that the UDM and its leadership understood the fundamental values that 
South Africans apply when choosing their government and asserted that voters want and 
would get the following by voting for the UDM: 
 
 A sense of ownership of government; 
 Direct control of government; 
 An accountable, ethical and incorruptible government; 
 Mutual trust between voters and government; 
 To be in charge of their own destiny; and 
 A say in the management of the country’s resources. 
 
The manifesto set out a detailed list of mechanisms which the UDM would use to create 
jobs, strengthen the economy, alleviate poverty as well as improve health care and 
education. The manifesto also outlined their past performance. Regarding its past 
performance the manifesto indicated that the UDM “has established itself as a significant 
player on the political landscape” gaining 16 seats in Parliament in 1999, and with 
representation in six provincial legislatures and became the official opposition in the 
Eastern Cape and Limpopo legislatures. It also listed the fact that the UDM contested 











manifesto pointed out that the UDM took a leading role in challenging the arms deal. It 
also outlines the way in which the UDM, together with taxi associations, campaigned for 
government to address concerns about taxi recapitalization. These examples, argued the 
manifesto, are indicative of the UDM’s active role in national politics and demonstrated 
that it is a viable, trustworthy and reliable opposition party, up to the task of governing. 
 
According to Naidu and Manqele (2005:217), the UDM more specifically promised to: 
 
 Set up a sustainable development program to create jobs and a productive and 
safe environment for the electorate; 
 Set up a domestic-led growth strategy through small business development; 
 Set up a skills development program to train people to find work; 
 Devote 1 percent of income tax to fund a properly paid, trained and resourced 
police force; 
 Increase public expenditure for education and health care, and reduce the budget 
for defense; 
 Provide a basic service subsidy for the poor; and 
 Develop a national consensus plan of action around HIV/AIDS   
During his speeches, Holomisa also highlighted various aspects of the UDM’s policies. 
He emphasized their policies around skills development, small business development and 
the need for tax havens and subsidies to encourage economic growth and job creation 
(Holomisa, 2004d). He also indicated that a UDM Government would invest more on 
irrigation schemes (Holomisa, 2004b), help both established and new farmers to expand 
their enterprises (Holomisa, 2004c) and would increase spending on education and 
healthcare (Holomisa, 2004a). Additionally, he pointed out that the UDM had grown and 
had support across all racial groups and all South Africans (Holomisa, 2004d).  
In its manifesto and at public events the UDM spent a significant amount of time 
criticizing the ANC’s performance. The UDM emphasized the following campaign 
messages about the ANC: 
 
 That the ANC had failed South Africa in a number of key areas, in particular 
unemployment, poverty and HIV/AIDS;  











through President Mbeki’s personal beliefs;  
 That the ANC was a politically intolerant organisation; and 
 That the ANC was simply interested in obtaining votes. 
 
The UDM’s manifesto while acknowledging the political freedoms obtained since 1994, 
argued that the level of freedom depends on socio-economic conditions. In the 
manifesto’s review of ten years of freedom, it argued that true freedom is not a once-off 
event but an ongoing process. The manifesto emphasized weaknesses in the ANC’s 
performance in the following areas: jobs, education, health, security and property 
ownership. The manifesto asserted that the South African economy was suffering from 
jobless growth due to the confusion created by the ambivalent ruling clique tripartite 
alliance of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP which, it argued, preached elimination of 
unemployment in the streets and legislated retrenchments and greater unemployment in 
parliament. 
 
During all his campaign speeches listed on the internet, Bantu Holomisa directed most of 
his time to criticizing the ANC. For example at a rally in Soweto, Gauteng, Holomisa 
asserted that they might appear to have the right policies, but without political will it 
could not be trusted to deliver” (Holomisa, 2004c).  
 
The UDM’s 2004 campaign strategy was consistent with the strategy used in 1999. 
During that campaign, the UDM also focused on issues such as the need to combat crime, 
solve unemployment, build more houses and improve access to health and education 
whilst simultaneously focusing on the failure of the ANC to live up to its promises 
(Maseko, 1999). Within its manifesto and some campaign speeches the UDM gave an 
account of past performance. The campaign was internally consistent. However, the fact 
that the campaign was centered on General Holomisa could have been counterproductive 
because as the focus group discussions revealed, images of General Holomisa negatively 
affected how campaign messages were interpreted –these messages were regarded as 
tarnished at the outset. The UDM’s campaign messages were also predominantly 
negative, focusing primarily on shortcomings and failures rather than indicating how 
























The main thrust of the ID’s campaign was to present itself as a credible and trustworthy 
party. The campaign of the ID also centred primarily on its leader Patricia De Lille. The 
focus groups suggested mixed views of De Lille. Some viewed her as being opportunistic 
because she left the Pan African Congress and formed the ID during a floor-crossing 
period. Amongst others she had a reputation of being a decisive no-nonsense person who 
had no involvement with any apartheid structures. At the time of the election, the ID was 
the only party headed by a woman. Posters donned a professionally-dressed De Lille who 
offered a smiling “thumbs up. The accompanying slogan detracted from the visually 
pleasing image by vaguely promised “more voice for your vote”.   
 
The ID presented the following key messages to the South African electorate: 
 
 That it would bridge the divides that exist in South Africa; 
 That as the fastest growing political party, the ID will defy predictions of a small 
showing; 
 That the ID had support across traditional social and political divides in SA; 
 That the ID would not resort to coalitions for political expediency; 
 The DA’s approach was damaging to democracy in South Africa.  
 That the ANC had performed po rly in certain areas, most notably its stance 
towards Zimbabwe, corruption, abuse of woman and children as well as HIV and 
AIDS; 
 That the ID has the necessary capacity and infrastructure; and 
 That the ID offers constructive, effective and principled opposition. 
 
The ID’s manifesto was entitled “Bridging the Divides: Uniting South Africa behind a 
Common Vision”. In some aspects, the ID’s manifesto presented details of the ID’s own 
policy positions and in others the manifesto indicated how it would hold the government 
to account in implementing existing policies. Although the party could not give an 
account of its past performance, the manifesto outlined the role that Patricia De Lille had 
played in uncovering irregularities in the arms deal. The ID'S manifesto pledged to 
bridge ten divides of the South African nation. These were listed as follows: 
 
 Government and People - bringing politics back to the people of South Africa and 











 The Cultural Divide - building bridges between the different social groupings; 
 Rural / Urban Divide - ensuring that rural areas are provided with the 
infrastructure and development they need to become integrated into the 
mainstream economy; 
 The Economy – bringing the informal and formal sectors of the economy together 
so that the benefits of future economic growth will translate into substantial job 
creation; 
 Inequality - ensuring that more destitute South Africans gain access to grants and 
striving to close the poverty gap; 
 Human Security - tackling crime that is dividing the nation and communities 
through fear; 
 HIV/AIDS - making HIV/AIDS every South African's responsibility and 
breaking down the persistent and destructive divide of the stigmatisation of HIV 
positive people; 
 Education - ensuring that no South African child will be denied their 
constitutional right to basic education; 
 The Digital Divide - effecting changes in the telecommunications sector to ensure 
that every South African can gain affordable access to the digital world and the 
internet; 
 Global Divide - ensuring that South Africa plays a leading role in fighting for 
global justice on issues such as trade and human rights violations. 
 
The manifesto indicated that it looked to the constitution for its guiding principles. The 
manifesto argued that alternative policies and holding the government accountable for 
their promises was critical. The manifesto also indicated that the ID stood for an “open 
and free society” that “believes in entrepreneurship and the market”. It qualified this by 
adding that government must protect those who are vulnerable and destitute. 
 
The manifesto outlined challenges to democracy, citing the arms deal, delays in dealing 
with the HIV/AIDS pandemic and actions around Zimbabwe, as undermining the 
separation of powers between the Executive and Parliament. It also criticized the 
concentration of power in the Presidency; parliament’s failure in providing oversight, the 
PR system and floor-crossing legislation. The manifesto criticized the government’s 











poverty eradication.  
The ID’s solutions for job creation included support for small and micro-enterprises; 
enhancing the public works programmes; rural development; a well-funded land reform 
programme; establishing Organic Farming Centres of Excellence as well as evaluating 
and revising trade policy. In addition, the manifesto indicated that the ID supported the 
formation of an influential block of developing countries to lobby for the reciprocal 
removal of industrialised countries' agricultural subsidies.  
The ID advocated a comprehensive social security net and cited the Universal Basic 
Income Grant as a temporary measure for enlarging the social security net. The manifesto 
also indicated that in addition to free health care for all children, there should be a 
National Food Security Programme to combat severe child malnourishment in South 
Africa. It argued that pensions should be increased annually in line with the cost of 
living, not inflation. With regard to HIV/AIDS, the manifesto indicated that the ID would 
ensure that the government complies with the Operational Plan for complete HIV and 
AIDS Care, Management and Treatment.  
The manifesto also set out a series of steps to deal with: 
 Human security; 
 Rape and Women Abuse; 
 Education; 
 Corruption; 
 Land; and 
 Ways to enhance South Africa as a society. 
While dealing with the same key areas as other parties and directing criticism at the 
ANC, its message of “bridging the divides in South Africa” was unique. The ID resorted 
to negative campaigning in response to campaign messages presented by the DA but 
largely presented a positive message in its overall campaign. According to Hoeane, 
(2005:202) the ID effectively presented itself as a party that was different from other 
parties, i.e. without baggage and was prepared to challenge the ANC through 
“constructive” and “patriotic” opposition. A key campaign message utilized by the ID 












A substantial proportion of ID campaign messages countered DA messages directed 
against them. Lance Greyling, policy co-ordinator for the ID, cited a Markinor study 
which, five months after the launch of the ID, showed the ID’s support at 2% nationally. 
This, Greyling (2004b) argued, positioned the ID as the fastest-growing political party in 
the country. Greyling additionally pointed out the ID had a broad support base which cut 
across traditional groupings; that the leadership had skills in a range of fields; and that 
the party was committed to not form coalitions. He cited the party’s “Access to 
Education Initiative” as one way in which the ID was helping communities overcome the 
challenges facing them. In another article Greyling (2004a) asserted that the only way in 
which a vote could be wasted was if a political party did not reach the threshold of being 
able to deliver a representative to Parliament. He added that
 
the DA existed solely to be 
anti-ANC.  
 
In sum, the ID managed to develop a unique internally coherent campaign theme and 
while not able to present a track-record, details of Patricia De Lille’s achievements were 
outlined. According to Kotler and Kotler (1999:6), a key challenge for first time 
candidates is to build an appealing message and then capture high level visibility. The 
ID’s messages, as previously outlined, while not necessarily striking could appeal to a 
broad range of voters. The campaign was comparative in nature with an emphasis on a 
positive message, namely bridging the divides in South Africa. The ID did criticize the 
ANC but steered clear of major clashes with the ruling party. As Hoeane (2005:204) 
indicates, the ID ran a targeted campaign that singled out specific issues which were not 

























In the 2004 campaign, the NNP contrasted the aggressive style of the DA against itself as 
the mediator between voters and the ANC.  The NNP’s primary campaign theme was that 
they provided a voice for voters via their coalition arrangement with the ANC.  The main 
thrust of the NNP’s election campaign in 2004 was that they would provide access to 
government decision-making processes and resources. This strategy was evident in all 
their campaign communications. One poster included a smiling Marthinus Van 
Schalkwyk, urging voters to let the NNP be their voice in government. The Western 
Cape’s New National Party launched its own election manifesto called the Cape Plan. 
 
The NNP emphasized the following key messages to the electorate: 
 
 That the NNP had an extensive battery of policies that would deal with South 
Africa’s social and economic problems; 
  That the NNP had strengthened it’s position through its alliance with the ANC 
and thus provided minority voters with a voice in government; 
 That the NNP was still distinct from the ANC; and 
 That the DA’s aggressive style of politics was unsuitable and damaging to 
democracy. 
 
In his introduction to the NNP manifesto, entitled ‘You Deserve a Fair Share’, Marthinus 
van Scalkwyk framed the NNP as the only opposition party that could ensure a voice in a 
multi-party government for opposition voters. He argues that the NNP’s consensus 
politics would be influential in dealing with the ANC and would encourage stability 
while the aggressive style of the DA encourages instability. The manifesto set out the key 
policy positions of the NNP and then listed areas for negotiation. The manifestos account 
of past NNP performance framed the party as having taken the initiative to transform 
South Africa by listing the NNP’s “timeline of courage”. The manifesto outlined how 
voters would benefit from the NNP’s dialogue with the ANC but also took pains to 
indicate how the NNP differed from the ANC (on issues such as the death penalty, 
abortion, affirmative action and Zimbabwe). The manifesto was divided into the 
following sub-sections: 
 
Part I: Message from the National leader; What does the NNP want to achieve? What 











countries challenges; What South Africa needs; Policy that works; Your Party in the new 
South Africa; Remember, your vote is a powerful tool and the road ahead. 
 
Part II: Core Values of the NNP. Political freedom; Economic freedom; Individual 
freedom; Cultural freedom and Religious Freedom. 
 
Part III: Core Positions on Key Issues. Abortion on demand; Affirmative Action; 
Braindrain; Changing of place and street names; Compulsory community service; 
Corruption; Crime and the death penalty; Economy; Euthanasia; Gang violence; 
HIV/AIDS; Housing; Land reform; Minimum wages; Mother tongue education in 
schools; Nepad; Payment for municipal services; Phasing out of commandos; Poverty 
and job creation; Religious instruction in schools; Section 49 of the Criminal Procedures 
Act; Sustainable Development; Women’s and children’s rights and youth. 
 
The New National Party did not have a functioning website. Furthermore the manifesto 
did not provide a plan of action as to how they would achieve their objectives other than 
negotiating with the ANC. 
 
Consistency with previous campaigns was the theme that the NNP had ended apartheid 
and that the NNP was a multi-racial party that welcomed all groups. Rhetoric around the 
potential exclusion of minority groups from the political system was also consistent with 
previous campaigns. However, the NNP’s campaign message of co-operation with the 
ANC was completely inconsistent with previous NNP campaigns. Previously the NNP 
had run predominantly negative campaign’s depicting the ANC as a dangerous, violent, 
authoritarian, politically intolerant party with an economic policy that would bring the 
country to its knees therefore making it not fit to govern (Giliomee, 1994 and Eldridge 
and Seekings, 1995). The collaborative arrangement with the ANC, as well as the 
assertion that this would benefit voters, essentially communicated that the NNP’s 
previous assessment of the ANC was completely inaccurate. It is likely that these 
messages were regarded as completely ludicrous and therefore ineffective. This is 
particularly important given Iyengar and Valentino’s (2000:110) argument that campaign 
communication is most persuasive when it interacts with voters prevailing expectations 












Not only was the 2004 campaign incongruent with previous campaigns but there was also 
a lack of internal consistency between the NNP messages presented to voters in the 2004 
campaign. The core messages, that the NNP had strengthened its position through its 
alliance with the ANC but that it was distinct from and would hold the ANC to account 
on issues such as the death penalty, abortion and affirmative action, were contradictory. 
As Southall and Daniel (2005:48) state the messages of: i) the NNP being committed to 
constructive opposition, reconciliation and consensus political; ii) differing from the 
ANC on key aspects such as being tougher on crime and the handling of Zimbabwe and 
iii) its presence in government giving important leverage to minority groups was as 
confusing as it was unconvincing. Scultz-Herzenberg (2005) also correctly points out that 
the NNP’s stated ideological shift to the centre of the political spectrum was undermined 
by its overall policy stances. 
 
4.4 Conclusion  
 
Did the content of the campaign provide voters with a basis to make a decision and an 
incentive to cast their ballot? Definitely not! South Africa’s campaigning process 
receives a negative score on this second component of the model.  
 
Firstly, with regard to the need for voters to be able to distinguish between parties, the 
growing number of non-partisan voters received minimal clarity as to why they should 
support a particular candidate or party. Parties presented their policies extensively in their 
manifestos, but less so in the more accessible aspects of their campaigns. This 
information therefore did not filter through into the remainder of their campaigns and 
was thus not communicated to voters. The focus on ANC failures was not sufficiently 
coupled with remedies for the situation. As Southall and Daniel (2005:45) argue, “all the 
major parties’ economic platforms were, in essence, so similar, that the opposition was 
simply reduced to saying and saying unconvincingly that, ‘we could do better’”. By and 
large, opposition parties in 2004 did not effectively specify how they would deal with the 
problems facing the nation. Therefore campaign messages blurred rather than illuminated 
the distinctions between parties. 
 
Had South African voters known nothing about their political context and had no prior 











severe difficulties in making choices relating to the 2004 election. The campaign 
messages of opposition parties carried the implicit conclusion that the ANC would win 
by a wide majority. Based solely on the campaign messages conveyed to voters, it would 
be reasonable for a voter to have concluded that: 
• The ANC would win the election by a large majority; 
• That opposition parties have little different to offer voters than that already 
offered by the ANC; and 
• Therefore, their individual vote would not count for much. 
 
That the overall campaign failed in its function of shedding light on the distinctions 
between parties in terms of their policy preferences is made worse by the fact that when 
parties highlight the same problem without communicating different solutions, voters 
turn to other attributes such as trustworthiness, inclusivity and competence as the basis 
from which to make decisions. And as the previous chapter demonstrated, these were 
either absent or viewed in a largely negative light.   
 
In terms of consistency, the focus on progress made and democracy celebrations by the 
ANC and the message to “bridge the divide” by the ID were internally consistent and 
largely positive in nature. The campaigns of the UDM and IFP were also internally 
consistent but the messages were predominantly negative. There was a lack of internal 
consistency between DA messages on a free market economy and other messages such as 
the basic income grant. There was also a lack of internal consistency between the NNP 
messages of holding the ANC to account while simultaneously securing a voice through 
co-operation with the ANC. The NNP’s campaign message of co-operation with the 
ANC was completely incongruent with previous NNP campaigns.  
 
With regard to the type of messages conveyed to voters, each party included in this study 
focused a great deal of energy on the shortcomings of their opponents, with some parties 
launching scathing attacks on each other. The ANC lambasted opposition parties with the 
exception of the New National Party. Opposition parties spent their energies negatively 
by criticizing the government’s performance and attacking each other. Aware of the 
increasing strength of the ANC in a context of declining voter participation, several 
opposition parties, most notably the DA, IFP and UDM, emphasized the general point 











virulent in pointing out that a vote for the ANC would increase the strength of the ANC 
and a vote for an opposition party, besides the DA, was a “wasted” vote. The DA took 
pains to draw attention to the NNP’s alliance with the ANC and delivered its messages 
about the ANC, NNP and ID in a particularly harsh tone. Tony Leon launched scathing 
attacks on Thabo Mbeki, Marthinus Van Schalkwyk and Patricia De Lille. The UDM’s 
entire campaign focused almost exclusively on the shortcomings of the ANC, to the 
neglect of the UDM’s own plans and policy preferences. The ID managed to keep out of 
the fray to some extent, yet was drawn into a reactive campaign with the DA. The ID 
argued that the DA was unpatriotic and opposed the ANC simply for the sake of doing 
so. ID messages countering the DA were relatively hostile and negative. The NNP 
devoted much time to painting the DA as an adversarial party which would not achieve 
much, and was particularly harsh in their messages regarding the DA with Van 
Schalkwyk aggressively tackling the DA and Tony Leon.  
 
In some instances the messages were clearly articulated but the harsh tone in which they 
were conveyed detracted from the content being communicated. The assessment 
conducted in this chapter supports Landsberg’s (2004) view that the campaign of 2004 
was characterized by “acrimony, bitter attacks and rivalry”, as well as Schulz-
Herzenberg’s (2004) view that the style f politics in South Africa limits constructive 
debate. And if, as Buchanan (2001:368) asserts, “aggressive campaign rhetoric, even 
when it conveys factual information potentially useful to voters, reinforces the well-
documented public distaste for candidates, politics, parties and government”,  this 
continuous mud-slinging could well have had the effect of drowning out the messages 












CHAPTER SIX: COMMUNICATING THE CAMPAIGN 
MESSAGES 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
As previously indicated, persuasive and compelling campaign messages will have little 
effect if voters cannot hear them. To contribute to the quality of the democratic system, 
campaign messages should be conveyed as widely as possible. In this chapter I outline 
what parties did to communicate their messages to voters.
72
 I describe the campaign 
strategies (in particular the paid components of these strategies) used by the ANC, DA, 
IFP, UDM, ID and NNP to convey their messages to voters. As the basis of this 
examination, I analyze Nielsen Media Research’s data on advertising spending as well as 





6.2 Party Funding and Spending  
 
In the 2004 campaign in South Africa, political parties did not appear to take the election 
results as a given. They spent vast sums of money to give effect to their campaign 
strategies (Davis, 2005). Advertising expenditure data calculated by Nielsen Media 
Research revealed that in the period January to the end of April 2004, the top six political 
parties collectively spent R46, 672, 219 million on advertisements.
74
 And according to 
Davis (2005:236), the main political parties in South Africa all have media strategists and 
departments that aim to get their party covered in the media through writing press 
releases; alerting the media to the movements of the leaders on the campaign trail as well 
as through paid advertisements.  
                                               
72 Campaign strategies clearly consist of more than simply mechanisms to transmit information to voters. According to 
Marquette (1996), campaign strategies consist of five components, namely: determining which voters in the electorate 
to approach; creating the message to communicate; obtaining necessary resources; timing the activities; and tactics. 
However, given the conceptual design of this study the focus of this chapter will be on the ways in which parties 
sought to communicate their messages. 
 
73 It should be noted that the Advertising expenditure include April 2004, whereas Davis (2005) includes on January to 
March 2004. 
 
74 This does not take into account the cost of media such as the internet, preparation of press releases and press 
conferences as well as the distribution of pamphlets, posters and other campaign paraphernalia not captured by Nielsen 












The Independent Broadcasting Authority of South Africa (ICASA) also allocated free 
radio broadcasting time to all parties that registered candidates. This was done in such a 
way that even parties without parliamentary representation received at least a quarter of 
the time available to the largest represented party (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2005: 6). Free 
two-minute advertising slots, called Public Election Broadcasts (PEBs), were provided to 
all political parties contesting seats in the National Assembly during prime listening time 
on all national radio stations. The PEBs were allocated to each party through a formula 
that considered the amount of seats each party held in national and provincial legislatures 
and the amount of candidates fielded by each party (Davis, 2005:236). 
 
In South Africa, parties represented in the national and provincial legislatures are funded 
on the basis of a formula consisting of proportional and equitable components of a fund 
appropriated by Parliament and managed by the IEC. The formula is tied to the number 
of elected public representatives in each party in the national and provincial 
legislatures. Through this fund R66.6 million was allocated in the 2003/4 tax year to 22 
parties. Public funding of parties is regulated by the Public Funding of Represented 
Political Parties Act 103 of 1997 and the Regulation under Section 10 (1) of the Public 
Funding of Represented Political Parties Act 1997 (Regulation R117, 1998) issued on 20 
November 1998.
75
 Parties are required to organize their audited financial statements in 
accordance with six descriptive categories: Personnel Expenditure, Accommodation, 
Travel, Arrangement of meetings & rallies, Administrative and Promotions and 
publications (Kotze; 2004a:27-44). In 2003/2004, R42 million was allocated to the ANC; 
R7 million to the DA; R5 million to the IFP; R4.7 million to the NNP; just under 1.8 
million to the UDM and R270 000 to the ID.  
 
As can be seen in table 7 below, the ANC, DA, IFP, UDM and NNP primarily spent their 
allocation on personnel and administration. The ANC spent almost R15 million of its 
allocation on promotion and publications. The ID spent practically all of its funds 
arranging meetings and rallies (which was hardly surprising given that it was only 
formed shortly before the 2004 election).  
 
 
                                               











Table 10: Party Income and Expenditure: 2003/2004 Financial Year 
 ANC DA IFP UDM ID NNP 
Allocation for the year 42 573 853 7 087 154 5 050 841 1 779 752 270 277 4 702 101 
Less: total expenditure 42 572 100 6 949 563 5 111 225 1 655 704 257 609 4 723 160 
1) Personnel Expenditure 21 556 123 4 934 463 3 159 309 356 597 -- 1 224 106 
2) Accommodation 59 805 -- -- 37 360 -- 35 740 
3)Travel  614 781 21 798 84 714 277 378 -- 240 278 
4) Arrangement of meetings & 
rallies 
13 510 -- 195 442 89 499 257 000 227 825 
5)Administrative 5 482 659 1 857 816 1 354 148 471 939 609 1179 875 
6) Promotions and publications 14 845 222 135 486 52 053 422 931 -- 1 815 336 
Fixed Asset Expenditure -- -- 265 559 -- -- -- 
Unspent money at year-end 145 456 137 591 60 384 124 048 12 668 21 059 
Plus: Interest and other income 14 160 15 352 22 678 5 657 56 -- 
Surplus/(deficit)   131 296 152 943 37 706 129 705 12 724 21 059 
Source: Kotze, 2004a. 
 
Political party funding and the financing of electoral activities are virtually unregulated 
in South Africa, with no legal limits on the amount parties may spend on electioneering, 
nor any requirements for disclosure of the sources and amounts of private donations. The 
IEC allocates funding for supporting electoral activities, proportionate to the size of each 
party’s existing representation at the inception of the campaign (Lodge and Scheidegger, 
2005:34). As a result, the already strong parties gain the most advantage. Currently, 
powerful parties automatically receive far larger shares of resources and are therefore 
able to command more media coverage, resulting in a situation where power structures 
are reinforced, leaving little opportunities for smaller parties. This, as Kotze (2004b:100) 
argues, “entrenches the minorities and majorities of previous elections”. 
 
Kotze (2004a:43) argues that “access to financial resources will always be considered by 
contesting parties as the crux of their success or failure”. However, Faull (2004) in his 
analysis of advertising expenditure per vote won, points out that the ID spent relatively 
little on advertising, R531,189 compared to the NNP’s R2,682,721 or R1.97 and R10.41 
respectively, per vote. The NNP was allocated R4, 702, 101 million compared to the ID’s 
R270 277 in the 2003/4 tax year (Kotze, 2004a:42). Thus, while campaign strategies are 
dependent on adequate resources, money on its own does not translate into effective 
campaigns. The issue seems to be more complex than insufficient funds, given that the 
ID as a small relatively new party which had far less funds than other parties performed 











6.3 The “Paid” Campaigns76   
 
6.3.1 The ANC 
 
The ANC clearly wanted to rekindle its image in the minds of voters. It primarily 
invested its money in outdoor media advertising, which provides a good way to increase 
identification (Weaver, 1996:210). The ANC spent a total of R12 million on outdoor 
media. Of this, 77% or 9.5 million was spent on billboards and 22% or R2.7 million on 
moving media (advertising on buses, trains and taxis).   
 
Table 11: ANC Advertising expenditure, (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 2004 
ANC Outdoor 4,267,348 4,655,324 3,000,533 435,392 12,358,597 
ANC Print 1,515,554 37,790 2,241,941 4,069,437 7,864,722 
ANC Radio 5,520 621,953 4,350,949 2,310,418 7,288,840 
ANC Total 5,788,422 5,315,067 9,593,423 6,815,247 27,512,159 
Source: Nielsen Media Research Advertising Expenditure 2004 
 
The ANC spent a total of R7, 2 million on radio advertising. The party advertised on 
numerous radio stations, targeting those with the largest listenership figures. Newspaper 
advertising is regarded as the least persuasive of the media commonly used for political 
campaigning due to their inherently passive nature (Weaver; 1996: 207). Nevertheless, 
the ANC also spent R7,8 million on advertisements in the print media. The ANC’s print 
advertisements primarily targeted the weekend papers, some regional dailies as well as 
several community newspapers. This money could arguably have been put to better use 
                                               
76 Unfortunately, I was unable to conduct a full assessment and comparison of campaign activities. What is clear 
though is the ANC and DA had very active campaign trails (Davis, 2005; Booysen, 2005 and Southall and Daniel, 
2005) and were able to generate more news than other parties. The DA held a series of mass rallies jointly with the IFP 
and on its own. Southall and Daniel (2005:50) note that Tony Leon’s campaigning in the townships had “razzmatazz, 
colour and the aura of a party on the move”. The ANC engaged in a series of meet-and-greets, “walk-abouts” and door-
to-door work (African National Congress, 2006). Cabinet ministers and other senior party figures were dispatched at 
taxi ranks, railway stations, community centres, hostels, apartment blocks and shopping malls (Lodge, 2005). The IFP 
also had an active campaign. As (Piper, 2005:154) indicates Chief Buthelezi attended no fewer than twenty nine 
meetings and rallies, three alliance-formation public announcements, eleven walkabouts and meet-and-greet sessions, 
six major press conferences as well as five DA/IFP rallies. The UDM conducted rallies in Limpopo, the Eastern Cape, 
the Western Cape and in Gauteng (www.udm.org.za, 2008). Patricia De Lille visited a cross-section of residential areas 













for radio advertisements, given that it is far more widely used than print media.   
 
The ANC’s website also formed a key component of the ANC’s campaign strategy. The 
ANC’s weekly newsletter, ANC Today (published on ANC’s website), constituted a large 
component of President Mbeki’s communication with the South African public and 
opposition parties during the campaign period. The newsletter also produced much 
earned media with numerous stories being generated around it.  
 
6.3.2 The DA  
 
Undoubtedly the DA also sought to reach as many potential voters as it could during the 
campaign period. The DA spent a substantial sum of money on paid media, spending a 
total of R9.5 million on various advertising formats. The DA was the only party recorded 
as having invested in direct mail, spending just over R70 000 on this form of voter 
contact. The DA invested R1.2 million in print advertising, placing adverts in various 
newspapers and also spent just under R200 000 on outdoor media. 
 
The use of radio advertisements formed the largest component of the DA’s campaign 
strategy with R8 million being spent on radio advertisements. The DA spent over R2 
million on stations with a predominantly black listenership, with R775 000 spent on the 
Zulu-medium station Ukhozi alone. The DA spent R1.3 million advertising on stations 
with a white listenership such as 5fm, Cape Talk, Highveld, Ofm and Radiosondergrense. 
The remainder was allocated to stations such as East Coast Radio, Jacaranda, Radio 702 
and SAFM. According to Weaver (1996; 207), radio is a better medium through which to 
launch a negative attack because it lacks the visual power of television. The DA took this 
view to heart and used a series of radio election advertisements to target its campaign 












Table 12: DA Advertising expenditure, (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 2004 
DA Direct Mail 7,589 0 41,262 23,371 72,222 
DA Outdoor 0 137,350 62,350 0 199,700 
DA Print 24,772 630,881 147,118 459,115 1,261,886 
DA Radio 0 2,284,103  3,739,007 2,022,861 8,045,971 
DA Total 32,361 3,052,334 3,989,737 2,505,347 9,579,779 
Source: Nielsen Media Research Advertising Expenditure 2004 
 
The DA also used their internet site to enhance their campaign strategy. Tony Leon used 
his weekly newsletter South Africa Today (published on DAs website) to respond to 
President Mbeki’s newsletter and as a key communication tool during the campaign 
period. This newsletter also generated earned media with several newspaper stories being 
produced around its content. 
 
6.3.3 The IFP 
 
The IFP spent its funds primarily on radio advertising. The IFP invested just under R1.4 
million in radio adverts, of which over R500 000 was directed at the Zulu-medium 
station Ukhozi FM. This was a prudent decision given that many IFP supporters are 
Zulu-speaking and likely to hear messages delivered via radio.  Another R209 196 was 
spent on advertising with the Xhosa-medium station Umhlobo Wenene FM.   
 
The IFP spent R269 802 on advertisements in print media, the bulk of which went to 
Rapport, an Afrikaans-medium newspaper with a readership base of 1.5 million people. 
A minor amount of R22 500 was spent on outdoor media. Thus, the IFP spent a total of 












Table 13: IFP Advertising expenditure, (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 2004 
IFP Outdoor 0 0 15,000 7,500 22,500 
IFP Print 7,254 7,254 0 255,294 269,802 
IFP Radio 0 0 497,631 861,032 1,358,663 
IFP Total 7,254 7,254 512,631 1,123,826 1,650,965 
Source: Nielsen Media Research Advertising Expenditure 2004 
 
According to Piper (2005:154) the IFP spent most of its money on rallies rather than 
door-to-door campaigning and it lamented the fact that they could only afford 60 000 
posters nationally, a handful of cars and nine election trucks. According to Reverend 
Zondi the IFP had a “fully-fledged Communications Directorate of about ten people”. He 
also indicated that the IFP prioritized radio through placing adverts and PEBs but “did 
not advertise much in the print media due to lack of resources”. He added that the IFP 
used billboards where they could and placed op-ed pieces in newspapers as well as 
announced campaign events through the media
77
. The IFP also had an internet site with 
scripts of Chief Buthelezi’s campaign speeches as well as the IFP’s series of pledges and 
links to the posters used by the IFP during the 2004 campaign.   
6.3.4 The UDM 
 
The UDM spent R3.3 million on paid media. Despite the view by Siviwe Nzwelini, 
UDM National Coordinator, that radio is the most effective medium to reach voters
78
, the 
UDM did not make the most of radio. The largest proportion of the UDM advertising 
expenditure (R1.8 million) was used on outdoor media. The UDM spent half a million on 
radio advertisements investing R128 130 on radio adverts with the Zulu-medium station 
Ukhozi FM and another R117 750 with the English-medium station Metro FM. A series 
of smaller amounts was used for adverts with Good Hope FM, SA FM, Ikwekwezi FM, 
Lesedi FM, Ligwalagwala FM, Lotus FM, Motsweding FM, Munghana Lonene FM, 
Phalaphala FM, Thobela FM and Umhlobo Wenene FM. Of the expenditure on outdoor 
media R1.8 million went to billboards and R31 375 went to moving media which is 
                                               
77 Interview conducted by CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis, in 2004. 
 
















Table 14: UDM Advertising expenditure, (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 
2004 
UDM Outdoor 0 695,400 724,150 416,575 1,836,125 
UDM Print 0 826,313 80,920 34,440 941,673 
UDM Radio 0 0 308,520 252,760 561,280 
UDM Total 0 1,521,713 1,113,590 703,775 3,339,078 
Source: Nielsen Media Research Advertising Expenditure 2004 
 
The UDM spent just over R900 000 advertising in the print media. The largest proportion 
of this, amounting to R284 580, went to the Sunday Times. In addition to this, R210 576 
worth of advertisements were placed in the Mail and Guardian and R108 000 in the now-
closed daily This Day. The UDM had an internet site with scripts of General Bantu 
Holomisa’s campaign speeches.   
 
6.3.5 The ID 
 
Of the parties considered in this thesis, the ID had the least amount of resources and 
therefore spent the least on paid advertisements. In total, the ID spent just over half a 
million rand, with almost all of it on radio advertisements. Of the total of R531 189 spent 
on advertising, they spent R463 246 on radio advertisements. This was a sensible 
decision given that radio is so widely consumed in South Africa. The largest proportion 
of R121 208 was spent on advertisements with Metro FM. An additional R102 516 was 
invested in advertisements with 5FM and R63 468 with SAFM. These are all English-
medium radio stations. A series of smaller amounts was used for adverts with community 
radio stations. The ID spent R67 943 on print advertisements, primarily advertising in 
community newspapers. The decision to advertise in community newspapers was also 
quite clever since it is a free newspaper delivered directly to people’s houses. The only 
exception to this was the Cape Times in which it bought R23 499 worth of advertising 
space.  
 













 According to Kruger, the ID made use of PEBs and an SMS 
campaign, rather than advertisements, due to their limited resources and she added that 




Table 15: ID Advertising expenditure, (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 2004 
ID Print 5,789 13,662 16,618 31,874 67,943 
ID Radio 0 0 69,660 393,586 463,246 
ID Total 5,789 13,662 86,278 425,460 531,189 
Source: Nielsen Media Research Advertising Expenditure 2004 
 
According to Hoeane (2005:195), the ID ran a sophisticated and technologically 
advanced election campaign concentrating on novel technological methods such as 
connecting potential voters to the party through sending of SMS messages and placing 
advertisements in classified sections of newspapers. The ID’s website had an email link 
to Patricia De Lille; pages which provided information on the various components of 
their manifesto; a digital democracy forum page; links to pages; the Young ID page and 
links to pages with information on the elections such as Election 2004 page (Hoeane; 
2005:195). 
 
6.3.6 The NNP 
 
The use of radio advertisements formed the largest component of the NNP’s campaign 
strategy with R1.75 million being spent on radio advertisements. The NNP spent over R2 
million on stations with a predominantly black listenership, spending R775 000 on the 
Zulu-medium station Ukhozi alone. While this meant that NNP messages would reach a 
broad audience, it is unlikely that these messages would have been well-received by 
listeners given their perceptions of the party. Again, Iyengar and Valentino’s (2000:110) 
view that campaign communications need to resonate with voters’ prevailing 
expectations or dispositions to be credible and compelling is pertinent. 
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The NNP also spent R1.3 million advertising on stations with a white listenership such as 
5fm, Cape Talk, Highveld, Ofm and Radiosondergrense. The remainder was allocated to 
stations such as East Coast Radio, Jacaranda, Radio 702 and SAFM.  
 
Table 16: NNP Advertising expenditure, (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 2004 
NNP Print 45,184 151,409 353,385 374,217 924,195 
NNP Radio 0 23,815 1,096,468 638,243 1,758,526 
NNP Total 45,184 175,224 1,449,853 1,012,460 2,682,721 
Source: Nielsen Media Research Advertising Expenditure 2004 
 
Carol Johnson, Media Director of the New National Party, indicated that the NNP 
emphasized canvassing through their “national leaders programme”. She added that they 
alerted the media where Marthinus Van Schalkwyk would be, working closely with 
journalists and political editors at the SABC, giving them a week’s schedule in advance. 
The NNP also distributed press releases to a database of 700 media contacts. It generated 
op-ed pieces by editing speeches of party leaders, giving them a ‘media hook’ and then 
sending them to publications. Johnson added that the NNP also ‘trawled’ the South 
African Press Association looking for pieces to respond to and made use of PEBs.  
Johnson indicated that the NNP distributed approximately 300 000 posters and more than 
a million pamphlets but did not use billboards because they were too expensive. 
 
6.4 Contact With Voters  
An important part of the dissemination process is personal canvassing conducted by party 
volunteers or direct contact between party leaders and voters. As previously noted by 
Weaver (1996:241) such direct voter contact is more effective per voter because it allows 
for two-way communication and humanizes the candidate.  
As seen in the table below, one in four CNEP respondents (24%) indicated that they had 
been contacted by the ANC and almost one in five (18%) had been contacted in person 
by the ANC. These figures are in line with reports that indicated that the ANC 
concentrated its efforts on an unprecedented rank-and-file national door-to-door 











community meetings, hostels, shopping malls, blocks of flats and townhouses (Lodge, 
2005:118). Lodge indicates that the ANC relied on mass party membership mobilization 
and that in every ward, ANC branch members were given lists of houses they were to 
visit and report back on. In door-to-door campaigning, major ANC notables were 
accompanied by councilors, mayors and other local officials who could address any 
grievances raised by residents. This was made possible by the ANC’s revitalization of its 
branch structures prior to the election (Southall and Daniel; 2005:43).  
 
Table 17: Reported Party Contact During 2004 Campaign Period.  
  ANC DA IFP UDM ID NNP 
No contact 76% 88% 91% 90% 91% 90% 
Mail 1% 1% .2% .1% .2% .4% 
Telephone .4% 1% .1% .2% .1% .4% 
In person 18% 3% 1% 3% 1% 2% 
E-mail-- -- .1% -- -- -- -- 
Can’t Remember Method 3% 2% 2% 1% 2% 2% 
Don't Know  3% 5% 6% 6% 6% 5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source of Data: Comparative National Elections Project 2004. 
Question: Please tell me whether any of the following political parties or candidates or their 
representative contacted you during the recent election campaign?  [If Yes]  Was that contact you in 
person, on the telephone, by mail, or by email? 
 
 
However, only one tenth of CNEP respondents said that they had been contacted by 
opposition parties. Furthermore only negligible proportions those that said they were 
contacted by opposition parties, could say how they had been contacted. Minimal 
amounts of voters were contacted by opposition parties in person. Despite the fact that, 
according to Piper (2005:154), IFP local structures were central to voter registration and 
party information dissemination, a mere 1% said that they had been contacted by the IFP 
in person.  
 
6.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter revealed a vast disparity in the resources available to parties which further 
stacked the odds against smaller parties while advantaging parties that are already strong. 
Additionally, the survey data revealed a striking lack of contact between opposition 













The ANC and the DA were able to mount impressive strategies due to their unrivalled 
access to resources through public and private funding (Davis, 2005:242). They were 
also able use their leaders’ internet newsletters to have a public sparring match and 
generate publicity for themselves. Despite having far less funds, the ID was innovative in 
its campaign strategy. The NNP, however, spent over two million rand advertising on 
radio station where the target audience was likely to have predominantly negative images 
of it. The UDM failed to fully utilize the reach of radio instead choosing to spend most of 
its money on outdoor advertisements.  
 
To increase voter access to campaign messages, parties should increase the extent of 
direct contact with voters and move away from print to radio advertising. This would 
enhance their capacity to reach more voters and be a more effective use of resources. 
Given the fact that large proportions of the South African speak a diversity of languages 
and live in predominantly rural areas, it is important for parties to tailor their advertising 











CHAPTER SEVEN: MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE 2004 
CAMPAIGN 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The mass media has several functions during an election campaign. In addition to being 
the vehicle for political advertisements from the parties, analytical or political 
commentary in the media synthesizes a large number of campaign activities and events, it 
influences which campaign issues and themes that will become most important, it 
crystallizes the differences in policy positions of the political parties, and it assesses the 
performance of the parties (Kavanagh, 1995:177). In order to contribute to the quality of 
the democratic system, broadcast and print media organizations should ideally cover 
campaigns in ways that emphasize candidate policy proposals that draw attention to the 
larger meanings of the choices that voters face and that accurately portray the content and 
the tone of candidate presentations. Journalists should avoid various forms of reporting 
that detract from such coverage, such as overemphasizing personal conflicts between 
candidates (Buchanan, 2001:365).  
 
I start this chapter by giving an overview of South African media access and media use 
patterns during 2004. I then assess whether campaign coverage was provided by media 
that are easily accessible to voters. I describe the media’s coverage of the campaign, 
specifically the information communicated by the mass media about the ANC, DA, IFP, 
UDM, ID and NNP in the 2004 election campaign. I also assess the extent of policy-
related coverage and whether the media focused on issues of concern to voters. I check 
whether voters trusted and perceived the media as unbiased as well as verify these 
perceptions by checking the content analysis data for evidence of bias. Taken together, 
these assessments will determine whether the media’s coverage of the campaign helped 
clarify the issues for voters. 
 
7.2 Profile of the Media in South Africa   
Post-apartheid South Africa has a well functioning and diversified media (Jacobs and 











industry as well commercial television and radio exists in South Africa.  
7.2.1 Radio  
 
In South Africa, as in the rest of Africa and the developing world generally, radio is a 
particularly important form of mass media – it has the advantage of reaching illiterate or 
semi-literate voters and those living in rural areas in the preferred language of the voter. 
Radio is thus a versatile and effective way of communicating political messages 
(Weaver, 1996: 206). Moreover, as the figures below very clearly show, in 2004, a very 
high proportion of South African voters could gain access to campaign information 
through radio, if such information was provided to them.  
 
With the deregulation and liberalization of broadcasting in the late 1990s, there was a 
proliferation of radio stations. By 2004, South Africa had over 100 community stations 
broadcasting in all eleven official languages.  The SABC provides both a commercial and 
a public service, each administered separately, with commercial radio stations 
subsidizing the public service stations (www.southafrica.info, 2006).  
 
By 2004, 33 7 million owned radio sets, compared to 10.4 million in 1994 (Allerman, 
2004). In addition to high levels of ownership, South Africans spent a substantial amount 
of time listening to the radio in 2004. In terms of radio listenership, 91% of adults South 
Africans interviewed by SAARF said that they had listened to the radio in the past seven 
days (SAARF, 2004a). The average time spent listening to the radio in 2004 was 
approximately four hours per day and 32 hours per week. South Africans living in 
provinces with metropolitan areas spent less time listening to the radio than those living 
in more rural provinces such as the Free State, Mpumalanga and Limpopo. Listening 
time was lowest in the Northern and Eastern Cape (SAARF, 2004c).  
 
The vast majority of South Africans listened to SABC’s African language radio stations. 
In 2004 Ukhozi FM, the SABC's Zulu cultural service was the most popular radio station 
with 6.5 million listeners. Metro FM, the SABC’s largest national commercial station in 
South Africa, targeting 25- to 34-year-old black urban adults and broadcasting in the 
metropolitan areas, followed closely behind with 5.8 million listeners 











 Table 18: Listenership of Radio in 1,000's [Past 7 days], February - April 2004  
SAARF AMPS 2004 
 Number of listeners % of Adult Population (30 656 000) 
Ukhozi FM 6507000 21.6 
Metro FM 5872000 19.9 
Umhlobo- Wenene FM 5075000 15.5 
Lesedi FM 4160000 13.4 
Thobela FM 3274000 10.5 
Motsweding FM 3134000 11.2 
Jacaranda FM 2743000 8.2 
94.95 East Coast Radio 2100000 6.1 
Rodiosondergrense 1762000 5.6 
99.2 YFM 1573000 6.4 
Ligwalagwala FM 1570000 5 
Munghana FM 1497000 4.2 
5FM 1414000 4.4 
Ikwekwezi 1406000 4.7 
94.7 Highveld Stereo 1373000 4.8 
KFM 94.5 1224000 3.8 
Kaya FM 1100000 4 
Phalaphala 891000 2.5 
RMFM 887000 2.2 
CKI FM Stereo 762000 2 
P4 KZN 662000 2.1 
Radio Pulpit 573000 2.1 
Good Hope FM 557000 1.9 
P4 Cape Town 556000 1.8 
SA FM 525000 2 
OFM 94-97FM 490000 1.5 
Lotus 471000 1.5 
Algoa FM 436000 1.5 
702 Talk Radio 278000 0.9 
Radio 2000 211000 0.9 
Classic 102.7FM 169000 0.6 
567MW 116000 0.4 
BRFM 51000 0.1 
Total Community* 5484000 15.6 
*Community radio stations include approximately 100 religious, student and other radio stations. 
Source of data: South African Advertising Research Foundation 
 
Umhlobo FM, the SABC's isiXhosa cultural service, broadcast in the Eastern Cape, 
Western Cape, Northern Cape, Free State, Gauteng, North West and KwaZulu-Natal, had 
over 5 million listeners. Lesedi FM, a seSotho radio station, had over 4 million listeners 
and broadcast to audiences living in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, North West, Free State, 
Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal.  Thobela FM, the SABC's Sepedi cultural service, had 
over 3 million listeners in Limpopo. Motsweding FM is a Setswana community service 











State also had over 3 million listeners (www.southafrica.info, 2006). Radio stations could 
thus be a powerful way of bringing information about political parties and elections to 
voters.  
 
7.2.2 Television   
 
While political parties are prohibited from advertising on television in South Africa, 
coverage of the campaigns via television results in powerful visual images (Weaver, 
1996:207) giving many voters the opportunity to see their leaders in a way not possible 
through other forms of media (Kavanagh,1995:216). 
 
The SABC’s television broadcasting was a powerful propaganda vehicle for the apartheid 
state. After 1994 it has been accused of serving the same purposes for the ANC 
government (Davis, 2005: 233). The SABC broadcasts on three domestic channels, with 
a mixed entertainment and public service mandate. SABC1 broadcasts in a wide range of 
languages, carrying news, entertainment and sports. SABC2 also carries programming in 
a range of languages, including most of the SABC's Afrikaans programming. SABC3 
runs most of the SABC's English content. Launched in 1998, E-TV is South Africa's only 
free-to-air television channel. The station carries a mix of news, sports and entertainment. 
E-TV broadcasts mainly in English, although does carry some programming in other 
languages in order to comply with its license requirements (www.southafrica.info, 2006). 
All channels dedicate half an hour to news, of which a portion is given to a market report, 
sports news and a weather forecast. 
 
A substantial proportion of South African voters could gain access to campaign 
information through television in 2004. By 2004, 8.2 million people owned television 
sets compared to 5.8 million in 1994. Ownership of television sets thus increased by over 
2 million between 1994 and 2004 (Allerman, 2004). Television was previously regarded 
as an urban media form due to the poor infrastructure and servicing of rural areas; 
however, by 2004 almost 45% of rural households had TVs (compared to 27% in 1994). 
Television penetration in urban areas by 2004 stood at 84% of all households 
(www.saarf.co.za, 2004e). South Africans spent an average of three hours watching 











According to SAARF data, SABC 1 had the highest proportion of viewers with 
approximately 21 million people (or 70% of an adult population of 30.6 million people) 
saying that they had tuned in to this channel in the past seven days. This was followed by 
E-TV almost 18 million viewers or 59% of adults and SABC 2 with almost 17 million 
viewers or 55%. SABC 3, which screens the English news, lagged behind with about 12 
million viewers or 40% of adults. 
Table 19: Television Viewing [past 7 days] 1,000's 2004 
 SAARF AMPS 2004 
 Number of viewers % of Adult Population (30 656 000) 
E-TV 17726 000 58.5 
M-Net – Main Service 3336 000 11.0 
M-Net CSN 630 000 2.1 
SABC 1 21473 000 70.8 
SABC 2 16702 000 55.1 
SABC 3 12085 000 39.9 
Total DSTV 1649 000 5.4 
Total TV 24383 000 80.4 
Source of data: South African Advertising Research Foundation 
 
7.2.3 Newspapers   
 
Newspapers are important in election campaigns because they provide a deeper analysis 
than is often possible on radio and television due to its unrivalled investigative capacity 
(Davis: 2005:237).  
 
There has been a transformation of print media ownership in South Africa compared to 
1994 when, as Davis (2005:237) indicates the newspaper industry was dominated by the 
pro-apartheid Nasio ale Pers and the Anglo-American Corporation which supported the 
parliamentary opposition. By 1999 Jacobs (1999:154-155) noted that whites still made up 
the bulk of mainstream newspapers but that ownership and control patterns in the 
newspaper industry were being transformed. By 2004, Davis indicated that print media 
had diversified and the demographic profile of editors had changed substantially.
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 In 
2004 there were four newspaper groups in South Africa: Independent Newspapers, 
Johnnic Communications, Naspers and CTP/Caxton with 20 daily and 13 weekly 
newspapers, most in English. Johnnic publishes The Sunday Times, the largest weekly 
                                               













newspaper with a readership base of 3.2 million people. Among the daily newspapers, 
The Daily Sun (which is published by Media24 a division of Naspers sold in Gauteng, 
Limpopo, Mpumalanga and North West) had the highest readership figures of 2.3 
million. This was followed by the Sowetan, published by Johnnic, with a readership of 
1.54-million people.  
 
Table 20: Readership of Newspapers in 1,000's 2004 
 SAARF AMPS 2004 
 Number of readers % of Adult Population (30 656 000) 
Sunday Times 3239 000 10.7 
Daily Sun 2292 000 7.6 
City Press 2066 000 6.8 
Soccer Laduma 2025 000 6.7 
Sunday Sun 1956 000 6.5 
Rapport 1600 000 5.3 
Sowetan 1544 000 5.1 
Sunday World 1062 000 3.5 
Son 744 000 2.5 
Burger (Sat) 661 000 2.2 
Sunday Tribune 672 000 2.2 
The Star 616 000 2 
Die Burger 562 000 1.9 
Ilanga 523 000 1.7 
Citizen Weekend Edition (Sat) 487 000 1.6 
Saturday Star 447 000 1.5 
Citizen 466 000 1.5 
Sat Weekend Argus  410 000 1.4 
Isolezwe 391 000 1.3 
Cape Argus  407 000 1.3 
Beeld 364 000 1.2 
P0st (Wed) 321 000 1.1 
Weekend Sunday  Argus  298 000 1 
Daily News 308 000 1 
Cape Times  316 000 1 
Independent On Saturday 270 000 0.9 
Mail & Guardian 233 000 0.8 
Naweek-Beeld (Sat) 245 000 0.8 
Mercury 213 000 0.7 
Daily Dispatch 226 000 0.7 
Sunday Independent 179 000 0.6 
Herald 193 000 0.6 
The Teacher 150 000 0.5 
Weekend Post 155 000 0.5 
Weekend Witness (Sat) 159 000 0.5 
The Witness  167 000 0.5 
Volksblad (Sat) 112 000 0.4 
Business Day 113 000 0.4 
Volksblad 126 000 0.4 
Saturday Dispatch 85 000 0.3 
Pretoria News 86 000 0.3 
Pta News Weekend (Sat) 89 000 0.3 
D.F. Advertiser 55 000 0.2 












In 2004, just over a third (39%) of the South Africans interviewed by SAARF said that 
they read any newspaper. One in five (21%) said that had read daily newspapers. About a 
third (31%) read a weekly newspaper. Use of print media was considerably higher in the 
Western Cape and Gauteng with 66% in the Western Cape and 59% of adults in Gauteng 
reading newspapers compared to around a third or less in other provinces (SAARF, 
2004b).   
 
7.3 Consumption of News   
 
In 2004 South Africans showed relatively high levels of news media consumption with 
large majority accessing news either through radio or television or both. Survey data 
confirms that radio was the most widely used and accessible medium, followed by 
television. Print media lagged far behind, see figure 6 below.  
 
Figure 6: Media Usage in South Africa: 1994-2004 
News Media Use
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In terms of following news, 79% of Afrobarometer respondents indicated that they 
listened to news on the radio everyday or a few times per week. Less than one in ten 
(5%) said that they never listened to the news on the radio. In the Afrobarometer survey, 
consumption of television news was also relatively high with 69% saying they watched 
news on television “everyday” and 10% saying they watched it “a few times per week”. 
Less than a fifth (15%) indicated that they never watched the news on television. Print 
was the least used of media among Afrobarometer respondents. Just more than a third of 
Afrobarometer respondents said that they read the newspaper on a daily basis. About one 
in five (18%) indicated that they obtained print news “a few times per week”.  Another 
12% said that they received print news “a few times per month”. A quarter (25%) said 
that they never read newspaper news.  
 
Table 21: Consumption of News Media, 2004 (Afrobarometer) 
 Radio Television Newspapers 
Never 5% 15% 25% 
Less than once a month 2% 3% 10% 
A few times a month 2% 3% 12% 
A few times a week 12% 10% 18% 
Every day 79% 69% 35% 
Don't know .1% .4% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Afrobarometer 2004 
Question Wording: How often do you get news from the following sources? 
 
The CNEP survey asked to what extent respondents followed the campaign via the news. 
Patterns of consumption followed similar trends to the Afrobarometer but were 
consistently lower. Almost two-thirds (65%) said that they never used newspapers to 
follow the campaign. Less than one in ten (8%) said that they followed the campaign via 
newspapers on a daily basis and a fifth (22%) of voters indicated that they followed the 












Table 22: Consumption of News Media, 2004 (Comparative National Elections Project) 
 Radio Television Newspapers 
Daily / Almost every day 22% 24% 8% 
3-4 days a week 12% 8% 4% 
1-2 days a week 11% 9% 9% 
Less frequently 14% 11% 12% 
Never 41% 48% 65% 
Don't know .4% 1% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source of data: Comparative National Elections Project, South Africa Survey 2004. 
Question wording: During the electoral campaign, how frequently did you follow political news 
through: 
 
Only one in five South Africans said that they followed the campaign via radio news on a 
daily basis, another 44% of South Africans say they get news about politics from radio at 
least a few times a week. Almost half (41%) said that they never followed the campaign 
on the radio.  A higher proportion (24%) indicated that they followed the campaign on 
television on a daily basis. Another 41% said they followed the campaign on television at 
least a few times per week. Almost half (48%) said that they never followed the 
campaign on television.  
 
7.4 Coverage of the Campaign   
 
7.4.1 All Media 
 
While voters mostly use radio and television and not print media in their everyday lives, 
content analysis reveals that the election campaign was predominantly covered by the 
print media.
 82
 Thus, the media that provided the most campaign information was used 
the least by voters, indicating a fundamental disjuncture between the media where voters 
seek campaign information and the media where it is most frequently and most 
elaborately reported.  
 
                                               
82 The analysis did not include paid advertisements. For print, all articles in the political, news, editorial, opinion as 
well as the business section were included. Excluded were ‘advertorials’, letters to the editor and other sections of the 
newspaper clearly indicated as of non-editorial content. On TV, all news reports were coded including sport and 












Table 23: Coverage of the Campaign in all Media Types 




























Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004 
 
For the content analysis each campaign-related statement, rather than article, was 
analyzed. A ‘statement’ was defined by Media Tenor as a unit of analysis within an 
article or story, which contains a subject, an issue, a rating, and a source.  Newspapers 
produced an average of 779 statements per day compared 70 campaign-related statements 
screened on television. Clips were collected for a cross-section of radio stations. It is 
therefore instructive to compare the newspaper, television channel and radio station that 
produced the highest number of campaign-related statements. Among newspapers, the 
English-medium daily This Day produced the most campaign related statements
83
. 
Among the television channels, E-TV had the highest campaign-related coverage while 
SAFM was the leader of the radio stations. SAFM had 537 campaign-related statements 
compared to the 5177 campaign-related statements produced by This Day during the 
same period of time. E-TV broadcasted 1215 statements.  
 
Table 24: Highest Coverage of Campaign  
  Number of Campaign-
related Statements 
Average number 
of statements per 
day 
This Day 5177 80 
E-TV  1215 19 
SAFM 537 8 
Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004 
 
                                               
83 This Day was formed in 2004 and closed down after a short period of time, therefore SAARF did not have 












7.4.2 Radio Coverage 
 
As indicated, radio stations did not have a large volume of campaign coverage. South 
Africa’s most popular station with 6 million listeners daily, Ukhozi FM, had an average 
of only 4 campaign-related statements per day or 280 for the entire campaign period. 
Motsweding FM and Thobela FM produced 7 and 5 campaign-related statements per day 
respectively. SAFM, with a listener base of half a million, had the largest amount of 
campaign coverage relative to other channels included in the data-set. Radiosondergrense 
had a listener base of 1.8 million people and produced an average of 6 campaign-related 
statements per day. 702 Talk Radio had a low listenership base of 278 000 people and 
produced an average of 7 campaign-related statements per day.  
 
Table 25: Campaign Coverage by Radio Station 
Radio Station Number of Campaign-related 
Statements 
Percentage of all 
Campaign-related 
statements 
Average number of 
statements per day 
SA FM 537 20% 8 
Motsweding 469 17% 7 
Radio 702 460 17% 7 
Radio Sonder Grense 378 14% 6 
Thobela 336 12% 5 
Ukhozi 280 10% 4 
Metro FM 188 7% 3 
Radio Jacaranda 82 3% 1 
East Coast Radio 16 1% > 1 
Total  2746 100% 42 
Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004 
 
7.4.3 Television Coverage 
 
Among the TV channels it was  E-TV, with about 18 million viewers, which  had the 
largest amount of campaign coverage. The Zulu/Xhosa news programmes on SABC 1 
had the most campaign coverage of all SABC’s programmes. Broadcasting in African 
languages, SABC 1 had the highest viewership figures, followed by the mainly Afrikaans 












Table 26: Campaign Coverage by Television Channel 
  Television Channel Number of 
Campaign-related 
Statements 
Percentage of all 
Campaign-related 
statements 
Average number of 
statements per day 
E-TV News 1215 27% 19 
Zulu/Xhosa News 883 19% 14 
English News 785 17% 12 
Afrikaans News  749 16% 12 
Sotho News 704 15% 11 
Business Focus 235 5% 4 
Total  4571 100% 70 
Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004 
 
7.4.4 Print Coverage 
 
Print media covered the campaign extensively with over 50 000 campaign-related 
statements. However, this coverage was predominantly in regional English and 
Afrikaans-medium newspapers which did not have very high readership bases. Among 
the daily newspapers, This Day had the highest volume of campaign coverage relative to 
other newspapers. This was followed by Die Burger, The Cape Times, Natal Witness, 
Beeld and The Star. Die Burger had an average of 75 campaign-related statements per 
day during the campaign period. The Cape Times produced an average of 60 campaign-
related statements per day. Of the weekly newspapers, The Mail and Guardian led the 
way with the highest level of coverage.  
 
Table 27: Campaign Coverage by Print Medium 







Average number of 
statements per day 
This Day 5177 10.2 80 
Die Burger 4851 9.6 75 
Cape Times  3870 7.6 60 
Natal Witness 3739 7.4 58 
Beeld 3380 6.7 52 
The Star 3209 6.3 49 
Citizen 2997 5.9 46 
Business Day 2957 5.8 45 
Sowetan 2718 5.4 42 
The Mercury 2693 5.3 41 
Cape Argus  2499 4.9 38 











Table 27 continued: Campaign Coverage by Print Medium 
Daily News 1768 3.5 27 
Mail & Guardian 1482 2.9 23 
City Press 1351 2.7 21 
The Sunday Times 1176 2.3 18 
Rapport 830 1.6 13 
Daily Sun 694 1.4 11 
Sunday Independent 615 1.2 9 
Isolezwe 608 1.2 9 
Ilanga 521 1 8 
Financial Mail 348 0.7 5 
Independent on Saturday 236 0.5 4 
Sunday World 130 0.3 2 
Sunday Sun 130 0.3 2 
Sake 70 0.1 1 
Business Report 65 0.1 1 
Finance Week 43 0.1 1 
Sake Rapport 43 0.1 1 
Total 50636 100.0 779 
Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004 
 
7.5 Coverage of the Parties  
 
7.5.1 All Media 
 
Regarding the volume of media coverage of the top six parties, Media Tenor data shows 
that the ANC and DA received a large amount of media coverage, the IFP, ID and NNP 
received a medium amount of coverage and relative to the ANC and DA the UDM 
received a low amount of coverage.  
 
The ANC received the highest proportion of media exposure with one in three statements 
analyzed by Media Tenor relating to the ANC. It is important to note that while the ANC 
did receive the highest volume of coverage, it did not secure the majority of all 
statements and the proportion of coverage was not vastly more than other parties. That 
the ANC received the most coverage is not unexpected. As Weaver (1996:210) points 
out, the “disparity between incumbent and challenger earned media is profound” because 
incumbents have stronger ongoing relations with news reporters and editors. Although 
some segments of the media has quite antagonistic relations with the ruling party, this is 











ANC received additional media coverage by having its policies and campaign activities 
mentioned and discussed by other parties and journalists, as well as because of the 
prominence of its leaders.  
 
 
Table 28: Coverage of Parties in all Media Types 








ANC 19182 33% 295 
DA 13254 23% 204 
IFP 7131 12% 110 
UDM 1487 3% 23 
ID 2413 4% 37 
NNP 5491 10% 84 
Other 8995 16% 138 




Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004 
 
 
The DA also managed to attract a sizable proportion of media coverage with almost one 
in four statements relating to it - there was only a 10 percentage point difference between 
the ANC and DA’s coverage. Davis (2005:247) points out that the DA’s strong media 
presence was due to its ability to sustain a strong media presence in the run-up to the 
elections. Other parties were unable to generate noteworthy amounts of coverage, with 
12% of media statements being about the IFP and 10% about the NNP. The ID, at 4%, 




























Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004 
 
 
Coverage of the ANC was highest on Radio 702, Ukhozi, Motsweding and Thobela 
while the DA received most of its coverage from Radio Jacaranda, Radio Sonder Grense 
and SA FM. The IFP faired best on Ukhozi FM and Radio 702. The NNP received most 
of its coverage from Radio Jacaranda while the UDM and ID generally received minimal 
coverage. 
 
Table 29: Campaign Coverage by Print Medium 
 SA FM Motsweding Radio 702 Radio Sonder 
Grense 
Thobela 
ANC 37% 40% 42% 33% 40% 
DA 23% 15% 15% 24% 15% 
IFP 12% 10% 15% 9% 12% 
UDM 2% 2% 2% 1% 5% 
ID 1% 4% 2% 5% 2% 
NNP 8% 9% 10% 13% 11% 
Other 17% 19% 12% 15% 16% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Number of Campaign-
related Statements 













Table 29 Continued: Campaign Coverage by Print Medium 





ANC 41.8% 38.8% 37.8% -- 38.6% 
DA 16.4% 26.6% 30.5% 18.8% 19.1% 
IFP 16.8% 12.2% 8.5% 6.3% 12.3% 
UDM 2.9% 1.1% 1.2% -- 2.4% 
ID 3.9% -- 4.9% -- 2.8% 
NNP 3.9% 5.3% 12.2% -- 9.1% 
Other 14.3% 16.0% 4.9% 75.0% 15.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Number of Campaign-
related Statements 
280 188 82 16 2746 
Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004 
 
7.5.2 Television Coverage 
 
The data on television news coverage revealed fairly even coverage of the main parties. 
The ANC also received the highest proportion of media exposure on television. Overall, 
just over one in five statements (23%) on television news related to the ANC. The DA 
again came in at second with 15% of statements relating to it and an 8 percentage point 
difference between the ANC and DA’s television coverage. The IFP managed to secure 
12% of campaign-related television news statements. The UDM fared slightly better on 
television (4.4% of statements) than on radio (2% of statements). The ID also received 
slightly more attention from television (5% of statements) than from print media (4% of 
statements) and radio (3% of statements). On television 8% of statements were about the 
NNP.  
 
Table 30: Extent of Coverage of Parties on Television (All Stations) 




ANC 1051 23% 16 
DA 692 15% 11 
IFP 544 12% 8 
UDM 203 4% 3 
ID 248 5% 4 
NNP 383 8% 6 
Other 1450 32% 22 

































Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 
 
The ANC enjoyed marginally more coverage on the SABC Zulu/Xhosa and Sotho news 
compared to SABC’s Afrikaans and English news as well as E-TV. Overall, almost one 
in five news statements on SABC channels related to the DA. The DA received far less 
exposure on E-TV than the SABC, with only one in ten statements being made about the 
DA. The NNP faired best on the Afrikaans news. 
 
 
Table 31: Television News Coverage of Parties by Channel 




E-TV News Zulu/Xhosa 
News 
Sotho News Total 
ANC 23.4 21.8 20.6 26.5 25.0 23.0 
DA 15.8 17.3 10.0 18.1 17.5 15.1 
IFP 9.9 14.9 9.3 14.9 11.5 11.9 
UDM 3.7 4.5 4.9 3.9 4.1 4.4 
ID 6.8 5.2 4.8 3.9 6.8 5.4 
NNP 10.1 8.9 7.4 8.5 6.3 8.4 
Other 30.3 27.4 43.0 24.2 28.8 31.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number of 
statements 
749 785 1215 883 704 4571 













7.5.3 Print Coverage 
 
The ANC received the most newspaper coverage, with 34% of all press statements in the 
Media Tenor data-set referring to it. Thus, the greater part of campaign-related 
statements was not about the ANC and the proportion of coverage was only 10 
percentage points more than the DA received. 
 
Table 32: Extent of Coverage of Parties in All Print Media  




ANC 17070 33.7 263 
DA 12038 23.8 185 
IFP 6248 12.3 96 
UDM 1219 2.4 19 
ID 2088 4.1 32 
NNP 4858 9.6 75 
Other 7115 14.1 109 
Total 50636 100.0 779 
Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 
 
The DA received a relatively high level of coverage in most newspapers. Overall one in 
four press statements analyzed by Media Tenor was about the DA. The IFP also received 
a relatively fair amount of coverage – 12% of all press statements. The NNP ranked 
fourth in terms of the volume of exposure given to parties by the print media. The ID, at 
4.1%, again received slightly more newspaper attention than the UDM which drew 2.4% 





























Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 
 
Almost two-thirds (61%) of Sunday World’s campaign-related statements and about half 
of the campaign coverage in The Business Report, Sunday Times and Mail & Guardian 
was about the ANC. Coverage of the ANC was lowest in the Daily Sun, Sake and 
Rapport. The DA received most its coverage from The Citizen, The Cape Times and This 
Day. DA presence was lowest in Sunday World, Ilanga, Sunday Sun, Isolezwe, Daily Sun 
and City Press. The IFP received most of its coverage from Ilanga, Isolezwe and 
newspapers based in KwaZulu-Natal such as The Mecury and Natal Witness. The UDM 
received negligible coverage from newspapers, with the exception of the Sunday Sun. 
Coverage of the NNP was highest in the Afrikaans newspapers Rapport, Die Burger and 
Beeld.  
 





















ANC 33% 33% 30% 31% 31% 32% 34% 39% 38% 34% 27% 34% 35% 
DA 27% 22% 29% 25% 22% 24% 34% 25% 26% 22% 24% 23% 21% 
IFP 11% 7% 10% 19% 13% 9% 8% 9% 11% 24% 3% 12% 21% 
UDM 2% 3% 2% 1% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 1% 4% 2% 1% 
ID 5% 4% 6% 4% 4% 5% 3% 6% 4% 2% 8% 4% 1% 
NNP 8% 17% 13% 5% 11% 8% 10% 8% 7% 6% 14% 12% 6% 
Other 14% 14% 9% 13% 16% 20% 9% 11% 12% 12% 21% 14% 14% 
Cases 5177 4851 3870 3739 3380 3209 2997 2957 2718 2693 2499 2436 1768 



































ANC 48% 33% 49% 24% 19% 38% 39% 24% 53% 30% 61% 31% 
DA 17% 15% 19% 23% 14% 22% 13% 7% 21% 19% 6% 10% 
IFP 11% 15% 11% 8% 11% 10% 38% 53% 10% 14% 6% 15% 
UDM 2% 3% 2% 3% 9% 4% 4% 5% -- 3% 2% 7% 
ID 2% 3% 2% 3% 7% 2% -- -- -- 5% -- 11% 
NNP 7% 4% 8% 20% 9% 8% 1% 2% 12% 9% 3% 8% 
Other 13% 27% 11% 19% 31% 16% 4% 10% 4% 20% 22% 18% 
Cases 1482 1351 1176 830 694 615 608 521 348 236 130 130 
Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 
 
7.6 Messages Communicated by the Media  
 
In addition to knowing the volume of coverage about a given party, it is also important to 
know the content of the coverage being communicated to the target audience. It is 
possible to receive a high volume of damning coverage which would not be to the benefit 
of the party.  
 
7.6.1 Media Messages about the ANC 
 
The messages communicated via media had the effect of contrasting the strengths of the 
ANC as the governing party with the weaknesses of opposition parties, largely because 
of the coverage of President Mbeki’s views given in his weekly newsletter. Much of the 
media’s coverage of the ANC focused on events and “walk-abouts” of high-profile ANC 
leaders. These events often involved miscellaneous messages about the optimism of 
South Africans and the importance of voting. Messages issued by the ANC, such as its 
contribution to overcoming apartheid; achievements in office; plans for fulfilling  stated 
goals and its unique strength, experience and commitment to dealing with challenges 
facing South Africa, were not highlighted. However, the media echoed some of the 
ANC’s intended campaign messages. The following key themes emerged from the 
analysis of the media’s coverage of the ANC’s campaign: 
 











 The ANC wanted to reassure “minority” voters; 
 The ANC acknowledged its shortcomings; and 
 The ANC had scathing views of opposition parties, primarily the DA and the IFP; 
 
Numerous media reports emphasized the fact that a resounding ANC victory was assured 
and that it would win the election by a wide margin.
84
 Many articles were, as a matter of 
course, prefaced with statements such as “It is a given that the ruling African National 
Congress (ANC) will again win easily on April 14”
85
 or “with the African National 
Congress’s (ANC’s) dominance assured, opposition parties have been left to fight among 
themselves over the scraps, with little chance of making significant inroads into ANC 
support”.
 86 
 While such statements later proved to have been accurate predictions, it is 
likely that they enhanced ANC’s campaign. 
  
 
ANC leaders managed to generate a substantial amount of media coverage. Much of the 
coverage focused on reporting of public events about President Mbeki and other senior 
ANC leaders. News coverage of an accessible and responsive president meeting his 
fellow citizens and listening to their concerns communicated a powerful message that 
capitalized on Thabo Mbeki’s rising trust ratings in opinion polls (Lodge, 2005:118).  
While some reports did cover President Mbeki’s views on poverty
87
, by and large the 
media gave scant attention to the content of the ANC’s existing or proposed policies. An 
important feature of the ANC’s campaign that did receive media attention was its 
acknowledgement of the shortcomings of its performance.
88
 Reports covered ANC 
Secretary General, Kgalema Motlanthe, indicating that the campaign of the ANC would 
“involve admitting some of the difficulties of the past ten years”.
89
 Another report cited 
Mbeki indicating that there would be “massive changes to the structure, powers, 
                                               
84 See for example Election campaign winds down. News24.com, 12 April 2004.   
 
85 See for example Exclusive: ANC wins. Business Day, 6 April 2004. 
 
86 See for example ANC win sure, Western Cape and KwaZulu up for grabs, DA’s future on line. Business Day, 13 
April 2004.  
 
87 See for example Poverty the issue – Mbeki. News24.com, 19 March 2004 and Mbeki: SA will tackle poverty in the 
next decade. Mail and Guardian, 19 March 2004. 
 
88 See for example ANC needs to work harder: Mbeki. IOL, March 11 2004. 
 












functioning and financing of local government” because he had “come face-to-face with 
the load of work that local governments carried” and seen that “they did not have the 
manpower, finances and other logistical resources to fulfill their functions”.
90
 
The media covered the ANC’s portrayal of itself as a political home for all and the 
reassurance of minority voters. For example, President Mbeki was quoted as stating that 
he “had not realised the extent of the poverty among the poor sections of the white 
community”.
91
 In response to rumours about extending his term of office and amending 
the constitution, Mbeki was cited as saying that “the African National Congress would 
not seek to change the constitution even if it won a two-thirds majority in the elections.
92
 
Reports also discounted rumours that President Mbeki might want to spend a third term 
as the President of South Africa
93
 and refuted the idea that the ANC would change the 
constitution for that purpose.
94
 Assurances given by Archbishop Desmond Tutu about 




A considerable proportion of media coverage related to the ANC’s views of opposition 
parties, primarily the DA and the IFP. The ANC’s weekly newsletter ANC Today 
received a considerable amount of attention, with a focus primarily given on antagonistic 
issues such as confrontations with the DA and the IFP.  
Several newspapers provided coverage of President Mbeki’s views regarding the 
coalition between the DA and the IFP as 'right-wing' coalition”
96
. They cited President 
Mbeki as having launched a scathing attack on the Democratic Alliance and Inkatha 
Freedom Party. Reports quoted President Mbeki saying that “the DA's predecessor, the 
                                               
90 See for example Mbeki: Govt set to change. News24, 11 April 2004 
91 See for example Mbeki: Govt set to change. News24, 11 April 2004 
92 See for example ANC not planning a third term — Mbeki, Business Day, 8 March 2004.  
93 See for example ‘King Thabo’ says he won’t stand for a third term. Mail and Guardian, 24 March 2004; Mandela 
defends Mbeki on third term rumours. IOL, 4 April 2004 and Third term 'never discussed' News24.com, 2 April 2004. 
 
94See for example 'ANC has no plans to change constitution' IOL, March 07 2004 and ANC 'won't touch constitution' 
News 24.com, 13 April 2004. 
 
95 See for example Tutu allays fears about ANC win. Mail and Guardian, 13 April 2004. 
 












Democratic Party, displaced the New National Party as the official opposition in 1999 
"by appeasing and absorbing much of the white right wing, which felt that the NNP had 
betrayed it by working to transform itself into a party working for the construction of a 
non-racial democracy”. The article concludes with Mbeki saying that “We have an 
intelligent electorate. I have no doubt that it has the capacity to see the reality behind the 
disguise of seemingly seductive words.”
97
  Another newspaper article under the title 
“DA-IFP an ‘apartheid alliance’, says Mbeki”, reported President Mbeki’s claims that the 
DA and IFP constituted a “Coalition for backward change” that would bring back the 
conflicts and tensions of the past.
98
 Other reports listed him as saying that “the Inkatha 
Freedom Party-Democratic Alliance coalition was nothing but a conspiracy to retain 
apartheid privilege”
99
 and that voters would decide the fate of this “right-wing 
coalition”.
100
 An additional media report stated that President Thabo Mbeki launched a 
scathing attack on the Democratic Alliance and Inkatha Freedom Party and that Mbeki 




The bitter interactions between the ANC and the IFP were further highlighted in the print 
media due the prominent legal battle between Chief Buthelezi, as the Minister of Home 
affairs, and President Mbeki regarding controversial immigration regulations in which 
Mbeki authorized Chief Buthelezi to be held personally liable for costs of a Cape High 
Court battle between the two.
102
 Newspaper reports highlighted the conflict between the 
two party’s leaders saying that President Thabo Mbeki has, once again, taken off the kid 
gloves and laid bare-fisted into Mangosuthu Buthelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party. 
The reports cited Mbeki as saying that “the IFP was the primary non-state perpetrator of 
gross human rights abuse” and had “collaborated with the apartheid regime”. The report 
added that Mbeki borrowed the descriptions from the Truth and Reconciliation 
                                               
 
97 See for example Mbeki: Coalition for Change is ‘right-wing’. Mail and Guardian, 26 March 2004.  
 
98 See for example Mbeki attacks 'right-wing' coalition. IOL, 26 March 2004 
 
99 See for example DA-IFP an 'apartheid alliance', says Mbeki. Saturday Star, 26 March 2004 
 
100 See for example Mbeki attacks 'right-wing' coalition. IOL, 26 March 2004 
 
101 See for example Mbeki blasts DA, IFP. News24, March 26, 2004 
 















Regarding political intolerance, the print media cited David Makhura ANC party 
provincial secretary in KwaZulu/Natal saying that “we are convinced that there are 
organized individuals within the IFP trying to stop the ANC from campaigning.”
104
 A 
report in the Mail and Guardian indicated that the ANC had laid 20 charges of 
intimidation, assault and disruption of political events primarily against the IFP in 
KwaZulu/Natal.
105
 Reports cited President Mbeki accusing the IFP leadership of 
“directly orchestrating the intimidation of campaigning political opponents.”
106
 At the 
same time, President Mbeki promised that “the talk of violence in KwaZulu/Natal will 
cease if the African National Congress took the province” in the election.
107
  
Another message carried by the media was the ANC’s view that opposition parties were 
simply interested in obtaining votes from people. Pallo Jordan asserted after the opening 
of parliament that “while the DA complains of the ANC’s hunger for power, it is equally 
hungry to monopolize opposition politics”.
108
 Reports cited President Mbeki urging 
voters at a rally to not vote for “silly parties” like the DA, NNP or ACDP and quoted him 




The print media also covered the message that the DA was using the ANC to obtain 
media attention. The exchanges regarding the DA’s request for a televised debate with 
President Mbeki were covered by the media. The ANC was cited as saying that “The 
ANC has never needed to, nor ever will, ask the DA for help in profiling our leaders. 
Why should we accede to their request to profile theirs?”
110
  ANC spokesperson, 
                                               
 
103 See for example Mbeki attacks Buthelezi. Weekend Argus, 2 April 2004 
104 See for example ANC says the IFP isn’t playing fair. Mail and Guardian, 17 March 2004. 
 
105 See for example ANC has laid 20 charges I run-up to elections. Mail and Guardian, 5 April 2004 
 
106 See for example Mbeki turns heat on IFP/DA. News24, April 2, 2004 
 
107 See for example ANC victory in KZN will end violence: Mbeki. Mail and Guardian, 18 March 2004 
 
108 See for example SA’s opposition: monkey biz? City Press, 15 February 2004  
 













Dumisani Makhaye, was also quoted as saying that the KwaZulu-Natal provincial ANC 
branch invited the leader of the Democratic Alliance to a public debate on national radio 




President Mbeki’s views regarding the campaign strategies of opposition parties were 
also covered by the media. In a media report entitled “Mbeki: Opposition wants it black 
and white”, IOL. 9 April 2004, President Mbeki was cited as having launched a stinging 
attack on his political opponents in his last weekly website newsletter ahead of the 
elections.  Mbeki, according to the IOL report, stated that “One of the central issues that 
will face the electorate will be to decide whether we want to conduct ourselves as a 
diverse but united nation, or prefer to divide ourselves into polarised and competing 
political, ethnic and racial factions”. Another report quoted him saying that the 
opposition “created all manner of scarecrows intended to terrify the people about the 




The media also reported on the fact that the ANC viewed the opposition as being weak 
because their aim was simply to oppose the ANC or be the opposition. President Mbeki 
is cited as saying that “if you want to be the opposition you have already been 
defeated.”113 Reports cite him saying that “The DA says it is the largest party that 
represents national minorities. What is that? This should not be a factor of pride, but of 
shame. Why are they not representing the people of South Africa?”114 Reports also cited 
President Mbeki as saying that “cutting the ANC down to size” was the sole aim of the 
opposition”. 115  
 Reports covered President Mbeki commenting on the optimism of voters in the country. 
He was quoted as saying he was surprised by the enthusiasm shown in all communities 
                                                                                                                                            
110 ' See for example Mbeki is running away from voters' IOL, 17 February 2004 
 
111 See for example Anytime, anywhere, ANC tells Leon. Mail and Guardian, 17 February 2004 
 
112 See for example 'Voters will not be swayed' News24.com, 5 March 2004. 
 
 
113 See for example Battle for control of KZN hots up. The Mecury, 5 April 2004 
 
114 See for example Mbeki: Govt set to change. News24, 11 April 2004  
 











for the election, and in people's confidence in the country's future and the 
government.”
116
 Reports also covered Nelson Mandela campaigning activities, in 
particular his endorsement of Thabo Mbeki’s performance as the president of the ANC 
and South Africa.
117
 ANC messages appealing to voters, particularly the youth
118
, to cast 
their ballot
119
 and stressing the importance of voting were also covered by media 
reports.
120
  Other reports focused on the importance of having free and fair elections with 
reports of President Mbeki appealing for “all South Africans to ensure the election is 
genuinely free and fair”.
121
 
7.6.2 Media Messages about the DA 
 
A considerable proportion of the media coverage of the DA related to the ANC’s views 
of it, particularly its relationship to the IFP. As indicated earlier, attacks on the DA 
conducted via the ANC’s weekly newsletter ANC Today received a substantial amount of 
media attention. The more sensational and confrontational components of their campaign 
featured prominently in the media. The media gave limited attention to the DAs plans 
and policy proposals, however, much of the coverage of the DA’s campaign messages 
did echo messages which the DA itself sought to communicate to voters. Media coverage 
highlighted the DA’s messages that: 
 
 The DA had experienced significant growth since 1994 and would perform well 
in the election; 
 It was necessary to create a stronger and more efficient opposition and 
simultaneously reduce the power of the ANC; 
 The ANC was inefficient, lacked integrity and had performed poorly; 
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 Other opposition parties lacked competence and workable policies as well as the 
capacity to challenge the ANC;  
 The DA had strengthened its position through its alliance with the IFP; and  
 It had a series of workable policies to deal with the key challenges facing South 
Africa. 
 
Media reports highlighted the DA’s message that it would perform well in the 
elections
122
. One report cited Tony Leon as saying that “millions of people, all across SA, 
are going to cast their votes for the Democratic Alliance” and that they had grown 
significantly between 1994 and 2004”
123
 Other reports highlighted the view that the DA’s 




A key message of the DA’s campaign which received coverage from the media was the 
call for voters to help them create a stronger and more efficient opposition by reducing 
the power of the ANC. 
125
 Tony Leon indicated that the goal of the DA was to unite and 
strengthen the opposition via the voters: “We are not talking about unifying every 
political party that springs up because somebody wants a political movement. It is 
absolutely critical for the democratic health of this country that we have the strongest, 
most united and powerful opposition that we can at national level…”
126
  Media reports 
cited Tony Leon at a rally in Mpumalanga urging voters to not vote for the ANC. 
According to the report, he was quoted as saying “I have a message for black South 
Africans today. You are not obliged to vote for the ANC. You do not owe the ANC your 
vote. You owe your vote to one person only, yourself. If the political party fails you, then 
you have the right to give your vote to another party”.
127
 Douglas Gibson told reporters 
in Johannesburg it was important to have a strong opposition “to cut the government 
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 Tony Leon, according tone media report, said “we want to co-govern at 
the provincial level in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape; we want to roll back the 
power of the ANC at the national level.”
129
 In another report Tony Leon warned that 
“April 14 is the time when the voice of the South African people must be heard. If the 
voice of the South African people is not heard on this occasion, it might never be heard 
again because the ANC (African National Congress) will grow to believe that they may 




Media reports also highlighted the DA’s accusation that the ANC lacked integrity and 
was lying to the South African public
131
.  One report noted Douglas Gibson’s comments 
that the ANC was willing to change the constitution for “short-term political 
considerations”
132
. Tony Leon was cited by media reports as saying that “human rights 
are not fundamental for President Thabo Mbeki, but flexible depending on the political 
interests and allegiances of the ANC because he “sides with oppressors like Saddam 
Hussein and Mugabe against their people”.
133
 Reports also covered the Democratic 
Alliance “hitting out” at the ANC regarding allegations that they may have benefited 
from a private oil deal with the government of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.
134
 Leon 
was also cited by media reports as accusing President Mbeki of “deliberate distortions” in 
a “bizarre historical account” devoid of truth as well as saying that “South Africans are 
tired of this two-faced, childish approach to politics.”
135
 Other reports listed him as 
saying that he “misrepresents his opponents, mischaracterises their motives and maligns 
their integrity” and that “there is nothing so calculated to polarise the people of South 
Africa as the idea that anyone who disagrees with the ANC is seeking to divide the 
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Reports cited the DA’s assertion that Mbeki’s refusal to conduct a televised debate 
between him and Tony Leon was a sign of arrogance and unaccountability.
137
 According 
to reports, DA chief whip Douglas Gibson said the refusal was a sign of growing 
presidential arrogance, disregard for the democratic process, and disrespect for the 
people. “It is only Thabo Mbeki who does not have the time, or the courage, to engage in 
public debate. By running away from a debate with Tony Leon, Mbeki is running away 




The media reported on the DA’s “ANC Cards of Shame” – which featured candidates 
who had “set back the fight against Aids, upheld human rights abuses in Zimbabwe, 
misused public funds and enriched themselves through the abuse of their public 
positions”. Douglas Gibson, cited reports, said that the “cards represent an overwhelming 
moral corruption within the ranks of the ANC”. President Thabo Mbeki appeared as the 
Ace of Hearts as “the leader of the Aids denialists in the ANC” and Health Minister 
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang as Queen of Hearts because she is a “committed Aids 
denialist and flouter of court orders”.
139
 The DA also took pains to point out that the 
ANC was not committed to multiparty democracy. In particular, Jacob Zuma’s statement 
that “the ANC will rule South Africa until Jesus comes back” raised the wrath of the 
DA.
140
 According to reports, the DA’s national chairperson, Joe Seremane, indicated that 
such a statement implied that it will be in power forever," and “raised serious questions 
about the ANC's understanding of, and commitment to, liberal democracy in South 
Africa”. He argued that it “is the language of a one-party state” and that “a government 
may enjoy a majority of popular support, but unless it is willing to allow the opposition 
to come to power through the ballot box, then it is a dictatorship not a democracy” and 
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Media reports emphasized Tony Leon’s assault on Mbeki. He was quoted as saying “My 
problem with Mbeki is that he does not practice at home what he preaches abroad and 
this doesn't reflect very well on someone who flits the world stage preaching about 
multiparty competition. Mbeki helps me with the voters.” He was also quoted as saying 
that “He makes it easier for me. With Nelson Mandela, his embraces made it more 
difficult - taking him on was like a betrayal of friendship. There is no such thing with 
Mbeki - he just makes his own life difficult.”
142
 Tony Leon was also cited as labeling 
Mbeki “a ruthless hypocrite” to accuse the IFP of intolerance “because “the ANC is the 
most intolerant party across the whole of South Africa” and that “the DA had been on the 




An additional DA critique of the ANC, evident in media coverage was that the ANC had 
weak policies, that they had performed poorly since coming into power and that they had 
failed South Africa in a number of key areas.
144
 Media reports cited Tony Leon as having 
told voters at a rally that he agreed with the ANC's election slogan “Only the ANC can 
deliver…it had delivered eight million people without jobs, 22,5 million people living in 
poverty, a quarter of a million people murdered in the last decade, and five to seven 
million people infected with HIV and AIDS”.
145
 Reports also covered the DA’s assertion 
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Another central DA campaign message highlighted by media was that other opposition 
parties lacked the capacity to deal with South Africa’s problems and to tackle the ANC. 
Media reports featured Tony Leon as saying that that Van Schalkwyk was the “most 
dishonourable figure in South African politics”. According to the report he said 
“Somehow, I think Marthinus van Schalkwyk is nearing the end of his political career. 
He is not a leader; he is a loser”.
147
 He was also quoted as saying that “voters will judge 
the New National Party which had “betrayed the voters” by “climbing into bed” with the 
African National Congress. 
148
 Speaking at the DA's final Western Cape election rally, 
Tony Leon, according to reports, declared that since the ANC-NNP alliance had taken 
over, the province had developed “the worst and the fastest-growing crime situation in 
the country” and that “ANC and NNP rule in the Western Cape had been like the locust 
years - lost opportunities, bloated government and stalled delivery”. According to the 
report, he added that “The voters of this province [the Western Cape] will never forget 
that Marthinus van Schalkwyk and the NNP sold out the people of the Western Cape”.
149
 
Another article reported on him taking Marthinus van Schalkwyk to task for election 
promises he was making to voters. 
150
 The DA featured Marthinus van Schalkwyk as the 
Joker on their cards of shame saying that he qualified for this position by virtue of “being 
in bed with the ANC”.
151
 Reports covered Douglas Gibson calling the NNP “a Maltese 
poodle begging for scraps at the African National Congress's table” and saying that “Van 
Schalkwyk is not credible with the voters” because he turned his back on the mandate he 
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A considerable amount of DA media coverage related to the ID.153 Douglas Gibson was 
reported as saying that the ID was a “one-woman show” that “voters have never heard of 
anyone other than Patricia De Lille” and the ID had no properly researched, 
comprehensive, coherent policy platform to offer, and no significant structures or 
leadership across South Africa”. Athol Trollip was also reported as saying that “Patricia 
De Lille is the beginning and the end of the ID party… She must grow up and know that 
we are in an election campaign now -and she must realise that going to parliament is no 
easy walk”. 154 Reports said that “in a no-more-Mr-Nice-Guy statement on Wednesday, 
the DA said the Independent Democrats leader… had been getting a “free ride” ahead of 
the elections, with no other party attacking her.155 Gibson now provided a short list of De 
Lille's "misdemeanours", dating back to 1993.156 Media reports also indicated that Helen 
Suzman said at a DA fund raiser that “those party faithfuls that felt attracted to De Lille 
should note that she offered little substance and she did not have an enthusiastic 
constituency”.157 Tony Leon was also quoted as saying that he was “amazed at the 
fetishisation of De Lille by the media”.158 The DA also accused ID leader Patricia De 
Lille of being a “political chameleon” and the ID of being a “tiny” party hell-bent on 
being an “opposition to the opposition”.159 Reports also covered the DA dismissing 
claims by Patricia De Lille that the ID could win 10% of the national vote, with DA 
director of strategy Ryan Coetzee quoted as saying that this was a “fantasy” and that she 
was “desperate to convince disbelieving voters that her party will amount to something 
after the election”. 160 
 
The DA received media coverage of the message that it had a series of workable policies 
that would deal with South Africa’s social and economic problems. Reports cited Tony 
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Leon’s plan to “put together a workable alternative to the government and challenge 
them for power in the next election”.
161
 Reports cited Tony Leon as saying that the DA 
“had policies which would work in curbing the country's high levels of unemployment, 
crime, HIV and Aids, poverty and corruption if they were brought into power”.
162
 
Another article reports him as saying that “the DA would use its growing power to push 
for strong alternatives to the government's failed policies”.
163
 A report on Tony Leon’s 
visit to Atlantis in Cape Town cited him as giving a detailed explanation as to how the 




Finally, the message that the DA had strengthened its position through its alliance with 
the IFP also received news coverage. Tony Leon was quoted as saying that “there were 
only two forces in the election: the Coalition for Change and ANC with its NNP ally”.
165
 
Reports cited him asserting that “Together, the Coalition for Change will save KwaZulu-
Natal from the dead hand of ANC control. Together, we will save South Africa from 
becoming a one party state… Working together, we can turn KwaZulu-Natal into a South 
African success story, so much better than the failures presided over by the ANC.”
166
 He 
was further quoted as saying that “the real majority wanted the ANC to have less power, 
not more” and that the Coalition for Change “was laying the foundation for a new 
majority in KwaZulu-Natal and South Africa”.
167
 Reports also covered Tony Leon 
defending the IFP's Growth and Development Plan (GDP), saying that “there is nothing 
offensive” about it. Reports quoted him saying that he was not subjected to any lack of 
tolerance by the IFP, but that the intimidation he received from the ANC made “anything 
the IFP does look like small beer.”
168
  Reports cited Tony Leon asserting that voters 
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7.6.3 Media Messages about the IFP 
 
The IFP received some policy-oriented coverage; however, the media did not give much 
exposure to IFP’s events for example the IFP’s launch in Durban.
170
 Reports about the 
IFP focused primarily on the public altercations between Chief Buthelezi and President 
Mbeki. Some of the coverage of the IFP’s campaign messages did echo messages which 
the IFP itself sought to communicate to voters. Media coverage highlighted the following 
IFP messages: 
 
 That it was important for voters to cast their ballot; 
 That the IFP issued a series of pledges at the end of March; 
 The IFP’s assertion that KwaZulu/Natal was in a better position than other 
provinces due to the leadership of the IFP; 
 The IFP’s contention that the ANC had performed poorly and that it had failed 
South Africa, particularly in dealing with HIV and AIDS; 
 The ANC’s views that the IFP had a right-wing coalition with the DA and Chief 
Buthelezi’s views regarding the importance of and reasons for the coalition; as 
well as 
 The conflict between Chief Buthelezi and President Mbeki. 
 
In several of his campaign speeches, Chief Buthelezi implored voters to cast their ballot. 
This received some media coverage. One report quoted him saying that “the needs of the 
country's citizens had been ignored by politicians who had grown detached from the 
majority. April 14 is the time when the voice of the South African people must be heard. 
If the voice of the South African people is not heard on this occasion, it might never be 
heard again because the ANC will grow to believe that they may rule without listening to 
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The series of pledges released by the IFP at the end of March received coverage from the 
news media.172 Reports indicated that the party had developed five “common-sense” 
proposals - each of which addressed key issues in its election campaign. One report 
indicated that five election issues were: HIV/AIDS, poverty, unemployment, corruption 
and crime, along with job creation.173  
The message of the IFP that KwaZulu/Natal was in a better position than other provinces 
due to the leadership of the IFP was picked up in media reports. Buthelezi was quoted as 
saying that the province had already made greater progress than other provinces in spite 
of the fact that “the IFP-led government of this province had been undermined and 
frustrated by the ANC.”
174
 The IFP’s specific plans for KwaZulu/Natal were also 
highlighted.
175
 Chief Buthelezi was quoted as saying that the “Growth and development 
blueprint for KwaZulu-Natal” would put the province on the road to success and 
prosperity. Reports cite Buthelezi as saying that the IFP provincial government would 
also ensure its budget was used to stimulate economic growth which would cut through 
the “structural conditions” that produced large-scale poverty.
176
 
The message that the ANC had performed poorly and had failed South Africa in the areas 
of HIV/AIDS, corruption, crime, unemployment and poverty also received media 
coverage.
177
 A media report quoted Buthelezi as saying: “It is also for the South African 
people to judge whether the same leaders who have thus far handled the HIV/Aids crisis 
should continue to be relied upon in dealing with the greatest tragedy, emergency and 
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disaster our country and our people have ever faced, the social and economic 
consequences of which are beyond our worst nightmares. I do not think there are enough 
words to express how deeply hurt I feel for the cavalier way and almost criminal neglect 
with which our government has dealt with the lives, deaths and suffering of hundreds and 
thousands of our people. We are all infected or affected by HIV/Aids and yet government 
policies have not registered the dramatic and imperative nature of this emergency”.
178
 
Reports cited him saying that he was insulted by the government using announcements 
about antiretroviral drugs for election purposes.
179
 Reports also quoted Buthelezi saying 
that AIDS is the ANC’s “Achilles’ heel”
180
 and covered his criticism of the 
announcement by the ANC government a week before elections to provide free anti-
retroviral drugs.
181
 According to the report he criticized the rollout delay and said that 
“the programme would be rolled out in its fully fledged form only in one year”. And 
according to another report Chief Buthelezi said that the “government action has been 
trapped in a syndrome of denial which has not moved us forward. Many South Africans 
have accepted that our country may remain a mediocre one, and feel that there is nothing 
that can be done in the next elections to solve the problems of HIV/Aids, crime, poverty, 
unemployment and corruption”.
182
 Reports noted Buthelezi’s assertion that the onus was 




The IFP received negative media coverage regarding its alliance with the DA. Initial 
reports highlighted Buthelezi’s statements that the floor-crossing legislation had forced 
him into forming an election pact with the Democratic Alliance.
184
 Reports then focused 
on President Mbeki’s assertion that the IFP had joined in a right-wing coalition with the 
DA.
185
 Chief Buthelezi’s views regarding the coalition were also presented in the media. 
He was quoted as saying that he had formed the Coalition for Change with Tony Leon's 
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Democratic Alliance so that the electorate would have a choice “between having five 
more years of the same, and the hope of a new beginning”.
186
 In one report he is cited as 
saying that “he had begun the policy and politics of coalition by developing the Coalition 
for Change with the Democratic Alliance (DA) “to show how different political parties 
can work together on the basis of a similar commitment to development, development, 
development”.
187
 According to another, he said that South Africans all faced the same 
problems and that they had formed the alliance to put the economy on an accelerated 
growth path.
188





Media reports noted the IFP’s initial attempts at diplomacy towards the ANC. One report 
argued that Buthelezi “seemed to steer clear of direct attacks on the African National 
Congress government, but opted rather to couch his criticism in diplomatic terms”.
190
  
Buthelezi was quoted in early February as saying that it was “regrettable that Mbeki had 
failed to properly address the challenges” facing South Africa.
191
 But as the campaign 
period wore on, and the IFP responded more and more to the ANC, media reports rapidly 
highlighted the growing animosity between the IFP and the ANC and in particular 
between its two leaders. The harsh exchanges between the ANC and the IFP became a 
common feature in the media with one report saying that relations between the two 
parties had “reached rock bottom” and another referring to the “growing tensions” 
between the parties.
192
. One report quoted Communist Party secretary-general Blade 
Nzimande as saying that “there is no bigger a political dinosaur than a bantustan 
leader”.
193
 Media coverage also highlighted the legal battle between Buthelezi, and 
President Mbeki regarding immigration regulations.  
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As indicated earlier, attacks on the IFP conducted via the ANC’s weekly newsletter ANC 
Today received a substantial amount of media attention in particular President Mbeki’s 
views of the IFP as an organization had tried to derail the negotiation process, engaged in 
human rights abuse and was still guilty of political intolerance. Newspaper reports 
highlighted Mbeki’s positions on the IFP, who was described as the “primary non-state 
perpetrator of gross human rights abuse”
194
, that had played a role in trying to derail the 
negotiation process
195
. Media reports also covered the ANC’s charge that the IFP was 
attempting to stop the ANC from campaigning.
196
 Reports indicated that the ANC had 
laid several charges of intimidation, assault and disruption of political events against the 
IFP.
197
 Reports also cited President Mbeki as accusing the IFP leadership of “directly 




Reports also covered Chief Buthelezi’s response to President Mbeki’s views. According 
to a media report, Chief Buthelezi accused the ANC of being driven by ideology, saying 
it was too concerned with what political parties stood for instead of addressing the needs 
of South Africans.
199
 Media reports also cited Chief Buthelezi as lambasting Mbeki for 
being an “ideologue and hypocrite who ducked real issues and harboured bizarre ideas on 
HIV and AIDS”. Another report said he “heaped criticism on Mbeki” and quoted him as 
saying that “the ANC had chosen to run away from debating substantive and real issues 
facing the country”.
200
 Another report quoted Buthelezi saying that Mbeki and the ANC 
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7.6.4 Media Messages about the UDM 
 
The extensive detail on policy positions of the UDM as set out in their election manifesto 
did not receive much media coverage. Instead, the messages relayed by the media 
focused almost exclusively on the shortcomings of the ANC to the neglect of the UDM’s 
own plans and policy preferences.   
 
The media emphasized the following UDM messages to the electorate: 
 
 The UDM’s view that the ANC had failed South Africa in a number of key areas, 
in particular, unemployment, poverty and HIV/AIDS;  
 The UDM’s view that the ANC lacked integrity as illustrated by high levels of 
corruption and through President Mbeki’s personal beliefs;  
 The UDM’s view that the ANC was a politically intolerant organisation; and 
 The UDM’s view that the ANC was simply interested in obtaining votes. 
 
A key UDM campaign message that received media attention was that the ANC had 
failed South Africa in a number of key areas, in particular unemployment, poverty and 
HIV/AIDS
202
. Party leader Bantu Holomisa was cited by the media as saying that 
“Cosatu had lost members because the ANC government had carried out policies which 
were detrimental to workers, making a handful of rich individuals richer”.
203
 In line with 
the UDM’s view that freedom depends on socio-economic conditions, Holomisa was 
quoted saying that “there could be no talk of real freedom for poor people in South 
Africa today” because “freedom from apartheid when you are imprisoned by poverty is 
not real freedom." 
204
 Holomisa was cited as criticizing the ANC’s economic policies, 
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The UDM’s critique of the ANC’s performance in its response to HIV/AIDS also 
received media attention. Media reports indicated Holomisa said at a party rally in 
Umtata that “Thabo Mbeki is still an Aids dissident” and that “when Mbeki first took 
office in 1999 he asked the people of South Africa a "silly question" which was “who 
told you that HIV causes Aids?" and as a result the process of Aids-awareness education 
started by former president Nelson Mandela and then health minister Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma took a dive”
206
 He also questioned COSATU in this regard, saying that 
“the same Cosatu that claims to be concerned about HIV and AIDS asks workers to vote 
ANC. This would be a vote for an ANC whose president has disputed the link between 
HIV and AIDS, and who questions statistics that indicate how many of our people are 




Another key message of the UDM communicated by the media was the view that the 
ANC lacked integrity and was not accountable. For example, Holomisa was quoted 
saying that “it was simply unacceptable” and “patently immoral”… “that a political 
organisation could have business interests in companies that benefited from government 
tenders”. He was further quoted saying that “the youth of the country still wondered 
when the Umsombuvo Fund was going to start distributing the millions that lay dormant 
in its accounts.”
208
 Other reports cited Hol misa’s assertion that the ANC was abusing 
state resources for campaign purposes, it quoted him asking: “When will this looting of 




An additional message regarding the ANC’s integrity related to the ANC’s electoral 
promises. Holomisa was quoted by media reports as saying that “the agenda of political, 
social and economic freedom offered by the ANC was retrieved from the dustbin and 
recycled for campaign purposes”.
210
  Holomisa also described politics in the Western 
Cape as nauseating
211
, saying the ANC, DA and NNP had failed to deliver on their 
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The UDM’s charge that the ANC lacked tolerance towards other parties also received 
media attention. Reports outlined the UDM’s formal complaint with the IEC that a group 
of ANC supporters violently disrupted a UDM rally and threatened members of the 
UDM.
 213
  Malizole Diko, the UDM premiership candidate in the Western Cape was 
quoted as saying that the UDM believed ANC members could be involved in a plot to 
intimidate voters and that he feared supporters of the ruling party could run amok at 
polling stations in several townships such as Samora Machel, Crossroads, Philippi, 
Nyanga, KTC and Langa.
214
 According to another report, Diko called on the ANC 




The media also covered the UDM’s assertion that the ANC was not genuinely concerned 
about voters and that the ANC was simply interested in obtaining votes from people. 
Holomisa was quoted saying that “as the elections are drawing nearer, the ANC is going 
through the convulsions of its political schizophrenia. We have all witnessed the two 
faces of the ANC. The one face of the ANC was the greedy expression of the Black 
Economic Empowerment that only gave opportunities to the few in the elite. This face 
was a careless sneer that pursues policies, which destroyed a million jobs, the stubborn 
frown that refused to deal with HIV/Aids. The other face of the ruling party was the 
smiling expression that promised job creation. This is an expression that professes 
concern about poverty, and the heroic expression that speaks of “the struggle” and “the 
revolution.”
216
  He was also quoted in another report as saying that “we know with 
certainty that after the election this promises will not be kept, because President Thabo 
Mbeki has already during the opening of Parliament said that nothing would change.”
217
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7.6.5 Media Messages about the ID 
 
The ID managed to receive some media coverage on its aims and objectives as outlined 
in the party manifesto. Some of the ID coverage related to public events attended by 
Patricia De Lille.218 Other coverage related to its conflict with the DA. Media coverage 
highlighted the following messages about the ID: 
 
 That the ID was focused on creating a prosperous and united South Africa;  
 That the ID’ offered a principled and effective opposition party, distinct to other 
opposition parties; 
 That the ID had grown and would perform well in the 2004 election; 
 That the ID would not form political coalitions; 
 That the ID would transcend racial politics; 
 The ID’s view that the ANC had performed poorly in dealing with the situation in 
Zimbabwe as well as HIV and AIDS in South Africa; 
 the DA’s message that the ID was a “one-woman show” which lacked the 
capacity to deal with South Africa’s problems and to tackle the ANC; and 
 The ID’s response to the DA’s negative campaign messages. 
 
 
Reports indicated that the ID’s manifesto focused on creating a prosperous and united 
South Africa with core priorities being the economy - especially job creation, poverty 




The ID’s attempt to distinguish itself from other parties also received media attention. De 
Lille was reported as saying that "The IDs manifesto is different from other political 
parties in that it is realistic, balanced and positive” and based “firmly on making the 
Constitution of South Africa a living document”. She was cited as saying that other 
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features that distinguished the manifesto was an emphasis on women and child abuse as a 
major priority, a strong environmental approach, a holistic approach to society as well as 
a position on the arts and animal rights.
 220
 De Lille also said that her party would serve 
the interests of those suffering from AIDS and that the ID cares about women and 
children.
221
 De Lille was reported as saying that her party was “rocking the vote” by 
bringing a new, principled and effective voice to the country's troubled political 
landscape
222
 and that unlike other parties had dedicated their energy into addressing 
issues such as corruption, HIV/AIDS and poverty.
223
 The ID also urged voters to let them 




Another key campaign message that received media coverage was the ID would perform 
well in the election. Reports indicated that the ID expected 10% to 12% of the vote 
nationally.
225
 Reports cited Lennit Max, the ID premiership candidate for the Western 
Cape, as saying that the ID would remove the DA as the official opposition. He was 
quoted as saying that “it is not the size of the dog in a fight - it is the size of the fight in 
that dog that matters”.
 226
 Reports also quoted the ID’s Eastern Cape provincial co-
ordinator, Fred Darke’s assertion that the party was getting stronger as well as his claim 
that in the Eastern Cape people were joining the party at a rate of between 250 and 600 
members per day. He was also quoted as saying that the ID would make inroads into DA 
and UDM support in the province.
227
 Patricia De Lille was also quoted as saying that the 
ID was confident of obtaining five percent of the votes in KwaZulu/Natal.
228
 Another 
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article noted that she “was extremely proud of the progress of the ID” and the 
“overwhelming support South Africans from all walks of life have shown for the 
Independent Democrats”
229
 Several reports gave coverage of a Markinor survey, the 
results of which found Patricia De Lille to be the “most popular opposition politician”
230 
and that the ID had higher levels of support than the DA
231
 - these findings were, of 
course, strongly repudiated by the DA. 
 
Another key message of the ID covered by the media was its promise that it would not 
form political coalitions. Reports cited Patricia De Lille saying that “coalitions have been 
miserable failures in the Western Cape and elsewhere. I would never betray the voters. 
The constitution allows for minority governments, and it is not necessary for parties to 
form coalitions.”
232
 One report noted De Lille’s dismissal of comparisons with the United 
Democratic Movement – she was quoted as saying that it “had been a collection of New 




An additional ID campaign message covered by the media was that the ID would 
transcend racial politics. Reports outlined Patricia De Lille assertion that the ID’s growth 
was a result of the party’s strategy to break the racial mould in South African politics.
 234
  
Another report noted De Lille saying that women in particular supported the ID as a party 





Another campaign message covered by the media was the ID’s assertion that the ANC 
had performed poorly in areas of corruption, abuse of woman and children, dealing with 
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HIV and AIDS and in its stance towards Zimbabwe. 
236
 With regard to corruption, De 
Lille, reports said would “finish off the ANC” in the Western Cape and produce a 




The ID’s view that the ANC had performed poorly in dealing with HIV and AIDS in 
South Africa also received media coverage. Reports highlighted the public HIV test 
undertaken by De Lille and party leaders on the eve of the election
238
. She was quoted as 
saying that: “South Africa is moving from an HIV into an AIDS pandemic” and that “the 
first step to effectively counter this pandemic is for South Africans to know their HIV 
status and to be empowered to take preventative measures.”
 239
 Reports cited De Lille 
labeling Dr Tshabalala-Msimang as a human rights abuser and a “useless minister” 




The ID’s criticisms of the ANC’s performance in dealing with the situation in Zimbabwe 
also received media coverage. The media reported on De Lille’s assertion that President 
Thabo Mbeki and the ANC government had ignored the plight of Zimbabwe. She was 
quoted as saying that women and children were raped while the government remained 
dead silent on the issue...we have the best constitution in the world, which respects 
human rights and the rule of law. Yet when a country, north of South Africa, abuses 
human rights, our government leaders maintain their quiet diplomacy...we condemn the 
government of Zimbabwe. If our government can't support Zimbabwe, we, the people of 




The ID received considerable negative media coverage as a result of DA campaign 
messages. The DA directed a large segment of their messages towards voters they 
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thought would consider voting for the ID. Media reports dubbed these interactions as a 
“war of words” between the two parties.
 242
  Reports noted the list of De Lille's 
"misdemeanors" dating back to 1993 the series of radio election advertisements in which 
the DA claimed that a vote for a smaller party such as the ID is a wasted vote.
 243
 DA 
provincial leader Athol Trollip, according to reports, said that this “reflected the truth 
about the ID i.e. that a vote for a smaller party is a wasted vote and that smaller parties 
split the votes.”
244
 In response to the DA’s campaign against the ID, Patricia De Lille was 
quoted as saying “The DA has never been our target. We have higher moral ground than 
their negative campaign, and the voters will decide for themselves”.
245
 Media reports 
highlighted the ID leadership’s complaint against DA advertisements with the 
Independent Electoral Commission saying the broadcast advertisements mislead the 
public into voting for the DA and that the DA advertisement used the name of De Lille 
and the ID in a defamatory manner.
246
 The ID also responded to the DA’s strategy by 
saying that the DA had launched its campaign against the ID “in a desperate attempt to 
win back the substantial ground they have lost among their core constituency to the ID”. 
According to reports De Lille attributed the DA’s “vitriolic attack” on her to her refusal 
to join that party, and to the findings of a DA-commissioned study that said the ID would 
attract 30% of the official opposition party’s supporters.
247
 Patricia De Lille was quoted 
saying that the DA’s negative leadership style and campaign was well documented “as 
dividing and not building our nation with an agenda that wants to take us back to the pre-
1994 period”. She was also quoted saying that the DA “is not loyal to the country” and 
that “SA does not need a party that does not add value to the building of this country”. 
248
 
Another report noted De Lille’s assertion that “the DA is no longer part of that legacy of 
liberal ideas and values” because “they have abandoned everything Helen Suzman 
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Reports noted the ID’s rebuttal of allegations that the ID existed solely around Patricia 
De Lille.
250
 The premier candidates of the ID issued a statement, covered by the media, 
which said that “while De Lille was a charismatic leader who held the foreground, she 
was not a one-woman party. She is part of a ground swell of voters that are looking for a 
voice, because the official opposition has got the message all wrong. We have a positive 
leader who appeals to voters from all walks of life. De Lille has taken the government to 
court several times and won. Patricia has a track record of having made a real difference 




7.6.6 Media Messages about the NNP 
Much of the coverage of the NNP’s campaign messages echoed the messages which the 
NNP itself sought to communicate to voters. Additionally a considerable proportion of 
the media coverage of the NNP related to the DA’s views of it. As indicated earlier, 
attacks on the NNP conducted via a series of advertisements received a substantial 
amount of media attention. Media coverage highlighted the following: 
 Information from the NNP’s manifesto, which covered their policy proposals in 
detail; 
 The Western Cape New National Party election manifesto called the Cape Plan; 
 The NNP’s assertion that it was the only party that could ensure a voice for 
opposition voters via their co-operative agreement with the ANC; 
 The NNP messages on how it differed from the ANC; 
 The DA’s message that a vote for the NNP was essentially a vote for the ANC; 
that the NNP was opportunistic and  a “lapdog of the ANC”;  
 The NNP’s response to the DA’s negative campaign messages; and 
 The ANC’s decision to not give Marthinus Van Schalkwyk the Western Cape 
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premiership if it won a majority in the province. 
The NNP’s comprehensive manifesto, which covered their policy proposals in detail, was 
covered by several media reports. These reports listed the NNP’s economic plans to 
“create one million permanent new jobs by 2008, achieve national economic growth of 
four percent within three years, and ensure three times the number of opportunities for 
adult basic education, further training, and entrepreneurship”.
 252
  
According to media reports, the NNP also committed itself to building almost a quarter 
of a million houses by 2010 as part of a blueprint for eliminating the Western Cape's 
housing backlog by 2019. The manifesto, according to reports, committed the NNP to: 
bringing the HIV infection rate below 10%, effectively eliminating HIV-positive births; 
creating a provincial poverty fund of R100m for targeted alleviation projects; working 
with national and local government to halve crime by 2010; and establishing a "one 
Nation Fund" with R10m start-up funding, to advance reconciliation and nation-
building.
253
 With regard to education, reports indicated the NNP’s intention of improving 
the student-teacher ratio in primary schools from the current 39:1 to 33:1 
254
 by adding an 
additional 27 000 teachers so that pass rates could be improved in key subjects, such as 
mathematics, science and technology”.
255
 Also covered by the media was the NNP’s “no 
mercy policy" on violent crime and re-instituting the death penalty”
256
.  
The Western Cape New National Party election manifesto called the Cape Plan was also 
covered by the media. Aspects highlighted were the goals of attracting R5 billion in new 
investments by 2008; creating 120 000 short-term jobs; skills training through a public 
works programme; building a new 240-bed hospital by 2007 to service the communities 
of Mitchell's Plain and Khayelitsha; reducing crime by 50%; increasing police officers 
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from 18 000 to 24 000 by 2010; appointing 2 868 new teachers by 2010 and the creation 
of a provincial poverty fund of R100m that would target poverty alleviation projects to 




Media reports also carried the NNP’s message that it was only opposition party that 
could ensure a voice in a multi-party government for opposition voters via their co-
operative agreement with the ANC.
258
 For example, Van Schalkwyk was cited as saying 
that NNP would continue to talk with the ANC because it was the only way to “reconcile 
the interests of different constituencies and communities”.
259
 Other reports quote him as 
saying that the alliance created a future for white people which they otherwise would not 
have had.
260 
He was also quoted as saying that the agreement between the NNP and the 
ANC represented a sincere hand of partnership that has been held out by the majority 
community in South Africa to minorities and that “through the NNP/ANC agreement, 
voters had a unique chance to make their voices heard in the highest levels of 
government - even if they disagreed with the ANC on some issues of principle”.
261
 Van 
Schalkwyk’s view that “the NNP, unlike other parties, could negotiate towards 
influencing decisions successfully and therefore promote the interests of, and co-




NNP messages on how it differed from the ANC (on issues such as the death penalty, 
abortion, affirmative action and Zimbabwe) also received media exposure. Van 
Schalkwyk was quoted as saying that “we do have a strong policy platform…we are 
much tougher than the ANC on crime; we strongly believe in bringing back the death 
penalty… there are important differences with regard to the labour market and…in 
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foreign policy…Zimbabwe being one.
263
 Van Schalkwyk was also reported as saying that 
the NNP had not consulted its coalition party - the ANC - before drawing up its 
manifesto. According to the report, he indicated that "the NNP makes its own manifesto 
which we will introduce to the coalition after the election." and commended the ANC for 
the way in which it helped govern the province, but said the NNP would like the majority 




The DA’s campaign messages regarding the NNP ensured considerable negative 
coverage for the NNP.
265
 Examples of  this included coverage of the DA’s listing of  
Marthinus van Schalkwyk as the Joker on their cards of shame
266
, DA members calling 
Van Schalkwyk “a Maltese poodle begging for scraps at the African National Congress's 
table”, 
267
 “a loser” and “the most dishonourable figure in South African politics” who 
had “betrayed the voters” by "climbing into bed" with the African National Congress
268
 
as well as and the description of ANC and NNP rule in the Western Cape as “the locust 
years”.
269
  This was exacerbated by the media’s use of the nickname for Marthinus van 
Schalkwyk - “kortbroek”, [translated as “shortpants”].   
 
The NNP’s response to the DA also received media attention.
270
 Reports noted the NNP 
brushing off predictions of the party's impending extinction as DA propaganda.
271
 
Van Schalkwyk was cited as saying that a vote for the DA was a one-way ticket to 
political irrelevance which would end up “reinforcing walls of division between our 
communities and selling out the future of our children”.
272
  Van Schalkwyk was also 
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quoted as saying the NNP had underestimated the "levels of cynicism" in the DA 
leadership and that “The (former) Democratic Party saw the DA as a vehicle not for 
change, but for the protection of privilege.”
273 
André Gaum of the NNP was also reported 
as saying that "under DA rule, the province's economic growth rate dropped from more 
than 4% to 2% and that under DA rule, the province was scandal-ridden and marked by 
political instability."
274 
 Reports noted Daryl Swanepoels assertion that “it is clear from 
the DA’s latest tirade [against F.W. De Klerk for coming out in support of the ANC/NNP 
relationship] that they cannot comprehend that this country does not need their arrogant, 
colonial to hell with the rest attitude”.
275
 Van Schalkwyk said, according to reports, that 
“British Westminster opposition-style politics was not appropriate for complicated 
societies, such as South Africa”. 
276  
 
A few days prior to the elections, reports highlighted the ANC’s decision to not give Van 
Schalkwyk the Western Cape premiership if the ANC received a majority in the 
province.
277
 The NNP tried to play down the speculations regarding the premiership with 
Carol Johnson, the NNP's media director saying that both parties were “fighting very 
hard to be the strongest in the Western Cape” and that there was “absolutely no rift or 
tension”.
278 
However, these reports clashed with the NNP’s primary campaign message 
i.e. that it was in a unique position of strength to negotiate with voters due to the coalition 
agreement. Subsequently, reports indicated that President Mbeki would endorse Ebrahim 
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7.7 Media Coverage of Voter Concerns  
 
After reviewing media statements about the different parties, it is time to ask a different 
question: to what extent did the media report on the issues that voters wanted to hear 
about? The analysis in this section will show that media failed voters in this regard. The 
CNEP survey asked respondents what they thought was the most important issue in the 
election campaign. One in three (35%) cited unemployment as the most important. 
Crime/justice was mentioned by 18%, Health/HIV/AIDS by 16%, poverty and service 
delivery 10% and housing by 9%. These findings are broadly in line with several surveys 





Figure 10: Voter Perceptions of Most Important Campaign Issue  
 
Source of data: Comparative National Elections Project, 2004. 
Question: During the election campaign, the candidates and parties discussed many different issues.  
In your view, which of the following was the most important issue in the recent election campaign?   
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More than three-quarters of all campaign-related statements (76%) did not relate to the 
issues identified by analysts and public opinion polls to be the primary campaign issues 
and were certainly not the ones earmarked by political parties in their manifestos and 
other campaign material. The Media Tenor content analysis revealed that media coverage 
predominantly related to public appearances by politicians with one in four statements 
(24%) focusing on such events. A fifth of the media statements (21%) coded by Media 
Tenor were statements regarding the political parties and politicians and their 
characteristics i.e. whether they were competent, suitable to govern, etc. Another fifth of 
all statements (20%) related to elections and voting. I also classified one in ten statements 
(11%) as “other” – this category consisted of one hundred and twenty categories each 




Overall six percent of campaign statements related to issues of democracy, human rights 
and governance. Another five percent concerned the economy. The “burning issues” of 
the day such as crime, unemployment, health, HIV and AIDS, education and housing 
received no more than three percent of media statements. 
  
 
Table 34: Overall Content of Coverage – All Media 
  Number of 
Statements 
Percent 
Public Appearance 13750 24% 
Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to govern 11752 21% 
Elections and Voting 11133 20% 
Other 6110 11% 
Democracy, Human Rights and Governance 3195 6% 
Economy 3085 5% 
Crime 1863 3% 
Welfare and Social Policy 1408 3% 
Unemployment 1556 3% 
Health 361 1% 
HIV and AIDS 1250 2% 
Education 549 1% 
Housing 719 1% 
Agriculture 107 .2% 
Transport 65 .1% 
Total 56903 100.0 
Missing Data 1243  
 Total 58146  
Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 
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As seen below, coverage of the top six parties followed a similar pattern to overall trends 
with slight variations. All parties had public appearances, views of parties/leaders and 
elections and voting as their top three categories. No more than 4% of statements with 
the ANC or DA as protagonist related to crime, unemployment, health, HIV and AIDS, 
education or housing. Sixteen percent of the statements which had the UDM as its 
protagonist related to the economy and unemployment. One in ten (8%) of the statements 
which had the IFP as its protagonist related to crime. Overall seven percent of statements 
relating to the ID focused on HIV and AIDS.  
 
Table 35: Content of Party Coverage – All Media 
 ANC DA IFP UDM ID NNP Other 














Parties & Politicians: 





















































































































































































































































Media Tenor also coded the statements in their data-set according whether it was policy-
related or not. According to Media Tenor data, all the parties received a low volume of 
policy coverage. The MMP also argued that “coverage tended towards event-based, non-
analytical reports on party campaigning, without sufficient interrogation of the issues 
raised” (www.mediamonitoring.org.za,2006).  
 
 


























Source of data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004 
 
 
Only the UDM had a majority of policy-related statements. Fifty five percent of the 
statements which had the UDM as its protagonist were policy-related. The ANC had the 
lowest proportion of policy-related statements (42%). 
 
Table 36: Proportion of Policy-related Statements in Coverage of Party Campaigns  
 ANC DA IFP UDM ID NNP Other Total   






































 Total Statements 19260 13291 7153 1493 2420 5514 9015 58146   













In their interviews with the MMP, all political parties highlighted the fact there was not 
enough space or time in the media for sufficient analyses. The general consensus from 
the parties interviewed was that the media were shallow in their analyses of party 
manifestos and campaigns most parties noted the need for greater depth of coverage in 
these instances (Media Monitoring Project, 2004).  
 
According to the MMP Mr Smuts Ngonyama of the ANC said that “there was lack of 
depth in the explanation of certain policies in the manifestos. Policies, like job creation 
and the ANC’s broad economic policies were not well explained by the media. Mr 
Ngonyama was also quoted as saying that “Election coverage needs to be more than a 
compilation of sound bites from different parties. It needs to seek [and] to delve into the 
issues and manifestos of parties in a critical and detailed manner”. Mike Moriarty, DA 
leader in Johannesburg, in his interview also indicated dissatisfaction with the depth and 
analysis that the media allocated to addressing party manifestos. He felt that “the media 
did not communicate their manifesto as the party had intended”. Bantu Holomisa in his 
interview with MMP concurred with this view saying that “there is a need for more space 
to be allocated for manifestos and also space for politicians to explain what their policies 
are,” ID media liaisons, Brent Meersman and Thulani Sithole, were also “not convinced 
that the print media had done enough research to provide good analyses”. Daryl 
Swanepoel, secretary-general of the NNP was recorded by the MMP as saying that the 
NNP was not satisfied with the way the media had handled various party manifestos 
because they had not done enough to explain the differentiated approaches of parties 




7.8 Media Bias in the 2004 Campaign  
 
Were the messages presented by the media biased towards a particular political party? 
The following section examines both perceptions of bias as well as the extent of media 
bias. It explores data from two media monitoring groups, interviews with representatives 
from the selected political parties conducted by the Media Monitoring Project (MMP) as 












7.8.1 Citizen Perceptions of Media Bias 
 
Respondents did not see the media in South Africa as favouring a particular political 
party. A strong majority of 85-89% regarded the coverage on television and radio and in 
the newspapers as objective in that regardAmong the small proportion of news media 
consumers who found a bias in the media, most understood this to be a bias in favour of 
the ANC.  
 
Table 37: Citizen Perceptions of Media Bias 
 No Yes 
Newspaper read 77% 23% 
Radio station listened to 85% 16% 
TV News watched 89% 11% 
Source of data: Comparative National Elections Project, South Africa Survey 2004. 
Question: Do you think [X] favoured a political party? 
 
While a large majority of South Africans did not see a political bias in the media, they 
also had little trust in the media, and least of all in the print media. . About a third of 
respondents said that they trusted the SABC (35%) and E-TV (31%) compared to a fifth 
who said that they trusted independent newspapers (19%). 
 
Table 38: Extent of Trust by Citizens in News Media 










Not at all 6% 6% 9% 
Just a little 17% 17% 25% 
Somewhat 36% 34% 34% 
A lot 35% 31% 19% 
Don't know/Haven't heard enough 6% 12% 14% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source of data: Comparative National Elections Project, South Africa Survey 2004. 
Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say?  Government broadcasting service (SABC TV or radio) Independent broadcasting services (E 












7.8.2 Political Parties Views of Media Bias 
 
In contrast to South African citizens, who did not see the media in South Africa as 
favouring a particular political party, political parties tended to feel aggrieved by what 
they perceived as media bias during the campaign period. The Media Monitoring Project 
interviewed the main political parties to assess their views of the media’s coverage of the 
2004 election. Several of the opposition parties interviewed by the MMP complained of 
SABC bias in favour of the ANC, with particular criticism being leveled against the 
SABC’s English TV news. Opposition parties were generally more satisfied with the 
SABC’s coverage in other languages as well as with the coverage by e-tv and radio. The 
IFP, UDM and NNP argued that key components of the print media were biased towards 
the ANC. The ANC, on the other hand, claimed that they did not receive enough 
coverage from the media in general, and the SABC in particular (Media Monitoring 
Project, 2004). 
 
According to the MMP, ANC spokesperson, Smuts Ngonyama, was concerned about 
equity in coverage - they quoted him as saying that “without pre-empting the outcome of 
the elections, the media is required to determine how to allocate space and time to parties 
which broadly reflects the extent of their support and influence”.  The DA’s Mr Moriarty 
indicated that “the media made all efforts to be as fair as possible, but that the SABC 
seemed to be struggling”, “SABC TV had a stance or a slant toward the ANC… SABC 
English TV news was particularly notorious for being pro-ANC, as opposed to the 
African languages news [on SABC] that was much fairer in their coverage of the 
elections.” For Mr Moriarty, print and radio were much fairer in the coverage of 
opposition events and stories, although some of the media “showed a lot of favour 
towards the ID leader, Patricia De Lille, much more than was due to her.” The IFP’s 
national spokesperson, Reverend Keith M. Zondi indicated to the MMP that the IFP was 
satisfied with the coverage from E-TV and the print media but voiced dissatisfaction with 
the coverage supplied by the SABC. He said that the SABC favoured the ANC at the 
expense of the smaller parties. In a separate interview, Rev Zondi indicated that the 
SABC refused to cover the IFP’s launch in Durban, but covered the ANC. In this 











because many journalists are not investigative journalists but activism journalists who 
sympathise with the ANC (Media Monitoring Project, 2004). 
 
In his interview with the Media Monitoring Project, UDM party leader Bantu Holomisa 
felt that most of the radio and print media had adhered to their mandate of equal coverage 
for political parties. However, according to the MMP, General Holomisa found the 
SABC television channels to be biased towards the ANC and questioned the manner in 
which the media judged what was newsworthy. Mr Holomisa claimed that during the 
election period, when “the ANC says something it is considered news, but if the UDM 
(or any other opposition party) said the same thing before, it wouldn’t be newsworthy 
(Media Monitoring Project, 2004). In a different interview, Siviwe Nzwelini National 
Coordinator for the UDM, echoed these views. He argued that …“the media plays an 
important role in shaping public opinion. The problem is that the SABC is government 
and ANC orientated and therefore tends to be biased.” The print media also tends to be 
biased. Some newspapers appear democratic but are pro-DA and pro-IFP. Newspapers 
such as the Sowetan, City Press and Sunday Times are clearly pro-ANC…we would 
organize a rally and then the ANC would organize a rally nearby with a high profile 





ID’s media liaisons, Brent Meersman and Thulani Sithole indicated to the MMP that the 
print media’s coverage of the elections was fair and radio coverage was good but that the 
SABC television channels were unfair in their coverage during the run up to the elections 
with the opposition parties being neglected. However, the ID was happy with the 
coverage that the SABC television channels provided on election day (Media Monitoring 
Project, 2004).In a separate interview, Marlon Kruger, Media Officer of the Independent 
Democrats echoed these sentiments saying that the ID was satisfied with the coverage 
they received, adding that “of course it could have been better”. She felt that the ID 
received a strong presence in the media “largely because the ID had an issue-driven 
campaign ...and... because the ID has developed a very strong relationship with 
journalists”. She added that “the personality of Patricia De Lille was also a key factor... 
because..the media are interested in covering ID events because “there is a chance she 
                                               











will say something good.” Kruger added that the ANC got a lot of coverage because 
Thabo Mbeki is also the president and the DA got a lot of coverage because they have 
very effective ways of getting media publicity, for example Tony Leon challenging 




Carol Johnson, Media Director of the New National Party said that the NNP found the 
SABC to be very objective in their coverage of the election but that some print media 
was biased, putting their own spin on things. She argued that “a perpetual problem was 
the ridiculing of Marthinus Van Schalkwyk”. According to Johnson, he would be called 
‘kortbroek’ in the same sentence as Tony Leon was referred to as Mr Leon. Ms Johnson 
added that “the print media also only wanted to cover the NNP once the election was 




7.8.3 Content Analysis 
 
Voters’ perceptions (rather than party officials perceptions) of the media were 
corroborated by the content analysis conducted by Media Tenor and the Media 
Monitoring Project. Additionally, Davis (2005:239) conducted a survey of editorial 
endorsements and concluded that the print media was less partisan than in previous 
elections with both ‘liberal’ and Afrikaans newspapers primarily choosing to not endorse 
any party. Davis indicates that the Sowetan, Sunday Times and Mail & Guardian 
cautiously endorsed the ANC while the only Pretoria News indicated its preference for 
readers to go to the polls and vote against the ANC.  
 
According to Media Tenor data, all parties received predominantly neutral coverage.
285
 
The ANC, with the highest volume of coverage, generally received neutral coverage but 
had more negative than positive statements. Coverage of the DA and IFP followed a 
similar pattern – both generally received neutral coverage but also on balance had more 
negative than positive statements. The UDM and NNP received very similar proportions 
                                               
283 Interview conducted by CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis, in 2004. 
 
284 Interview conducted by CNEP researcher, Gavin Davis, in 2004. 
 
285 The rating score was calculated on two levels i.e. explicit use of words and implicit context which was then 












of positive and negative ratings. According to Media Tenor’s data the ID had the best 
image of the mainstream parties, receiving the least negative coverage. 
   






























Source of Data: Media Tenor Content Analysis 2004. 
 
The Media Monitoring Project also assessed the degree of bias exhibited by the media for 




 The MMP declared that 91% 
of all items they analyzed were fair, i.e. without any clear bias, with 9% seen as having 
clear bias. They add that 3% of all items monitored displayed both bias against and bias 
in favour of a party or parties. According to the MMP, the trend was that parties received 
coverage that focused on both the positive and the negative and that this did not translate 
into unduly favouring or opposing any particular party (Media Monitoring Project, 2004). 
 
                                               
286 The MMP defined bias as being multi-faceted i.e. as a result of the language utilised, the deliberate omission of a 
counter view to that initially put forward, and/or the overall presentation of the item in the context of the newspaper or 
broadcast media news bulletin. The MMP also argue that language bias is most clearly evident when allegation and 





















Source: Media Monitoring Project, 2004. 
 
 
7.9 Conclusion  
 
This chapter revealed that the problem of indistinct campaign messages was further 
compounded by the media’s campaign coverage. In addition, the campaign appears to 
have been disproportionately covered by the print media while usage and ownership 
figures show radio to be the most widely used medium in South Africa. This would 
suggest that many voters were not exposed to campaign messages at all, or at least not 
frequently. This finding points to a potential blockage in the information dissemination 
process. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the ANC and DA managed to generate the most media coverage. Despite 
opposition parties’ allegations of media hostility towards them, the content analysis 
conducted by the Media Monitoring Project and Media Tenor, revealed that coverage of 
all parties was mainly neutral. Voters also felt that the media was not biased toward a 
particular party. Editorials endorsements were also less partisan than in 1999 and 1994. 











through the vast array of material presented to them. Coverage was events-based, lacking 
in depth, and tended to focus on the scathing attacks and public confrontations between 
party leaders, further blurring rather than illuminating the choices for voters. There was 
limited policy-related coverage and the media did not focus on the issues of concern to 
voters. According to Media Tenor data, all the parties received limited policy coverage. 
Furthermore, in interviews with the political parties, the Media Monitoring Project 
indicated that all parties highlighted the absence of sufficient analyses in the media 
during the 2004 election.  According to the Media Monitoring Project (2004), the general 
consensus from parties interviewed about the 2004 election, was that the media were 
shallow in their analyses of party manifestos and campaigns. While most parties noted 
the need for greater depth of coverage in these instances, it is unsurprising that the fierce 
mud-slinging between parties is what caught media attention. Newspaper reporting 
portrayed the content and the tone of candidate presentations but failed to cover the 
campaigns in ways that emphasized candidate policy proposals and draw attention to the 
larger meanings of the choices that voters face.  
 
These findings support the assertions by Buchanan (2001) and Louw (2005). Buchanan 
(2001: 367-370) argues that in trying to hold the attention of the mass audience, the 
current market incentives for the media discourage detailed or substantive coverage of 
policies. According to Buchanan, in the media’s aim to sustain and enlarge market share, 
their political coverage focuses on the most dramatic and conflictual features of 
campaigns.  Louw argues that a symbiotic relationship tends to develop between 
journalists, pollsters and spin-doctors in which politicians need publicity, and journalists 
need news. For Louw, the resultant symbiotic relationship means that political news is 
built upon a mutually-reinforcing game, exacerbated by the pressures of commercialism 
which drives journalists to produce ‘spectacle’ news – a genre requiring celebrities and 
dramatic or entertaining stories. The result, Louw argues, is an arrangement in which 
political PRs supply journalists with celebrity politicians and hyped-up news to entertain 
the masses. According to Louw, journalists then evaluate political performers, picking 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’, giving journalists the power to boost or undermine political 
careers. This, Louw argues, produces a watchdog-ism not based on evaluating policy-
making abilities at governance, but on evaluating personalities, impression-management 
skills and politicians’ abilities as performers.  According to Louw, news as an 











it facilitates the de-skilling and downsizing of newsrooms, since producing such stories 
does not require engagement with the complexities of policy-making and governance 
(Louw, 2005:70-89).  
 
In South Africa, media professionals in South Africa themselves bemoan the state of 
their profession. Hadland (2005:13) contends that conflicting demands and roles facing 
journalists, have led to “tensions, frustration and an environment in which excellence has 
found it hard to be heard” and that “just over ten years after South Africa became a 
democracy, the media are still struggling to understand and fulfil their role in the new 
dispensation”. He further argues that the many roles of South Africa’s media: watchdog, 
corruption-buster, nurturer of goodwill, supporter of national unity, critical, constructive, 
reflective of mainstream opinion, a voice to the voiceless, uphold ethical and professional 
standards, create a diverse workforce alongside rapidly advancing technologies, all have 
led to tensions, frustration and a tough new world of difficult choices, moral dilemmas 
and sophisticated technical demands for journalists.  
 
Some point to voters as the source of the problem - respondents in a survey of people 
engaged with the mass media reported that the South African public “wants 
sensationalism and easy-reads” and as a result, “journalists are instructed to give their 
readers what they want to read” (Mochaba, Raffinetti, Vallabh and White, 2003:67). 
Others in the survey were more introspective, arguing that “media houses hire young 
journalists because they are cheap to employ and are not a threat to the status quo”, 
resulting in journalists “performing half-heartedly” (Mochaba, Raffinetti, Vallabh and 
White, 2003:67). 
 
However, Quintal (2005: 54) argues political journalism in South Africa has been 
neglected and deprioritized due to the belief that the political story was over. Quintal 
further asserts that the effect of this neglect was evident in the 2004 election coverage. 
Quintal (2005: 56) argues that much of the problem lies with inexperienced political 
reporters, poor newsroom leadership, over-reliance on press statements and little 
generated original copy. Weaver (2005:30) points out that one of the major problems in 













In sum, the media blurred rather than illuminated choices for voters in the 2004 election. 
The media’s coverage of the campaign, despite emerging as unbiased, lacked depth and 
tended to be sensationalist focusing on events, public appearances as well as the scathing 
attacks and public confrontations between party leaders. Taken together media reporting 
of the 2004 campaign did not help clarify the issues for voters and therefore added little 

















The fourth component of the model is South African voters as recipients of the 2004 
campaign. Citizens form an integral part of a good quality democracy. As key actors, 
well-informed voters who scrutinize candidate and media performance (Buchanan, 
2001:365) gather and process accurate information (Bingham Powell, 2005:68) enhance 
the democratic process. Indeed for campaigns to have any worth, they cannot simply fall 
on “deaf ears”.  
 
In this chapter I look at key demographic features, in particular education and literacy 
levels. Given that voters who are interested in and engage with campaign messages, as 
well as feel a strong sense of internal political efficacy, contribute to enhanced 
accountability and responsiveness, I examine whether voters felt competent to play an 
active role in politics; were interested in following the campaigns and paid attention to 
the campaign messages. I also look at patterns of partisanship and assess whether voters 
in 2004 were open to persuasion by political campaigns and campaign stimuli.  
 
8.2 Demographic Profile 
 
There were several key demographic features of the South African electorate in 2004. 
Large proportions of the electorate lived in rural communities. Additionally, voters spoke 
a diversity of languages and had relatively low levels of formal education. The electorate 
was relatively young with a sizable proportion of first-time voters with no-first hand 
memories of the political transition in South Africa or life under apartheid. For political 
parties devising campaign messages and strategies, this meant that these needed to be 
tailored to voters with a diversity of languages living in mostly rural areas. Additionally, 
messages need to cater for younger cohorts.  
 
According to SAARF data, South Africa had an overall population 46.7 million in 2004.  
KwaZulu-Natal had the largest population with 6.1 million adults, followed by Gauteng 











smallest population is the Northern Cape with just over 600 000 inhabitants or two 
percent of the overall population (SAARF, 2005). As at 2004, South Africa had a Voting 
Age Population of 27.4 million people (Piombo, 2004:255).  
 





























Source of data: South African Advertising Research Foundation, 2005.  
Graphical Image Used With Permission From SAARF.  
 
South Africa still has many rural communities. In 2004, the largest proportion of the 
adult population i.e. 40.9% or 12.3 million lived in communities with less than 500 
people and 12.4% or 3.7 million lived in communities with between 500 and 39 999 
people. A third (33.3% or 10 million) lived in more densely populated areas with 250 000 
people or more. Another 13.4% or 4 million lived in areas with between 40 000 – 249 
999 people (SAARF, 2005). 
 
In 2004, the gender composition of the adult population had an almost even split with 15 
million adult males and females. In 2004, 27% of the population was in the 16-24 age 
category, 25% in the 25-34 age category, 27% in the 35-49 age category and 22% were 
over the age of 50 (SAARF, 2005). This meant that the oldest in the 16-24 category 
would have been fourteen years old at the time of the 1994 elections. The youngest age 













Unfortunately SAARF did not include race as an indicator in their instruments. 
According to Census 2001 data Black South Africans constituted more than three-
quarters (79%) of the total population of, Whites 9.6%, Coloureds 8.9% and Indians 
2.5% (Statistics South Africa, 2003). It is reasonable to assume that by 2004, Blacks still 
constituted the vast majority of the population. 
 
There are eleven official languages in South Africa. As at 2004, the home language of 
most South Africans was Zulu, with one in five adults, almost 7 million, stating that it is 
their home language. The second largest language grouping was Xhosa. Almost 5 million 
adults said they spoke Xhosa as their home language. These were followed by Afrikaans 
and English, spoken by 15% or 4.5 million and 11% or 3.3 million respectively. Another 
9.2% or 2.7 million said that they spoke North Sotho as their home language. Just over 
8% cited either Tswana or South Sotho as the language which they speak at home. 
Smaller proportions i.e. less than three percent gave Tsonga, Swazi, Venda and Ndebele 
as their home language (SAARF, 2005). 
 







Percentage 1.2 1.9 2.2 3.6 8.1 8.5 9.2 10.9 15 16.2 22.6































8.3 Educational Profile 
 
A review of SAARF data reveals a slight reduction in the number of people without 
formal education from 12% in 1994 to 7% in 2004. There was also an increase in the 
proportion that had finished primary school from 66% in 1994 to 81% in 2004.  Those 
who had completed matric and obtained some tertiary education also increased from 23% 
in 1994 to 33% in 2004 (SAARF, 2004b).  
 







No School 12.4 11.8 11.5 10.8 10.8 9.0 9.2 8.2 7.5 7.0
Primary Completed 66.2 69.6 71.3 72.5 73.0 76.2 77.4 79.5 81.0 81.3
Matric + 23.0 24.6 26.2 27.9 28.2 30.0 31.9 33.5 33.4 33.2
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
Source of data: SAARF, 2004b. 
 
SAARF figures show an increase in the proportion of people who completed matric from 
fourteen percent in 1994 to twenty five percent in 2004. Despite these improvements, by 





In the 2004 Afrobarometer survey less than 17% reported having completed post-
secondary education. About a quarter (26%) had completed high school and just under a 
third (30%) said that they had started but not completed secondary education. 
 
 
                                               












Table 39: Education Profile in South Africa, 2004 
 Educational Level Percent 
No formal schooling 6% 
Informal schooling only 1% 
Some primary schooling 11% 
Primary school completed 9% 
Some secondary school/high school 30% 
Secondary school completed/high school 26% 
Post-secondary qualifications, not university 10% 
Some university 3% 
University completed 3% 
Post-graduate 1% 
Don't know .2% 
Total 100% 
Source of data: Afrobarometer, 2004 
Question: What is the highest level of education you have completed?   
 
Despite the lack of formal education, most South Africans can read. The proportion that 
can read and understand was 93% in 2004 while the proportion that can read and write 
was 80% in 2004 (SAARF, 2004a).  
 











Source of data: South African Advertising Research Foundation, 2004a. 
 
 
Dalton (2000:31) classifies those who have at least some university education and/or are 
“very interested” in the political campaign as being “cognitively mobilized”. While the 











education, this does not automatically translate into voters who are not cognitively 
engaged. In a country such as South Africa, formal education is not necessarily a good 
indicator of political astuteness given the vast mobilization of ordinary members of 
society in the struggle against apartheid. In this context, citizens without formal 
education could end up being extremely politically active. Furthermore, on a range of 
issues, for example government performance, South African voters are willing and able 





8.4 Political Interest 
 
A broader question is, “how interested are South Africans in political matters. At a first 
glance, it appears that South African voters are not interested in political matters. Mattes 
(2005:44) argues that “the level of engagement amongst the South African public is 
relatively low”. As seen in the figure below, at any given point less than a fifth of South 
Africans said that they frequently discuss political matters or follow politics “almost 
always” or “most of the time”.  
 





















































Frequently Talk About Politics With Friends / Family Follow Politics Always / Most of Time
 
Source: Mattes, 2005 
                                               
288 Jacobs (1999:150) also argues that despite low levels of formal education, voters in South Africa are adept at 












Based on Afrobarometer data, Mattes shows that the size of South Africa’s “attentive” 
public is the smallest in Southern Africa.  As Mattes (2005:44) indicates, “such low 
levels of engagement lead us to expect that South Africans are relatively ill-informed”. In 
the CNEP survey, only a third (36%) reported being very interested or somewhat 
interested in politics while almost two-thirds (64%) said that they were not very 
interested or not at all interested. However in the Afrobarometer survey, almost two 
thirds (61%) indicated that they were very interested (29%) or somewhat interested 
(32.2%) in following political matters. Just over a third (38%) said that they were not 
very interested or not at all interested in politics.  
 
Table 40: Interest in Public Affairs 
 Interest in Political Matters Afrobarometer* 
2004 
CNEP 2004** 
Not at all interested 18% 41% 
Not very interested 20% 23% 
Somewhat interested 32% 22% 
Very interested 29% 13% 
Don't know 1% 1% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Afrobarometer,2004 and Comparative National Election Project South Africa, 2004. 
*Question wording: How interested would you say you are in public affairs?   
** Question wording: More generally, how interested are you in politics?     
 
 
Respondents in the Afrobaromter surveys were also asked about the frequency of their 
political discussions. Just under a third (34%) said that they never discuss political 
matters. Almost two thirds (65%) indicated that they discuss political matters frequently 
(19%) or occasionally (46%). 
 
Table 41: Extent of Political Discussion 




Don't know 1% 
Total 100% 
Source: Afrobarometer, 2004.  














8.5 Campaign Interest 
 
Putting aside more general political interest, how interested were voters in following the 
2004 election campaign? It appears that the election campaign did spark interest among 
voters. In the Markinor survey more than two thirds (69%) of those surveyed said that 
they were either very or somewhat interested in following the political campaigns in the 
election. 
 
Table 42: Interest in the Campaigns (Markinor Opinion 2004) 
 Percentage 
Very Interested 18% 
Somewhat Interested 51% 
Not Interested 27% 
Do Not Know 4% 
SOURCE: SABC/Markinor Opinion 2004 
Question: Are you interested in following the political campaigns for this year’s national election? 
 
 
Respondents in the CNEP survey also reported higher levels of interest in the campaign 
than in politics in general. Almost half (49%) indicated that they were very interested or 
somewhat interested in the campaign compared to the third who reported being very 
interested or somewhat interested in politics. 
 
Table 43: Interest in the Campaign (Comparative National Elections Project) 
 Percentage 
Very interested 23% 
Somewhat interested 25% 
Not very interested 19% 
Not at all interested 32% 
Don’t know 1% 
Total 100% 
Source: Comparative National Election Project South Africa, 2004. 
Could you please tell me to what extent you were interested in following this election campaign-?   0= 
Not interested at all, 1= Not very interested, 2 = Somewhat interested, 3=Very interested 
 
Low proportions of the electorate indicated that they discussed issues relating to the 











with family and friends “often” or “sometimes”. Less than one in five discussed the 
campaign with neighbours or co-workers. 
 
 
Table 44: Discussion of Campaign Issues,  2004.  
  Discuss candidates, 
parties or issues 
with family 
Discuss candidates, 
parties or issues 
with friends 
Discuss candidates, 
parties or issues 
with neighbours 
Discuss candidates, 
parties or issues 
with co-workers 
Never 53% 51% 72% 78% 
Rarely 17% 13% 11% 7% 
Sometimes 22% 25% 13% 9% 
Often 9% 11% 5% 7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Comparative National Election Project South Africa, 2004. 
Question: How frequently did you talk about the candidates, parties or issues with your: family; 
friends; neighbours; co-workers 
 
8.6 Attention To Campaign News 
 
While low proportions said that they discussed issues relating to the 2004 campaign, 
majorities indicated that they paid attention to campaign news presented via all media 
types. Overall 57% indicated they paid “much” or “some” attention to campaign news in 
newspapers. Similarly 57% and 60% said that they paid “much” or “some” attention to 
campaign news on the radio and television respectively 
 
Table 45: Attention Paid to Campaign News,  2004.  
  Attention to campaign news from 
newspapers 
Attention to campaign 
news from radio 
Attention to 
campaign news from 
television 
Much Attention 18% 24% 25% 
Some Attention 38% 33% 34% 
Little Attention 33% 33% 30% 
No Attention 11% 11% 11% 
Missing 793 497 582 
Total 407 702 617 
Source: Comparative National Election Project South Africa, 2004. 
Questions: Overall, how much attention did you pay to the election campaign news that you read in 
the newspapers? Overall, how much attention did you pay to election campaign news that you heard 
on the radio?  Overall, how much attention did you pay to election news that you heard on 
television? 












8.7 Party Identification 
 
In South Africa, levels of partisanship have declined significantly between 1994 and 
2004 and the numbers of independent non-partisan, potentially “floating voters” have 
simultaneously increased. Declared partisanship was highest after the momentous 1994 
election, with 88% saying that they felt close to a political party and at its lowest in 1999 
with under half (45%) identifying with a political party. By end of 2004, 60% of the 
South African electorate indicated loyalty to a particular political party.  
 






















1994 1995 1997 1999 2000 2002 2004
 
Source Schulz-Herzenberg, 2007. 
 
Strikingly, eighty one percent of those who said that they identified with a party 
identified with the ANC i.e. the vast majority of party identifies were ANC identifiers, 
while identification with opposition parties was minimal. We could reasonably assume 
that that identification with the ANC is a tight emotional attachment, not subject to cross-
pressures such as campaign stimuli. This would explain Piombo’s (2005:279) 
observation that “the decreased share of the vote earned by the opposition as a whole 
suggests that it is mainly opposition voters who stayed at home”.  They are probably 
from the same pool of voters who say that they do not feel close to any political party, 
given that negligible proportions of the electorate say they feel close to any other 












As at 2004, just under half of the South African electorate (48%) indicated loyalty to the 
ANC while identification with opposition parties was minimal. In the Afrobarometer 
2004 survey, eighty one percent of those who said that they identified with a party 
identified with the ANC i.e. that the vast majority of party identifies were ANC 
identifiers.  As Schultz- Herzenberg (2007:119) indicates, party identification seems to 
be weakening for all parties - independents are disproportionately coming from the 
opposition parties, which have experienced a much higher rate of decline than the ANC. 
 
Within the South African context, those people who had direct experience or contact with 
the political system such as experiencing the wrath of the apartheid regime or being the 
victim of a politically motivated crime are more likely to have an emotional attachment 
to the party with which they identify, such as the original identification which Campbell 
et al described. These partisans are more likely to have a tighter connection to that 
political party and be less resistant to contrary influences such as election campaigns, i.e. 
they could be classified as “ritual partisans”.  Younger generations, who did not live 
through apartheid but heard stories about it through their parents or other significant 
people, are more likely to have a cognitive rather than strong emotional attachment to a 
party. Schultz-Herzenberg (2007:124) indicates in her longitudinal analyses of trends in 
party identification that there is tentative evidence of a decline in partisanship among 
younger voters, with the lowest level of partisanship being displayed among 18-29 year 
olds by 2004. 
 
8.8 Partisanship and Political Interest 
 
Using Dalton’s categorization of voters Mattes (2005:60) indicates that the proportion of 
"apartisans" has remained at ten percent or less over the past decade, and the proportion 
of "cognitive partisans" has remained at roughly 15% or less and so only about one 
quarter of the South African electorate met Dalton’s definition of a cognitively mobilized 
voter. Mattes (2005:60) therefore concludes that “even though South Africa has a 
relatively large proportion of non-partisan voters, the vast majority of these voters 
probably do not have the information or cognitive skills that would enable them to shift 
their party allegiances on the basis of ongoing party performance or policy issues”. 
 











interested, a different trend emerges.  In the 2004 Afrobarometer survey, of those who do 
not feel close to a party, half the respondents say that they are interested and half say that 
they are not. This categorization would place the proportion of apartisans at a far more 
substantial 50%. Furthermore more than two thirds of those who say that they feel close 
to a political party (68%) say that they are somewhat or very interested in public affairs. 
Table 46: Interest in Public Affairs by Party Identification 
    No, not 
close to any 
party 
Yes, feels 
close to a 
party 
 Refused to 
answer 
Don't know  Total 
Not at all interested 27% 14% 23% 15% 18% 
Not very interested 24% 18% 24% 36% 20% 
Somewhat interested 32% 33% 28% 23% 32% 
Very interested 17% 35% 24% 23% 29% 
Don't know 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Afrobarometer 2004. 
Questions How interested would you say you are in public affairs?   
Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
 
Furthermore, a majority (57%) of those who did not feel close to any political party said 
that they discussed politics occasionally (46%) or frequently (11%). Among partisans, 
almost three quarters (70%) said that they discussed politics occasionally (47%) or 
frequently (22%). 
 
Table 47: Extent of Political Discussion by Party Identification 
  No, not close 
to any party 
Yes, feels 




Don't know Total  
Never 42% 30% 42% 30% 34% 
Occasionally 46% 47% 39% 51% 46% 
Frequently 11% 22% 16% 9% 19% 
Don't know 1% 1% 3% 11% 1% 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Afrobarometer 2004 
Question: When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political 
matters: Never; Occasionally; Frequently. Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
 
Thus, a less strict categorization of the South African electorate, i.e. not including tertiary 
education and including voters who were “somewhat interested” in politics and 
“occasionally” discussed political matters points to public open to persuasion during 












8.9 Political Efficacy 
 
As indicated, numerous studies have demonstrated the importance of a sense of internal 
efficacy for engagement in democratic processes. A few of the surveys conducted 
between 1994 and 2004 asked South African respondents a range of questions related to 
political efficacy. The results indicate that in 2004 South African voters had a severe 
shortfall of internal political efficacy.  
 
In 1999, a majority of respondents (54%) interviewed for the first Opinion 99 survey felt 
that they had “quite a good understanding of the important issues facing South Africa”, 
however only 35 percent indicated that they felt “well prepared for participating in 
political life”. In the first Afrobarometer survey, six in ten (62%) felt that they did not 
“have enough information about political life and the actions of government”. In the 
2000 and 2004 Afrobarometer surveys, respondents were asked whether they could 
understand politics and government or if they felt that it was too complicated to 
understand. In both surveys, large majorities felt that politics and government affairs 
sometimes “seem so complicated” that they “can’t really understand what’s going on”.   
 
Table 48: Internal Political Efficacy, 2000 and 2004.  
Internal Efficacy Afrobarometer 2000 Afrobarometer 2004 
Strongly Agree 31% 25% 
Agree 45% 41% 
Neither Agree Nor Disagree 12% 14% 
Disagree 10% 13% 
Strongly Disagree 3% 4% 
Don't know .2% 4% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Afrobarometer 2000 and 2004 
Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?  Politics and government 
sometimes seem so complicated that you can’t really understand what’s going on  
 
 
As of 1995 South Africans displayed a high sense of optimism about the impact of voting 
with 64 percent saying that voting can make things better and 64 percent agreeing that “it 
is important who is in power because it can make a difference to what happens”. By 
2000, South Africans retained this optimism, with six in ten (62%) Afrobarometer 











percent still agreeing that “it is important who is in power because it can make a 
difference to what happens”. Unfortunately these questions were not repeated in any of 
the 2004 surveys. It would have been interesting to see 2004 data on the efficacy of 
voting given the steady decline in voter participation. The 2004 Afrobarometer survey 
asked how well elections “enable voters to remove from office leaders who do not do 
what the people want”. Overall, the largest proportion (46%) felt that elections do not 




The data revealed a previously unacknowledged interest in political and campaign 
matters. South African voters were interested in politics displaying a higher level of 
interest in election campaigns than politics in general. In the Afrobarometer survey a 
majority of those who did not feel close to any political party said that they discussed 
politics occasionally or frequently. The analysis thus revealed a substantial body of 
voters available to be persuaded through an election campaign.  
 
However, the results also showed that while South African voters felt that voting is 
important, they had a severe shortfall of internal political efficacy. This and the declining 
levels of partisan loyalty (and by extension, the proportion of voters possessing a highly 
effective method of organizing and evaluating political information) had important 
implications for campaign management. Parties could not simply rely on broad appeals to 
mobilize their supporters; rather, they needed to use a variety of accessible media to 
convince voters of the merits of voting for them via persuasive and compelling messages. 
These messages would both need to deal with issues of concern of to voters. It would 
also need to convince voters of their capacity to deliver on those promises. Instead as 
seen in chapter 5, political parties engaged in destructive campaign tactics and promised 












CHAPTER NINE: THE IMPACT OF THE 2004 CAMPAIGN 




Among the basic criteria for designating a country as an electoral democracy are that 
voters have access to information about candidates and their platforms, that they can vote 
without undue pressure from authorities and that candidates can campaign free from 
intimidation (Freedom House, 2002). A quality democracy provides its citizens with a 
high degree of freedom, political equality and popular control over public policies and 
policy makers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of stable institutions 
(Diamond and Morlino,2005:x-xii). As noted in chapter one, competitive elections 
require high turnout levels combined with the credible threat of electoral alternation. This 
enhances vertical accountability and responsiveness (Diamond and Morlino, 2005: xix) 
because the threat of eviction induces policy-makers to give greater consideration to the 
needs of voters. Moreover, good quality election campaigns increase electoral 
competition and simultaneously strengthen vertical accountability and democratic 
responsiveness by allowing competing parties to articulate their stances (Street, 
2001:253) by giving citizens’ unfettered access to alternative sources of information 
including independent media and divergent opinion (Diamond, 1996:11) and by 
providing incentives for people to vote. In turn, election campaigns, responsiveness, 
vertical accountability and ultimately democracy all require strong opposition parties, 
sufficient information, independent and pluralistic mass media as well as active and 
engaged voters.  
 
The democratic impact of an election campaign can be judged by the extent to which it 
drew voters into the electoral process thus facilitating accountability and responsiveness. 
To assess whether this occurred in South Africa’s 2004 campaign, I revisit the findings of 
each component of my analytical model. I then look at trends in participation and insights 
provided by the focus group discussions. Finally, I provide a series of recommendations 












9.2 Assessing the 2004 Election Campaign 
 
To answer the question of whether the 2004 campaign provided voters with an incentive 
to vote as well as contributed to an environment conducive to accountability and 
responsiveness I return to my analytical model. Based on this ideal model I argued that 
for election campaigns to enhance the quality of democracy: political parties perceived as 
competent, trustworthy and inclusive (by the voting public) must transmit a high volume 
of comparative policy-relevant campaign messages through a widely accessible and 
credible range of media to an interested and efficacious electorate, providing them with 
an incentive to go to the polls and cast their ballot.   
 
I find that the campaign damaged rather than enhanced the quality of democracy in South 
Africa. As noted at the beginning of this thesis, South Africa now has freedom, free and 
fair elections, a democratic constitution, a Constitutional Court, an extensive judicial 
system, transformed political institutions as well as a wide range of political and socio-
economic rights. However, it has poor quality election campaigns. In South Africa the 
campaigning process, which should “temporarily change the basis of political 
involvement from citizenship to partisanship; and in the process attract interest and votes 
from people who generally find politics uninteresting and remote” (Popkin, 1991:8), 
appears to actually hamper voter participation.  
 
In 2004 a substantial body of voters without firm partisan attachments (but with low 
levels of internal efficacy) was available to be persuaded by political parties. These 
voters had unprecedented access to the mass media with vastly increased television 
access and almost universal radio coverage reaching into remote rural areas. However, 
they also possessed largely negative images of opposition parties and their leaders and/or 
lacked information about them. This meant that these parties needed to deal with those 
negative perceptions and work hard to convince and persuade voters of the merits of 
voting (for them).  
 
Instead of doing this, campaign messages blurred rather than illuminated the choices for 
voters and failed to provide distinctions between policies, instead promising similar 
outcomes without adequately communicating their strategies to achieve these promises. 











concluded that the ANC would win the election by a large majority, that opposition 
parties had little to offer compared to what was already offered by the ANC and that 
therefore their individual vote would not count for much. 
 
There was also a striking lack of direct contact between opposition party members and 
voters which meant that voters had limited opportunities to communicate with and 
question party representatives.  Parties and party leaders also engaged in acrimonious 
attacks against each other. Negative campaigning was the norm rather than the exception. 
 
The poor communication by parties was further compounded by the media’s pre-
occupation with conflict and hostility between party leaders. Despite emerging as 
unbiased, coverage of the 2004 campaign lacked depth and tended to be sensationalist 
and focused on events, public appearances and the scathing attacks and public 
confrontations between parties.  The media’s coverage thus provided little assistance to 
voters attempting to sift through the chaotic array of information presented to them. 
Moreover, the coverage was disproportionately provided by the print media even while 
voters were most likely to use radio and television to follow the campaign. 
 
Juxtaposing my empirical findings against my analytical model reveals a bleak picture of 
campaigning in South Africa. To sum up: every component of the model received a 
predominantly negative assessment.  Based on my analysis, a summary statement of 
South Africa’s 2004 campaign would be that negatively perceived politicians and 
opposition parties engaged in destructive campaign tactics covered by news media which 
was sensationalist and lacking in depth, thus resulting in a dearth of pertinent, 



























and unable to 
deal with major 
issues 
 















































These results can best be understood by looking at Louw and Buchanan’s analysis of the 
relationship between candidates, journalists and voters. Buchanan argues that candidate 
incentives (of electoral victory) combine with media incentives (the need for peer 
respect, novelty, immediacy and the pressure of sustaining or increasing readership 
figures) and with certain traits of the electorate (such as alienation and indifference) to 
invite and offer rationalizations for the use of manipulation and deception.  According to 
Buchanan the difficulties of motivating an often indifferent and inattentive public invites 
candidate appeals to narrow self-interest and to emotions like fear, prejudice and anger as 
well as “emotional appeals that covertly trigger racial resentment”. Media incentives 
evoke campaign coverage practices (such as a focus on the most dramatic and conflictual 
features of the campaign) and discourages extensive or detailed substantive coverage of 
policies (Buchanan, 2001: 366-370). The mutually-reinforcing, symbiotic relationship 
between journalists and candidates drives journalists to produce ‘spectacle’ news:  a 
genre requiring dramatic or entertaining stories with a focus on evaluating personalities 
not policy-making abilities. At the same time, this results in voter cynicism towards 
politics as well as a growing apathy and withdrawal from participation, which then fuels 
the above-mentioned patterns (Louw 2005:270-89).  
 
In 2004 the campaign was characterized by the features described by Buchanan and 
Louw. Rather than delving into their policy platforms, candidates appealed to voter’s 











focused on the most dramatic and conflictual aspects of the campaign. It is likely that this 
contributed to an increase in voter cynicism toward the democratic system and alienation 
from the political process. Thus, as aptly explained by Buchanan and Louw, it is the 
interactions between politicians, the media and voters that have a detrimental impact on 
the quality of South Africa’s democracy.  
 
Given this negative state of affairs, it is probable that the 2004 election campaign in 
South Africa offered modest value to voters and in many instances “turned them off” 
from voting.  For focus group participants, the campaigns seemed to amplify pre-existing 
feelings of disillusionment. They felt that the campaigns were ultimately an exercise in 
impression management and displayed a distinct aversion for campaign rhetoric. They 
indicated that it would take far more than innovative communication strategies to 
improve the image of politicians and opposition parties. Several focus group participants 
did feel that campaigns were important because they gave people hope, connected leaders 
to voters and helped voters decide between political parties. However, others felt that 
campaigns were simply a waste of valuable resources with parties making the same 
promises every election. Both groups of non-voters indicated that a party could convince 
them to vote through increased visibility in communities, by keeping their promises and 
by delivering change. In other words they wanted to be convinced by the actions of party 
leaders between elections rather than by the rhetoric of a campaign. This supports 
Booysen’s findings of twenty three focus group discussions conducted in the run-up to 
the 1999 election. Booysen (1999b:38) noted that, at that stage,  South African voters 
were still highly motivated to vote but felt weary of election campaigns and rather 
wanted “feedback, progress reports and people coming to their communities to listen and 
hear”. 
 
9.3 Participation Patterns 
 
Participation has declined sharply since the first democratic election in 1994. 
Participation as a proportion of the voting age population (VAP) declined from 86% in 
1994 down to 72% in 1999 and 58% in 2004. As seen in the diagram below, participation 
in national elections, counted as a percentage of voting age population, has decreased by 
30 percentage points between 1994 and 2004 (Piombo, 2005: 253). As Schultz-











roughly 3.9 million since 1994, despite growth in VAP and increases in registration. 
Taken differently, these figures indicate that 6.76 million eligible voters inadvertently or 
deliberately remained unregistered and 5.06 million registered voters stayed away from 
the polls, or were for one or other reason prevented from voting (Southall and Daniel, 
2005:38). 
 












Source of data: Piombo, 2005. 
 
While this decrease in voter turnout is not unique to South Africa, as Mattes (2006: 107) 
points out – it was not inevitable
289
.  Mattes argues that neither South Africa’s choice of 
electoral system, its experience with democracy nor its level of development accounts for 
the level of voter participation. Whatever the underlying reason, the limited contact 
between voters and their representatives between elections and the fact that these 
elections occur only every five years makes the continuing decline in voter participation 
a cause for concern. Further declines would not bode well for South Africa’s fledgling 
democracy.  
 
                                               
289 Some analysts indicate that many established western democracies have seen declining or low voter turnout and that 
this is a “normal” trend. Afrimap and the Open Society Foundation for South Africa (2006:7), in their review of 
democracy and political participation in South Africa, note that “as a percentage of the registered electorate, the 2004 
turnout in South Africa is roughly comparable with Western European levels and much higher than many African 












Declining participation in South Africa also needs to be located within a context of 
increasing ANC margins. In South Africa the negative implications of declining levels of 
voter participation for democratic responsiveness and accountability are more severe due 
to the increasing electoral strength of the ruling African National Congress. The ANC’s 
proportion of the vote, taken as a proportion of total votes cast, increased from 62 percent 
in 1994 to 66 percent in 1999 to 70 percent in 2004. In contrast, votes cast for opposition 
parties decreased from 33% in 1994 down to 22% in 1999 and down to 18% in 2004. As 
Mattes (2005:106) indicates turnout trends and voting patterns are not unrelated. As a 
proportion of all eligible voters, votes cast for the ANC decreased from 56% in 1994, 
down to 42% in 1999 and then down to 40% in 2004, a 39% decline in the size of the 
ANC vote bloc. By 2004, more people (42%) stayed at home than voted for the ANC. 
The disproportionate abstention of opposition supporters creates the appearance of 
increasing support for the governing party even as its actual active support across the 
population may be declining (Mattes, 2005:106-107). Piombo (2005:279) also argues 
that “the decreased share of the vote earned by the opposition as a whole would suggest 
that it is mainly opposition voters who stayed at home.” Thus, while the number of seats 
the ANC obtained increased from 252 in 1994 to 266 in 1999 and 279 in 2004, the 
overall number of votes cast for them had decreased. The nearly 70 per cent ANC 
majority the ANC achieved in 2004 translates into a 40 per cent minority of the entire 
eligible population (Southall and Daniel, 2004:38).   
 
































Obtaining increasing proportions of the vote share from decreasing proportions of the 
electorate undermines vertical accountability and democratic responsiveness. Firstly, 
there is a diminished incentive for incumbents to anticipate and realize citizens’ desires. 
Secondly, citizens may feel disempowered by their inability to evict unresponsive policy 
makers. The 2004 campaign reduced rather than fostered competition. Increasing ANC 
support, along with declining participation levels has thus lead to questions about the 
quality of South Africa’s newly established democracy. The specter of continued ANC 
victories is not negative per se, what is problematic is that these victories may be the 
result of no other feasible alternative thus reducing accountability and responsiveness.  
 
In the 2004 elections, the conditions that favour democratic responsiveness and vertical 
accountability were lacking. Opposition parties were not seen by voters as viable 
alternatives to the ANC; there was a lack of debate around policy alternatives; the media 
blurred rather than clarified choices and voters lacked political efficacy. Taken together, 
these results indicate a downward spiral. If South Africans are not presented with viable 
alternatives from competent inclusive trustworthy opposition parties, voters will find 
little incentive to cast their ballot and consequently the governing party has little need to 
be accountable and take seriously the opinions and needs of ordinary people.  
 
The answer to the question of whether the 2004 election campaign contributed to the 
quality of democracy in South Africa has to be a resounding “no!” My study reveals a 
unflattering picture of campaigning in the 2004 elections. The 2004 election campaign 
offered minimal value and in many instances could have “turned voters off” from casting 
their ballot. If left unchecked, this situation could result in the weakening of the quality 
of democracy. The threat to a new democracy such as South Africa’s is, as Huntington 





It is in the interests of both the ANC and opposition parties that voters return to the 
electoral process and turnout levels increase. For opposition parties, increased voter 











predominantly non-partisan or opposition supporters.  For the ANC a situation where 
only a minority of the voting population renews their mandate could lead to a decline in 
legitimacy and result in different set of challenges. Moreover, the fact that the problem 
lies primarily with broad structural arrangements and political institutions, exhorting 
voters to “get back into the game” is likely to yield limited results. Given the bleak 
situation outlined in this thesis, the pertinent question is, “What practical steps can be 
taken to progress to a situation where election campaigns provide citizens with the 
incentive to vote and enhance rather than hinder the quality of democracy in South 
Africa?” 
 
Firstly, at a structural level, the disparity caused by the existing funding allocation system 
requires reconsideration.  As Popkin (1991:67) notes, “elections are competitive when 
challengers have sufficient money to convey themselves and their messages to voters”. It 
is important that development of a regulatory framework, including mechanisms to 




Secondly, opposition parties need to develop strategies to improve the way in which they 
are perceived by voters. As a first step, opposition parties will need to consider what it is 
that underpins the negative perceptions of them. If parties fail to address these negative 
perceptions around trust, credibility and inclusiveness, the most innovative of future 
campaign strategies aimed at wooing independent voters, will be of little effect. As 
Mattes (2006:115) asserts a more competitive system in South Africa requires the rapid 
development of skills and capacity in opposition parties.  
 
 In addition to improving their image, opposition parties need to raise their profile 
because in many instances voters simply could not offer an opinion about them. This 
indicates that they have not branded themselves in the minds of voters. Leaders should 
make themselves more visible in communities and parties should increase the extent of 
                                               
290 The Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa) has been advocating against the current system in which private 
donations are not fully disclosed to the public or regulated law, because of the “corrupting tendencies” of these 
donations (Matlosa, 2004a:2). A conference on party funding hosted by the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 
(EISA) and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) recommended that: a limit be established on the amount of funding 
parties may receive from private donors; a threshold be determined for expenditure on party campaigning; a situation 
where parties become too dependent on public financing, be guarded against as this would undermine the relationship 
between parties and their supporters; there should be fair and equal access to state-owned media by contending parties 
other than the ruling party and clear regulatory mechanisms should be put in place to ensure accountability and 












direct contact with voters outside of election periods. Parties also need to plan their 
campaigns adequately, developing mechanisms to generate both free and paid media that 
reinforce each other. Parties should use radio more extensively, given the fact that it is 
such a widely accessed and powerful medium.  
 
Another challenge for political parties is to move away from the mud-slinging that has 
characterized election campaigning in South Africa. The bitter animosity and vicious 
attacks on each other have clearly done little to draw voters into the electoral process. 
Not only should the content be transformed but also the style and tone with which it is 
delivered. While there is an Electoral Code of Conduct which commits all parties to a 
range of provisions concerning electioneering (Lodge and Scheidegger, 2005:7-8), 
parties still exercise choice over the ways in which they conduct their campaigns. 
Currently, there is little incentive for parties to engage in constructive campaigning 
practices. Thus, parties may operate within the framework of Electoral Code of Conduct 
but continue to engage in negative practices which turn voters off. Whilst this is a 
complex issue with no easy solution, a framework to guide parties away from this 
destructive pattern should be considered.   
 
Furthermore, competing parties should articulate themselves adequately to allow citizens 
to engage fully with the content of their communications. As Dunn (1999:339) argues “a 
political system in which accountability is enacted on the basis of ignorance and 
incomprehension is unlikely to benefit anyone with much consistency”. Parties 
consequently need to consider transforming their campaign messages so as to provide the 
electorate with a comprehensive overview of their policy stances, and plans to implement 
them.  Parties also need to develop messages that attract interest in the electoral process 
and motivate people to cast their ballot. As more young voters, without firm partisan 
attachments open to campaign stimuli, enter the electoral system it is imperative that 
parties present clear information to them during the campaign period so that they are 
given the means by which to make a well-informed choice.  As seen in numerous 
surveys, voters are keenly aware of the problems facing the country and they also know 
the policy areas in which government has shortcomings. As Keys (1967: 1) said more 
than forty years ago “Voters are not fools”. Therefore, it makes very little sense to use 
the crucial period leading up to election day to again explain what the problems are and 











about performance failure must be balanced with a discussion about how to fix those 
failures. Therefore, opposition parties should move away from a critique of government 
performance as the primary basis of their campaign messages. Instead they need to 
provide clear details of how they will implement solutions.  
  
However, a good campaign is only the starting point. Or in this case, it should be the end 
point of a productive inter-campaign period. Voter perceptions of political parties and 
party leaders are based on prior knowledge and experience. These perceptions are 
relatively deep-rooted and generally formed long before the campaign period begins. The 
action that parties need to take will require moving beyond improved communication 
strategies. Better communications, improved campaign themes, carefully-constructed 
policy-relevant messages and considerate campaign tactics on its own will no longer 
satisfy South African voters. As the focus groups revealed, the problem runs deeper than 
image management. Following the example of the professionalized campaign industry 
prevalent in more established democracies is likely to do South Africa’s democracy more 
harm than good.
291
 Slick well-constructed campaigns, which cost vast sums of cash, are 
offensive to people struggling to meet their basic everyday needs. Parties can develop 
methods to assist communities in dealing with some of their problems outside of election 
periods. For example, parties could partner with faith-based organizations and non-
governmental organizations, and increase their efforts to tackle issues such as HIV and 
AIDS, substance abuse, crime, poverty and more. Genuine efforts to alleviate problems 
of importance to voters are likely to lead to increased visibility, improved party images 
and a willingness to vote for that party. Political parties should also consider extensive 
drives to establish functioning branch structures. This would, in turn, rebuild the stock of 
partisan identification and again provide the cognitive hook for voters to use, as they 
navigate their way through campaign material. 
 
Finally, as previously stated, the media has a critical role in South Africa’s young 
democracy because the provision of political information enables voters to both make 
political choices and hold government to account.
292
 Gerwel (2005:1) points out that 
“after little more than ten years of democracy in South Africa, the need for quality 
                                               
291 Louw (2005:27) argues that there has been a growth of professionalized industry of impression managers who 
research the political environment to decide what sort of political face will be most popular, ‘invent’ such a face and 
then groom and coach candidates to perform this role.  












journalism is as urgent and important now as it has ever been”.  
 
Jacobs (2004:37) describes the media in South Africa “as a potent and often ambivalent 
power centre that must be understood on its own terms.” The results of this study points 
to the emergence of a destructive campaign cycle, with long-term damaging effects. The 
way in which the media covered the campaign is a continuation of the coverage practices 
which emerged in the 1999 election. Even then, Jacobs (1999:150) noted that the media 
failed to grapple with the issues of concern to voters and focused primarily on vote-
catching events. While media houses need to attract the interest of its audience (and a 
focus on the most dramatic and conflictual elements of a campaign might raise audience 
figures in the short-term), as seen above, in the long-term it has damaging effects.   
 
Journalists can provide in-depth analysis, critically scrutinize proposed policies and set 
out the implications of these policies in a way that is understandable to ordinary citizens. 
In-depth news pieces could be done in consultation with relevant experts so that content 
can be put into a larger perspective. Hadland (2005:14) notes that “South Africa needs 
quality media, equipped to understand, analyze and convey our complex society and so 
contribute to the deepening of its fledgling democracy”.  
 
Journalists and other media professionals, more than politicians, have the power to break 
the destructive cycle that is evolving in South Africa. As Louw (2005:90) indicates, the 
power of journalists comes from the fact that politicians need the media. Thus, as Louw 
argues, journalists potentially have the power to disrupt and undermine the work of spin-
doctors by refusing to accept the line they are spinning and unearth the real issues. Media 
houses can choose to inject their coverage with policy-relevant material. This would help 
voters to sift through the vast array of information and distinguish between the policy 
platforms of parties.  Radio stations in particular could increase their volume of 
campaign coverage and provide more information on the merits and logistics of voting. 
This would also assist in dealing with the lack of political efficacy revealed by the data.   
 
It is apparent that media professionals in South Africa face a complicated series of 
challenges. However, given South Africa’s complex historical context, many in the 
media have faced tougher challenges and risen to the occasion. In South Africa, it is time 











long have been played without sufficient self-reflection. Indeed Berger (2005:26) 
concludes that South Africa has the capacity to generate a new paradigm of journalism. 
Self-scrutiny and a cognisance of these relationships could well be the key to breaking 
the negative symbiosis developing between political parties and the media, aptly 
described by Louw in his analysis of the media and political processes.  
 
Hopefully, the findings of this study will foster a renewed debate around the role and 
character of campaigning, as well as the complex relationship between political parties, 
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Appendix 1: Ethical Considerations 
 
Ethical considerations in this study related primarily to the role of respondents within the 
survey of citizens and the focus group discussions.  The compilation of the content 
analysis data-set did not involve human subjects. Transcripts of radio and TV material, as 
well as news paper clippings were collected during the months preceding the elections (9 
February – 14 April 2004 and were coded, captured and collated into a data-set by Media 
Tenor.  
 
Data collection involving human subjects was carried out by survey companies that are 
governed by the South African Market Research Association (SAMRA) code of conduct. 
 
In all the surveys the participants had reasonable and sufficient knowledge about the 
projects under whose auspices they were conducted. Respondents were told by the 
interviewer which research institution was conducting the survey and that they did not 
represent the government or any political party. Respondents were given some 
information about the overall project and the content of the questionnaire to be 
administered to them. Confidentiality was assured and the length of time required for the 
interview was indicated. The person approached then had the option of refusing to be part 
of the study or agreeing to assist them further with respondent selection. If the respondent 
selected differed from the original person approached, this process was repeated. In some 
projects, respondents were given a token gift to thank them for their time. 
 
The participants were given some information about the overall project, confidentiality 
within the group was assured and the length of time required for the discussion was 
indicated. The person approached then had the option of refusing to be part of the study. 
If the person agreed to participate, they were asked a set of preliminary questions to 
ensure that they qualified to be part of the discussion. Prior to the discussion groups, the 
purpose of the study was again explained as well as the need to keep the discussion 











participated freely and would keep the discussion confidential. Respondents were given a 
payment to thank them for their time. Respondents had the right to refuse to answer any 
of the questions at any stage.  
 
Informed consent was secured from the respondents in both the survey and in the focus 
groups. In the survey, verbal consent was obtained from the interviewer. In the focus 
group sessions, participants were required to complete a consent form stating that they 
have participated in the study of their own accord as well as binding them to keep the 












Appendix 2: Focus Group Methodology Notes 
 
I used the principles set by Krueger (1998) to guide the structure of my discussion 
guides. According to Krueger, a successful focus group discussion usually has the 
following categories of questions: opening, introductory, transition, key and ending 
questions. The opening questions are designed to be answered quickly with the purpose 
of making participants feel comfortable.  Introductory questions introduce the general 
topic, but are not normally part of the analysis.  Transition questions move the 
conversation toward the key questions that drive the study, key questions drive the study 
and ending questions close the study.  
 
The discussion started with an ice-breaker about the participants’ favourite past-time. It 
then moved to a general question about the election and what people they speak to were 
saying about election and the campaigns. Participants were then informed that everyone 
in the room had voted in the same pattern or that they were all non-voters. If they had 
voted for the same party, they were asked why they had voted for that party again rather 
than choosing a different party. If they had voted for a different party, they were asked 
what had changed their minds caused them to not vote for the party they voted for 
previously. If they had not voted, they were asked why they decided not to vote given 
that they voted in the two previous elections. All groups were presented with a campaign 
picture of the parties that they had not voted for (non-voters were provided with pictures 
of all six parties considered in this study). They were then asked why each particular 
party was unable to convince them to vote for that party. Participants were then given the 
statement “Some people say that campaigns do not really matter in elections because 
people have already made up their minds; others say that they are important because they 
help voters to choose who to vote for” and then asked how they felt about election 
campaigns. Finally, they were asked what advice they would give to somebody in charge 












Appendix 3: Focus Group Recruitment Form 
 
For the focus group discussions, participants were recruited the following questionnaire.  
 
Focus Group Recruitment Form 
Good day, my name is ………….  I am working for a researcher from UCT who is doing a study 
on how political parties communicate to voters.  We are doing group discussions on these issues.  
Confidentiality in these groups are assured and no comments will be linked to names in any form 
whatsoever. The group discussion will take about 2 hours. TRANSPORT AND 
REFRESHMENTS WILL BE PROVIDED. YOU'LL BE GIVEN A MONETARY GIFT for the 
2 hours. Would you be interested in joining the group discussion? 
(If respondent says ”NO”, thank for their time and close interview. If the respondent says YES, 
continue with the questionnaire) 
First I need to ask you a few questions to ensure that you qualify to be part of the discussion.[IF 
NOT VERY INTERESTED/NOT INTERESTED IN CAMPAIGN, VERY CLOSE TO A 
PARTY OR MADE UP THEIR MIND A LONG TIME BEFORE ELECTION: THANK FOR 
THEIR TIME AND INDICATE THAT THEY UNFORTUNATELY DO NOT QUALIFY TO 
BE PART OF THE DISCUSSION]. To the rest, thank them and indicate IT WILL BE HELD AT 
(venue) on (date and time). Inform them that they will receive a follow-up phone-call to confirm 
the details. 
 
How interested were you in following the recent election campaign? 1= Very interested, 
2=Intersted, 3 = Not very interested, 4= Not interested at all 
Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party? 1= yes,  2=no 
Which party is that? 1 =ANC, 2= ACDP, 3=DA, 4=ID,  5= IFP, 6=NNP, 7=PAC,  8=UDM 
Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close or not very close? 1= Very close,  
2=Somewhat close,  3=Not very close 
For each of the following, which party did you vote for? 1=Nat 1994, 2=Prov 1994, 3=Nat 1999, 
4=Prov 1999,  5=Nat 2004, 6=Prov 2004 
In the past  election, at what stage did you make up your mind ? 1=On election day, 2=A few 
days before, 3= About a week before, 4=About a month before, 5= A long time before 
What is your age? 
What is your highest level of education? 1=Finished primary,  2=Finished High school,   3= 
Tertiary 
What is your contact details? 
Race ? 1=Black 2=White 3=Coloured 4=Indian 













Appendix 4: Focus Group Discussion Guides 
 
Discussion Guide For People Who Voted 
Good morning / evening. My name is ________. I would like to thank you for joining this 
discussion group.  This discussion is being done as part of a research project for a student from 
UCT who is studying how political parties communicate to voters. 
 
A few things to remember: there are no right or wrong answers in this kind of discussion, just 
feelings, ideas and opinions. So please feel free to say what you feel. 
 
It is important that everyone must participate. What counts are your views and your opinions, 
no matter how insignificant you might feel your ideas to be. You are in a sense representing so 
many other people out there who feel and think the same as you do, so you are speaking on 
behalf of them and therefore you must have your say. 
 
It doesn't matter if your views differ. Being honest about your ideas is more important, even if 
your opinions are different from everyone else’s. We are tape-recording the proceedings for 
later analysis. We will use quotes, things you say, in her report but not even first names will be 
used. PLEASE  SIGN THE  CONFIDENTIALITY SLIPS  
 
Only one person should speak at a time, otherwise we will not be able to hear properly. This is 
important for recording and transcription purposes. 
We’ll start off with everyone’s name and (just briefly) your favourite past-time.  
The election held on the 14
th
 of April was a big event, what did people that you speak to say 
about the recent election and the campaigning before the election?  
FOR THOSE GROUPS WHERE EVERYBODY VOTED FOR THE SAME PARTY 
Everybody sitting in this room voted for the (READ IN NAME OF PARTY_____________) in 
this election and the previous one. What made you decide to vote for them again this time 
around rather than choosing a different party?   
FOR THOSE WHO VOTED FOR A DIFFERENT PARTY PREVIOUSLY 
Everybody sitting in this room voted for ____________previously, what made you change your 
mind and decide to not vote for them this time around?  
Looking at this image of ____________________________, why was this party unable to 
convince you to vote for them? 
Looking at this image of ____________________________, why was this party unable to 
convince you to vote for them? 
Looking at this image of ____________________________, why was this party unable to 
convince you to vote for them? 
Looking at this image of ____________________________, why was this party unable to 
convince you to vote for them? 
Looking at this image of ____________________________, why was this party unable to 
convince you to vote for them? 
Some people say that campaigns do not really matter in elections because people have already 
made up their minds; others say that they are important because they help voters to choose who 











Thinking of all we’ve said and discussed here, what advice would you give to somebody in 
charge of a political party? How do you think that they can improve their chances in the next 
election?) 
Do you have any final comments before we close? THAT CONCLUDES OUR DISCUSSION, 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. 
 
Discussion Guide For People Who Did Not Vote 
Good morning / evening. My name is ________. I would like to thank you for joining this 
discussion group.  This discussion is being done as part of a research project for a student from 
UCT who is studying how political parties communicate to voters. 
 
A few things to remember: there are no right or wrong answers in this kind of discussion, just 
feelings, ideas and opinions. So please feel free to say what you feel. 
 
It is important that everyone must participate. What counts are your views and your opinions, no 
matter how insignificant you might feel your ideas to be. You are in a sense representing so many 
other people out there who feel and think the same as you do, so you are speaking on behalf of 
them and therefore you must have your say. 
 
It doesn't matter if your views differ. Being honest about your ideas is more important, even if 
your opinions are different from everyone else’s. We are tape-recording the proceedings for later 
analysis. We will use quotes, things you say, in her report but not even first names will be used. 
PLEASE  SIGN THE  CONFIDENTIALITY SLIPS  
 
Only one person should speak at a time, otherwise we will not be able to hear properly. This is 
important for recording and transcription purposes. 
We’ll start off with everyone’s name and (just briefly) your favourite past-time.  
The election held on the 14th of April was a big event, what did people that you speak to say 
about the recent election and the campaigning before the election?  
Thinking back to the previous elections, everybody sitting in this room voted 
___________previously, please explain your reasons for voting for __________at that stage.  
Thinking now of the elections held this year. Please explain the reasons that you changed your 
mind and decide to not vote in 2004?  
What, if anything, would have convinced you to vote in the 2004 election?  
Looking at this image of the ANC, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them in 
the 2004 elections?  
Looking at this image of the DA, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them in 
the 2004 elections?  
Looking at this image of the IFP, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them in 
the 2004 elections? 
Looking at this image of the UDM, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them in 
the 2004 elections? 
Looking at this image of the ID, why was this party unable to convince you to vote for them in 
the 2004 elections?  











the 2004 elections? 
How likely is it that you would vote in the next elections in 2009? What are your reasons for 
saying that? 
What would a political party have to do in order to convince you to vote for them in 2009? 
Some people say that campaigns do not really matter in elections because people have already 
made up their minds; others say that they are important because they help voters to choose who 
to vote for. How do you feel about election campaigns? 
Thinking of all we’ve said and discussed here, what advice would you give to somebody in 
charge of a political party? How do you think that they can improve their chances in the next 
election?  
Do you have any final comments before we close? THAT CONCLUDES OUR DISCUSSION, 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. 
 
Appendix 5: Focus Group Consent Form 
 
 
I,_________________________________________(INSERT NAME, THE USE OF A 
SYNONYM IS ACCEPTABLE)  
 
HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I AM PARTICIPATING IN THIS DISCUSSION 
GROUP OF MY OWN FREE WILL. 
 
 
THE PURPOSE OF THIS DISCUSSION GROUP HAS BEEN EXPLAINED TO ME. 
 
 
I  WILL MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THIS DISCUSSION GROUP.  I WILL 
THEREFORE NOT TALK  
 

























He likes driving, going to town, sightseeing.  And___________, he likes jolling! 
 
He likes poetry, reading, driving, and sightseeing. 
 
__________is my name, and I spoke to ___________and ____________.  ____________likes 
dancing and laughing… 
 
You like laughing! 
 
…and ____________also likes laughing and jolling. 
 
He likes laughing as well; his name is___________, that’s the only thing he likes, laughing! 
 




I am ____________.   
 
And what does he say, what does he like doing? 
 
 
He likes working.  
 
She is a student, and she studies at UCT. 
 









As I said, my name is Cherrel and I have got two small kids.  I enjoy spending time with 
them and going jogging as well.  Okay, I am just going to run through how this is going to 
work, how the afternoon discussion is going to work.  Thank you for joining in.  It is part of 
a research project that is being done for a student of Cape Town University who is looking 
at how political parties communicate with voters.  Just a few things, there is no right or 
wrong answer in the discussion.  It is just your opinion, your feelings.  So please, even if you 
disagree with each other, feel free to say what you want to.  And then also, it is very 
important that every person participate so that I get a full idea of what everybody thinks.  
Your views are very important, so if you have something in your mind but then you don’t 











the discussion.  Then, also, we are tape recording the proceedings, this is for analysis.  But 
when the report is written, no person’s name – it will just be a long list of what everybody 
said, and there is four other groups that is also being done, so it will all just be in there 
together with everybody else and it will all be in a report, so we won’t be able to say, ‘okay, 
Wilfred said so and so’.  Last thing, if just one person can speak at a time because of the 
recording.  Because I see you guys have got a lot to say!  Lastly, what we are saying is 
confidential, so I just need you to sign a confidentiality slip.  So afterwards you won’t go 
and phone somebody and say, ‘You know what so and so said in the group?’  So you are 
just acknowledging that you are taking part of your own free will.  
And also that I did discuss it with you and you will maintain the confidentiality and not 
discuss it afterwards.  That is all you are signing for.  Also just remember to speak out so 
the recorder can hear you.  Okay, the election held in April was a big event.  What did 
people you speak to say about the recent event and the campaigning during the election 
time? 
 
On my side I will say that the 2004 election was just – how can I put it? – in 1994 basically the 
election was about freedom, the Blacks.  In 1999 it was ANC, but the ANC didn’t actually fulfill 
what they always said they were going to do.  So this year’s election I actually didn’t vote 
because I felt that it was kind of a waste of time. 
 
And other people, what did people you spoke to say about the election? 
 
I will just echo what he said; it was just a lot of promises.  They go out of their way, they even go 
to your home or houses to see how you live and give you big promises, and at the end of the day 
nothing happens.  But they got the vote and nothing happens after that. 
 
It becomes obvious that we all know the ANC is going to win.  What I actually read about, 
Patricia De Lillie’s party coming up, and she is a new party, there are quite a number of new 
parties.  But no matter how many parties there are, it is still going to be the same, the same 
promises.  It’s like when you get to work, you get the manager, the chairman, but you never get 
there, they tell you to do this and that and you will become this and that, but you never do and 
you always have to do the dirty work.  There is one thing that is always bothering me, and that is 
people are looking for (inaudible) nations.  I mean there is so much money around, I am sure 
there is a lot of money, people paying taxes and things, if it was fairly distributed, why not give 
donations to the poor and things. Because every time you have to give the person on the street, 
the person in church, wherever you go, why do you always give from your pocket, I mean and 
you still pay the taxes, now what are they doing with the taxes? 
 
And others on this side, what did people say about the elections? 
 
What I heard from people is it is a waste of time.  It is the same ones over and over, and they 
aren’t going to give us anything.  Not jobs or anything like that.  My main thing I can say is it is a 






Yes, people who got jobs last year and two years back, they were happy, and people who got 
houses as well, they were happy.  Especially these informal settlements, they were very happy 
because they had houses which they didn’t have before, so some people were happy and some 
people were not happy. 
 
Okay, thinking back then to the previous elections, everybody sitting in this room voted for 












Everyone was looking out for – in fact I was looking out for a new life, work.   What we thought 
was that everything would just, you know, change.  But it is now ten years and we are still living 
in that past. 
 
The thing is, you know, when I voted in 1999, I thought ‘give them a chance’, you know, in five 
years, you can’t do much in five years.  The previous Government had how many years to do 
what they wanted to.  In five years you can’t do anything, give them another five years.  But it is 
still the same thing.  What I don’t like is the Affirmative Action.  That doesn’t make sense to me.  
They have got the wrong concept of the thing.  It happens in the workplace and it happens in 
sport, people don’t get into a team because of their ability to play, they are there for their skin 
colour, which is wrong.  And then the team loses and they blame the coach, you know.  But it is 
not a matter of the coach not coaching properly; it is because of the skin colour.  You can’t just 
put anybody in there for their skin colour that can’t play! 
 
Okay, and others, what were your reasons at that stage for voting for the ANC? 
 
I thought better job prospects and better jobs.  I applied and I wasn’t black enough, I didn’t get 
the job.  So I think nothing has changed, well, it has changed reverse actually.    
 
It’s the other way around.  I think that is everyone’s reason for voting ANC, because they thought 
they were going to have a good home, a good job, and that they are going to live a better life.  We 
are not going to live the life we lived before that, before Mandela became President.  But it 
doesn’t seem that way. 
 
What the ANC is doing is promising us things and then after that not doing it.  But when the 
ANC want us to vote these things are coming forward before and then after – nothing. 
 
My main reason for voting, why I got so serious about voting is because I thought I was going to 
get a house, or at least one of us, but no one I know got a house. 
 
Individually I thought there was going to be a major change after the 1994 election, but there was 
a slight change, but not that much.  After 1999 there was not such a development in the 
townships.  People got houses, but not everyone.  What I found out recently, after these elections 
more houses were built. 
 
Another thing with this houses story is they just give it to any contractors and they just build 
these one bedroom houses… 
 
And they’ve got like ten children in them! 
 
…so long as they get the money from it, then they disappear and the houses are falling apart and 
nobody seems to care, nobody is complaining, but it shows that the ANC is giving houses.  They 
wanted houses, there are the houses, but they aren’t worried what type of houses.  They just issue 
houses.  Why don’t they take some more money and let the people live in decent homes. 
 
Livable at least. 
 
Obviously if you are going to give people houses you are going to do a history about the people, 
he has got three children, he has got two, and I’ve got one child, so I am not going to get the three 
bedroom house.  I will take a two bedroom house; you know what I am saying.  He can’t be 
given a one bedroom house with three children, that is where crime comes in, where rape comes 
in.  There’s a lot of things to consider. 
 















Honesty, yes, if they promised you then they have got to give it to you, so that they in the 
townships will feel it first, because they live like squatting, without water, without sanitary and 
they feel it more than what we feel it.  So they must first do something to help those people and 
then they can convince us to vote again. 
 
Okay, what would have convinced you to vote? 
 
Individually, for me, from where I come there is not much done about the youth, about the crime.  
There is only bars, there is nothing like… 
 
Sports, things like that? 
 
Yes.  I don’t understand how come, there is only taverns, bars… 
 
So if there was something for the youth, that would have convinced you? 
 
Yes.  Because they end up being criminals. 
 
Okay, what would have convinced you? 
 
You see, the idea, when they need a vote, they have a way of getting a vote.  But now after that, 
nothing happens.  They even put in a house before the vote and say ‘this is your house’, just vote 
for us and you will have it.  They also have a tendency of giving people groceries just to get a 
vote.  And then while you are waiting for the next thing to happen, nothing happens. 
 
Okay, but just hypothetically then, what would somebody have had to do to get you to vote 
for them?  What would have convinced you? 
 
I would say honesty and justice. 
 
The justice system is also down the drain. 
 
I mean if a Government official steals they will spend a million more just to prove him wrong. 
 
And yet there is a child stealing food and he gets sent to jail where there is 20 other prisoners 
waiting for trail because they don’t know where to put him. 
 
A political prisoner gets put in a separate cell and then he gets out and says he helped the 
community or he did something good.  So there is no justice in the system, if you steal, you steal, 
whether you are President or not.  You must be treated fairly.  So whether you stole money or a 






So is there anything that they could have said that could have convinced you? 
 
Not anything they could have said, what they could have done. 
 











increasing instead of decreasing.  And the housing, like Stephen said, they will build the one 
house and nine people are supposed to live in it.  It’s like a shack, a one bedroom house, there is 
no privacy in it.  And the crime, the crime is still high, most especially the raping.  You don’t see 
people being charged guilty by the justice system.  So there is still a lot to be done. 
 
 
Anything else?  Okay I am going to show you some images. 
 
 
That is just a poster of the DA.  Okay, looking at the picture of the DA, why was the DA 
unable to convince you to vote for them in the 2004 election? 
 
I just see white faces! 
 




Other people?  It’s a legitimate answer. 
 
Same promises, nothing happens.  There was one part where the DA stated ‘we’ve got a plan to 
bring down crime’ I think something like that.  But now if he has a plan to bring down crime, 
why must he hold it till he gets his vote to be President?  Why make this promise that he can 
make this promise if he becomes President.  Only if he becomes President.  So that’s empty 
promises.  But everybody else does the same thing. 
 
My problem is – I don’t have a problem with DA or any White parties at all, I can vote for any of 
them – but my problem is that I wanted to vote for them, but they were still representing the 
people who were in the old order are still in the DA, you see.   Now all of a sudden they want my 
vote to get a seat in the Parliament.  I can’t vote for them, it is impossible for me to get my vote 
down, I can’t just do that.  I know he will still do the same things he was doing previously.  So 
they say they are changing, that is fine, but they still have a lot of work to do.  They must come to 
the townships, or let me put it this way, they must be visible in order to convince me. 
 
Coming to visibility, what he is talking about, they are only visible when they need your vote.  
After that, quiet, nothing happens.  All of them.  Even if they put a black face there or a Colored 
face or whatever.  But still, it is the same thing. 
 
And this side of the table? 
 
Where I still have the slight – I wouldn’t say I would vote for the ANC, but I will give them 
attention if it’s on the news, because of the jobs… 
 
But what about the DA? 
 




Because I have heard them on TV and it doesn’t make sense. 
 














I don’t know anything about the DA. 
 
Okay, you don’t know enough about the DA. 
 
The thing is the visibility thing is very good, becoming more involved in the community, I mean 
why does the minister have to have a body guard?  I mean who is going to harm you if you don’t 
do anything wrong?   
 
Very good point there. 
 
You see my point, only if you are doing something wrong do you need a body guard, you are 
either backstabbing somebody or you are doing something stupid.  But I mean it is unnecessary 
expense!  They are getting a fantastic salary, plus their perks are as high as their salary.  And they 
talk a lot of nonsense and they still get paid for it.  They don’t make a lot of sense.  They are 
passing bills which is not even proper bills, you know what I am saying?  It’s not to protect the 
community.  I mean it is the community that they want funds for, but they don’t want to give it to 
the community.   They want to be on the receiving side all the time… 
 
…they must start being more involved in the community.  Even the President, if he has 
something going, he has always got a whole entourage with him.  He’s got everybody around him 
and he is talking.  That is not being part of the community.  Why not walk freely, who is going to 
harm you?  Unless there is a psycho around or something, but a psycho only becomes a psycho 
when he is upset about something.  But once you start feeling the warmth and the understanding 
– I am talking about any political party in general – if they become more involved in the 
community then we will have a better result in this country.  Then everybody will be happy, our 
trade will grow stronger and things like that.  That is how it works, don’t just keep yourself one 
side because you are up there and you think you are untouchable or something like that.  That is 
what they think they are. 
 
One other thing, I wanted to vote for them, seriously, but now, for the past ten years I have been 
following these politics just a little bit.  But they don’t come with constructive things.  Like 
maybe if the Government says this thing, they always oppose, every time.  They will come with 
their own initiative, something that they came up with and then they said ‘no, here is this thing, 
let’s do this thing’.  For me to be convinced by hearing the fighting, it is really putting me down 
instead of making me want to be their follower.  It doesn’t help me in order to be their follower. 
 
You said you don’t trust them.   Before I go onto the next question, tell me more? 
 
There is still racial problems.  So basically I feel like, let’s say I vote for DA, the same thing is 
still going to be there. So that is what I feel.  Not that I am racist or anything! 
 
Okay, I know we have spoken about the ANC previously, but just in this section now I am 
dealing with all the parties.  Looking at the image of the ANC, why were they not able to 
convince you to vote for them in the 2004 election? 
 
At one stage the President was more overseas than in his own country.  There was problems in 
our own country, but he was busy helping other countries.   Zimbabwe and things like that.  Sort 
out your own mess inside here before you clean up someone else’s mess.  The thing is they are 
always running here, there, but never in their own country.  They want you to vote and they will 
go to the townships like Mitchell’s Plain and all over, but you don’t see them, always.  I mean 
they can just come around, show the community they are with them, just by doing something 
with them.  I mean they must spend hundreds and thousands on parties, you know what I am 
saying, just finger lunches and things like that.  Why can’t they take that money and use it to 
have a fun day one day in the township.  Then move around to another township.  That is what 












One other thing that made me not to vote for ANC is their promises.  Not all of their promises, 
but some of their promises were not met with things that were expected to be met.  And other 
things, is this thing of – I won’t say it is nepotism, if you go to the council there in town, 5th floor, 
6
th
 floor, you will find they are all chommies (friends)… 
 
You’ve got to know someone. 
 
I had no interest, because he didn’t do the things that he promised us. 
 
People are living worse than what he was supposed to give them.  They are living more 
untidy. 
 
I am not going to say something bad, I know it is not easy to do something we all want them to 
do.  But why mention all these things and then you don’t even do it. 
 
Like ___________ said, he is never around, he is always out  of South Africa and not 
participating much in our problems.  Always somewhere else. 
 
I was going to say, people need employment.  But now you are going to start your own thing.  
Now in my thinking, we don’t think the same all of us.  He will go and buy something and sell it.  
Now I will sell something that I feel will make money for me and my family.  And the next thing 
the scorpions come and they pick you up because you are doing what is not right… 
 
You are making money. 
 
…you are making money. 
 
They take all your stock and your money. 
 
They take everything. 
 
_____________ is talking about the free enterprise thing, I mean many times I have seen where I 
stay they guys are selling smoked snoek and things like that, but they don’t have a public license 
to sell on the pavement and things like that, and before you know it they take everything away 
from them.  And now the people lose their stock and the money they pumped into it.  And now 
they have to go back to the council and get a license and pay for it.  some of them are doing it 
illegal for a long time.  Free enterprise means that if you want to sell something it is free, you can 
do what you want to, but there is still rules and regulations, and you don’t know if you are on or 
off yet, seriously. 
 
Is there anything else on the ANC?  Okay, looking at the image of the IFP, why was the IFP 
unable to convince you to vote for them? 
 
This is the one person I don’t trust!  He just doesn’t give me that – something about this man just 




One other thing about this party, he does have members here in the Western Cape, but only a few 
members.  I know of one person, he is living in my street, he is a member of the IFP and one 
other member, it is a family, and they all come from KZN.   
 
 











that I can get the money at the end of the day’.  You are not doing it out of your heart.  And also, 
his party is more focused for KZN, it doesn’t have interest for people living here in the Western 
Cape.  So I can’t vote for somebody whose interest is in KZN and doesn’t have interest in other 
parts of South Africa. 
 
And also, I think in the running in the last elections, this visibility thing – okay, some of the 
parties did come to the occasion, but guess where he went to, to canvas for people?  Simonstown!   
 
I mean what do you think of that?  How will I vote for him if he goes to Simonstown? 
 
I don’t know much about them. 
But didn’t he have some fun with King (inaudible).  His own king, he couldn’t come to an 
agreement with him.  He wants to outvote that man and then he wants to go to Simonstown… 
 
I mean if you want to properly run for a country where you have control over people, you must 
have control over yourself. 
 
And one other thing; I have seen him a long time ago, this guy doesn’t have the interests of the 
people, he sees only now the people of Natal, he has been too long in that province, but he didn’t 
do anything for the sewages, the housing, the hospitals.  Only now when he saw people are busy 
with houses and hospitals, now he is talking about this thing.  But before that he was quiet.  It is 
very difficult to vote for somebody like this. 
 
These people become fat cats.  That is what they are, they just want the money at the end of the 
day. 
 
Have you ever watched them on TV on channel three?  From 2 to 3 or 3 to 4, I am not sure about 
that… 
 
Oh, but they are sleeping! 
 
They are sleeping!  What does that bring to the people?  That just shows you that at the end of the 
money he is getting paid. 
 
He is getting paid for sitting there, yes. 
 
Is there anything else?  Okay, looking at the image of the UDM, why was the UDM unable 
to convince you to vote for them? 
 
He looks like a Tsotsi. 
 
No, this one rules like an iron fist.  It is very dangerous to be rules by someone with that 
background, who doesn’t have a heart for someone else. 
 
I don’t know much about him, I just know he left the ANC on a bad note.  I didn’t do much 
research. 
 
I don’t know much, just that he was kicked out of the ANC.  In other words he wanted sort of to 
revenge… 
 
Keeping  in competition with the ANC. 
 













he wants power, he is fighting for power more than the interest of the people.  And also, he is 
only focusing for the people who are living in the Eastern Cape, not on the people who are living 
in other parts of South Africa. 
 
And his support, if you can say support – for the mines – people who are coming from the 
Eastern Cape and the people who are staying in Lower Crossroad, they are also coming from the 
Eastern Cape.  It doesn’t have people who were born and bred here.  They’ve got this thing, man, 
like kings… 
 
They want to be worshipped. 
 
…yes, they want to be worshipped.  They still believe in that old order where the man first eats 
before his family.  And his family can’t eat the meat, he must first eat the whole chicken… 
 
And then his family gets the remains. 
 
…yes.  That is true, that is what is happening. 
 
Okay, looking at the picture of the Independent Democrats, why was the ID unable to 
convince you to vote for them in 2004? 
 
This is one person I wanted to vote for, but she didn’t come to the township as well.  I don’t 
remember seeing her face.  It is that visibility again. 
 
Is this Patricia De Lille?  She was coming from the PAC.  But my question is, where are this 
number of parties coming from?  Because when we were suffering there was no UDM and DA, 
and now they want to help us lately.   
 
It’s all about the money. 
 
Even if you are going to a hospital and you are dying they don’t help.  How much money do you 
want, go to a doctor.  The guy is bleeding, he’s been stabbed, and the doctor says ‘no money?  Go 
somewhere else’.  Things like that, it is all about the money. 
 
The people in the day hospitals and that, they don’t have the oath no more.  The doctors take an 
oath.  But there is no oath today, everything revolves around money.  There is no oath to help 
people.  Now it is all to do with medical aid and credit cards and nobody cares.  If you have got 
money you are recognized.  So these people, I don’t know what they are doing.  If they are 
honestly doing something they will put their heart and soul into it.  I have seen Patricia De Lille 
at my niece’s valedictory.  She was the main speaker there, and she spoke nice, but again, she just 
sat there at her table, she didn’t mix.  You know, it was a hall, with everyone in it, and she didn’t 
go around and greet the people.  I mean she doesn’t have to know everybody’s name, but go 




She was elected by the school to be a main speaker, so she felt honored, but then thing is, show 
back the support, sit among the people.  Move from table to table.  She delivered her speech, 
handed out the awards, and left.  With the bodyguard.  
 
As ____________was saying, as a leader, you need the people’s support, you must mingle, get 
involved.  Not just do your speech and then leave as if you don’t care. 
 
Most of these people, if you look at their background, they lead a classy life, I would say.  If you 











humanity.  There is no such thing as money.  When he was President, there was no complaints 
because he did his work properly.  And me, I wouldn’t vote for none of these people.  Because 
why, because I would rather vote for Zola. 
 




You know, where Mandela came from, being in the struggle, helping, being with people, and 
today he is honored as being the world’s favorite person.  None of these people would, you know 
what I am saying, the ANC President, he was studying in England, he wasn’t among the people, 
fighting for the rights to win. 
 
Another thing, I think she wanted to outdo UDM.  Because while she wasn’t kicked out of them, 
she left.  And now she goes for another party.  Why?  Because it’s still the same thing.  She will 
preach what this guy preaches and this guy preaches, trying to outdo the ANC, but nothing 
happens. 
 
It’s all empty promises. 
 
And then the one joins with the other one to win the vote. 
 
It’s like a little game they play, they don’t worry about the next person.  It’s like playing 
monopoly or something. 
 
They are all under the same thing, they fall under the same thing, because it has nothing to do 
with the people.  None of them mention people.  As they said, it is always bodyguards.  For 
what?  If you are an honest person, a sincere person, why worry about people killing you? 
 
And where are they staying?  They should be staying amongst us.  I see what is happening.  As 
soon as she is elected, she goes and stays in Constantia.   
 
 
Okay, looking at the picture of the NNP, why was the NNP unable to convince you?  
 
Because part of the NNP was still the old order.  Even though they tried to recruit some other 
faces, like our faces, in order to get the people to vote.  But the core was still the old kind. 
 
The reason why the NNP didn’t give me any reason to vote for them is because they joined forces 
with the ANC.  So they showed that they have got no power at all.  They needed a backup.  
 
It comes back to power.  Power hungry.  I don’t know if they are already disbanded, but before 
they disbanded, they joined DA, ID, all these other parties, leaving their followers alone, you see.  
And it is the leaders disbanding.  What about their supporters that are faithful to them, who are 
voting for them all these years.  Now they must follow them.  I mean it doesn’t work like that. 
 
The whole thing is just in reverse.  I mean the ANC are doing the exact thing that the NNP did 
years ago.  So we are living back in Apartheid, but in a nice way, you know what I am saying.  
Because now the Blacks are getting work, and the Whites are not getting work.  And the Indians 
and the Colored might get work.   
 
They are still stuck in the middle. 
 
Yes, they are still stuck in the middle.  So everything is in reverse, but the White man suffers 











winning is because the Blacks wouldn’t want another White man to be President again because 
they are going to lose all their luxuries that they have got now.  Because they were suppressed all 
the time and now they have got all the luxuries.  So if a white man like Tony Leon comes in then 
it is back to normal again, back to Apartheid.  And we (the Coloureds) just sit in the middle of 
everything. 
 
You can see people are still racist today. 
 
Yes, very racist.  
 
My point with the NNP it’s worse than slime, getting all it’s people, then joining the ANC. 
 
And another thing, why was it changed from National Party to New National Party.  Was it 
because van Schalkwyk took over? 
 
They try to convince you thinking there is something new now. 
 
I don’t care if it is changed or not, but I hate that name; National Party. 
 
Anything else on the New National Party? 
 
I think for myself, when I was in school, I thought the National Party was the best.  Everyone 
said it was.  I grew up not knowing about the ANC.  Only when I started hearing about the ANC. 
 
Okay, how likely is it that you would vote in the next elections, in 2009? 
 
If I see a dramatic change.  Dramatic change in the sense that people get employment, houses 
getting built.  I mean, change in the lives of people.  And then I will vote. 
 
I will vote if the politicians become more visible in our areas.  And not for one or two weeks or 
once in a blue moon, they must be very active in the communities.  And they must be honest with 
the community and they must allocate the money properly.  The one thing I wanted to say earlier 
on, it is like beauty pageants, you know, when they come on TV.  It is all for the sick children 
and the AIDS and everyone is taking photos of them with the children.  And once they are 
crowned you never hear of them again.  Now it is the same thing with politicians.  Once you give 
them the vote to look after you, then you don’t see them again. 
Then you go ten years back on the waiting list for a house.  Or you pay more school fees and 
education that your child can learn and the text books and all that. 
 
One thing I liked about the NNP in the Apartheid years was that there was security, there was 
health and there was education.  That we had.  We might not have had the best schools, but… 
 
But there was. 
 
…we had education.  There was books given to us and all our parents had to do was pay school 
fees and things like that.  But now there is some system and the hospitals can’t wait to get you 
out of the bed so they can give it to someone else.  The nurses and the doctors is not doing their 
work. 
 
How do you feel about campaigns?  Do you think it is useful or not useful? 
 
I think it is useful. 
 















Because of the mud.   You know, if it was raining last night, then you can’t walk because of the 




…because there is places were you have to go around this corner and this corner in order to get 
the message to the people. 
 
That is what they do, yes.  I mean campaigning is a good thing because they are promising.  They 
come to the people, they make the point to go to the people and sit on their mats, just to convince 
the people that they care.  And after they go, nothing happens.  But it is good, because they bribe 
the people and all that.  They even come to their house.  Because they want you, the people, to 
see now things will happen. 
 
You were saying it is useless? 
 
At this stage it is useless because of the past and what they didn’t do for the people.  So I think 
they are just wasting their time. 
 
I think it has got an advantage and a disadvantage.  The advantage is there is people who only 
know ANC.  It is good for the other parties to put their word across and let other people know 
there is other political parties.  The disadvantage is they give a lot of empty promises and they 
sing the same old song over and over and over.  That’s the disadvantage.  But for me actually, I 
don’t think it is useful. 
 
You were saying? Why do you say it is not useful? 
 
I just don’t see the point in doing it, everybody is confused, and nobody knows who to vote for.  
People just get cross because they feel ‘I need to vote, I have to vote, something is going to 
happen if I don’t vote’. 
 
That’s all they know, that they have to vote, because people tell them they have to vote. 
 
If you register you have to vote, if you are not registered, you are not going to get a house. 
 
It’s useless, because people are making promises, the same promises, so people are confused, 
they don’t know who to vote for. 
 
I would say it is not really useless, because if they want what they are saying, it is fine.  I 
wouldn’t say it is useless, just be honest. 
 
You say just be honest, but how long have the political parties been voting? 
 
They haven’t been honest for the past ten years. 
 
What I am saying is you can come right. 
 












We’ll be dead by then! 
 
No, like you said, fine, the person can become honest,  they can change their lives around and 
come forward and be honest.  But the people are not going to be convinced now.  They must 
make drastic changes.   
 
My point is when there is changes, even if it is 15 years, my grandchildren will see it.  We don’t 
have to see it. 
 
Anything else very important or useful about campaigns?  Thinking of all we have 
discussed here, what advice would you give to somebody in charge of a political party?  
How do you think they can improve their chances in the next election? 
 
They must mix with us. 
 
They must mix. 
 
They must be visible. 
 
Be among the people. 
 
Try to get people some work, some employment, houses, before we vote. 
 
Long before we vote. 
 
You must be able to see the change. 
 
They must take some notes from Zola. 
 
Yes, he helps the community. 
 
I mean look at what he is doing.  He’s got a documentary and he actually goes and makes 
people’s dreams come true.  And he goes and researches, this person has got a problem, so he 
goes and researches, he helps the people.  Why can’t politicians do it. 
 
So he is more like a role model.  I didn’t now about Zola Seven, but my child will say ‘Zola 
Seven!’.  He sits with the people and he talks to them. 
 
He talks to everybody; old, young, rich, poor.  Even if you are disabled.  He can run for 
presidency.  Most old people will even vote for him, because they see what he does. 
 
I even seen him perform.  He actually told the bodyguards ‘move away, move away’ and he 
actually came closer to the people and spoke to them.  
 
It seems we are bringing Zola up… 
 
More than the ANC… 
 
Or our President! 
 
Okay, is there any other final comment about anything we have discussed?  Any other point 












Yes, there is two main things:  (inaudible) and honesty.  If I just take a drive in the evening, and 
see 16 or 18 people sleeping on the pavement.  You can see how desperate these people are, their 




This is the size of the house (gestures to room) he has got six kids, his mother from Transkei is 
staying by him also, and that is the size of the houses.  People are too scared to moan. 
 
Just now the little they got is taken away as well. 
 
They say they are going to give people a small piece of land and build a house.  Today it is still a 
squatter camp. 
 
Because they are cramped up. 
 
The Wendy houses has been taken away, but it still looks like that because you have to extend.  
Because if you have six kids like he said, you have to extend the house.  I mean we don’t want 
double stories.  If you look at the houses they stay in, it is two people. 
 
They don’t stay there half the time, they are flying all over the show. 
 
They don’t stay at home, yes. 
 
What they spend can be put back into the communities, you know what I mean.  Show the people 
that you care, that is the bottom line, because you must be able to care for somebody to win his 
heart over.  You can’t just expect to tell him and convince him.  Most of the people, maybe they 




…and people don’t know what to do, they are scared.  They put fear in these people.  They tell 
them if they don’t vote they don’t get houses, these type of things.  So the people are so scared, 
they just do what they say.  And there is some people who just couldn’t care less anymore 
whether they vote or don’t vote, they just sit.  They just don’t want to talk about politics.  Politics 
is becoming a very scary topic.  It shouldn’t be like that. 
 
You don’t know where to make your mark, because someone might see. 
 
Yes, if you don’t make a mark by the ANC, they will know, because your ID is there and this and 
that.  There was this one guy who argued with me who said they know where you voted, so I said 
no, they don’t know where you voted.  And he said they do know, they do, and he was rather 
scared about it. 
 
Or you have a friend who says ‘vote for ANC’ and that is not out of our hearts. 
 
Or they just go to the poles because it is a holiday, so let’s just go make our mark, it is a holiday. 
 
Nobody here and nobody I know is asking for money.  Give me a job and I will work for that 
money.  I don’t want money just like that.  That is where the jobs come in.  There is 5 million 
people unemployed, and unemployed is where it starts, because you can’t feed your family. 
 
The other thing is, there has been some changes in the area, there is cameras in the area and 
robots put up there.  For years there was nothing like that.  Just because he came in there now, 











else.  You see now, that is where the money is going.  Because he knows his parents are there.  
You know what I am saying?  Why don’t they do it in other areas.   Other areas have got speed 
bumps.   I don’t think they are putting it there for the children. 
 
A few months ago I went for a job at the council and it was another friend of mine.  And his 
sister had got a job there and his uncle has got a job there.  What must I do there, I don’t know 
any one there.  Not to say you want it that way, but be fair.  A friend of mine, his father – he 
works for the council - applies for a house.  And about two months later he got a house.  I applied 
six years ago and still nothing.  So today it is who you know. 
 




You don’t want to? 
 






No.   
 





It’s pointless, you must go make a cross there for somebody just to get a better scene.  But those 
people don’t think, that party doesn’t think that if you had a brother in the opposition party, you 
would have sacrificed your life just to make a vote.  They just take it, another cross. 
 
All of us staying here, we are South Africans, we feel we are part of this country.  So if they 
joined us – I am not saying they must come to my house, nothing like that, mix with part of us.  
Show they care. 
 
 








Okay, just go around.    
 
Okay, Cheryl has got two children and they keep her busy.   And jogging. 
 
This is ___________________; she has a full time job.   She is a housewife.  And she enjoys 
painting. 
 












Yes, I do paintings.  I just do it for my own personal nature.   This is Jason.  He is working full 
time, what he does I do not know.  His pastime is watching movies. 
 
This is _____________________.  He is a student.  Basically he likes partying, having fun.  He is 
outgoing, and likes challenges. 
 






This is ____________________  Actually I am meeting him for the second time today.  I met 
him in Knysna a few years back in camp. 
 
Okay!  That’s a coincidence! 
 
Yes, Cape Town, Western Cape…He is in business admin for a construction company. 
 









This is __________________.  He is married, he’s got kids and he loves to take his grandchild 
for walks in the morning. 
 
Thank you.  Okay, I am just going to go through how these groups are going to work.  
Okay, firstly, thank you very much for coming to be a part of the discussion.  It is being 
done as part of a research project for a student who is busy studying how political parties 
communicate to voters.  Okay, just a couple of points; there are no right or wrong answers, 
so feel free to say what you want to.  And your views are very important, so don’t sit there 
and you are like thinking a point, but everybody is talking so you are not going to say your 
point.  Rather just say what you feel, because your views are important.  If your views 
differ, it is fine, we can disagree, just say what you feel.  Then, also, as you can see, we are 
tape recording the discussion, but four other groups are also being done, so it all gets added 
together, so we won’t be able to be able to say Amanda said so and so, it will all be just a 
whole long discussion, and then it will be put into the report, quotes will be put into the 
report.  It’s all confidential, in fact, each one of us needs to maintain the confidentiality of 
the group, so I am just going to hand out a confidentiality slip, if you could just sign that.  
What it says is basically that you are participating of your own free will, that the purpose 
has been explained to you, and that you won’t discuss the group outside.  You’re not signing 
your lives away! 
 
 
Okay, I am going to start off with the first question then.  The election held on the 14
th
 of 
April was a big event.  What did the people that you spoke to say about the election and the 
campaigning before the election? 
 












Yes, but the one thing is, just one at a time, because of the recording, but just jump in 
whenever.   
 
I think for myself that a lot of people were disillusioned, because a lot of people felt it wouldn’t 
make a difference, because the ANC would have the majority and they would resound in victory, 




The people that I came in contact with the elections, most of them were undecided, they did not 
know which way to go, and some of them waited until the last minute, others didn’t go vote at all 
because they thought their needs wouldn’t be attended too.  And basically with the last vote I 
didn’t go, because I didn’t think there was a party that good. 
 
In my personal opinion, I also said I am going to vote, and at the last minute actually I decided 
not to vote because even the people in Parliament, they didn’t even know what party they are 
going to join after the election, due to the fact that a lot of them jump on the band wagon, and 
when they see it is not working out, they sell themselves out to go and join another party.  And at 
the end of the day, the people that vote for them, they make promises to the people, and they 
don’t fulfill their promises, and I think that is very unfair towards the man in the street. 
 
To me I think it was fairly obvious that the ANC was going to win.  I didn’t see much difference 
in the ratings, and so many people were going to vote, I didn’t see what difference my vote would 
make at the end of the day. 
 
My experience, because I was supposed to actually help someone out – stand in at the post, what 
I experienced wasn’t nice, because there, if you don’t vote for this party, this is going to happen, 
if you don’t vote for that party, this is going to happen.  I didn’t vote that day, because I knew 
that if I am going to vote then I don’t know who I am going to vote for, I trust no one from what I 
saw that vote.  I trust no one and that is why I didn’t vote.  Because if I am going to vote for this 
party, what are they going to give me?  What are they going to give them?  Understand?   What 
are those people going to get out of it?  There are a lot of promises being made, and as far as I 
have seen it hasn’t been laid on the table, I don’t see anything; it is just talk, talk, talk, but no 
doing.  I want to see doing, not just talking. 
 
If I may ask, did you see any intimidation?  I mean did you think people were like…threatened? 
 
Yes, I’ve seen it.  I’ve seen it with my own eyes. 
 
But when you vote no one knows where you put your cross. 
 
Yes, but I was outside, and as people come in they go to different, you know, and I am standing 
and  
 
I am watching everyone.  You can see the expressions on the people’s faces… 
So who threatened you? 
 
Look I don’t like to mention names, but different parties, if you don’t work for that one then they 




There was only two parties actually competing this year, and where I come from, Guguletu, it is a 
black area.  Because of the struggle, a lot of people, as I did, did not vote, because of empty 











many changes, and other black people wouldn’t go vote for a white person, because of what the 
whites did before and all that. 
 
Okay, thinking back to the previous elections, everybody in the room sitting around this 
table the opposition party.  Okay, what was your reason at that stage for your voting 
choice, because you felt motivated to vote? 
 
I wanted change. 
 
Are you talking about ’99? 
 
No, I am talking about any of the previous elections. 
 
 
’94 or ’99. 
 
We wanted to give a life to our kids, to give them the opportunities that we were denied.  I can 
remember me being in Grade 1 being taken out of school.  I was there one minute and gone the 
next, and I didn’t know what happened.  It was only later on in life when my parents told me.  
We were moved out of the areas that we lived in and we were forced into Mitchell’s Plain and 
that is where we grew up.  You want change.  If you look at the situation in Mitchell’s Plain, it 
has just gone down and down.   
 
It’s getting worse. 
 
It’s getting worse. 
 
The others?  The reason you voted the way you did at the previous elections? 
 
I think that time there was jobs.  That time you could just walk into a job, but now you can’t just 
walk into a job, because I mean if you walk into a job – there’s nothing.  There is people that are 
not even educated that’s got a post and there is people that is educated that hasn’t got a post.  
How many educated people are sitting at home without jobs?  And how many people that is not 
educated is in jobs? 
 
Well, I confirm what you say, because my daughter has got 14 years experience in insurance and 
she has got all her diplomas and all her exams and she went for an interview and at the end of the 
interview they said ‘I’m sorry, but it is AA’.  So the whites are now being marginalized and the 
Coloureds are now being marginalized and the Indians are now being marginalized – with all due 




…This is the reality… 
 
That’s a fact, yes. 
 
…is this retribution for what happened in the past. 
 
To put it to you this way, we were actually brainwashed by the previous Government actually.  
We are only realizing it now that we were brainwashed.  They tell us this is what is going to 
happen if you don’t vote for us, you know, all the wrong things, and people are going to come 
into the country and they are going to take over this and they are going to do this to you, so we 
were actually brainwashed, it is only now that we realize that all these years we were actually 












So is that why you voted as you voted? 
 
Yes.   
 
Never mind the Apartheid era and the racism in the country; every country has racism.  For 






…He never caused Apartheid, the people of the country caused Apartheid.  I believe other 
political leaders get too much credit.  Take for instance Nelson Mandela.  People act like he was 
the only one in prison.  There were a lot of people in prison, but he still got all the credit, you see.  
Before Whites used to get everything and Blacks got nothing.  I wouldn’t say it is revenge… 
 
…but what’s due to them. 
 
 
…When the Whites were in charge they gave things to the Whites.  Same as the Blacks.  The 
Blacks are now in charge, they will do the same for their families; put them in power.   
 
But what I want to know, what about the Coloureds.  The Coloureds are always in the center.   
 
No, the Coloureds are not always in the center, especially not in the Western Cape. 
 
It’s always the Whites, then the Coloureds, then the Blacks, now it is the Blacks and then the 
Whites and… 
 
No, the Whites are still in charge, they are still in charge.  
 
Okay, I missed this, because I was at the door. 
 
I was saying that what is happening now is people are saying the Blacks are in charge.  Not that 
the Blacks are in charge, but that the Blacks are in top positions.  What they did is what the 
Blacks are doing right now, putting their families and friends in the right positions.  It’s not some 
sort of vendetta, you would also do that if you were in power; you put your family member, the 
one that is poor – now I don’t see anything wrong with that, because everybody does it. 
 
You put the best person for the job in the position. 
 
Everybody is supposed to be like that, everybody is not like that. 
 
If you are more qualified, then you deserve to get the job you apply for. 
 
Look at the Deputy President.  He’s got no education, but he is the Deputy President.  Nobody is 
complaining about that. 
 
Alright, let me just steer back to this – I didn’t hear from you guys your reason for voting.  
 
My point of view, why I voted for a certain party, because I was looking for some party that 
would make employment.  That was my biggest concern at the time.  But before 1994 there was 
enough employment, and ever since 1994 there wasn’t.    They took the power but they didn’t 












Okay, so now thinking of the elections this year, what made you decide to not vote 
in the 2004 election? 
 
I didn’t think my vote would make a difference.  I don’t think a party I would vote for would put 
an extra loaf of bread into my tin.  It’s up to me to put food on the table, no one is going to give it 
to me, no matter what party I vote for, so that is why.  If you are unemployed no Government is 
going to give you a job and say ‘no, shame, she’s got five hungry kids at home to feed, give her a 
job, give her husband a job, he may be over qualified or under qualified, but give him a job’.  
Nobody is going to do that for you, so that is why I decided I am not going to vote. 
 
I feel the same.  I didn’t vote because they make promises and they don’t deliver.   They forget 
about you, they are in power they are sitting there.  So that is why I didn’t vote. 
 
I didn’t vote, because the party that I voted for originally, the DA – three years ago in 2001, the 
NNP crossed the floor and they joined the DA, and that was very disillusioning for me.  That was 
a disillusion.  
 
I believe in seeing is believing, and if I see something.  I did see some changes, but I didn’t see 
anything special for me, so… 
 
The reason why I didn’t vote is because somebody that was in a certain party was my role model 
and when he walked over and crossed the floor to another party I decided no, I can’t put my vote 
down for him, and then he is going to have seat and I am still going to be sitting where I am 
sitting now.  That is why I decided, you want to cross the floor, and you go on your own.  I am 
not giving my vote to you again this year. 
 




…no, up until the next one, everyone knows the ANC is going to win… 
 
 
…so why vote when you know you are not going to make a difference.  Let’s say the ANC was 
not going to win, there was a 50/50% chance, I wouldn’t not vote for the DA, because of personal 
vendettas, my father and Tony Leon and all that.  Sometimes you’ve got to face the facts, you 
see.  Don’t do something which you are not going to gain anything from.  Today all these people 
say these parties promised something.  That is what you must do when you campaign.  You can’t 
just go there and say ‘I am DA, vote for me’ you must stay in the game, you must promise, you 
must not lie to the people.  The ANC is not giving out jobs, giving out money for people to start 
businesses.  The ANC in the last elections never said they are going to employ people.  People 
think when they vote they are going to get a better job, you are going to do this and you are going 
to do that.  You are just increasing their budgets; they are just going to earn more money. 
 
The reason I didn’t vote is because I didn’t know the parties.  Everybody said to me ‘vote for 
that’ and I said ‘but I don’t know that person, give me some background and then I will vote’.  
But they couldn’t. 
 
You didn’t get enough background. 
 
I didn’t get enough background from anyone.  Even with Nelson Mandela, I knew his 
background, but still I didn’t vote, because I was confused and I didn’t trust any of the parties, 
because what can they give, I want them to lay it out on the table, say ‘that is that’.  Let the 












Win the people’s trust. 
 
Like say for instance in the housing scheme.  A lot of people are ANC, they promised housing, 
and up till today a lot of people are still struggling, for 12 years, been living on the ground, 
struggling for toilets, there’s no water, there are no toilets, up till today they still don’t have a 
house.  There are a lot of illnesses there, there’s a lot there.  There’s TB, there’s cancer, there’s 
AIDS, and I said ‘no!’ 
 
Okay, what if anything would have convinced you to vote? 
 
What would have convinced me to vote is that my husband became retrenched in 1999.  He is a 
hard worker, he went through numerous interviews.  He is either over-qualified or his degree is 
incomplete.  Give him a chance, he is Colored, he is hardworking, he has got the figures to back 
up, and he was not given a chance.  In 1999 I actually thought why did I go and cast my vote in 
1994?  In 1994 I thought putting my cross next to a certain party it is going to open up a world of 
doors for us; it is going to give us a better life, so… 
 
You were very optimistic. 
 
…I was very optimistic.  That convinced me.  I think small issues, gain the trust of people, and 
puts you in power.  It is not for us to decide or come up with these things.  They have got to make 
it public for us, say ‘yes fine, we are going to commit to working in the poorer areas’, once we 
see little homes starting to mushroom, and see eradicating poverty, it’s going to win my trust 
back.   
 
What would have convinced you to vote in April? 
 
If they had improved the health system, and education, because that is the two most important 
aspects in any country, is your health and your education.  But in this country talk is cheap, 
people are always saying ‘no, we are going to improve the health situation, we are going to 
improve the education’… 
 
…but I mean you must go there to the hospitals and experience it yourself and then you will see 





…the second thing is most people can’t afford to pay school fees, so now what they do is they 
hold back the reports at the end of the year and you don’t know if your kids has passed or what is 
happening.  So I mean, for me that is something important in any society. 
 
Is there anything that could convince you? 
 
No, I would have seen there is a difference, and then I would have decided, but up till now they 
are telling everybody on the TV and in the newspaper it is improving, but it is getting worse, it is 
not getting better. It is pointless telling anybody that doesn’t have the experience and don’t see 
firsthand how the system works.  Up till now it is just getting worse, you can go to any 
Government hospital or day hospital and you will see there is no improvement. 
 












Yes, the newspaper is publishing the murder rating in Cape Town is down by 3%, but the 
hijacking is up by 5%.  We don’t want to see all that; we want to make our safe communities for 
our kids.  We want a safer environment.   Figures means squat to me.  I want to see it happening. 
 
You see, why there is figures is because maybe they arrested 10 of the biggest hijackers, now 
automatically those figures are coming down now, but what happens when the other 10 comes 
out of jail, then it is just going to go up again. 
 
Apparently the jails are 118% overcrowded.   There is actually no place. 
 
People actually want to go to jail, because in jail there is everything!  I mean there is 
computers…they are living better than what we are living! 
 
Okay, I am just passing this around.  Casting back in your mind now, looking at the ANC, 
why was the ANC unable to convince you to vote for them in the April elections. 
 
For me it wasn’t a matter of convincing, it was a matter of they were going to win.  I couldn’t 
waste my vote, because whether I voted or not… 
 
I don’t have anything else to add, I am just backing up what I said, that is why I didn’t vote, 
because of all my points that I stated earlier on. 
 
They wouldn’t have convinced me in any case because the ANC is very powerful, and it’s going 
15 years now and there was no improvement.  There was slight improvement, but nothing major.  
So nothing would have changed my mind. 
 
The ANC spent I don’t know how many billions on armaments, and airplanes and warships, and 
South Africa isn’t at war with anybody.  That money could have well been spent on health – I 
mean I read in the Argus that women are in labour in the hospitals and there is not enough 
doctors and the women are giving birth in the corridors.  They don’t even have enough beds.  It is 
a disgrace. 
 
I think as citizens we must not forget one thing, the ANC is not the one controlling the thing of 
the country, the ANC can’t make all the decisions, it is not their problem.  (inaudible) does his 
budget every year February, March, February – he does a budget with what the economies can 
afford.  Whether people want to give birth in corridors Mundi Shabalala cannot do more than 
what is given to her, because already teachers don’t get paid enough, the teachers are on strike.  It 
is not the ministers that control the ANC; it is the EU, the AU.  Look at Zimbabwe; it was taken 
out of the African Union, just because Mugabe doesn’t want to do certain things that are done by 
the African Union.   Not everything is supposed to be done by the ANC.  The thing that the ANC 
does is not so much in South Africa, like what you said, the Arms Deal, it wasn’t the ANC, even 
though the fraud cases came from the ANC members because they were the party in charge, but it 
wasn’t the ANC’s decision to buy the weapons. 
 
But you know something, we have the most liberal constitution in the world that promises 
education for all, free medical attention for all, so what is the point of the constitution being 
liberal if it can’t deliver? 
 
It’s true.  And who makes the constitution? 
 
The ANC!  It’s the majority party, so they have to take the blame. 
 
From my point of view I decided no, it is pointless.  It is already – they are not going to lose 
again, because the first time when they won it is just going to improve more votes and more 












But I think they should eradicate all the small parties.  The KISS parties and all that. 
 








Because those parties like KISS, they get a seat and then they cross floors to bigger parties for 
better positions. 
 
Okay, that is a picture of the DA.  In the 2003 election, why was the DA unable to convince 
you to vote for them? 
 
As I said, I have got a personal vendetta with the guy, but one thing about the DA, it keeps its 
promises, because he has money. He is not using the states money, he has money.  It is in the 
news, they will go to Atlantis, and they will bring blankets, groceries for all the poor people.  The 
ANC will just go there and will be eating at the table and the poor people will be watching them 
eat.  That is one thing, the DA does deliver. 
 
Okay, so it’s more personal. 
 
Mine’s more personal, yes. 
 
Could you tell us why you have a personal vendetta, because you mentioned your father and 
Tony Leon?  Did they have a fight? A disagreement? Is your father in politics? 
 
No, my father is not in politics.  The thing is, my father’s boss is DA, my father is ANC. Tony 
Leon went to my father’s work and since my father is an active person for the ANC, he was 
asked not to make a comment to any of the questions and statements made by Tony Leon, and he 
could never let down his party and listen to what the other party was saying, and he said 
something, he almost lost his job because of the exchange of words between him and Tony Leon, 
and why I took this personally, because if he had lost his job, I could have been suffering right 
now, because of him, you see. 
 
Okay, this is not the party for me, so I am not even interested in who is the leader of this party, 
who is the members of this party, this is not the party that interests me, so I am sorry if I can’t 
make any comments on this. 
 
Okay, if I must say, I think the DA is a racist party.  It appeals to the White upper middle class, 
even if the Deputy Chair of the DA is an African. 
 
(inaudible) is also a black person, Colin Powel is also a black person, but they were put in power 
just to be puppets.  They are using them. 
 
They are just there because of the colour.  
 














I just want to say, the DA, they are not right, at that time I did not think they were right, not a 
strong enough party.  At that time I was looking for a party that was strong, that would at least 
win the election.  
 




Don’t you think it would be a good idea to have a co-election for all the minor parties? 
 
Okay, so that is the IFP over there.  Why was the IFP unable to convince you? 
 
Personally, in my opinion, we are Xhosa.  We can’t be controlled by a boy, by a Zulu.  They 
don’t go to the bush.  So we can’t be controlled by boys.  So that is why I didn’t want to vote. 
 
I think the IFP is very regional, you know, confined to… 
 
Kwa-Zulu Natal, yes. 
 
It’s not a well known party in the Western Cape. 
 
I don’t think we can identify really. 
 
That is the same comment I was going to make, they are not in the Western Cape, they are more 
in Natal.  He grew up in Natal; he doesn’t know what’s happening where we come from, where 
we call it the Cape Flats.  So it’s pointless if people are going to vote for the IFP. 
 
Do you remember in 1994 there was so much violence in Natal? 
 
In Natal, yes! 
 
The ANC and the IFP were killing each other.  It was before the elections and during the 
elections. 
 
Okay, you’ve got the UDM in f ont of you.  Why, in the 2004 elections was the UDM unable 
to convince you to vote for them? 
 
He was doing what Tony Leon is doing, fighting against the ANC.  They will not say anything 
about the UDM; they were just fighting, fighting against the ANC.  Every statement was saying 
the ANC does this; it does not say what they can do.  For a black person to fight another black 
person, it is looking stupid in front of the Whites and the Coloureds.   Especially when he was 
ANC. 
 
This is also a party that was actually established in the Eastern Cape.  So to me, in the Western 
Cape it doesn’t make sense to go and vote for somebody in the Eastern Cape, because at the end 
of the day if he should come in, he is going to see more to the Eastern Cape, like Transkei and 
Ciskei and Umtata and so to me, it doesn’t interest me to vote for somebody that is not going to 
look after our province. 
 
To me a party must be popular in all provinces, not only one.  Because then it is not going to 
matter. 
More important, they must be very, very active in the community throughout the time, they 
mustn’t just be visible when there is an election. 
 











unable to convince you to vote for them in the 2004 election? 
 
Patricia.  She is a friend of a friend of mine.  And then she came to me and she said to me I must 
vote for her friend. 
 
 
Your friend came to you? 
 
Yes, and she said I must vote for Patricia.  So I said ‘who’s Patricia, I don’t know Patricia’ and 
she said she’s ID and all that.  So I said no, I don’t vote for someone that I don’t know. 
 
When they were campaigning for the election, and they always say when they look for votes they 
are the people’s person and all that, but when you ask them once they are on that stage there and 
they give a discussion to the people why you must vote for them, they ask them questions, and 
they can’t give them a direct answer.  I mean if people can’t give you a direct answer, it is 
pointless voting for them.  Even now when she is in Parliament, she can come up with this fraud 
and all that, but when she was campaigning and people were asking her certain questions, and she 
couldn’t come up with a direct answer, for me it is pointless going to vote for somebody that 
can’t give you a direct answer, so once they are in Parliament, what are they going to do to the 
public, they are undecided.  So for me it is not voting for somebody that can’t give you an answer 
direct. 
 
But Patricia is the second most powerful woman in South Africa next to Winnie Mandela.  
Coming back to my point, she will never run South Africa.  So you can rather not waste your 
vote, you can rather not vote for anybody if you are going to waste your vote.  But I think she can 
deliver.  If this was Winnie Mandela in charge of the Independent Democrats, yes, I would vote 
for her… 
 
Yes, but only if she is going to deliver, in which way is she going to deliver. 
 





…it’s not a matter of the ANC is doing better or not. 
 
Okay, the only difference is now, from my point of view, is there is more millionaires in 
Parliament now than anything else.  I mean that is a fact, there is more people becoming 
millionaires, you know, in the previous years, nobody actually realized that South Africa was one 
of the most richest countries through the mines and the coal and all that.   It is only now that 
people realize that this is one of the richest countries, even with oil.  I don’t know why we paying 
so much money for oil.  And here by Mossgas, Saldahna, we are having our own oil, but still 
paying prices, they are importing oil from whatever country they are getting oil from and we are 
paying sky-high prices.  And it is only now that people realize that this is one of the richest 
countries and I don’t know if they have still got the goal that they used to have, but this is one of 
the richest countries, and people didn’t realize it. 
 
I didn’t know much about the party at the time.  It was a small party, and I didn’t want to waste 
my vote. 
 
I didn’t even think about them. 
 












I think, look, she is a personality, and she exposed a lot of fraud, like you said. 
 
I do like her, I like what she stands for, she is very direct.  The reason why she did not get my 
vote is because it is a new party, and casting my vote for a new party is a bit tacky.  But I do like 
her, I think she is wonderful, she is great, and I do think she can make a change, giving her the 
opportunity she can make a change, especially for the women and children. 
 
 








They’ve been through too many changes, and when a party goes through too many changes, there 
is risk behind it.  That is why they never got my vote. 
 
In 1994 they did get my vote, because I believed at the time that they could deliver.  But since 
1994 so many changes were made, and the NNP walked over to other parties, and then I decided 
that if they could walk over from party to party, what would happen if they were in power. 
 
Okay, in 1994 and 1999 they brainwashed me to vote for them, but in the last election I used my 
own discretion not to vote.  
 
Not that I am racist or anything, but in terms of the colour, I wouldn’t vote for them.  Now if FW 
de Klerk was still President, I would vote for them. 
 
Yes, the same, if he was still President I would also vote for him, because you never know, 
maybe some miracle still happens. 
 




Okay, that’s interesting.  Okay, how likely is it that you will vote in the next election, 2009? 
 
I think for me, I haven’t really educated myself much on the smaller parties.   And I just think 
people like Patricia De Lille; I have got to give her a fair chance.  And through a vote of mine, it 
is going to put her into a seat of power, and for the next elections I definitely will educate myself 
more onto the different parties, their stances, what they offer, what they believe in, the core, the 
core of our country.  So I have really got to educate myself more and not just vote this one or this 
one because they are the bigger party. 
 
I’d like to see now in the next four years will there be changes.  Will pensioners, will children get 
more grants, will things improve and it is possible that one of the parties will get my vote. 
 
I haven’t decided for which party I am going to vote… 
 
 












Oh, just if I am going to vote.  Well, it is still another two or three years, so I haven’t decided, it 
is still in the future.  I will decide if it is worth my vote or not, otherwise I will rather stay away 
from it. 
 
The same like ________________ said, I would also like to educate myself more in the parties, 
and for my vote, if I decide to vote again, I want to see that there are more houses for the people, 
education, house, the death penalty, that I would love to see come back, because the crime in this 




…it is unbelievable.   So I want to see that before I vote again.  There must be a change. 
 
Yes, the same, once I see some changes, then most definitely I will vote in the next election. 
 
I might vote for the ANC in the next elections, for the following reasons:  if the economic well 
being of the country remains the same as it is right now, or betters.  I won’t talk about houses, 
because… 
 
…people keep on coming into Cape Town where there is jobs, and the ANC and the ANC are not 
providing houses, you see.  In the matter of education, one thing they promised is free education, 
and we still don’t see that.  You are still paying thousands.  You can just take your child to those 
White schools – as they are still called – private schools and pay R30 000.00 per year, because 
these teachers in the Government schools, you go to the shebeen with them and the policemen 
and then just now they say they spend R45 Million for security at the police stations, because if 
you can’t be safe at a police station, you can’t be safe anywhere.  If that had to change – I don’t 
see any other party changing that now, but if the ANC had to change that, fulfill all those things – 
I won’t say anything about a job, because it is up to each and every person to make a living for 
himself, because you are provided with the funds right now, these are the provident funds, if 
those things had to change, more things available, I would vote for the ANC. 
 
The next question actually relates to what you said, which is what would a party have to do 
in order for you to vote for them in 2009? 
 
Keep its promises. 
 
It must deliver. They mustn’t make empty promises and then at the end of the day there is 
nothing that has been done. 
 
Pop into the townships and let the people know who they are.  Communicate with the people.  If 
you are not at that level, go down to that level and speak to them. 
 
And not only at election time. 
 
Yes, I mean that is not on. 
 
They must be visible throughout.  They should be visible; I mean after all, they are our leaders. 
 
I mean, how do you – if you want to deliver to the people but you don’t go into the community.  
You must actually go into the community, into the townships and see what they are all about, 
how do they live… 
 












…and then if you go through all that…I mean like my late father always used to say, you have to 
crawl before you walk.  Go do all those things, and then you only deliver. 
 
They should actually see to the needs of not certain people, they should see to the needs of 
everybody.  And then we can actually say we are a community, doesn’t matter what colour, 
because at the moment there is still racism, it doesn’t matter where you go.  And some people just 
put up a front because they are in the company of certain colour people, but once you go out there 
you will see certain people go that side and certain people go that side.  So they should actually 
see to the needs of all the people and then these other things will fall away. 
 
The important fact that he mentioned is that we are forgetting the major problem that we have in 
South Africa; the refugees and immigrants.   On the way here we were talking about it; why there 
are so many refugees and immigrants in South Africa in places most of us can’t afford, Sea Point, 
Moreesburg, Ottery, Mowbray, the most expensive places, they occupy those places.  You go to 
any parking lot, who will be coming to your car asking for your R3 or R4, the refugees.  You go 
anywhere, you go to Cape Town, it’s all there, and we keep on complaining that we don’t have 
jobs.  Those people are coming into this country and doing what we were supposed to do; starting 
their own businesses… 
 
Taking it away. 
 
…not that they are taking it away, they are doing what we are not doing.  The blame is on us. 
 
I mean if you walk into a shop, we don’t see our people that is the owner of the shop, you see 




Okay, some people say that the election campaign does not matter because people have 
already made up their minds. Other people say the election campaign is important because 
it helps people to choose in the election.  How do you feel about the election campaigns?  Do 
you think it is useful or not useful? 
 




Yes, it’s almost like a mass hysteria.  Have you see how crazy they go in America?  Everybody 
releases balloons and they play the Star-spangled Banner and people do get caught up in that 
hype. 
 
Do you feel that it is useful? 
 
Yes, it is useful, because it gets people interested. 
 
And at least you can see who is the people that is in the party.  Let’s say for instance, we make an 
example of the DA.  When they were campaigning on that bus with the open top, and at least you 
can see, okay, there’s that guy that is always on TV, and you know, whatever party, at least you 
can see this is how they look, but they don’t look so fat on TV, you know, but at least…it doesn’t 
matter what they are saying to campaign, but at least you can see here’s the people in your 
township only for that time period.  Afterwards they forget. 
 
I think it is a waste of money, it is like advertising coke.  Coke wouldn’t lose any money if they 
didn’t advertise.  Because you know you are going to vote for them.  It’s like you say now, 











not a matter of knowing those people, but knowing who you want to be President.  You don’t 
care about all the other people. 
 
Do you people think campaigning is useful…? 
 
Yes, I think it is useful, because there is a lot of people who is not into politics and it gives them a 
chance to decide.  If you could look at a picture of a party, you could see which party is selling 
itself through advertising.  It gives the people an opportunity to choose which party to vote for. 
 
I think it is useful.  Getting back to the point of coke, there is lots of competitors. 
 
The other point is also, once you are campaigning, you are selling yourself to the public, so if you 
don’t campaign people is not going to vote for you.  Like if you advertise coke – okay, 
irrespective that coke is one of the famous cool drinks, but I am talking about the political parties.  
If they are not going to campaign, people are not going to know this is Mrs. So and So… 
 
You’ve got to keep it fresh in people’s minds all the time. 
 
…because you must sell yourself to the voters so people can see this is Mr. So and So or Mrs. So 
and So. 
 
You are shaking your head, but there are two views, which one do you agree with? 
 
This one.  It’s very useful; it gets the people all excited. 
 
The thing you should understand, for the past two or three elections, two elections, I am talking 
about the youth now.  They have only seen the ANC in power, so convincing them to vote for 
another party wont go through their heads or through their minds, they just say the ANC is the 
right party to vote.  And you can never convince an old person to do something wrong when she 
grew up doing something right.  So she know she always votes for the ANC, whether the ANC 
flag changed or anything.  Now for the youth which will be voting in the next coming elections, 
they also want to vote for what they have seen people voting for.  They won’t vote for a KISS 
party, they don’t want a KISS party.  It’s the people in their 30’s that are thinking ‘who should I 
vote for?’  I knew straight which party to vote for.  I was never involved in the Apartheid era, 
because when I grew up I went to the color schools at the time that I wanted and I went to the 
White schools at the time that I wanted. 
 
So how do you feel about campaigns then? 
 
Campaigns?  Like I said, it is a waste of money.  You know who you want to vote for.  It’s like 
going to the movies.  If you see a preview on TV you will go straight to that movie, you won’t go 
to watch another movie. 
 
But the campaigns are going to take place anyway. 
 
Yes, they must take place. 
 
 
I don’t know how the other gentlemen and ladies in the room feel, but when I went to vote in 
1994 for the first time I was so excited, because for me it was something unusual, we never had 
the opportunity to vote.  You always hear people at that stage going to the poling stations so for 
me it was something exciting, it was a good feeling and experience to go and vote for a party that 












I think it can be useful and a waste of time.  Like he said, it is for promoting, and like he said, it is 
a waste of time, it’s money waste.  For me it works actually both ways, it depends, you know. 
 
To get back to your point about having, for a better word, lack of tunnel vision, you know who 
you are going to vote for – parents are disillusioned, grandparents are disillusioned, we are all in 
some way disillusioned and you know, we talk among each other, parents talk, people talk, and 
youth hear what we are talking.  And it is though-provoking for them, you know, mother is 
saying that about the ANC, dad is saying that about the NNP, so it is also good that there is 
campaigning because it opens up a brand new world to the youngster that is about to vote.  He is 
torn between the parties because he is hearing that opinion, that negative, that positive, so I think 
campaigning is good.  
 
And then I also think our kids are going to grow, our grandkids are also going to vote, who is 




…and you know, it wears people down and it just carries on.  I just think that type of thing; it is 
the core of the family.  I just think we are South Africans, and we are family, irrespective of face, 
color.  And abortion.  If my daughter must have an abortion, it effects me.  It ill effect the 
granny, the uncle, the aunt.  It’s all about emotions.  So I think they need to take that kind of 
thing into consideration before a law can be passed. 
 
They should actually go down to the communities and ask them ‘what is your suggestion?’ not 
only with the abortion, but with the death penalty, because I mean we are the people that stay in 
the Cape Flats or whatever area where the crime is escalating and the police is already negative 
towards the crime in the area, because if people go to the police to report a crime they take 
forever to come and see whatever investigation will have to be done.  So the people should come 
down and see before they make any decisions, they must come and see what is happening, can’t 
we change this, just to make everybody feel happy. 
 
There is a lot of corruption in the force.  And I would like that to stop.  If you phone the station 
now, there is abuse in the house; they will take ages to come.  If someone hits someone or 
something, they will go and sort it out, but if it is drugs or something like that they will stand 
back and they won’t go, because they get paid for that.  I don’t say each and every one of them, 
but there is a lot of rotten apples.  So I would like that to stop.  For me to vote again, that must 
stop, as I said, the death penalty must come in, and I want to see more parties participate in the 
communities, getting involved with it, so we can see okay, he is doing something – then I will 
start voting again.  
 
Okay, advice to the parties, if you were to advise them how they can improve their chances. 
 
I would say they must deliver. 
 
No empty promises. 
 
Okay, is there anything related to anything we have discussed that you wanted to raise any 




We’ve said our say. 
 
One thing I would like to say to any party that would win at any time, even the one in charge 











building houses and people keep on coming to Cape Town, building shacks and then say there is 
no houses.  A lot of houses are being built.  Since they see there is a lot of people, there won’t be 
enough time to build houses.  They give them building material to build houses themselves.  
Which is something good.  But the more they keep doing that the more the people are going to 
come, and they have houses wherever they are coming from.  Big homes, cars and all that, and 
they keep on coming to Cape Town.  They should stop building factories in Cape Town, because 
people keep coming because there is work in Cape Town.  There is Volkswagen, there is 
Mercedes, there is BMW.  Places like I & J, they are delivering fish all over South Africa, their 
head office is here in Cape Town.  They can build another one in Durban, so people can go to 
Durban.  Factories live Levi, Truworths, they are all here, and people are coming here for job, 
and next month sending money for their family to come down, come see there is work here.  
 
Anything else?  No?  Okay, that concludes the discussion.  Thank you very much.   
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 




_____________works from home and her children think she earns a lot of money.  She says it’s 
not the case. 
 








Sean Bartllet, yes. 
 
I’ve got two boys, I spend a lot of time with them, and I like jogging and sleeping.    
 
I am married, got four children, eldest one nineteen, youngest will be seven.  And I love working 
for the company that I work for.  I love my friends a lot, I am a very outgoing person, and I like 
meeting people.  I like to socialize and do things like this.  I love it.  I didn’t know anything about 
it when a friend told me, I had never done it, but I love it.  Okay, so that is me. 
I am 50, so I haven’t got much to do anymore, I am on the dump.  I know Sean Bartllet 
personally.  I love the outdoor life.  I have survived till 50 and I never thought I could.  I grew up 
in the townships and here I am, 50 and still going. 
 
I like to meet people.  I am married, got three children.  Youngest ones are five and two, eldest is 
eleven.  And I am a sportsman; I love sports, any kind of sports. 
 
So we’ve got a whole load of sportsman here. 
 
We used to play each other, but he was much younger than me. 
 
My name is ___________, I’ve got one child.  I like working, and I like partying.  And I like any 
kind of sport, and that is all I can say, not much. 
 
Okay, that is great.  As I said, my name is Cherrel, and I just want to thank everyone for 
attending the discussion.  It is being done as part of a research project for a UCT student 











right or wrong answer; it is just everybody’s opinion.  Your opinion is important, so don’t 
sit with an idea in your mind and you don’t share it with the group.  It is important that 
everybody gets a chance to participate.  And even if people’s views differ, it doesn’t matter.  
And everything is confidential.  We are busy recording, but there is seven other groups that 
is being done, so it will just be a whole lot of text at the end of the day – I won’t be able to 
say ‘Ralph said this’ or ‘Phillip said that’, it is basically added together for a report.  And 
then also, when we speak, for the recording, just one person at a time, so that it comes clear 
when they do the recording.  I just need to go and get you some pencils, because for the 
confidentiality it also applies not only for us involved in the report keeping, but you guys as 
well, that you don’t discuss after the group at the soccer clubs and say ‘so and so said 
this’… 
 
We fully understand. 
 
 
Basically what it says is you are participating of your own free will and that everything has 
been explained to you.  Okay, so the first question.  The election held on the 14
th
 of April 
was a big event.  What did people that you speak to say about the elections? 
 
To me they were happy about it.  Some felt they had to vote to do something for the country, to 
be part of the country. 
 
I thought it was a good idea to vote, because in the past they couldn’t vote.  So when we voted 
we were like part of South Africa - how can I say? – Citizens of South Africa.  Before the 
election our people were not – how can I say? 
 
They were not represented. 
 
They were not represented.  Like they don’t belong in this country. 
 




In 2004 it was the third election that everybody voted.  1994, 1999 and 2004.  1994 was a 
fantastic get-together for everybody.  Everybody was allowed – for the first time – to become 
South African citizens, which I felt fantastic about.  Everyday I stood three or four hours to wait 
to cast my vote, because I wanted everybody to vote.  People who had never voted before were 
taken in slowly, two by two and shown how to vote.  I personally, in previous elections, in four 
elections, in 1961, ’66, ’70 and ’74, I was an electoral officer.  But I felt upset, because the 
majority of the country was not allowed to cast their vote.  That upset me very badly. 
 
 
Okay, did other people want to say anything? 
 
Yes, I wanted you to rephrase the question that you asked originally. 
 
Okay, it was basically just asking you what people were saying about the 2004 election. 
 
What were people saying, but no one answered what the people where saying.  Just rephrase it 
again?  What were people saying?  People to us? 
 
















Yes, this year.  But they never told you what people where saying, they were telling you their 
opinions.  Now I will tell you what people were saying:  ‘Gaan julle weer vir die kaffirs vote?’ 
(Are you going to vote for the Blacks again)?  I am being straight forward now; I am going to say 
it how it is.  They were saying what they feels, but the question you asked – that is why I asked 
you to rephrase the question ‘what were people saying’.  He wasn’t telling you what people were 
saying, he was telling you what he was saying… 
 
 
Let’s move on to the next question… 
 
No, no, no, I don’t want to be like a dummy, what you are asking, we are going to answer.  You 
were asking what people were saying, but he answered you and he answered you what he was 
saying.  Now I am going to tell you what people were saying to me. 
 
That question is designed to move us into the meat of the questions. 
  
I gave you just an honest answer. 
 
No, that is exactly what I want. 
 
But you are leading this meeting now.  Couldn’t you tell him that was not the question or rectify 
it and say ‘that isn’t what I want, the question was –‘and explain the question.   The question 
wasn’t what your opinion was; it was what people were saying to you. 
 
The reason why I didn’t is because it is not one of the meaty questions. 
 
Okay, sorry about that, but it is just if you ask me something then I answer it directly. 
 
Okay, now thinking of your point, the elections in 1994 and 1999, everybody sitting around 
the table initially voted ANC.  At that stage, what were your reasons for voting ANC? 
 
They promised me a house, and I am still sitting without a house.  That is ten years ago.  And to 
be honest, I became very frustrated.  I am so full of - on the news I see it:  ANC will build 
houses, ANC will do this, ANC will do that – they did nothing for me yet.  So why, I don’t need 




…I won’t go into colour racial thingies… 
 
I must just ask you, in the 2004 election, did you vote? 
 
No.  I didn’t go vote, but my aim was to vote for the DA, but I couldn’t get into the queue. 
 
I am going to have to give you your incentive and then – because what they do is, when you 
fill in, they just double check that you voted ANC and then DA.  Is that everybody around 
the table besides you?   
 
I didn’t vote, there wasn’t enough time, by the time I got there it was totally blocked.   
 












You should have been patient like I was; I stood there for hours and hours and hours. 
 
There’s your incentive.   
 
I didn’t vote as well. 
 
They will give you your incentive at the door.  I am sorry, but it is for the profile of the 
group.  Hopefully we can carry on smoothly from here.  Okay, for the rest of you, we were 
talking about 1994 and 1999, everybody voted ANC.  What were your reasons? 
 
Mine were that at that time everything would have been equal, there would have been free 
education, free medicine, there was going to be houses for the poor; the poor were going to be 
uplifted.  And to this day, they have done something, but they haven’t done enough for the poor.  
I have seen Nelson Mandela’s house that Winnie built for him while he was in prison, a beautiful 
house.  And I just feel that they are spending thousands of rands and the poor are still eating dry 
bread and water. 
 
I went to the different talks that the different parties had and then I just thought that if I did it – if 
my mother knew it she would have turned in her grave – but I mean I listen to all the talks and I 
knew nobody else would come in.  And I thought that maybe they would keep to their promise. 
 
Initially I was in the struggle.  I took a rubber bullet here – I don’t want to show you the scar, in 
’76 – but I thought that everything was going to fall into place, the majority rules now.  It is just 
certain of ethics.  When the abortion – I don’t want to make it a religious issue, I am a Catholic – 
but when the abortion issue came in I just thought about it, and then another thing came in, like 
the equity.  The way it was implemented, I was for the equity, but the way it was implemented in 
Cape Town and I have got a couple of connections, and then I realized that on the most 
Government jobs there were equity.   
 
 
I am ANC, but the equity, it doesn’t make sense to me, the abortion, it doesn’t make sense to me.  
We are a third world country with housing and financially, but they want to practice first world 
things like with abortions and equity and whatever.  It is not easy for someone who is in the 
struggle.  It is not easy for me to be here even.  I am in a difficult position really, but that is really 
my stand point.  It is not even a moral issue, because morals aren’t really involved, but what you 
think is morally right, I think is morally wrong.  It is not even taken into consideration. 
 
Okay, we can come back to that, let me just hear from the others. 
   
For me it was hard, we were struggling then.  So we couldn’t vote for any party, must vote for 
Nelson Mandela. 
 




Many years ago I met somebody I was working with.  His name was Walter.  He was named after 
Walter Sisulu.  We became very good friends.  He knew a lot about rugby.  It was very 
interesting to hear an African talking about Afrikaaners, but he had no hatred in him, and I 
thought to myself that I must do him a favor.  We were in the same building one day and I called 
him away from his work and I said to him ‘come upstairs with me, we are going to the third 
floor’ and he said ‘who is there, I can’t go, I must get back to work’ and I said ‘no, I want you to 
meet somebody’.  I took him to the third floor and I introduced him to a friend of mine.  He 











with the one hand.  And he couldn’t get over it.  So I said ‘don’t worry, you’ve got my vote’.  I 




Not the PFP, before the PFP. 
 
I don’t mean to be rude … but you guys also want to move on and I’ve got a series of 
questions. 
 
I voted for the ANC because we were struggling, we were struggling in the past.  Like I said 
before, the reason for voting was to become a citizen.  So that we can also have something to say 
about sitting in Parliament.  That is why we voted ANC, for a better future.  Their token was 






I voted ANC because I was very disillusioned about the previous Government.  And I have 
always looked up to Nelson Mandela.  And I just thought it was like a new world and I saw better 
things for South Africa. 
 
Okay, what made you change your mind and not vote for them in 2004? 
 
Promises that they made and haven’t kept.  There is some that they have done, but like I said 
before, they were talking about free medical aid and schooling and basically housing and all that 
and uplifting the poor and all that.  And we still get the poor; we still have to pay school fees.  
Now they are busy trying to cram 35 children into a classroom, I mean really, it is ridiculous. 
 
Two nights before Chris Hani was killed I was sitting with my daughter watching Chris Hani 
being interviewed on TV. And she said to me, ‘look how nice he talks and look how nice he is’ 
and to think that two days later the way he was killed, and the first thing that went around South 
Africa was that the person that saw the shooting was an Afrikaans lady.  I thought and we all 
thought that this country was going to come together and be one country, bugger the Afrikaner, 
and bugger the bladdy Boer, and the kaffir this and that – excuse my language.  And for you I 
have more respect than for those that went overseas and live like bladdy kings.  I don’t have any 
more respect for these people that went overseas.  Because they were living it up, I saw them in 
London.  Our present President, he wasn’t short, he married his wife in a castle!  While his 
people remained behind, were beaten up, I saw them getting hit in Adderley street.  I saw it with 
my own eyes.  It hurt me very much. 
 
Okay, in terms of why you changed your mind and didn’t vote ANC 2004. 
 
I didn’t vote for the ANC in 2004 because for me there was too much corruption going on.  And I 
thought one vote less for the ANC would be one vote less power for them.  I know one vote 
doesn’t count, but that is how I felt about it. 
 
For me corruption isn’t an issue, because corruption was happening more in the Apartheid 
government.  For me it was more moral issues.  They addressed moral issues where abortions 
were concerned, and the realizing of abortions – that was one of the moral issues.  And the way 
that the Equity Act was implemented.  I mean in Cape Town now I have got statistics, I’ve got 
friends that works in Government departments.  No Colored male is on the list for any job as a 











the DA addressed these areas on the equity, on the sentences, the death sentence policy and the 
abortion – they took a stance on that.  That is basically where I made my decision. 
 
Okay, can I just hear from the others? 
 
The ANC promised us a lot of things, but we never got it. 
 
Just to come back to __________, he said his reasons for voting for the DA, let me just ask 
the others, what were your reasons for choosing the DA in 2004?  There were a lot of 
parties, what made you choose the DA? 
 
The DA is the next strongest party to vote for.  At least when they decide a thing, they are trying 
to solve your problem.  They are not just doing this or doing that, they are trying. 
 
The reason why I voted for the DA is because I voted for the ANC in the past and they never did 
anything.  Now I am going to vote for the DA to see what is going to happen for the next five 








All my life I never voted for the National Party, for the simple reason that a child of ten – and 
that came in 1948 – I lived across the road, I knew nothing about politics in those days.  There 
was a loudspeaker giving out the results, and I remember the result of Piet van der Berg, he was 
the first Cabinet Minister under Smuts to lose his seat.  Our school principal’s son – and I still 
remember his name and surname – he hit me over the head and he said ‘Vanaand gaan julle 
Joode en julle hotnots en julle kaffirs vrek’ (Tonight the Jews, Coloureds and Blacks are going to 
die) and I ran home screaming because I didn’t know what was going on.  I didn’t know what he 
was talking about.  Or why.  What had we done?  I was a little boy.  And he was a tall chap, 
about 6 foot 3.  Matric.  And after that I wanted nothing to do with the National Party, I never 
liked their policies.  I never liked the Group Areas Act and all those things like that. 
 
To me if you take that time of year, the National Party was losing more and more of their 
eligibility.  They couldn’t control what they wanted and how they wanted it and the only party 
that basically could take over was the DA.  You can’t go vote for a losing party. 
 
Is there anything else you wanted to say about why you voted for the DA? 
 
The only thing that I can say is that you have to look at things realistically and you have to see 
what the next party has to offer… 
 
…It wasn’t easy for me coming from the struggle and changing to the DA, but the same things 
that were making sense to me, like I told you, on the abortions, on the sentences people were 
getting, on the equity, especially in the Western Cape.  I mean you have to go to Jo’burg to get a 
job.  Or Durban.  Because on the equity list they advertise for the administration there is no 
position for a Black male.  It gets re-advertised Coloureds woman.  The Equity Act, they should 
have brought it a bit down.  That is unacceptable.  And Black empowerment where you have to 
have a black partner in your business.  If you have a business and it is a private business nobody 
can tell you, so they have to downsize.  So the DA, they were making waves on the Equity Act, 












Okay, is there anything else on why people voted for the DA, quickly, before we move on? 
 
Probably because the DA is taking control of the corruption that is going on.  There is a court 
case going on in Durban at this very moment that our Vice President might be involved in.  I 
don’t want to say he is involved, I am not the Judge, and I don’t work for the Scorpions. 
 
That happened after the elections. 
 
No, this came along before the 2004 elections.  The Scorpions were involved in it. 
 
Okay, what I handed out is an election poster of the ANC.  The question is, looking at the 
picture of them, why was the ANC unable to convince you to vote for them in 2004? 
 
I didn’t vote for the ANC because they made promises and nothing happened, and all the 
corruption which didn’t come out as much as now.  But I just will not vote for them again. 
 
Mine was three major issues:  the abortion, the Equity Act and the violent crime that is not really 
dealt with.  They are not appointing people that have the qualifications that should be able to 
handle these violent crimes, because I watch TV and I could be a better spokesperson than any of 
one of the Generals that is running a section of policemen.  I don’t know how – I am not going to 
criticize his formal education or his degrees that he has – but a young journalist of 22 years old is 
cutting him apart with questions.  Just questioning him why aren’t they doing that and a 
policemen of that stature should immediately be able to answer the questions of the journalist 
saying ‘we are doing that, we are doing that’, I mean I could have done better. 
 
Alright, we are talking now in confidence.  While listening to the radio and reading a book 
suddenly the announcer said ‘there is breaking news’ and she explained to us what the breaking 
news was.  The captain of the South African Police Services – his wife – the General, Salemi, 
Salemi, yes – his wife was caught in Sandton pinching in the shop.  They caught her as she 
walked out and they found quite a lot of stuff on her.  But it didn’t appear in the paper the 
following day.  They continued for hours talking about it on that particular radio station – on 
Cape Talk.  And I was going berserk.  I was saying if Amy Kleinhans was caught, and she had to 
pay, she would have paid up, am I right?  But Salemi’s wife, it was all hushed up.  I think it was 
wrong. 
 
But you see, there it is who you know. 
 
Let’s not bring that in, there is much greater issues.  Where the South African Government has a 
little say about the Palestinian issue.  They have got so a little say about the Palestinian issue.  Or 
a lot to say, they want to try to run the Palestinian issue, and they have got a little to say about 
what is happening in our country.  Mbeki wants to say Islam can’t do that, Islam can’t do that, 




…the world, to say certain items about this, he has to sacrifice.  So the global concept, they must 




…that is one thing; the DA tries to bring the issues back home. 
 
Looking at the image of the IFP, why did they fail to convince you to vote for them in 2004?   
 












They are not strong enough? 
 
I think it is a matter of we don’t want to bring to South Africa a tribal thing.  It is a tribal thing.  I 
am not really prepared to bring in tribalism.  In the history of Africa, tribalism is the downfall of 
Africa.  So let’s not go back to tribalism. 
 
Okay, you are nodding your head, what do you want to say? 
 
I don’t like this guy. 
 
You don’t like Buthelezi? 
 




I don’t know enough about them. 
  
You don’t know enough about them. 
 
I don’t know enough about the IFP.  I can’t even give an opinion about it. 
 
In 1980 I met Chief Buthelezi in Stellenbosch and I found him to be a very nice person. 
 
Okay, _____________, your opinion? 
 
The first time I voted for the ANC.  The second time I thought the IFP is close to the ANC.  That 
is why I didn’t – I don’t know this party so well. 
 
Okay, that is fine.  ______________? 
 
In Natal there are more Zulus.  Between the ANC and the IFP it is not a case of politics and 
ruling the Government, it is more a (inaudible) situation, the Zulus are there and the Xhosas are 
there, it goes back to Dingaan’s time when they were going at each other.  And this is why the 
IFP loses a lot of votes. 
 
Okay, that is interesting.  Okay, the UDM.  
 
The UDM is the same as the IFP. 
 
Why do you say that? 
 
This guy used to be in the ANC.  And he also thought he was going to climb the ladder very 
quickly, and he thought he could be Nelson Mandela’s right hand and unfortunately Nelson had 
his guys already and he just fell down the ladder.  To me the IFP has a stronger political situation 
that what the UDM has.  Even though the UDM comes from Natal, they are not as strong as the 
IFP. 
 
The same.  To me it is all small parties.  I always look for a bigger party that really counts.  To 
me they don’t really count. 
 
To me this guy is trying to make himself better. 
 












Yes.  This is a guy that was a general in the Apartheid Government.  Then he joined the ANC and 
then forms his own party.  And then I don’t really think he has got a foot to stand on.  He is a 
general in the Apartheid Government.  He splits from the Apartheid Government, he joins the 
ANC.  Then he forms his own party with a former National Party.  I mean honestly! 
 
It doesn’t seem to have gotten anywhere.  Funny enough, the ACDP seems to have taken on a lot. 
 
Anything on this side before we go to the ID? 
 
I don’t know it. 
 
You don’t know it, okay, that’s fine. 
 
If you take Patricia, she can come far.  She stands up for what she believes in.  This whole 
armament deal that is going on in Durban she is the one that started it.  She wanted to know what 
is happening to the money and who is spending it.  Who is spending millions and there is a poor 
man sitting there looking for a job, looking for a house. 
 
So why was she not able to convince you for the ID? 
 
The thing is, she is still small.  She doesn’t have that big power behind her.  She’s got the power, 
but there is no backing up.  But I believe in another five or six years she should be able to have a 
good go. 
 
I do know quite a lot of about Parliamentary procedure.  She had no right to be told to remove 
herself from Parliament.  Because in Parliament you are protected. 
 
But now why did the party not convince you in 2004? 
 
The same reason. 
 
Okay, and other people? 
  
She belonged to a very radical pa ty.  The PAC.  Now if you belong to a radical party and you are 
a radical person, then my belief is you stick to your radical views.  You don’t try to use the 
housewives of Mitchell’s Plain to forward a party that forms after that, because that, I believe, is 
only for personal gain.  She formed this party for personal gain.  Because if you are really a 
radical and your heart is really in being a radical and being a member of the PAC, not even being 
a member of the ANC, and then you move over and try to woo the housewives of Mitchell’s 
Plain, which are the underprivileged people and the people of Guguletu and Bonteheuwel and all 





When I went to the polls to vote it was like ‘which one of the two?’.   I like her a lot, she is a 
woman.  The only thing that got me for the DA was that when we were standing in the row there 
was people discussing the parties and I was quite determined to go and vote for her and I think 
she stands up and I don’t care what anybody says I just feel that she stands up for her rights and if 
she feels something is wrong she says it.  And then when I heard this lot talking and I got in there 
I just… 
 












But I also think at the next election she is not going to be as small, she is going to go past quite a 
lot of people. 
 
 
Anything on this side?  ____________________? 
 
I can’t really say that much, I was actually betwixt between her and the DA, but ultimately I 
chose the DA. 
 
Her party was too small by the time we started voting to challenge the big parties. 
 
Okay, this is the last one… 
 
Oh no!  This is a hopeless case.  To me the NNP is a waste of time.  The guy can’t make up his 
mind where he wants to be.  He jumps from the one place to the other.  That is what I feel about 
him. 
 
In 1994 the Nationalist Party got somewhere.  And they formed with the ANC a Unionist 
Government.  And then they walked out.  Pik Botha was so annoyed that to this day he doesn’t 
talk to FW de Klerk.  He wanted them to remain with the ANC, to help them along. 
 
Their campaign turned the people to the ANC, because they had the so-called Colored people as 
coons.  They had a coon carnival.  They had the coons on the bus playing music.  The National 
Party wanted to use the coons to get votes.  And the people realized it. 
 
Okay, I have heard from two that they were between two parties.  The rest, did you at any 
stage consider voting in 2004 for any other party besides the DA? 
 
To me they didn’t have the power to rule the c untry, they were there, but they weren’t there. 
 
Anybody else consider? 
 
No, the ironic thing was, I walked into Woolworths at the Garden Center one Saturday afternoon 
and Mr. van Schalkwyk walked in to buy some stuff on his own, without any bodyguards.  And I 
said to him ‘Aren’t you Mr. van Schalkwyk?’ – This was before the election.  And he said yes.  
He was very nice, but he didn’t seem like a leader. 
 
Okay, now campaigning consists of a lot of aspects, we mentioned some of it.  If you think 
specifically of the DA campaign, which aspect of the campaign made you keen to vote for 
them? 
 
I stay in Southfield now for nine years and I have got a friend that works for the DA.  One 
evening we were sitting and I had this quarrel with my daughter.  The next minute my phone 
rings and it is this guy from the DA, I am trying to think what his name is now, from Plumstead, 
and he says to me “Hello, Mrs. Hannekom, how are you.  You sound very cross!”  And I said it is 
because I don’t have time for all this stuff.  And he kept on chatting and asked ‘what is wrong, 
can’t I help you?’ and we chatted a lot and two days later he phoned me again and said ‘I just 
wanted to know if you are feeling better’ and I was so embarrassed!  But it was a nice feeling that 
they phoned around. 
 
To me it was that if they got into power the rules that they would have brought in, equality for 













Okay, let me move onto the next question then.  Some people say that campaigns 
don’t really matter in elections… 
 
To me they do. 
 
…because they have already decided who they are going to vote for.  Other people 
say that campaigns are really important because they help you make your choice.  How 
does the group feel? 
 
To me, if you are going to have a party, how are you going to know who to vote for?  I mean 
campaigns are there to tell you what they are about and what they are going to do.  If you are not 
going to campaign, why the elections, you are wasting millions and millions of money. 
 
I also think it is important. 
 
I think campaigns is really important, but what I want to have implemented is follow up on the 
campaigns, because they never follow up on the campaigns.  If they won you don’t see posters 
saying ‘thank you, we are going to have a meeting, we are going to celebrate something’.  You 
have to follow on. If you have a good campaign and you win or even if you lose, you can still 
come together, it is still the opposition.  Come together, say, ‘fine, we lost, but we still have that 
amount of thousands’.  So those thousands come together in the hall and we discuss where did we 
go wrong, there is going to be a next election, we are going to win.  Things like that, little things.  
Even if you lost by 50 votes fair and square, we were still trying. 
 




Why do you say? 
 
I just want to vote. 
 
You just want to vote, you don’t want to worry about the campaigns. 
 
…they must regroup.  They only regroup after five years.  In five years they regroup again, but 
not yearly. 
 
Why regroup after five years, they lost, so regroup yearly.  It is the people that are voting, they 
must regroup immediately.  You can beat anyone if people regroup immediately.  And convince 
people from that time already.  Okay, they won the election, they are in power, I have to do that, 
we have to do certain things, but we are the opposition, we can do certain things.  So let’s 




I think campaigning is important, because it works subconsciously on your mind.  Every time 
you see posters or something when you are going past, it is going to have some effect on you 
subconsciously.  
 
















At the same time, the people that one have to be sitting in Parliament.  It is very difficult, they 
also have to go out, as you said. 
 
But we are not going to use that people that is sitting in Parliament, we are going to use… 
 
It is very tough for them to go out and talk to the people. 
 
Okay, thinking of all that we have said and discussed here for this past hour or so, what advice 
would you give to somebody in charge of a political party, how do you think they can improve 
their chances in the next election? 
 
Communicate with your voters, hear what problems they have got, and try to see if you can get a 




That is the biggest policy. 
 
Being honest is not the only policy.  What I would say to a person that is in a political party, he 
can be how honest, but he is not going to run the other branches, he is not going to run the police.  
Have a hands-on attitude towards the police and all the other little groups that are attached to you.  
You can be honest, but you have to have a hands-on approach. 
 
I suggest that tomorrow morning you go to the Delphi Center in Sea Point and see the police at 
the Delphi Center at their tables being helped by the local people living in the Sea Point area. 
 
So the community and the police work together.  
 
That is right.  
 
We have discussed quite a bit here, do you have any comments on anything we have 
discussed here? 
 
The one thing I feel the ANC are basically shying away from it, and that is the crime rate.  These 
guys walk away, nothing happens...   
 
…When you read the paper you see our justice system is so wrong.  There is so much 
unemployment, why don’t they take these people, train them.  I mean you get guys who are 
sitting five, six years, waiting trial in prison and by the time they do get the sentence they sit two 
years because they already sat six years.  So we have an issue with the crime rate and we have to 
fight it.  I mean we’ve got this 16 day thing now of women and children.  What happens now?  
Does that give them the right to beat up on women and children?  We’ve got to do something 
about the crime rate. 
Any other comments that you want to raise? 
 
Look, the Government is stretched out to its limits.  Okay, like I said, they put certain people in 
positions they shouldn’t be in.  They have to put people that can really do the job.  The Equity 
Act is not something that you do or don’t do, you have to do it, and it is Government legislations.  
So you are going to get people that are not qualified for the job.  I think that is something that 
they have to review for people that is really qualified. 
 
 
Okay, well that brings us to the end of the discussion.  Thank you very much, all of 













IFP Voters – 1999 - 2004 
 
My name is Gugu; I am working for a research company that collects views from people 
and take it to those who need it. So in what we do there is nothing wrong and right. When I 
ask a question everybody must answer freely.  What you say through your mouth is your 
view. Then every one must feel free.  
 
In this study we have been asked by UCT students from Cape Town, They study on 
communication with the voters, ways of voting, how political parties communicate with 
voters.  Everything we discuss today is confidential and must remain with us, and then 
there is a form to sign that this will be confidential. Every one must sign. Now we need to 
know each other as we are here, we must be free. We must tell each other the name what 
you like most and generally about yourself. I will give you one minute.  
 
I have a great pleasure because I have spoken with my child, now I am happy because we share 
same family name. She has four children. What she likes is to stay with her children throughout 
her life. But the problem is beyond her control; hence she stays here in Siyakha. 
 
Even on my side I am happy because I meet my mother Sis' Khanyi whom we share the family 
name. She told me that she has five children. She likes to use her hands. She loves things that will 
make her earn income 
 
So you do not know each other before? 
 
No, it is for the first time. 
 
This is ___________________, she stays here in Siyanda. She told me that she has two children. 
What she loves is sport like baseball, as well as netball.  
 
This one is ______________________ she stays here in Siyanda and she tells me that she love to 
get going and live happy life.  
 
This one next to me is ________________, she stays in Ntuzuma, her biggest problem there in 
Ntuzuma is that she does not have title deeds. Even the previous government tries to [provide] 
title deeds but still she does not have [one]. Even if she wants to drink water she can't, because 
there are no water pipes. There are a lot of things she still needs. 
 
The sister next to me tells me that she finished schooling but till to date she is unemployed. Her 
name is _____________________.  
 
This one is _____________, he says his problem is that there are no jobs and government he rely 
most on casual jobs. He wants to stay with his family. He likes to drink alcohol to quench his 
thirst. 
 
His name is ___________________, he likes parties. 
 
Today we are going to discuss about the elections. Thinking back on the 14
th,
 it was a big 
event, known nationally. I would like to know from the people you spoke with, what is it 
that they said about this years elections? What were they saying about elections as well as 
campaigns before the elections? 
 
Most of the people in these years’ elections were not happy, because they voted in the past, but 












I also support the sister’s [statement] because most youth do not see the importance of voting. 
This is because in the past elections, they voted but nothing was done, or is done for the youth. 
So in these years’ elections they did not see any reason to vote. They say they will vote but 
everything will remain the same. 
 
Children like me, we canvassed other people to go and vote but now they have lost hope. Even 
the promises we heard during the campaigns, we didn't see any improvement. Those who have 
passed in school are not working; there are no jobs for them. We even beg them hoping that 
things will be fine. We beg them to change their vote and see what the other one [party] will 
bring, because you cannot continue voting [for] the one [party] whom is doing nothing. Now, 
government has promised us houses, but I have five children, the other three have their children 
but we stay together in the shacks. They build small houses (ikopi). The Apartheid government 
was better, because even if they do little things, but you still had a place to stay, where you would 
stay and do better things. 
 
Most people say the past [ANC] government was better under Mandela’s [leadership], because he 
was able to give grants, and schools. This one of Mbeki’s has failed in many things because there 
are no jobs.  
 
The other thing is that these children, we saw them in newspapers having passed their matric. 
There is not even something to make them happy, not all the children are happily giving birth 
with no reason. They rely on looking for casual jobs. There must be an increases in factories and 
the children grants must be available, than to stay [unemployed]. Maybe they must be given a 
chance to study further, to further their ambitions and must be supported. 
 




 What about campaigns what were they saying about campaigns? 
 
 In rural areas where I come from, those who didn't vote in the previous election were just happy, 
because for them it was for the first time they were casting their votes, then they were excited.  
 
I voted because I had to, but I was not excited. 
 
Since all of us we voted and we voted for the IFP, from 1994, 1999 and now 2004, Lets we 
think back in 1994, what was the reason for voting IFP? 
 
I liked its slogan. 
 
I voted the IFP because its leader speaks one language; he does not speak this today and 
tomorrow changes. He stands for the truth. What he said in the past years, is what he is saying 
today, he does not go off the line. I love IFP because it has humanity (Ubuntu), it respects. I go to 
church on Sundays and I am respected, but when there is a rally for IFP, I do not go to church if 
that rally is on Sunday; I go to attend the rally. We are taught of respect at all times. IFP is able to 
look after its people and the nation. When he speaks, at all times he likes people to be happy and 
live a [good] life. 
 
I voted the IFP because I love it, and my parents support this party. And the fact that Baba 
Shenge (Mr. Buthelezi) people like his thinking. When he campaigns, he does not make promises 
to people, but he does what he can. 
 
I voted IFP because I grew up in a family of the IFP. Also IFP supports our culture and tradition. 












On my side, Baba Shenge is the only person I see, he has a good record for governing people.  He 
speaks one language, he promises a better life to all people.  
 
When Shenge speaks, Baba Shenge has spoken, even if he is in other places he makes no 
promises, IFP has nothing, it makes no promises but he encourages people to make things for 
themselves. 
 
In 1994 what excited you in the IFP? 
 
In 1994, we were threatened; I was nearly necklaced with tires by the ANC. The only 
organization that used to be available was Inkatha. We were threatened but I became strong and I 
voted the IFP. It was better, in the past I knew nothing about rates, the ANC come with title 
deeds. I voted for the IFP. 
 
Let’s talk about 1999, you voted the IFP because you like IFP slogans or the thinkings of 
Umtwana kaPhindangene (Mr. Buthelezi) 
 
I voted the IFP, because I used to vote for it, I couldn't just change to other parties. Even at home, 
I grew in a family that loves the IFP. Our grand parents still tell us about Umtwana ka 
phindangene, then I decided to vote for the IFP. In 1999, I was in Gauteng and when the elections 
came I decided to go to where I registered, to vote for the IFP. Even when I was young, doing 
standard eight, we use to say: “Viva, IFP,” but not knowing exactly what is happening.  
 
Beside your family influence, what are your reasons that you vote IFP? 
 
When Buthelezi speaks, he encourages people to work for themselves, to work in the gardens. In 
rural areas, people believe in rural farming. 
 
I will continue to vote for him, even if I am left alone. I wish he succeeds, so that one day he 
rules this country. I have seen him, that he is a strong man. The most important thing and the one 
that attracts me most, is that God is always at the centre of the IFP. It is better if we are lead by 
someone who knows what is wrong. Only him. 
 
I voted in 1999 because of other leaders who say we must practice abortion. This I do not 
support, that a person can do what ever they like.  
 
I voted for him because he encourages children to go to school. Now we know there is 
Mangosuthu Technikon, there are other things named after him, which contributes to 
development. 
 
I voted for him because he is the only one I can see that can lead the nation. He is a respectable 
leader. Since he says we will triumph together, we must be united so that we can go forward. 
 
I decided to continue voting for him, because the other government didn't provide us jobs and 
houses. We still stay in the shacks. Now we have some problems. This is why Umtwana Ka 
Phindangene, I hope he succeeds. 
 
I voted IFP because at home they supported it and I love its policies. 
 
You have voted this year, why did you vote for the IFP? 
 
What I can say, this year the IFP, the previous government encouraged us with this grant to 
continue giving birth, the next thing we die because of AIDS, but this government is failing to 











promises. This was the reason I voted for the IFP. Mangosuthu, where ever he goes, he always 
talks about the HIV/AIDS. He comes out and tells us when his children have died because of 
Aids. He supports other people. 
 
I voted IFP because I have a wish, that the man you can trust can lead the nation. He speaks at all 
times about respect and respect among other people. Mr. Buthelezi does not like abortion, he 
likes children to be responsible, to go back to their culture, this is why I am going to vote for him.  
I voted for the IFP because it fought against Apartheid. It is not fighting the rights of all people, 
but for blacks. 
 
All of you have voted IFP because of the reasons you put forward, but now I would like to 
know whether there is something that can change you to vote other organizations beside the 
IFP?.  
 
I can vote for other organizations if it will have a major role in the country. May be it can come 
with the cure of HIV, or reduce crime. 
 




Eliminate these rates payments. 
 
 
Firstly, is it possible that you would vote for other organizations like ANC, UDM? If that is 
possible what is it that they must do?  
 
If the whites can provide food to people, instead of putting them in trucks and dumping it in some 
places. We can change that. 
 
We can vote for the other organizations, if it will preach the word of respect, culture, provide jobs 
and every one can live a better life. Because we need respect, good life, and our traditional chiefs 
are respected.  
 
I won't change to other organizations. 
 
On my side, unless the IFP dies, I can’t vote for other organizations. 
 
If it provides job opportunities, I would vote for someone [else]. 
 
Jobs and our culture, we respect. 
 
Educate our children. 
 
I can vote for another organization, but I will not, unless it is doing something, because all 
[parties] say this and that. All this policies we talk of are the IFP policies,  
 
Let’s talk about campaigns, we want to know whether prospective votes have already had a 
stand as which party to vote or they are campaigned. They want to know whether or not 
campaigns are important? Because they can waste a lot of money but campaigning is not 
helping at all. What are you views about campaign? 
 
Campaigns are important because it educate, people know why they vote this party, If all the 
party during campaigning they have money, but one organization come with food and do 











Others then decide to vote other organization unintentionally because of these things. Campaigns 
are important so that people can be educated.  
 
Campaigns are useful because you are able to choose which party to vote after the campaign. 
 
You can know before you vote that really you love this organization and its policies, and the 
feeling of the people that really there are elections. 
 
Even on my side campaigns are important because it encourages people to votes. 
 
Campaigns are important, call meetings and do house to house and encourage the olds and 
disabled. You show the gestures and appearance of the leaders to be voted. 
 
People have been campaigning, but we do not see any progress. What we see is poverty. 
Campaigns or no campaigns person knows which party to vote for. They come and say our 
children will live a better live and get free education but we pay school fees. This start from the 
campaigns themselves. To me campaigns are not necessary. To me, what is important is that the 
organization I voted is doing its job to help me and my family. 
 
Campaigns are important, but this year I was annoyed not to see the IFP but in Johannesburg I 
saw a lot of IFP and the ANC. Others were receiving t-shirts from the ANC and Mr. Mbeki was 
available then you could see others changing from IFP to ANC. 
 
I agree that campaigns are important; some people become confused when they do not see their 
organizations. There are also those who are threatening others and others then are afraid to come 
out. If he can see that his party is still alive then he become happy and continue. 
 
Assume that there is this party, what advise would you give me about how must I do 
campaigns? 
 
I can say you can campaign but do not criticize.  
 
You can campaign but stand for truth do not say tomorrow we will do this and tomorrow that is 
not done. Then followers will cry for their time wasted on you. 
 
How will you know that I am telling the truth? 
 
That will be clear, because you have said tomorrow we will do this and tomorrow arrives but 
nothing is happening. 
 
What must I do if I campaign, so that I get a lot of supporters? 
 
Do things people would recognize even if it’s little. You go and tell the government to stop 
abortion. I think you can get a lot of people. 
 
As youth, we do not have electricity, water and roads, if you come with solution and provide that 
solution to people.  
 
Councilors are supposed to be the one who do campaigning but they can't because they get 
wages. They suppose to get wages from us. 
 
Can you advise the leader of the organization as to what he must do to improve in the 
elections? 
 











even this organization that is in power was helped by the youth. They used our children in order 
to go to parliament. If this organization want to win elections it can do that vie the youth. 
 
What are the youth needs? 
 
Job opportunities  
 
Sport need to supported 
 
support the talent  
 
Youth, must be provided with something they have volunteered now they have run out of energy.  
 
They must be employed by the IEC and get something. 
 
They must encourage the youth 
 
If one organization can provide tractors and call people to come and plough, people can stand. 
 
It must bring back culture back and tradition  
 
When a girl is growing there must be expects to tell what a man is and boys be told what is a 
women. 
 
Provide solution to this grant. 
 
If the other one uses condom, and other receive a grant. Then the other one will stop using 
condom and he will need a grant and become pregnant.  
 
Now what is needed, if someone is having AIDS he must get a grant not everyone  
 
The reason why we must return back to our culture is that when this boy make my child pregnant 
he need to cleanse this house and because the ancestors won't be happy. 
 
They must not provide educated people to run the IEC, because now they just bring the teachers 
who whom we never saw in any rally. They need to give people who are not working. 
 
They must provide cameras in the poling stations so that there can be a proof that everything 
went well.  
 
Thank you very much for your participation!!! 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
ANC Voters – 1999 - 2004 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Let’s start. We can just go around the room and give your names and a favourite pass-time 
… something that you enjoy doing. Maybe a hobby or a sport. 
 
 
















My name is _____________ and I like to watch sport. 
 
So you were watching the Olympics everyday and going to bed late. 
 
My name is _________________ and I enjoy soccer. 
 




My name is ________________ and I like playing pool. 
 
My name is _______________ and I enjoy watching TV. I watch TV a lot and when I’m in front 
of the TV I don’t want anyone to disturb me. I like watching the BBC. I also like sport. 
 
OK. My name is Cherrel Africa and I also like watching sport. I ‘ve got 2 boys and they’re 
very much into basketball but I can’t find a place for them to play basketball. They play 
soccer at school. I’ve also been watching the Olympics. 
 
OK. The first question I want to ask with regard to the research… The elections on the 14
th
 
of April was a very big event, what do people that you speak to say about the election.  Just 
generally, people that  you speak to, what do they say about the election? 
 
The people that I’ve spoken to…I think after the election… the ruling party… the reason why 
they did that is they want to say… a lot of young people… most people voted for the ANC. They 
don’t want other parties. They just give ANC that boost. 
 
Its like they want to give the ANC a reminder… to show their confidence. For those that voted 
they gave their vote to the ruling party. Its like people are voting for the ruling party because, ja 
there’s a lack of jobs, but people wanted to give this ruling party a second chance because its 
like…10 years is not enough to make rapid changes. Rome was not built in a day. So now since 
this ruling party said… houses, jobs, shelter but now there is still more to do you see. So if they 
vote for other parties, the other parties are going to start their own things like that so they wanted 
to give this ruling party a chance to proceed further with this delivery. 
 
Ja… like the ones that I talked to … I had interesting chats with people that I talk to. Some said 
that they voted for the ANC er firstly because of the history of the ANC and knowing where the 
ANC comes from … the history of the ANC and the role the ANC played you know in South 
African politics and then they said… their fear is … the ID… because the other parties are like 
dogs without teeth… you know… somebody said “I just vote because of my heroes that have 
passed away fighting for democracy… because of Chris Hani… we are still in the tri-partite 




Erm.  Then let me ask you…That’s what other people have been saying, moving now to 
yourselves. Some people are satisfied with government performance, other people are not 
that satisfied, overall how satisfied are you personally with the governments performance? 
 


















I can see that everything has changed. Most of the things have changed…I’d say 85% of things 
have changed. 
 
Even though we can’t know what’s happening behind closed doors but I can say its 
transparent…its open for everyone in the country… even though we can’t attend each and every 
one… 
 
To add to that… the very same government… there’s still a lot to be done… that I know… to 
bring hope to the hopeless… you can see a distance and they are on the right path… they are 
actually aware of the ground to cover… that there’s a lot to be done. 
 
Er… they treat people equally… there’s no … how can I put it… there’s no differentiation … 
discrimination and all that stuff… 
 
I think that another thing that is important… I agree with what is being said… but I think my own 
misgivings is the slow pace of change on the economic side… some of us have degrees but we 
are without work… about two years now…I’m saying… even though I’m in agreement with 
what is being said here… I think the lives of many of us have not been changed… in a lasting 
sense… haven’t changed so much for the better…and yet would say 10 years is not enough…my 
personal ambitions at this time – I will be supportive of them, but it does concern me. But I agree 
with everything that was said… our democracy is flourishing…but economically, materially 
there is a lot that they must do. 
 
And another thing… I would like to emphasize more on the issue of jobs… there’s some change 
that’s happening but the ordinary citizen… the ruling party… people are voting continuously  for 
the ruling party so now there is some change but it is very slow. Our emphasis is on the fact that 
there’s no jobs… they can build houses but our emphasis is the jobs. There are people 
outside…there are no jobs…people are struggling because there are no jobs. 
 
I think…I mean what does come across…when listening here…you get the sense that economic 
development is a problem…they talk of jobless economic growth which is a problem…the 
economy is growing jobs is still a big problem. 
 
Ok, the next question… 
 
I just want to highlight one more thing on this issue of jobs and education. When I look at the 
education system that our government is using…education…funding students more especially at 
tertiary level… to me its like some structural adjustment kind of …er… programme… because 
you give loans to those like poorly students and then after a certain period they complete their 
studies then you expect them to pay back those loans and when they pay back…it’s a huge 
amount of money that they owe you know…you lend R10 000 and then its tripled or fourpled 
you know…so in that case you are impoverishing the poor instead of trying to enrich or empower 
them. I think it could be better if you say that I will give you a loan of maybe R14 000 or 
so…then you will study and after you’ve finished studying you will come and work for the 
institution…that’s the way of paying back you know… rather than saying after three years 
you’ve finished your degree but then for another three years you don’t get a job…the interest is 
accumulating. When it comes to the issue of houses… I think …yes I can see the speed of 
building these small RDP houses but on the other hand I think if government can be able to offer 
people jobs they can be able to buy and build such kind of houses that they can come out of a 
shack and build a house. If you give them houses but you don’t give them jobs…you give them 















Coming to the point of education, I think the government must do a lot in the education of this 
country. Firstly we know that the majority of the population in this country is blacks. Most blacks 
when they finish high-school level they don’t know what to do with their lives. They finish 
standard 10/grade 12 and they are blank you know. They go to higher learning institutions and 
they don’t have any idea what they want to do there. They end up being lost and… you know… 
doing unnecessary courses. 
 
You know I still believe we are under the so-called Bantu education… it still exists in this 
country…it was introduced by Verwoed…really at present I’m doing research about Bantu 
education…I still believe we are still under the same line of Verwoed you know because we are 
still… most blacks …they feel that they can’t do it…the white person is always more clever than 
them…and we cannot adventure life…we are always focused on this thing…working, studying, 
woking. 
 
OK, I…   
 
What I wanted to emphasize is that the education system, it must change to at least introduce 
more practical subjects at high school. 
 
Ok, on this question, let me just take these last points and then I need to carry on. 
 




We need to at least make sure that they pump more money into education or whatever the case 
may be so that the government can get what they need… they need skilled people…educated 
people. Our freedom depends on that…therefore they must send down projects…its never too 
late…that will equip those unfortunate people…projects that will help them to sustain a living. 
 
I agree that… I think the biggest problem facing South Africa is not so much that there’s an 
inability to introduce new projects…I’m sure one has heard of O.B.E and all sorts of 
things…these are endeavors to change things…I think the problem is money…because it requires 
a lot of money…a lot of resources…look at the high schools we came from in the townships. 
Throughout my years at school, there was a building at the school, we were told that it used to be 
a lab, we never went into it. We study until matric and he or she gets to UCT…so I’m saying 
things are better but when I look at it the biggest problem is finance…that is facing us…and 
those who give the government funding they then prescribe what they should do with it. You 
know your needs. The government may say our biggest need is that we need to finance education 
so that we can change the system and help people to be self-sustaining but those who…the 
sponsors and the donors they say we give you this much money…this must go to this thing and 
that…don’t spend so much health…don’t spend so much on job creation projects…spend so 
much on that. I mean this is a developing country…you look at the rest of Africa. Some are 
worse off but then I’m not saying that to justify the slow pace of delivery…when one looks at it, 
the biggest problem is funding for all these things. 
 
OK, just to move on. Each and every person in this group voted for the ANC in 1994, 1999 and 
2004. Can you talk about your reasons for voting for the ANC in these elections. 
 
1994 was an exciting period…especially for all blacks…going everywhere…high schools… it 












In the first elections we were obviously all excited. Came the second one… okay we 
thought…give them a chance… the ANC must win again…but along the way we started to 
question…some people thought maybe the ANC’s not doing well. Most people voted for the sake 
of the ANC being there…not for other parties because we’d end up in the same way we were 
before…it was “let it be the ANC”. Some people say if there is corruption let it be the ANC 
which does corruption. 
 
People still have that hatred of what happened in this country and I am one of them. 
 
Ja…and another thing…I agree with him…the ANC has been with us since we grew up…so I’ll 
vote for the ANC and the majority of blacks will vote for them. 
 
We were just excited to vote for the ANC in 1994 but now the only thing is change…we need 
some change because now we are tertiary level…there’s a lot of things happening at tertiary 
level. We need some funding…its very very important you see…that happened previously…there 
can be very many projects coming through…we need to get progress whereby we can get a way 
forward…otherwise…the ANC has done a lot so far but now let us go forward and then at least 
we can get what we are looking for. 
 
The situation now…there’s a question of …we need some practical…whereby someone can be 
very confident of themselves so that they can be able to speak out about what it is they are 
looking for…so we can talk with the ANC and all these parties…what is very important is to 
form groups so then…I’ve got my idea and the person next to me has got his own idea and then 
we can make a good combination of those ideas so we can form something like a group. 
 
For me…you know I was very excited to vote in 1994…particularly for the ANC…looking at the 
history of the ANC…when it formed it was named ANNC, African National Natives Congress, it 
was predominantly for blacks. So now seeing the fact that the ANC is committed to other races I 
feel ANC…I see that as…I am not a racist so then this is the party to vote for, for the rest of my 
life…because I like that we are a multi-racial country so we must have a multi-racial party. So I 
am still voting ANC because it is looking out for all Africans and all South Africans. 
 
I think in 1994…I mean…it had a lot to do with the history of the ANC. I think that’s what drove 
most of us – to do away with racism once and for all. We wanted to see change…then in 1999 it 
has sunk in that we are in power…we felt that we want to give them a chance…we need houses 
and if you listened earlier on you’ll realize that there has been a progression. A lot of things have 
happened…but there is a problem with the pace of delivery…of this change. 
 
They must go back again and do more with much more vigour and we will  criticize if they don’t 
deliver. Besides giving confidence to the ruling party we are saying that we want you to do 
things…we want your foot soldiers to walk that road and deliver these things. And in 2009 we’ll 
say “How far did we come?” I was listening  to my brother saying “I will vote ANC for the rest 
of my life but we don’t know what’s going to happen…I mean if you look at other 
governments…people have been in there more than 20 years and then people get tired…if you 
look at Zimbabwe, ZANU PF…they can’t be in there forever…you can’t give them forever to 
deliver. 
 
Its not like Zimbabwe…Mugabe is like…on some sort of revenge…we in the ANC criticize… 
 
No, let me just finish my point…the point I am making is that…I hope the ruling party…the fact 
that we are liberated should serve as an advantage for us because if you look at almost all of 
them… the likes of …inaudible… he was once a hero…the people of that country said we must 
vote for him forever and then there came a stage where they became disgruntled…it depends 












I am sure that expectations were too high. I don’t know if it was the chain of command but we 
expected more…we expected projects to be coming from NGOs…it takes time…up to now you 
get different stories…there are people who do not feel like us…you will get mixed feelings about 
the situation. 
 
The thing is…I left my job to go back to school…I see if maybe I get education I ‘m going to be 
better but my feeling is that people are leaving the country…if the government can create more 
jobs. 
 
I have a feeling…if we can have a one-party state but in a democratic form…the ANC. Why I am 
saying that…I am really excited about what happened recently when our enemy came and died 
on our hands, the National Party. When the ANC was chopping the National Party into pieces 
that makes me so excited because the National Party was our enemy and therefore the 
mechanisms that the African National Congress is using…there are possibilities that these little 
parties can come to an end…you see that’s why we can end up with a one-party state…I still 
have a hope that we…the ANC …can root out these rotten potatoes in departments because there 
are people who are corrupt in the ANC, in government. 
 
I hear two brothers on this side saying I’ll vote ANC long-term and I see a head shaking on this 
side. Can I just ask about that, do others feel the same? 
 
I think there’s one ruling party no. There’s many parties…provincial…national …but I think it’s 
a good idea if all of us, most of the people vote ANC…it’s the government that I want. 
 
Do you see yourself voting for them long-term? 
 




Ja, as I said earlier…judging from experience of what has happened in Africa…some of the 
countries which got a majority…during that people were excited…I mean up until today…even 
here in South Africa… people…they are starting to question the ANC…you know…from now 
and in 10 years to come… we don’t know what’s going to happen. 
 
So would you say you’d vote long-term ANC? 
 
I’ll judge, I’ll judge…I’ll give the ANC a last chance…I would say that…obviously people…the 
forthcoming elections…if things are still going the way they are…if people really don’t see 
change…I’m going to question them...inaudible. 
 
          
Let me put it this way…the commitment that I see…I don’t want to go into issues of 
corruption…corruption has always been there even in so-called democracies. On voting ANC 
long-term…to put it safely, in the foreseeable future I would definitely vote ANC…we have a 
history that we share…the ANC was at the forefront of the struggle…we are here today…we are 
able to come to Cape Town without producing a pass… those things…are things that people died 
for…now I’m not saying that we don’t appreciate that but if at some stage we sit back and say 
that things are moving too slow for our liking we may have to look for alternatives…despotism 
has grown in parties that have a good history of struggle…most if not all parties have 
evolved…the fact that we were liberated after all of them should serve as a lesson for all of 
us…look at Zimbabwe…the example of Kenya…that party had a good record…they took them 
out of office… the people said no its too much…we can’t be blind…we must see change in our 











gave them an overwhelming majority and we want delivery and I’m saying at some stage… 
maybe 2014… we may say to them “no, no its too much” 
 
Can you tell me what will happen if the ruling party can deliver up to the expectations of voters 
and…like…the majority of South Africans can see this ANC is really like delivering…lets say in 
2009 and 2014 we find that when the results are coming in other parties are not coming in at 
all…its only the ruling party which is the ANC and its because of voters who put that party there. 
So when I was talking about one-party state South Africa might end up in that situation…it won’t 
happen because of that political parties but because of the people’s will…you know people can 
turn the political environment if we have a leader…someone who can come up and make people 
aware …inaudible…You can only tell the driver “drive” and “stop”. If people can…in the near 
future…can say this is political party A and party B…let us agree that this elections we give 
political party A a chance and then we want political party A to do A,B and C and then if its not 
doing that after a certain number of years we can change. 
 
This reminds me of a discussion about Presidents going to a third term and fourth term. People 
were asking “what is wrong with that?” There’s nothing wrong but when your seat becomes your 
house…after a while…people got into office, did a good job…but the people got tired and they 
wanted to hold onto office…we must be careful of those things. But I’m not saying that we must 
vote out the ANC for the sake of voting them out. I think we must keep the ruling party on its 
toes if I may use that term. 
 
They don’t take a mandate from the grassroots …they just do what they think is right for the 
people. 
 
Okay, now I just want to show you some images from the campaigns. Let me pass this around. 
 
Looking at this image of the IFP, was it about the IFP that they were unable to convince you to 
vote for them in 2004? 
 
I don’t know whether I was fortunate or not…because…IFP…I’m chopping IFP. What has 
happened in Gauteng before the elections most of the guys who were killing people from the 
hostels…most of them were followers of the IFP and I’ve experienced this first-hand…in a brutal 
way…people were killing each other in a senseless and brutal way. 
 
They say a leopard never changes its colours…the thing is…this guy (Mangosuthu Buthelezi) his 
whole party…his zulu party…they don’t accommodate other people, that’s why I don’t vote for 
them. 
 
This guy was with the ANC first of all…in the Natal region…I cannot go according this guy. 
 
They are forces that challenged political change…they sounded more like an ethnic political 
party…they are not encompassing the whole of South Africa. 
 
If you look at the history of the IFP…culturally… it was an organisation  that was there for 
cultural purposes, to say ‘us as Zulus, we need to remind ourselves of who we are”…it was an 
identity kind of thing…I think its difficult to evolve into a political party that would encompass 
other people…because as a political party you have to encompass all. In 1994 I did see a few 
posters in the Eastern Cape of the IFP…they were struggling to become an all-encompassing 
political party. That was their biggest problem and they’ve not been able to transcend that 
and…the destructive nature …just recently people were watching TV…this area Ulundi…it has 
significance to the King Shaka…it was almost a no-go area for the ANC…the Minister of 
Defence and Correctional Services had to go there because the IFP did not want the ANC to go 












And we find that even long before the 1994 elections, Gatcha was used by the then regime…you 
see… to kill ANC supporters…this guy…there is nothing good about him. 
 
To me personally there is a need for young politicians to analyse the political songs, when they 
analyse the political songs it will give a lot of information to know exactly about these heros. For 
Mangosuthu my feeling or opinion with him is that he was an informer…he betrayed his 
people…you know he was like Judas…when I think of the IFP, I just see his face and I think of 
impimpi. 
 
The next one we are looking at is the DA.   
   
Can I say on the DA…I’m asking myself what was Tony Leon doing in 1993…to me he is like 
an opportunist…and he is misleading people because one…he is the opposition…he is a person 
who…like…always criticizes you know…if he criticizes he doesn’t come with constructive 
criticism. For instance, when they were saying to the Minister of Transport…saying that he must 
resign…he was not coming with an alternative…you must come alternatives. But, I think he’s 
there for people from the white communities. 
 
Ja, Tony Leon was there when the National Party was in power. What did he do to stop the 
National Party from oppressing black people? Nothing! So when I look at Tony Leon and I ask 
myself what is he going to do that he never did before…how is he going to create more jobs? He 
is an opportunist. 
 
I want to say that…he is said to be a custodian of white privilege…that’s the first thing. Then 
these things, more work, less crime…these are issues that are being raised by Civil Society and 
NGOs and we find that Tony Leon…the opportunist that he is…capitalizing on these 
things…create more jobs, less crime…50 000 police on the streets…these are the issues…he’s 
playing on the emotions of the people…these are issues that are contagious…you know that if 
there is massive unemployment the likelihood is that people will resort to crime. These things are 
so obvious…its just pure opportunism. What he is, is a custodian of white privilege…and he’s 
just going to stay like that. I was listening to the stats…if you look at the voting 
patterns…Rondebosch, Carlton, Constantia, Sea Point, Muizenberg, Camps Bay…they know that 
if they vote DA someone is going to fight to preserve their privileges. 
 
Their campaign was “Fight Back”. Fight what? What should we fight? 
 
The question that I ask myself is what if we were the same in terms of numbers, would the ANC 
be the ruling party? I think the reason the ANC is in power is because the majority of 
people…some of us are not aware of what is happening… they do not have a clue of what is 
happening in the country especially in rural areas and the townships…I was shocked…there was 
this guy on TV …inaudible…so they just vote ANC…they don’t actually know what is 
happening in the country. 
 
Why do you mention that in relation to the DA? 
 
Ja…I was thinking the ANC…okay…is in power and its got this high percentage of voters…I’m 
thinking this high percentage, is it because people are loyal or…I mean… maybe these other 
guys…maybe …they do not have that support, but they are able to come up with changes in the 
country you know. 
 
That thing about the DA…part of the problem of the DA…white people oppressed us for all 
these years and now I’m seeing a white man saying “Vote for me, I’m going to bring change”. I 
ask myself, does he think that I’m crazy…that he wants me to believe that he will bring more 
jobs. That is part of the baggage…the majority of South Africans are blacks and as long as that’s 











because white people voted for them…and they are still voting for them…they are privileged. 
Transformation is taking place in this country…because of that, the ANC is stepping on their 
toes. So I’m saying that all of these changes are not to the favour of those having privileges, 
unfortunately. 
 
White people who voted DA, those who did not want to vote ANC, will definitely vote DA so the 
DA is going to be there as a strong party…a opposition party. 
 
I was amazed to discover that there were whites who were in exile and joined the ranks of the 
ANC. 
 
I have misgivings about Tony Leon. He seems to be selling or projecting economic interests. I 
don’t know exactly whats his agenda. 
 
Okay, lets move on to the UDM. 
 
This is a problematic subject. The face of the UDM is General Bantu Holomisa,  who was a 
former Homeland Minister and therefore participated in the previous regime and has the 
experience of protecting a Homeland and now has somehow changed. He joined the ANC and 
when things did not go his way left and joined a former member of the National Party, Roelf 
Meyer. 
 
Look at the alliance, a man from a Homeland came to the ANC, left when things were not going 
his way and then is a bedfellow with one of the architects of apartheid, Roelf Meyer. I look at 
him and think of all those things and ask myself “What kind of man is this and can I trust my life 
with him?” The answer is “No!”, I just can’t do that. It doesn’t really matter what he says about 
10 years of unemployment. Again, he is using the same tactics as Tony Leon. He is using those 
issues…relevant issues…the issue of unemployment…we find that these opposition parties will 
all go for those issues…issues of corruption, the arms deal. People like him do not realize that 
there is a history that will always follow him. They carry a lot of baggage and I think that 
baggage is too much. 
 
I want to agree with this. This guy left the ANC…to me Holomisa is a snake…his own people 
are leaving him everyday…I would never think of voting for them. 
 
Actually, he’s days are numbered. If you look at the trends…he lost the last remaining 
municipality…I think in Umtata…2 or 3 weeks ago…they lost it. 
 
This guy…the place that he grew up in is a rural place you see…and now it’s a one-sided party 
this one…because he’s leading a rural place where he can lead those people… its also a very very 
poor place that one…he has done changes in that place and as a leader of that place the only thing 
he comes with are what the people are looking for…unemployment…that question of 
unemployment…its about the poorness of that place. 
 
Okay, the Independent Democrats. 
 
Ms De Lille, she suffered even more than a lot of people and is part of the mass democratic 
revolution…and part of the PAC…her history is impeccable but then I think she does…to 
me…show signs of opportunism. 
 
She always capitalizes on being vocal on issues…the whole AIDS debate…the issue of 
corruption…if you look at these opposition parties, they always raise these issues. These are 
issues that the ruling party is raising. I mean… these are issues that are discussed in portfolio 
committees and parliament almost every day. How do we make sure that we decolonise this issue 











issues…but the problem is that before you hear these issues being raised by the ruling party 
itself…there’s a rigorous debate in the ruling party today about all of these issues…the issue of 
corruption…I mean…the issue of AIDS…you see. The advantage of the ruling party is that you 
have a divergence of views. That is what is lacking in these smaller parties…then when they raise 
these issues, you see that but that its issues that’s here in the ruling party…that have been 
tabled…the issues of AIDS and corruption that she raises everyday. 
 
We’ve been promised this and that…houses…in the campaigns all these parties have been 
promising things…lets set an example with the present government. I don’t know how, but 
setting an example so that when the next government comes into power, it must respect the 
masses…because we the people on the ground are the ones that are suffering…I mean…even if 
this…like UDM can win…if given a chance…maybe, maybe, maybe they can bring changes 
faster. 
 
This Patricia De Lille, she decided to quit her own party to form another party…so from that 
point I see no reason to vote for her because she never even made right in her own party. 
 
On that issue of her leaving…part of her logic…the PAC…you hear complaints about the 
PAC…problems of leadership…Mr Pheko who is said to be one of the worst despots there ever 
was…I did speak to people in the PAC and some people are disgruntled…you hear these stories 
that the leadership is dying…I’m saying…that’s what pushed De Lille away. But look at the 
alliances in her party. They worry me. Some of the closest people in her 
leadership…inaudible…he was a member of the DA…sometime he might have joined the 
ANC…what worries me is that she works closely with such people. 
 
I think she has yet to find her footing. 
 
Ja, when I look at the ID…yes, the ID came in as an alternative to voters…to followers 
disappointed by the National Party…they at least see the ID as a shelter and those who don’t 
really support the DA, they will vote ID. When I look at the leader of the ID, Patricia De Lille, 
yes she is a strong woman and a very promising person but looking at the leadership in her party, 
its worrying. She can die tomorrow as an individual. I’m wishing the Lord might give her many 
many years.  She might make ordinary citizens view the country in another way…she’s a strong 
woman. 
 
To wrap up, thinking of campaigns, some people say that campaigns don’t matter because people 
make up their minds a long time before the elections, other people say that campaigns are very 
important because they give information. Do you think they are important or not important? 
 
I think they are important because people tend to forget and they need these things to remind 
them…besides the promises…I mean if you look at people read those things…these 
posters…television campaigns, the newspapers, that is why the campaigns cost millions of 
rands….I think it would be dangerous on the part of any party to just sit back, so the campaigns 
are valuable. 
 
If you look at some of the posters, “Don’t fight blacks”, this was how the ANC was saying with a 
little sarcasm, “fighting what? Is it fighting transformation? And preserve your privileges” These 
campaigns are saying there’s a better product. 
 
Yes, I think the campaigns are important. As my colleague said…like…people tend to forget 
easily. Not all people forget, but desperate people tend to forget very easily, people who are 
hungry, poor people. They are the ones who also are putting representatives there. 
Representatives of parties, when they campaign, they come up with empty promises you see. 
So…like…if there could be any way, perhaps the IEC could play that role because its playing a 











accountable and how to vote our MPs out as we voted them in. So, if we see they are not 
delivering according to our expectations, what can we do as ordinary citizens that voted, how can 
we take them out before their term comes to an end. So, I think if those kind of workshops can 
come to people at grassroots that we can bring a lot of changes and make political parties not 
make empty promises. If you promise something, you must deliver because I voted on that 
promise…but you cross the floor at the end of the day. 
 
The campaigns must be accompanied by consultation. If they consult, we can keep in 
touch…there should be meetings…there should be rallies. 
 
Campaigns are a wonderful thing…it tends to remind people and give them hope…that’s all I can 
say. 
 
Are there any comments on anything we’ve discussed before I close? 
 
I think…its opinion…it could be wise if there could be policies on the ways of 
campaigning…there mustn’t be any political parties that will campaign on issues that they won’t 
be able to fulfill and if you campaign about something and tell people you will be doing this and 
this and this, there must also be a time-frame for that…you know...whilst they are in that 
position…what are they doing…even if they don’t win, to be in a ruling party position…but as 
political party A, they promised within 5 years or a number of years, they will be doing this and 
this and this…people believe in action, that’s what they believe in. 
 
I don’t know whether the budgets are the same or what…one councilor is doing things for their 
people but another is not doing anything…no changes, nothing. If there  can be changes, it will 
be better. 
 
I agree with that…the issue of timeframes…what is different this year is the issue of timeframes. 
The premier of the Eastern Cape said that in a 100 days we want this done…this is what we want.  
They tell us …okay…in a  100 days the Minister of Public Works in the Western Cape will have 
done 1,2,3,4 and 5 in terms of public works programmes that are generated. We want to see 
change, and change that we can count…this week this has happened…if we can keep our 
government going in that direction. 
 
And the other issue is the issue of monitoring…we do have good policies and then when it comes 
to the issue of the implementation of these policies…yes, some of the issues are being 
implemented…we hear the Minister or DG saying “I delegated this person to do this and this in 
certain area” but who’s…like…doing continuous monitoring? So that what is supposed to be 
done is really happening. So, I think the culture of monitoring is what the government needs to 
emphasize or encourage in departments. These policies, are we implementing them and how are 
we monitoring them?                    
 
You know…just on that…I was shocked before the elections, when I learnt that the MEC for 
housing in the Eastern Cape at that time had records that 500 houses were built but half the 
houses were not done…were only at foundation level and I was asking myself, “Didn’t he have 
someone to walk there and see that it was not done?” 
 
And that guy that was interviewed on 3
rd
 Degree by Deborah Patta…the guy for 5 years or 7 
years, he was given a budget of more than 2.5 million…we must keep them accountable…the 
officials that we vote in…we must them these questions and raise these issues…it can’t be 
difficult to go see…if someone says I’m going to build 500 houses, I don’t think it will take 
much at the of the 6 months to go see, are these things happening on the ground. 
 
I think the reason is that these people who are there on top don’t respect the people…they don’t 











that they are representing the masses, they will deliver because they have the respect of the 
people and he knows where he comes from. 
 
I agree with everybody. It is not wise for people who we elected to office to sit in there offices 
from 8:00am to 4:00pm. They should go out to their constituencies and find out what it is they 
need…what it is they lack. Sometimes its difficult for us to reach their levels…to go to the 
Minister of Home Affairs…they won’t allow us to go to the man in charge…so they must come 
down to the constituencies and ask them “What is it that you need?” 
 
I would like to bring in an example of a classroom with students and a lecturer. If  you are a 
lecturer and you are lecturing students, first you give tasks to the students. They must take this 
course pack and go home and read 10 pages or 3 chapters, then by tomorrow they come back and 
review what is in these chapters and then you learn from them, are they really reading. Whatever 
kind of preparation you do as a facilitator or lecturer you will do it according to the students 
…that they are reading, that they are understanding, that they are on top of their work. They will 
make you prepare as a teacher…you know. The same applies to government institutions and 
citizens at grassroots level…and the role of Civil Society Organisations. If you look at our Civil 
Society Organisations from the late 90’s and 2000 and look at the role of Civil Society 
Organisations in the late 80’s… people now…they are no longer interested in political 
matters…you know…we can’t do away with politics. So what I’m saying is that we young 
people, we have a huge role to play…we have a huge role to make these people that are leading 
us…that they are supposed to do things in a certain way and they must hear our footsteps…that 
we are there…you see. 
 
And another thing, most people that I speak to…they say “ I’ve got my own car, I’ve got my own 
house, why do I need the party? I can go wherever I want, I’ve got my money, I can marry 
whoever I want” so… 
 





That’s why these young ones, they don’t care…they focus on work, studying and progressing in 
life. 
 
The typical example…you ask a person how they differentiate between the ruling party, 
parliament and the cabinet…what is the role…they will tell you different things…I’m talking 
about grown-ups who don’t really understand what the whole setup is…they just see this building 
and they think of government and when they think of government they think of the ruling party 
you see…I think institutions should open up a school of democracy. 
 
Thanks very much for your time guys.  
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
1994 -1999 – ANC Voters that changed to UDM in 2004 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
She is _______________ from Nambonga, she is staying  in the 83,she always make herself 
happy to she like to be happy when he is watching soccer,  
 
And this one is __________________, she goes to church, she like music,  
 












No so just assisting others,  
 
And the other said he is ____________________, he stays at no 52, but what I’m sure of, he likes 
music, especially choral music, I ask him which group he, he said Nkamboti, and he has recently 
come back from the choir, . 
 
Now this is _________________i, he stays in 147, and she does not like someone who lies, and 
someone who is not confident, he doesn’t like someone who is not confident, from what 
______________has said, that she did not want someone who is not confident and who would 
tell lies,  
 
I want all of us to be confident, and everything that we say to be true, some of the people 
I’m sure they never participated in the market research like this, in a group discussion, now 
we are here to discuss your views to, here we represent a different number of people here, 
everything that we say here, there is nothing wrong here, we just want your views truly and 
honestly, here everything is recorded, and we help this for someone to do analysis after and 
here we need to sign something of confidentiality so that none can go and disclose that 
someone has said that and someone has said that. To make this sure, that everything we say 
here is confidential, so that we wouldn’t go to, when we go home, go to the streets and 
discuss someone has said that and that and that, and here we are going to sign a 
confidentiality. Here you must take this, that and say, I as who and whom, I agree that I’m 
going to, I am here freely, I agree that everything that has been discussed here I am going to 
leave it here. Do we agree on those things? Then we need to sign here, your full name at the 
top, and your signature at the bottom. And you say I, your name. Does anyone want 
another paper? Then your full name at the top and a signature at the bottom. Thank you. 
What we are going to discuss about here, the first one is, in fact, I have different issues, but 
the first issue is that I’m speaking Xhosa and I want everyone to speak freely in that 
language that, but even if you use Xhosa, but sometimes you feel that you do not have a 
specific word for Xhosa, but you just speak freely. In this year 2004, on the 14
th
 of 
February, there were elections, and it was a very big event. But before there were elections, 
what were the discussions about the elections?  
 
People, people were bored the don’t see any improvement from the previous election, they don’t 
see any progress, there is nothing, no they, now they were not sure, some were saying I’m going, 
I’m not going, but ultimately they decided to go and vote. Those that decided to vote.  
 
Just before the election, what were they saying to you? How, you mean you didn’t discuss 
with anyone before the election? What were the discussions and talks before the elections?  
 
Some of the people were saying that there is nothing, that has been improved, from 1994, now we 
vote again, now because I’m not working, and I’m not going to school, some others decided to 
not and some others decided to go to vote.  
 
But what about you brother? 
 
But my friends were saying that they are not going to the elections, but I decided that I’m going 
to try and convince some of them, but it is important that they must go and vote and be sure 
which party they are going to vote, and then they decided to go and cast their vote.  
 
Like before the people were campaigning, the people were campaigning for their parties, but 
people were complaining saying that, because during the last campaigns, there were a lot that 
they put in the campaign, but there were no improvement from what they said from the election 
campaigns.  
 












What had happened, people are always crying, some of them are saying there is nothing that has 
been improved,  
 
Let me come back to this man who is on my left, here, brother were here to discuss and talk 
about the elections. Everything that we hear in this room, is the talk and, no I’m not going 




No I do not have any response, because the people whom I stay with they never spoke anything 
about election. 
 
Now I’m free now, because you are saying that the people whom you are staying with are 
not talking about elections. Okay, here in this room before all of us here, we voted the ANC, 
why? I voted in the elections, what is it that causes us to vote for the ANC?  
 
But, before there was a lot of frustrations from the people, and after the release of Mandela, then 
people decided to vote the ANC and support the ANC, because Mandela has stayed a lot, and he 
suffered a lot for the freedom. Now people decided to participate in election and voted for the 
ANC.  
 
Was it because of Mandela’s release?  
 
The only reason that it was so important on my side, our brothers and our sisters those who died 
during the liberation they are fighting for the ANC, the second point is, the one serious problem 
is we suffered a lot during the apartheid regime, and the ANC was the only organisation that was 
central and vocal, fighting for the liberation of our country.  
 
What about you? 
 
The reason that I decided to vote for the ANC, because even when were in school we were told 
that the only organisation that is fighting for people’s rights is, is the ANC. And the second the 
ANC, it has worked hard, and now at least now all people are equal and have rights, and they 
have shown some of the improvement, and that is the reason that I decided to vote for the ANC.  
 
And why did you voted the ANC? 
 
The reason why I voted for the ANC, firstly, we wanted the freedom. The reason that I voted 
ANC is my aunt died as a member of the ANC, and I was following her cause. The ANC is at 
home, I followed the cause of that aunt.  
 
And the other one said that the ANC wanted us to be equal.  
 
This issue of voting, I didn’t know, it was very exciting, and then I decided to vote for the ANC, 
then I just participated in such election. It was for the first time, me voting.  
 
But why did you participate and vote for the ANC?  
 
No, I just wanted to vote for the ANC.  
 
The way that we were suppressed by the apartheid regime, and they way that we see all the police 
vans, and our family members were being arrested and with no Dom Pass, or pass, and our 











apartheid government, and what happened, when that time arrived that we must vote for an 
organisation and then the ANC was the only option.  
 
You voted for the ANC? Is there anything that you want to add more? 
 
On my side I just wanted to add, the ANC, I voted for it, because it was not discriminating 
anyone, and then it didn’t say when I’m in power some of them are going to listen, it said that 
everyone is going to enjoy the fruits of election. Then I saw that this party, it was the only party 
that come from this point. 
 
But this year you have changed, why did you decided to vote for UDM for 2004?  
 
Like on my side, I voted the ANC on the past and they did what they could do, but I could see 
that the ANC could not finish what they promised. Then I decided to change hoping that this one 
was going to go straight to where the ANC failed.  
 
There are many parties that you could vote. There are many parties that campaigned for 
elections, but you have chosen the UDM, why?  
 
In 1994, I was working in Transkei, and then that time then Bantu General Holomisa was the 
leader of that country, and we were very free. So I voted in 1994 and then voted for the ANC, 
and Holomisa he was also a member of the ANC, and then in the due course how could, there 
were many things that I was not happy of, and then I decided to change and look for, because 
some of that things were promised were not achieved but now we we’re suppressed now.  
 
How difficult was it to access jobs?  
 
Like before, you could come to a company and know on the door and you could get a job, but 
now there are many processes, you have to go to a process of interviews, some of the people 
could not express themselves freely in the process of interviews. And for instance, someone 
could make a job or give a job, but he is impossible, for him to express freely in the interview. 
 
But also the houses that the government is doing to people, I cannot even describe. 
 
Why did you decided to chose the UDM from the ANC? 
 
But in Transkei, Holomisa we were free during his time of reign, and then I decided to vote for 
UDM.  
 
Did you join the UDM because you followed Holomisa?  
 
Yes, because some of the things that he did in Transkei and we were so happy at that time.  
 
On my side, in 2004, I voted for the UDM because, because there was that time that General 
Holomisa took over from Matanzima, everybody in Transkei was very happy, and there was a 
time when peoples could get, when they were underpaid they could get a lot of bonus, and it was 
through funding that Transkei was prospering at that time. So now I decided in 2004, no, what 
Holomisa was doing in the former Transkei, in that little Transkei he does have the capability to 
do such thing in this big South Africa, if he can be given a chance. That is why my X goes 
straight to next to Holomisa.  
 
Now I have to add on what she has just said, when I arrived here in Cape Town, in 1995, when I 
started to work, the scale of work go down, it was not the same as the one in Transkei, it goes 











someone who speak frank and freely, and he was discovered during his time in Umtata, a 
welcome was freely and now I say, and now I decided to vote for UDM, the General, he is frank.  
 
Do we all change because of this reasons?  
 
No, I think so because, one important thing is someone who is on the forefront must be someone 
who is confident, if it makes it difficult, he must be frank and confident and be able to pull a lot 
of support.  
 
on my side I think it is because of him as Holomisa. 
 
And to add more onto that, sometimes you look a person just as a person, and you look him on 
his face, when he is speaking and you can see the and you can see that he is having the confident, 
and you can see that when this person, he’ll have something, no he was a ruler in the former 
Transkei, and that is why I’m saying that he must be given a chance and he can be seen, and 
judging from the things that he did in the past.  
 
Now would be the last one on this? 
 
From what I know in the former Transkei, I never saw him with body guards, he was not as if he 




But now, this coming question, people are getting information about the political parties 
from different aspects, or from different sources, where did you get the political 
information about the UDM?  
No, I get the information about the UDM in Guguletu, it was a rally of UDM. I got the 
information from the rally in Guguletu.  
 
No, I get the information from this rally, these rallies. This information, the rallies, they explain 




But beside rallies, where else do you get information? 
Like on my side I get the information from the people that I am working with these people are the 
member of UDM, they were explaining what is the UDM, the UDM is like this and this and that, 
they showed me their aims, explaining the aims and objectives of the UDM, from work.  
 
On my side, sister, I got the information about the UDM from the TV, there was an incident, a 
very hot incident, an incident from Richmond in Natal, where Mr Nkapete was killed, it was a big 
debate, it was where I got the information and where Mr Holomisa, where he could do a speech 
and to that, sensitive speeches, then I can see this person, this guy is standing for what he is 
saying, he can speak clearly and frank about this party.  
 
In our communities, there are people from the UDM, now they can speak freely about the UDM, 
just freely on talks and not community meetings. And there was a time when then there was some 
time when the people of UDM could and General Holomisa could come down and address and 
you could see to this person that early in the morning and late in the evening, that this person Mr 
Holomisa is here comforting the family. And then that shows me that Holomisa really is 
responsible. 
 












When moving from the ANC then going to UDM, wasn’t there a time when you could think 
of another party before you went to the UDM?  
 
No, on my side without thinking the only person, okay the only person that I am in a relation with 
he is a member of, the ANC members are fighting with themselves there is no unity within the 
ANC. Now I’ve decided, if, since they are not united, since there is not unity within or between 
themselves, some of them are killing each other because now they are rushing for high position, 
at that time, I decided to join the UDM.  
 
On my side, I, before UDM, I thought of voting for DP, but when I was thinking of DP, now I’ll 
be downplaying all the effort that have been done, I would be going back now if I voted for 
Democratic Party. So I decided no, I even heard about something about DP on the TV, I could 
see Tony Leon is a bit of a racist, and then he was asked in the TV about why the ANC where the 
ANC could not see the coloured in the position, now Tony Leon is still in that believe of the old 
regime of apartheid. Now I could recall that this person is not, he is not supporting the unity now, 
before I decided to join the side of UDM.  
 
On my side, I just thought of voting for Azapo, now I wanted to enquire about this Azapo, but I 
could see that it was just a group who leans when they go to meetings they go into groups, no, I 
just wanted some time to join this group, now when in that group I saw someone taking a brick 
and waving it to someone, and saying I’m going to kill, and I’m saying, no, I’m not going to vote 
for this Azapo, now I have every hope of voting for Azapo goes down, and then it rises up,  but 
otherwise Azapo, I love it and I like it because they are people of Africa, then now I was just cold 
now about this brick thing, now I decided if someone wanted to kill some other Africans, there is 
no hope. No I just have thought about the UDM. 
 
Now, here I have some images from different political organisations, specifically when they 
are campaigning, you can pass it to one another. What is it that you look for from these 
images that convinced you to vote for or didn’t convince you when you look on this image 
on the ANC? What is it that makes you to convinced that? 
 
Like to me, when I’m going to town, I go on this corner, I go this corner, then I could see this 
image, this organisation has a lot of people, and you can see that this party has a lot of money. 




Now on my side, nothing good that I could see from these posters that I could see from the ANC.  
 
Nothing from this poster that I could see, I could just look at this poster and then nothing. It was 
not directed to me, but to someone else, from this image, the only thing that I could see there are 
a lot of promises and the promises that were from this image are not being put forward.  
 
There is nothing that I could see here on this poster, I just see, to me it is just meaningless, 
because on my side, I just voted for ANC once, and then 1999, I didn’t vote now I voted in 2004, 
but the ANC just disappointed me.  
 
Do you believe from suppression and now you want some position, and you can see that the ANC 
is doing what, is repeating what was being done by the apartheid National Party. 
 
To me this really showS it was nothing. 
 
On my side these images are all over, but they have no meaning. But they are just silent to me. 
But I decided a month before the election that no man, I know that I’m going to vote for a 












But now we are wasting time, what about you Dada?  
 
No, this image didn’t do anything to me, I didn’t even bother to look at the images, because I 
knew that I am going to vote for  
 
What about you sister? 
 
No, I could see this poster, I could see this poster, they were just posting it next to my house, but 
in just a minute, after they put the poster, a few minutes after that, some children could climb the 
pole and drop that poster down and you could play, and you could see that even the children 
could see that there is nothing would come out of the ANC.  
 
Now I’m going to with this image, this image that I’m giving you now, look there, nothing 
happened, this is Tony Leon.  
 




When you could see this image, you could feel that it opened the wounds of apartheid. You could 
see that, he, the Democratic Alliance want us to go back to the oppression of apartheid.  
 
Okay, now what about you? 
 
No, it is a repeat of what I was saying earlier, but about the Democratic Party, when I listened to 
that comment of Tony Leon in the TV, you could see that this person, really I could not waste my 
vote and vote for the Democratic Party, cause they want us to go back  
 
On my side, when I see now when I look at the Democratic Alliance, you could see, now since he 
was staying in the shack, you could see that now the DA could chase us and ask us for pass.  
 
In general, does the party depend mostly on the leader?  
 
Yes, it depend mostly on the leader. Because the leader is mostly the one who is influential and 
no one could go without a head.  
 
No, let’s talk about you, you people who are involved, do you look at the organisation itself, 
or the leader?  
 
No, we look also from what they do, exactly what they do, and the leader himself.  
 
I do have another image, you can pass it through to other people. Nothing said to us about 




Why don’t you want to look, just on the reason, why? 
 
The reason, the problem with this IFP, they are in Kwa Zulu Natal, the IFP wanted to form a co-
illition, the IFP rejected the coalition with the ANC, then they wanted to form a coalition with, 
then they joined with the Democratic Party, and then I could see then, no, that this party is not 












On my side I could say without the political leader the Zulu National itself could not mix to the 
Xhosa. I don’t know from what side that came from, if you are Xhosa and you go to Gauteng, 
they look as if you are someone who is, who is a skelm, or who is a crook, there is nothing to 
come out good from a Xhosa person, when what about you as a Xhosa person, when you get 
under the Zulu’s?  
 
Here, the problem here is Gaja, he was working with a Batete, before 94, he had some police 
protection, this police people, they were fighting against the UDF, they didn’t want to see the 
members of the United Democratic Front, his police guards, Gaja’s police guards, were working 
with the apartheid regime, and I could see that this person was not really, he is the same as Tony 
Leon, no, I don’t like this guy, because when you look at his nation, he like is a nation, the Zulu 
nation, he would not accept anything that will tamper with that King of the Zulu peoples, he likes 
the Zulu people, the culture, the tradition of the Zulu, he did not want anything that would 
destroy the Zulu nation, and the nationality,  
 
But why you didn’t vote for IFP? 
 
No the reason is one, he likes only the Zulu’s, he is not interested about everyone in South 
Africa,  
 
What about your vote?  
 
The reason that I didn’t vote for the IFP, on my area I never saw anything like this, because I 
could not vote for anything that I didn’t see in my area.  
 
Here in Kwa Zulu Natal, something that happened in the past, now what happened in the past, 
they look at your hand when you when they saw that your finger was cut through, your culture, 
now they will kill you because of your culture, because of your cultural, then I decided not to 
vote for IFP, because they are for the Zulu, and that what they did as a Zulu people to the 
Xhosa’s.  
 
Now here is an ID, independent Democrat, why, what is it that fed you to vote for the 
Independent Democrats?  
 
The only thing is she is really opportunistic, because, firstly she was in the PAC, she was 
speaking a lot and then she just, and then she go to the top structures of the PAC, then she 
decided, and then she just decided to cross the floor, and then you could see, that the only thing 
that she want is to gain from the politics, financially. And the second problem then they criticise 
a lot, and she criticise and provides no solution to the problems. She cannot express what must be 
done, or say what must be done  
 
Now I’m asking to other people?  
 
On my side, I didn’t hear anything, her campaigning, I don’t want to lie, really, I never saw this 
lady in Guguletu.  
 
I saw only mostly Costadine, here in parliament, you could wonder where this person get hold of 
their information. And she is always involved in this political gossip in parliament, but you could 
really you could see that when she always uses this gossip to put her on the top.  
 
I never saw her to addressing problems, in our areas,  
 
What other reasons that..? 
 












Why does she not like to put unity to the PAC?  
 
You always look to opportunity, and really she is not reliable.  
 
And what about you? 
 
No, I have seen her a little, from the ID,  
 
On my side when I analyse, when you analyse the Independent Democrats, you could see, for me, 
you could see that this person would not be will not be willing to listen to other people’s views, 
because she would be independent, she would not appreciate the support, now you could see even 
from what she did in the PAC, she spoke a lot from within the PAC, and she was mobilising 
within the PAC, then she decided to move out.  
 
You know, on your side, what happened, why you didn’t vote for her,  
 
No, on my side, I never saw this lady.  
 
We vote organisation only, because we saw them.  
 
Is it important for a leader to be seen in our communities?  
Yes, it is very important, because you are a leader and because they are people, and you must 
work with them.  
 
Don’t come only when it is time for election, and then you come. You must always be part and 
parcel of people’s actions.  
 
Let us concentrate on the last image of the NNP? What the NNP feeled, or why you didn’t 
vote for NNP?  
 
What is it, De Klerk?  
 
On my side, the reason why I didn’t vote for NNP is, the NNP wants, I was a casual in Sea Point, 
in a hotel in Sea Point, when I was going to Sea Point, I saw the poster of the NNP, saying…. 
When I analysed the poster of the NNP, I could see that this poster of the NNP is racist, the 
majority of the people in the NNP are the white people, and the majority of them did not care 
much about other on the feeling of the non-white people. Now this party wanted to fulfil the 
interests of the white people. Now when I see this poster, I decided no, the problem on my side 
was he said he was going to, there was a rally in Phillippi, but the first time he wanted he said he 
first go to Lentegeur, on the rally in Lentegeur. But his speech, really was not convincing, and 
then he was always on the side of the white people. But no, I did not mind about that, but he 
didn’t go to Phillippi at all, and then he really disappointed me and I said, no, no this leader is not 
going to stand on his ideas.  
 
 
Why you didn’t vote for ? 
 
No, I decided no, there is no way I can go back to Pharaoh, never saw any change.  
 
What about this (in-audible)?  
 
No, this is just a word, no, it is just a word change otherwise nothing change in content of 












Okay, and the other thing that said I must not vote for the NNP, you could go to these rallies, 
now when he address the people in the rally in Khayelitsha, he addressed the people the African 
people in Khayelitsha with Afrikaans, and really, you could see this person really, he is not. And 
he knew exactly the African people are not conversant of Afrikaans, but he was convinced that he 
must address them with the Afrikaans. Then this person was not good, then he turned me off.  
 
When they put these boards on the poles, it is part and parcel of campaign, it is part and 
parcel of identifying and showing themselves, now I want you to tell me which other way of, 
there are many ways of selling, what is it here in the UDM that interested you most from 
their deal?  
 
On my side, the only thing that I was very interested in from the UDM, is when Holomisa go, 
will Holomisa go to the rallies that the majority of people there who go to that rally would speak 
are Xhosa, that he would speak Xhosa and when he goes to any rally of people that speak 
English, and then he would speak English. And because people cannot understand much of the 
language, much of they do not understand the language, what is important is that people could get 
the sense of what he was saying exactly on your true language.  
 
What else interested you in the UDM when they first campaigned? 
 
On my side, when they campaigned the campaigned was very late on my side, because you could 
see when there was problem, Holomisa he would arrived at exactly the scene of the problem and 
to comfort the people.  
 
What interested me in the UDM, is when my home girl died, in Nyanga, who was very caring, 
the UDM was very caring, and I just decided when the times of casting a vote, now I’m going to 
vote for UDM.  
 
What is it that interested you? 
 
Holomisa could see that the UDM has gained a lot of membership, and then I was following the 
numbers, because they could see the work, the work that he did, and because he worked very 
hard in the… 
 
And when we speak of the UDM, who do we see?  
 
No, we see Holomisa when you talk of the UDM.  
 
What about other people that are sub structures of what he does?  
 
It is not that we don’t see other leaders within the UDM, but the only person that we see is the 
General only.  
 
And when he speak Xhosa, he speaks Xhosa, not mixed, but then he is honest, but the ANC, is 
not honest, and you could see that really. 
Holomisa is honest.  
 
On my side, there is nothing that can change me to another party. UDM is the only answer.  
 
If there is something that makes me unhappy, I can participate, I can participate in on the 
leadership of the UDM and influence, so that we can unify and get to make the organisation more 
viable.  
 
Because of course, we run away from the ANC, then we join the UDM, but we have to stick to 












Here in the UDM, as members of the UDM, is there anyway when you can sit and discuss? 
 
No, there are channels that you must follow, also in the UDM, you go in a specific channel and 
you go, if you see you are from this level, this first level, you are not happy on the grass roots 
level, then the original level and then you go to provincial level and from provincial you go to 
national. And then you can see from that side. No, we are summarising.  
 
Now my question is some of the people say that campaign is not really important, because 
people have already made up their mind before the election?  But others say the campaigns 
are very important, because voters have to choose who to vote for? What about you?  
 
Campaigns are very important or not?  
 




Because, since they are campaigning, now they strengthen your ideas and then they strengthen 
and make sure of your voting and emphasize their elections.  
 
On the side campaigns are solidifying your views, and your thoughts about voting for that party.  
 
On my side, when you campaign, other people do not know about any party, and like ID, they 
don’t know about Independent Democracy, now when you campaign, some of the people didn’t 
even never participated in any elections, now the campaign will help  
 
Now, on my side, campaigns are very important,  
 
Is it important, campaigns are very important for the leader contesting the election or the 
voters? 
 
No, campaigns are very important, it is important for the leader and it is important for the 
elections that they can pull a lot of support from the voters,  
 
Some of the people are not politically aware and some of the them are aware, campaigns 
are very important for those that are not aware, but if someone is politically aware, then 
elections are not important? 
 
Now if I know politics, I read newspapers and watch TV, if I know what is going to happen, now 
for someone who is not politically aware, the campaigns are very important.  
 
What about you? 
 
On my side, I can say the campaigns is very important because they solidify and strengthen the 
fact that I am in UDM. Now I do have every right to in and listen to anyone like ANC so that I 
become clear about what is happening, whether to show that I am staying in the right or going in 
the right direction. The campaigns are very important.  
 
What about you brother?  
 
Well on my side and my views, it is very important, sometime we see, we see a leader and then 
you cannot see only the party, you must also get the leaders of the party to come it is very 
important for the leader of the party to come to the people just like this one.  











important for them to come to our area  
 
And now, what reason some say that campaigns are not important, and some say that 
campaigns are important? 
 
Now you know the KTC in Guguletu, before the elections, before the elections, you could see 
Mantu Shabalala going to our hospitals, coming to campaign, what is it that she was doing when 
people were crying, there is no need for any elections.  
 
Now you contradict yourself.  
 
No, I said for special campaigns, for those who do not know about politics, but for me, I’m 
politically aware, I know, I know these people, the campaigns are important, to the one that is 
being campaigned.  
 
For the one who is going to vote, and now they’re in-between, there are those that are not sure, 
the one who campaigned a lot is the one who would at least get a lot of people, during the 
campaign, therefore campaigns are important,  
 
So on my side, campaigns are really important, as the campaigns is important only to also to 
those who campaign, and those who are going to vote.  
 
As a prospective voter, is it important to be campaigned?  
 
Not as important as you see this person, not only do you go and vote, we only see this person on 
the ballot paper. It is important that you see this person during the process of campaigning, some 
of the people are not so, they are in between, so the process of campaigning, the leader who is 
going to get a lot of people specifically those who are not who are not sure, campaigns are really 
important. No I’m finishing now.  
 
From what we’ve discussed, lets, if a person is, if a person can be given a chance to head a 
political party, what is it that we can do to improve, let me put it in this way, what can you 
do in order to be a real leader?  
 
No, go to the people, stay with them, ask them, talk to them,  
 
Where are you going to get them? 
 
Lets be open what must I do really, you go to the street, the street canvassing, or the board, or the 
leader in the rural areas and you ask them that you wanted to see the people and that you wanted 
to talk to them. And you sit with them, and you discuss maybe, with the comet of that area, it 
must give you that particular date and you ask them, and you don’t tell them, what you want, that 
you need this and that and that and ask from them, what is it that you want? And you must know 
your people, and you must go down, really, you must be a good listener, and you must listen from 
exactly from what the people are saying, advise them, and then encourage them, you must advise 
them, then you can be a good leader from there.  
 
What about your brother? 
 
On my side,  
 
No, I’m just going to add. 
 
Your first line is to enquire and do research what is it that the people need. And you know, do 











grant project where we are going to each and every household and see them and ask them 
whether they do receive the grant, or not, and we are assisting them with the application forms. 
This is another way of assisting people.  
 
Now I’m going to repeat this, the committee and the sub committee’s and then there’s where you 
go to the people because a door to door campaign is really expensive and too much.  
 
From all of you three people who have just spoken, you say you must go to the people, what 
else?  
 
No, you must tell them, you must tell them why that particular thing could not be done in that 
particular way this one is going to be done in this way or that way. And don’t show them think 
that you are big or big headed, and at the end of the day you don’t follow your promises. They 
are approachable also.  
 
What about you? What is important ? 
 
I’m going to repeat, when you first introduce yourself to the people, and then tell them these 
things are going to happen, and you must show them these things are going to happen if you 
















The content analysis data-set had two levels of analysis: articles and statements. An 
article was defined as an independent graphical unit with separate headlines. On 
television and radio every new story was considered a new unit. One article could have 
numerous statements. A ‘statement’ was defined by Media Tenor as a unit of analysis 
that contains a subject, an issue, a rating, and a source.  
 
The main SABC news broadcasts (Afrikaans news, English news, Nguni News, Sotho 
news) as well as e-tv news were included in the data-set.  Newspapers included were: 
The Star, Beeld, Sowetan, Mail & Guardian, Pretoria News, Business Day, Citizen, Cape 
Argus, Cape Times, Die Burger, Independent on Saturday, This Day, Natal Witness, 
Daily News, Isolezwe,  Ilanga, The Mercury, The Sunday Times, Rapport, Sunday 
World, Sunday Independent, City Press, Finance Week, Financial Mail, Daily Sun, 
Sunday Sun, Sake, Sake Rapport and Business Report. Radio news from Jacaranda, 
Radio Sonder Grense, SA FM, East Coast Radio, Ukhozi, Motsweding, Thobela, Radio 
702 and Metro FM were collected by the Centre for Social Sciences Research (CSSR) 
and were also coded and captured into the data-set. 
 
In print media, all articles in the political, news, editorial, opinion as well as the business 
section were included in the data-set. Excluded were letters to the editor, ‘advertorials’ 
and other sections of the newspaper clearly indicated as of non-editorial content. On TV, 
all news reports were coded including sport and weather but excluding the re-broadcast 
of ‘highlights’ after advertisement breaks.  
 
Each article/report and statement was coded and captured into a data-set using the 
following coding categories developed by Media Tenor:  
 
1. Name of publication/medium, e.g. The Star, Beeld, SABC 1; 
2. Date when publication was printed;  
3. The month where it was reported on; 
4. The week when the articles appeared.  
                                               











5. The page number of the article; 
6. The article number on the page, from top left to right to bottom; 
7. The section where the article was found, such as news front, news, business, 
business front and others; 
8. The type of article/report (op-ed,interview, etc); 
9. The origin or the article/report e.g. an agency report or from the journalist of the 
medium; 
10. Main individual issue. The main issue is the individual issue that receives the 
greatest coverage in the article (number of lines); 
11. Area of focus. This could be national (South Africa) or provincial (Western Cape) 
or local (Cape Town) or even international; 
12. Main individual protagonist. The main protagonist is either a person or an 
organisation or an entity that the article/reports focus on the most; 
13. The explicit rating of the article, according to majority statements; 
14. The implicit rating of the article, according to majority statements;  
15. The overall rating, combining explicit and implicit at equal weight; 
16. Group of media, e.g. dailies, weeklies, provincial, radio, television etc; 
17. Areas of coverage grouped according to provinces; 
18. The individual newsmaker on a statement level; 
19. the individual source making the statement; 
20. Topic i.e. the individual issue of the statement; 
21. Whether the topic was a policy or non-policy issue. 
 
Media Tenor argued that the bias or tendency contained in the presentation by a 
journalist, protagonist or his partners as well as independent sources can be expressed: 
 explicitly, by using terms of clearly positive or negative judgement (for instance 
‘good’, ‘promising’, ‘ominous’, ‘disappointing’.), or 
 implicitly, if the presented content is embedded in a positive or negative context.  
 
They therefore use a combination of two separate ratings i.e. explicit and implicit which 
is then combined to establish the overall ‘rating’ of a subject or issue. 
 
Explicit Positive Rather positive  ambivalent rather negative negative neutral 
Implicit Positive Rather positive  ambivalent rather negative negative neutral 











Appendix 8: Coding Frame for Recode of Media Tenor Issues 
 
 
ORIGINAL CODE NEW CODE 
1 =    Ethical values 15 = Other 
2 =    Democracy/state 3 = Democracy, Human Rights and Governance 
3 =    Justice in general 3 = Democracy, Human Rights and Governance 
4 =    Human Rights 3 = Democracy, Human Rights and Governance 
5 =    Responsibility of individual 15 = Other 
6 =    Political/civic culture 3 = Democracy, Human Rights and Governance 
7 =    Economy and welfare 6 = Economy 
8 =    Domestic and external security = 
other 
15 = Other 
9 =    Anti-American ideology = other 15 = Other 
10 =  Coalitions and co-operations 4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to 
govern 
11 =  Political parties: 
Tendency/Competence 
4 =  Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to 
govern 
12 =  Political parties: Internal affairs 4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to 
govern 
13 =  Elections, voting 1 = Elections and Voting 
14 =  European Union  15 =  Other 
15 =  Suitability to govern 4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to 
govern 
16 =    Parliamentary work 4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to 
govern 
17 =    Public appearance 2 = Public Appearance 
18 =    Politicians: Relations to party 4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to 
govern 
19 =    Politicians: Leadership qualities 4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to 
govern 
20 =    Politicians: Personal characteristics 4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to 
govern 
21 =    Party politics other 4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to 
govern 
22 =    Domestic security 15 = Other 
23 =    Politically motivated crime 5 = Crime 
24 =    Non political crime 5 = Crime 
25 =    Official: Position within 
organisation 
4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to 
govern 
26 =    Official: Leadership qualities 4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to 
govern 
27 =    Official: Personal characteristics 4 = Parties & Politicians: Competence, suitability to 
govern 
28 =    Constitution 3 = Democracy, Human Rights and Governance 
29 =    Justice system 3 = Democracy, Human Rights and Governance 
30 =    Minorities, immigration 15 = Other 
31 =    Black Economic Empowerment 6 = Economy 
32 =    Elections 1 = Elections and Voting 
33 =    Domestic politics 15 = Other 
34 =    Foreign policy 15 = Other 











36 =    Developmental aid 15 = Other 
37 =    International politics 15 = Other 
38 =    Warfare 15 = Other 
39 =    America's position in world 15 = Other 
40 =    International trade 15 = Other 
41 =    Public budget, debt 6 = Economy 
42 =    Revenue, tax policy 6 = Economy 
43 =    Economic policy 6 = Economy 
44 =    Mining 15 = Other 
45 =    Employment policy 7 = Unemployment 
46 =    Agriculture 13 = Agriculture 
47 =    Economic situation 6 = Economy 
48 =   Labour costs 15 = Other 
49 =    Situation within global economy 6 = Economy 
50 =    Competitiveness 6 = Economy 
51 =    Situation of companies overall 6 = Economy 
52 =    Business climate 6 = Economy 
53 =    Consumer protection 6 = Economy 
54 =    Market position 6 = Economy 
55 =    Regulations 6 = Economy 
56 =    Procurement of capital 6 = Economy 
57 =    Mergers, co-operations 6 = Economy 
58 =    Executives, management 6 = Economy 
59 =    Personality of management 6 = Economy 
60 =    Personnel 15 = Other 
61 =    Research and development 15 = Other 
62 =    Production process, productivity 6 = Economy 
63 =    Products, marketing 6 = Economy 
64 =    Public appearance company 15 = Other 
65 =    Image 15 = Other 
66 =    IT 15 = Other 
67 =    History 15 = Other 
68 =    Strikes 15 = Other 
69 =    Business associations, appearance 15 = Other 
70 =    Trade unions 15 = Other 
71 =    Economy other 6 = Economy 
72 =    Media, media policy 15 = Other 
73 =    NGO's 15 = Other 
74 =    Welfare/Social policy 14 = Welfare and Social Policy 
75 =    Social services 14 = Welfare and Social Policy 
76 =    Pension policies 14 = Welfare and Social Policy 
77 =    Health system 8 = Health 
78 =    Aids: causes 9 = HIV and AIDS 
79 =    Aids: prevention 9 = HIV and AIDS 
80 =    Aids: treatment 9 = HIV and AIDS 
81 =    Aids: opportunistic infections 9 = HIV and AIDS 
82 =    Aids: social/political effects 9 = HIV and AIDS 
83 =    Aids: economic effects 9 = HIV and AIDS 
84 =    Aids: other issues 9 = HIV and AIDS 
85 =    Females/family/homosexuality 15 = Other 
86 =    Education 10 = Education 
87 =    Culture 15 = Other 











89 =    Social policies 14 = Welfare and Social Policy 
90 =    Religion 15 = Other 
91 =    Environment 15 = Other 
92 =    Energy 15 = Other 
93 =    Transport 12 = Transport 
94 =  Technology, research, science 15 = Other 
95 =  Germany 15 = Other 
96 =  Soccer 15 = Other 
99 =  Rugby 15 = Other 
114 =  Athletics 15 = Other 
116 = Tennis 15 = Other 
118 =  Golf 15 = Other 
119 =  Water sports 15 = Other 
121 =  Sport in general 15 = Other 
125 =  Sport, other 15 = Other 
126 =  Public opinions 15 = Other 
127 =  Accidents 15 = Other 
















The monitoring was conducted by first language speakers who underwent training from MMP. 
The monitoring was sent to the MMP office on a daily basis, where it was checked and then 
captured into MMP’s specially designed election database. In total, 6080 items were monitored 
from 24 March 2004 up to and including 24 April 2004.  
 
For television, the headline news bulletins were monitored on SABC1, 2, 3 and on e-tv, as well 
as at least one current affairs programme per day. For radio, two bulletins were monitored each 
day, one in the morning and one in the late afternoon, as well as at least one current affairs 
programme per day. The monitoring times varied from station to station. The following media 
were monitored:  
 
Media Monitored  by MMP 
Beeld  Radio Grahamstown  
Bush Radio  Radio Pretoria  
Business Day  Radio Teemaneng Stereo  
Cape Times  RSG  
Citizen  SABC 1  
City Press  SABC 2  
Daily News  SABC 3  
Daily Sun  SAFM  
Die Burger  Saturday Star  
EP Herald  Sunday Independent  
e-tv  Sowetan  
Ilanga  Sowetan Sunday World  
Independent on Saturday & Sunday Tribune  Sunday Sun  
Isolezwe  Sunday Times  
Kaya FM  The Star  
Mail & Guardian  This Day  
Motsweding FM  Ukhozi FM  
Naweek Beeld & Rapport  Umhlobo Wenene FM  
OFM  Weekend Argus  
Radio 702  Weekend Post  
Radio Algoa  Y-FM  
 
Bias was understood as “a result of the language utilised, the deliberate omission of a counter 
view to that initially put forward, and/or the overall presentation of the item in the context of the 
newspaper or broadcast media news bulletin”.  
                                               
















I used SAARF AMPS® which is the SAARF All Media and Products Survey. It is a 
single source survey, i.e. information on media usage, product consumption and 
demographics are collected from the same respondent. It is an in-home face to face 
personal interview. The SAARF AMPS® sample is 12 500 adults (16 years and older) 
and the survey was conducted from end January to beginning June. The SAARF AMPS® 
sample was designed by using multi-stage area stratified systematic sampling, pre-
stratified by population group (Coloured, Indians and whites form one stratum and black 
another), province, community size, gender and age.  
I also used the SAARF Radio Audience Measurement Survey (SAARF RAMS®) which 
uses the same respondents used for SAARF AMPS®. The SAARF RAMS® Diary is left 
with the respondent at the end of the SAARF AMPS® interview and collected a week 
later. Respondents are expected to record, for every station listened to, quarter hour by 
quarter hour, for seven consecutive days, their listening. Respondents are also requested 
to, at the end of the reporting period, to indicate the three most preferred stations (in 
order of preference). A new procedure called ‘flooding’ was introduced in 2004, where 
all household members, in addition to the one selected for SAARF AMPS are requested 
to keep a SAARF RAMS® Diary, this doubled the(SAARF RAMS®) sample. 
Additionally, I used the television viewing information provided by SAARF AMPS®, 
the SAARF TAMS Panel provides television viewing information, minute by minute, 
using so-called ‘peoplemeters’. It is semi-automatic electronic equipment that is 
connected to households’ television equipment. It records television set events 
automatically, while viewer are logging in and out by using a remote control unit. 
                                               
















With regard to radio, Nielsen Media Research receives all radio data electronically from 
the respective media owners. The received data consists of the following: flighting code, 
date of Ad, start and end time, duration of ad, standard rate card rates, agency code and 
name, manufacturer code and name, product code and name.  
 
This data are loaded onto their system and run through a coding file to obtain the radio 
advertising figures. Similarly Nielsen Media Research receives television log sheets with 
the following information: flighting code, start and end time, duration of ad, brand 
description and standard rate card rates. This data are loaded onto their system and run 
through a coding file to obtain television advertising figures. Print figures are calculated 
by AC Nielsen based on the size of the advertisement and the cost of advertising space 
charged by the publication. They include daily newspapers, weekly newspapers, 
community newspapers (country and free sheets), consumer Magazines, trade magazines 
and business and technical magazines. Direct mail includes the distribution of addressed 
and un-addressed mail or samples directly to the home. Direct mail advertising figures 
are based on data provided by the media owners. Outdoor advertising figures advertising 
figures are based on the standard rate card cost supplied by the outdoor company and 
includes billboards, walls and murals, sports stadium /promotional, on premise/store 
signage, commuter promotions, transit media (trains, taxis, etc), electronic and 
retail/street furniture.   
 
                                               











Appendix 12: Nielsen Media Advertising Expenditure Figures 
 
Table 49: ANC Outdoor Media Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-Apr 04 
 BILLBOARDS 3,264,098 3,553,534 2,476,642 228,832 9,523,106 
 COMMUTER PROMOTION 0 59,540 0 0 59,540 
 MOVING MEDIA 1,003,250 1,042,250 482,600 206,560 2,734,660 
 RETAIL 0 0 41,291 0 41,291 
Total 4,267,348 4,655,324 3,000,533 435,392 12,358,597 
 
Table 50: ANC Radio Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-Apr 04 
ALPHA FM 0 0 6,014 3,195 9,209 
ALX FM 0 0 13,096 6,962 20,058 
TLANTIS FM 0 0 5,264 2,792 8,056 
BOTLOKWA FM 0 0 6,756 3,593 10,349 
BUSH FM 0 0 11,944 6,332 18,276 
GRAHAMSTOWN FM 0 0 5,631 3,001 8,632 
KHANYA FM 0 0 5,631 3,001 8,632 
LETHLABILE FM 0 0 6,431 3,441 9,872 
MAFISA FM 0 0 8,301 4,451 12,752 
MARITZBURG FM 0 0 14,271 7,585 21,856 
MOHODI FM 0 0 6,756 3,593 10,349 
MOSUPATSELA FM 0 0 6,395 3,399 9,794 
RADIO MAPUT 0 0 6,756 3,593 10,349 
RADIO MORETELE 0 0 7,490 4,012 11,502 
RADIO VALLEY 0 0 0 2,080 2,080 
SETSOTO FM 0 0 5,905 3,139 9,044 
SOSHANGUVE FM 0 0 7,705 4,095 11,800 
TAKALANI FM 0 0 5,631 3,001 8,632 
TYGERBERG FM 0 0 0 5,530 5,530 
UNITRA FM 0 0 5,230 3,001 8,231 
VAALTAR FM 0 0 6,431 3,441 9,872 
VCR STEREO 0 0 3,522 4,854 8,376 
VUKANI FM 0 0 5,631 3,001 8,632 
ZIBONELE FM 0 0 11,707 6,274 17,981 
P4 CAPE FM 0 0 3,796 3,411 7,207 
P4 KZN FM 0 0 26,823 315 27,138 
CAPE TALK 0 0 67,384 54,512 121,896 
RADIO 702 0 0 100,758 86,614 187,372 
EAST COAST RADIO 0 0 92,280 98,220 190,500 
KAYA FM 0 41,900 296,465 129,535 467,900 
KFM 94 5 0 67,035 476,475 269,250 812,760 
CISKEI 0 5,103 32,172 12,354 49,629 
GOOD HOPE FM 0 0 0 103,734 103,734 
IKWEKWEZI FM 0 15,030 85,320 33,345 133,695 
LESEDI FM 0 68,316 396,170 151,752 616,238 
LIGWALAGWALA FM 0 15,678 94,188 36,675 146,541 











METRO FM 0 97,923 581,756 269,074 948,753 
MOTSWEDING FM 5,520 42,645 249,254 97,397 394,816 
MUNGHANA LONENE FM 0 17,254 103,706 44,475 165,435 
PHALAPHALA FM 0 10,187 61,417 28,353 99,957 
SAFM 0 0 70,662 57,252 127,914 
THOBELA FM 0 46,296 258,778 97,923 402,997 
UKHOZI FM 0 104,511 665,831 308,649 1,078,991 
UMHLOBO WENENE FM 0 70,302 392,510 219,959 682,771 
Total  5,520 621,953 4,350,949 2,310,418 7,288,840 
 
Table 51: ANC Advertising Expenditure, Print Media (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 
Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 
Jan-April 
2004 
BEELD (MON-FRI) 54,665 0 54,665 245,533 354,863 
BURGER (MON-FRI) 48,235 0 96,470 195,008 339,713 
BURGER (EASTERN CAPE) 14,933 0 29,866 67,789 112,588 
CAPE ARGUS 39,015 0 39,015 195,075 273,105 
CITY PRESS 78,840 0 78,840 191,160 348,840 
DAILY DISPATCH 29,845 4,504 22,981 48,128 105,458 
DAILY NEWS 33,394 0 74,307 160,038 267,739 
DAILY SUN 35,798 0 51,826 84,835 172,459 
D.F. ADVERTISER 16,351 2,212 37,722 38,825 95,110 
EASTERN PROVINCE 




0 0 7,541 0 7,541 
ILANGA 27,135 0 54,270 73,537 154,942 
ISOLEZWE 12,536 0 25,072 25,072 62,680 
MAIL & GUARDIAN 21,840 0 43,680 0 65,520 
MERCURY 28,166 0 56,854 73,234 158,254 
NATAL WITNESS  8,013 0 0 17,258 25,271 
POST 0 0 14,054 25,852 39,906 
RAPPORT 137,160 0 274,320 346,680 758,160 
SATURDAY DISPATCH 0 0 2,203 0 2,203 
SATURDAY WEEKEND 
ARGUS 41,753 0 83,506 66,803 
192,062 
SOUTH COAST HERALD 0 1,413 0 12,715 14,128 
SOWETAN 33,033 0 78,239 176,455 287,727 
STAR 68,278 0 136,556 341,383 546,217 
SUNDAY SUN 15,288 0 30,576 37,401 83,265 
SUNDAY TIMES 178,200 23,715 457,584 488,076 1,147,575 
SUNDAY TRIBUNE 50,593 0 101,186 148,591 300,370 
SUNDAY TRIBUNE HERALD 0 0 0 94,254 94,254 
SUNDAY WORLD 23,751 0 47,502 47,502 118,755 
THIS DAY 43,200 0 86,400 178,200 307,800 
VOLKSBLAD 20,878 0 41,756 51,337 113,971 
WEEKEND POST 23,544 0 47,088 66,393 137,025 
OTHER* 410,207 5,946 126,056 509,129 1,051,338 
TOTAL 1515554 37790 2241941 4069437 7,864,722 
*Other includes most community newspapers  
 












 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-Apr 04 
Direct Mail-UNADDRESSED 7,589 0 41,262 23,371 72,222 
 Outdoor-BILLBOARDS 0 137,350 62,350 0 199,700 
 TOTAL 7,589 137,350 103,612 23,371 271,922 
 
 
Table 53: DA Radio Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-Apr 04 
CCFM 0 0 0 9,707 9,707 
EAST RAND FM 0 0 0 6,377 6,377 
GOODNEWS FM 0 0 0 5,295 5,295 
HIGHWAY FM 0 0 0 10,276 10,276 
NAMAKWALAND FM 0 0 0 4,005 4,005 
RADIO KABOESNA 0 0 0 4,088 4,088 
RIVERSIDE FM 0 0 0 4,683 4,683 
TEEMANENG FM 0 0 0 4,045 4,045 
TYGERBERG FM 0 0 0 10,221 10,221 
WEST RAND STEREO 0 0 0 4,129 4,129 
P4 CAPE FM 0 0 4,992 7,716 12,708 
CAPE TALK 0 0 168,922 56,655 225,577 
HIGHVELD 94 7 0 184,432 321,975 124,730 631,137 
RADIO 702 0 76,254 127,110 51,581 254,945 
EAST COAST RADIO 0 142,800 270,528 126,432 539,760 
JACARANDA 94 2FM 0 330,750 486,744 281,235 1,098,729 
KAYA FM 0 75,900 0 0 75,900 
KFM 94 5 0 125,700 300,258 161,415 587,373 
5FM 0 94,500 110,430 67,422 272,352 
GOOD HOPE FM 0 103,638 212,196 141,696 457,530 
IKWEKWEZI FM 0 21,114 37,140 17,153 75,407 
LESEDI FM 0 137,824 147,517 93,051 378,392 
LIGWALAGWALA FM 0 26,910 45,783 21,753 94,446 
LOTUS FM 0 30,780 35,910 21,852 88,542 
METRO FM 0 159,030 200,130 142,950 502,110 
MOTSWEDING FM 0 70,646 92,876 55,417 218,939 
MUNGHANA LONENE FM 0 28,760 39,588 26,951 95,299 
PHALAPHALA FM 0 17,353 29,120 15,176 61,649 
RSG 0 154,704 302,082 189,936 646,722 
SAFM 0 61,860 110,286 50,778 222,924 
THOBELA FM 0 99,089 131,654 79,396 310,139 
UKHOZI FM 0 279,959 495,276 204,038 979,273 
ALGOA 0 32,500 28,470 13,230 74,200 



























Table 54: DA Print Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-Apr 
04 
ATHLONE NEWS 0 11,073 2,028 2,028 15,129 
BEELD MON-FRI 0 38,034 0 0 38,034 
BURGER MF 0 33,743 0 67,857 101,600 
 BURGER OOS KAAP 0 13,454 0 0 13,454 
 CAPE ARGUS MF 0 40,012 25,359 0 65,371 
 CAPE TIMES MF 0 0 0 26,972 26,972 
 CITIZEN MF 0 33,579 0 0 33,579 
 CONSTANTIABERG BULL 0 0 2,352 4,704 7,056 
 DAILY DISPATCH MF 0 220 0 0 220 
 DAILY DISPATCH WE 0 0 257 0 257 
 DAILY NEWS MF 0 34,246 14,470 20,184 68,900 
 DIAMOND FLDS ADV MF 3,024 7,548 0 1,659 12,231 
 DISTRICT MAIL 0 0 0 944 944 
 EIKESTAD NUUS 0 1,435 4,162 2,870 8,467 
 FALSEBAY ECHO 0 7,032 0 0 7,032 
 GEMSBOK UPINGTON 0 0 3,281 0 3,281 
 GEORGE HERALD 0 0 0 7,232 7,232 
 GRAAF REINET ADVERT 0 0 0 531 531 
 GROCOTTS MAIL 0 0 154 0 154 
 HEIDELBERG NIGEL HERAU 0 0 0 242 242 
 HERMANUS TIMES 0 0 293 1,131 1,424 
 HIGHVELD HERALD 0 0 1,257 0 1,257 
 KLERKSDORP RECORD 0 0 199 0 199 
 LADYSMITH GAZETTE 1,860 0 0 0 1,860 
 LETABA HERALD 7,702 0 0 10,902 18,604 
 MAIL&GUARDIAN 0 0 492 0 492 
 MALUTI 0 0 0 927 927 
 METRO BURGER EAST 0 0 674 0 674 
 METRO BURGER WEST 0 0 615 0 615 
 MIDLAND NEWS 0 0 290 290 580 
 MOSSELBAY ADVERTISER 1,100 0 0 0 1,100 
 NATAL WITNESS MF 0 16,025 470 3,962 20,457 
 NATAL WITNESS WE 0 7,044 0 3,082 10,126 
 NEWCASTLE ADVERTISER 453 0 0 0 453 
 NOORDKAAP 0 0 0 1,334 1,334 
 NORTHERN NATAL COURIER 288 0 0 0 288 
 PLAINSMAN 0 12,864 0 0 12,864 
 POST 6,246 18,946 18,946 9,369 53,507 
 PRETORIA NEWS MF 0 8,902 13,467 0 22,369 
 RANDBURG SUN 0 0 0 799 799 
 RAPPORT MAIN BODY 0 105,924 0 105,924 211,848 
 RECORDER VOLKSRUST 0 0 0 3,128 3,128 
 ROSEBANK&KILLARNEY GA 0 0 0 1,166 1,166 
 RUSTENBURG HERALD FRI 0 0 974 0 974 
 SOUTH COAST HERALD 2,402 0 1,484 1,920 5,806 
 SOUTHERN MAIL 0 10,308 0 0 10,308 











 STANDERTON ADVERTISER 0 0 0 1,045 1,045 
 STAR MF 0 69,642 34,518 0 104,160 
 STELLALANDER VRYBURG 599 0 1,410 0 2,009 
 SUNDAY TIMES M B 0 143,871 0 143,871 287,742 
 TYGERBURGER BELLVILLE 0 0 588 0 588 
 TYGERBURGER DURBANVIL 0 0 512 0 512 
 TYGERBURGER KUIBRAK 0 0 525 2,450 2,975 
 TYGERBURGER KUS 0 0 537 0 537 
 TYGERBURGER PAROW 0 0 788 0 788 
 U D NEWS 779 0 0 710 1,489 
 VAALWEEKBLAD THUFRI 0 0 2,374 0 2,374 
 VOLKSBLAD MF 0 15,119 0 0 15,119 
 VRYSTAAT BETHLEHEM 0 0 0 123 123 
 WESLANDER 319 0 957 11,528 12,804 
 WORCESTER STANDARD 0 0 2,538 0 2,538 
 ZOUTPANSBERGER 0 0 0 2,718 2,718 
 BURGER MF 0 0 0 9,888 9,888 
 HERMANUS TIMES 0 0 410 0 410 
 LADYSMITH GAZETTE 0 1,860 0 0 1,860 
 TYGERBURGER GOODWOO 0 0 588 0 588 
 VOLKSBLAD MF 0 0 7,753 0 7,753 
 WORCESTER STANDARD 0 0 0 2,833 2,833 
 Total 24,772 630,881 147,118 459,115 1,261,886 
 
 
Table 55: IFP Print Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004) 
IFP      
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 
2004 
BEELD  0 0 0 38,034 38,034 
ILANGA 0 0 0 92,804 92,804 
LADYSMITH GAZETTE 7,254 7,254 0 0 14,508 
RAPPORT  0 0 0 103,208 103,208 
SOUTH COAST HERALD 0 0 0 4,710 4,710 
VOLKSBLAD  0 0 0 15,119 15,119 
ZULULAND OBSERVER 0 0 0 1,419 1,419 
  TOTAL 7,254 7,254 0 255,294 269,802 
 
 
Table 56: IFP Radio Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 
2004 
P4 CAPE FM 0 0 4,320 3,780 8,100 
P4 KZN FM 0 0 2,800 2,450 5,250 
EAST COAST RADIO 0 0 0 57,810 57,810 
5FM 0 0 7,980 18,780 26,760 
GOOD HOPE FM 0 0 6,840 0 6,840 
LESEDI FM 0 0 0 17,118 17,118 
LIGWALAGWALA FM 0 0 432 3,078 3,510 
LOTUS FM 0 0 39,255 58,410 97,665 











MOTSWEDING FM 0 0 3,020 7,227 10,247 
MUNGHANA LONENE FM 0 0 1,131 2,301 3,432 
PHALAPHALA FM 0 0 2,259 2,258 4,517 
RADIO 2000 0 0 6,000 6,000 12,000 
RSG 0 0 0 34,896 34,896 
SAFM 0 0 2,160 9,480 11,640 
UKHOZI FM 0 0 231,681 269,100 500,781 
UMHLOBO WENENE FM 0 0 77,688 131,508 209,196 
  TOTAL 0 0 497,631 861,032 1,358,663 
 
 
Table 57: UDM Outdoor Media Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 
2004 
BILLBOARDS 0 695,400 712,900 395,950 1,804,250 
MOVING MEDIA 0 0 11,250 20,625 31,875 
  TOTAL 0 695,400 724,150 416,575 1,836,125 
 
 
Table 58: UDM Print Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 
2004 
BUSINESS DAY SURVEY 0 73,884 0 0 73,884 
CITY PRESS 0 112,320 0 0 112,320 
DAILY DISPATCH MF 0 36,164 0 0 36,164 
DAILY NEWS MF 0 0 4,452 0 4,452 
EASTERN PROV HERALD 0 38,043 0 0 38,043 
INDEP ON SATURDAY 0 0 4,465 0 4,465 
MAIL&GUARDIAN 0 107,256 68,880 34,440 210,576 
POST 0 0 3,123 0 3,123 
SOWETAN 0 66,066 0 0 66,066 
SUNDAY TIMES 0 284,580 0 0 284,580 
THIS DAY 0 108,000 0 0 108,000 
 TOTAL 0 826,313 80,920 34,440 941,673 
 
Table 59: UDM Radio Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 2004 
GOOD HOPE FM 0 0 23,610 16,770 40,380 
IKWEKWEZI FM 0 0 5,400 4,440 9,840 
LESEDI FM 0 0 32,430 29,280 61,710 
LIGWALAGWALA FM 0 0 6,570 6,030 12,600 
LOTUS FM 0 0 9,060 5,700 14,760 
METRO FM 0 0 61,500 56,250 117,750 
MOTSWEDING FM 0 0 18,570 14,040 32,610 
MUNGHANA LONENE FM 0 0 7,290 4,830 12,120 
PHALAPHALA FM 0 0 4,860 3,210 8,070 
SAFM 0 0 20,400 13,260 33,660 
THOBELA FM 0 0 19,770 12,120 31,890 











UMHLOBO WENENE FM 0 0 31,530 26,230 57,760 
TOTAL 0 0 308,520 252,760 561,280 
 
 
Table 60: ID Print Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 
2004 
ATHLONE NEWS 0 0 317 0 317 
BEDFORDVIEW EDENVALE 0 0 646 0 646 
CAPE ARGUS  0 9,710 0 0 9,710 
CAPE TIMES  5,789 3,952 0 13,758 23,499 
DAILY SUN 0 0 1,993 5,979 7,972 
DIAMOND FLDS ADV  0 0 0 389 389 
EIKESTAD NUUS 0 0 0 205 205 
GEORGE HERALD 0 0 2,034 0 2,034 
GERMISTON CITY NEWS 0 0 575 0 575 
JOBURG EAST EXPRESS 0 0 360 0 360 
KAAPSE SON 0 0 0 6,650 6,650 
KEMPTON EXPRESS 0 0 726 0 726 
MALUTI 0 0 0 1,436 1,436 
PLAINSMAN 0 0 331 0 331 
REPRESENTATIVE 0 0 807 0 807 
STELLALANDER VRYBURG 0 0 1,340 0 1,340 
SUNDAY TIMES EX NATAL 0 0 1,800 1,200 3,000 
SUNDAY TIMES METRR 0 0 3,060 2,040 5,100 
TEMBISAN 0 0 416 0 416 
TYGERBURGER BELLVILLE 0 0 622 0 622 
TYGERBURGER GOODWOO 0 0 590 0 590 
TYGERBURGER KUIBRAK 0 0 637 0 637 
VUKANI 0 0 364 0 364 
WORCESTER STANDARD 0 0 0 217 217 
 TOTAL 5,789 13,662 16,618 31,874 67,943 
 
 
Table 61: ID Radio Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 
2004 
ALX FM 0 0 0 2,986 2,986 
BUSH FM 0 0 0 3,183 3,183 
CCFM 0 0 0 2,577 2,577 
EAST RAND FM 0 0 0 2,100 2,100 
HIGHWAY FM 0 0 0 2,212 2,212 
RADIO RAU 0 0 0 1,742 1,742 
RADIO TUKS 0 0 0 1,921 1,921 
RIPPEL FM 0 0 0 4,206 4,206 
SOSHANGUVE FM 0 0 0 2,194 2,194 
TODAY FM 0 0 0 3,311 3,311 
TYGERBERG FM 0 0 0 4,117 4,117 
UCT FM 0 0 0 1,424 1,424 
VOC FM 0 0 0 2,744 2,744 











YFM 0 0 0 6,552 6,552 
CAPE TALK 0 0 0 14,343 14,343 
RADIO 702 0 0 0 21,172 21,172 
EAST COAST RADIO 0 0 30,840 22,230 53,070 
5FM 0 0 0 102,516 102,516 
METRO FM 0 0 0 121,208 121,208 
RSG 0 0 13,980 28,770 42,750 
SAFM 0 0 24,840 38,628 63,468 




Table 62: NNP Print Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 
2004 
 APPLE EXPRESS 0 0 10,415 0 10,415 
 BEELD (Mon –Fri) 12,537 22,288 33,434 9,751 78,010 
 Print-N&BEELD (Week-end) 2,786 5,572 1,393 1,393 11,144 
 BONUS NORTH WESTERN 0 0 0 12,977 12,977 
 BURGER  3,955 75,274 161,053 183,670 423,952 
 BURGER OOS K SAK 0 7,784 17,010 0 24,794 
 BURGER OOS KAAP 2,358 15,856 31,568 11,676 61,458 
 BURGER OOS KAAP WE 629 0 0 0 629 
 BURGER WE 1,483 2,472 25,956 11,124 41,035 
 CAPE ARGUS MF 0 0 9,710 18,958 28,668 
 DIAMOND FLDS ADV MF 0 1,382 2,212 0 3,594 
 DISTRICT MAIL 0 0 4,026 4,026 8,052 
 EIKESTAD NUUS 0 0 2,358 2,460 4,818 
 ESCOURT&MIDLAND NEWS 0 0 0 1,094 1,094 
 GEMSBOK UPINGTON 410 0 0 1,169 1,579 
 HELDERPOS 0 486 1,949 5,811 8,246 
 HERMANUS TIMES 0 0 0 702 702 
 HIGHWAY MAIL 0 0 0 4,100 4,100 
 KAAPSE SON 500 5,100 5,600 1,400 12,600 
 KROONNUUS 0 0 1,188 0 1,188 
 LADYSMITH GAZETTE 11,160 0 0 0 11,160 
 LOWVELDER FRIDAY 0 0 0 7,326 7,326 
 MAIL MAFIKENG 0 0 0 1,955 1,955 
 MALUTI 0 0 0 2,873 2,873 
 MIDDELBURG OBSERVER 0 0 2,742 3,199 5,941 
 NATAL WITNESS (Mon –Fri) 0 0 0 8,218 8,218 
 NATAL WITNESS (Week-end) 0 0 0 3,522 3,522 
 NOORDKAAP 0 0 0 3,134 3,134 
 NOORDWESTER TVL 0 2,051 0 0 2,051 
 NORTHERN NATAL COURIER 0 0 0 1,296 1,296 
 ONS STAD 0 0 0 6,550 6,550 
 OUDTSHOORN COURANT 0 0 0 976 976 
 PLAINSMAN 0 0 3,958 3,958 7,916 
 POST 0 0 0 3,123 3,123 
 POTCHEFSTROOM HERALD 0 0 0 2,449 2,449 











 PRETORIA RECORD CENTU 0 0 0 2,544 2,544 
 PRETORIA RECORD EAST 0 0 0 2,544 2,544 
 PRETORIA RECORD MAMELODI 0 0 0 1,255 1,255 
 PRETORIA RECORD MOOT 0 0 0 1,755 1,755 
 PRETORIA RECORD NORTH 0 0 0 1,535 1,535 
 PRETORIA RECORD WEST 0 0 0 1,105 1,105 
 RAPPORT 3,880 0 0 0 3,880 
 RIDGE TIMES 0 0 0 2,965 2,965 
 RUSTENBURG HERALD 0 0 0 11,864 11,864 
 SAT WEEKEND ARGUS 0 0 10,392 10,392 20,784 
 SOUTH COAST HERALD 848 0 0 0 848 
 SOUTH COAST SUN 0 0 0 1,044 1,044 
 U D NEWS 0 0 8,078 0 8,078 
 VAALWEEKBLAD  0 0 2,374 0 2,374 
 VOLKSBLAD (Mon- Fri) 3,588 10,780 15,985 11,020 41,373 
 VOLKSBLAD (Week-end) 1,050 1,868 1,984 443 5,345 
 VOLKSBLAD SAKE 0 496 0 0 496 
 WITBANK NEWS 0 0 0 1,940 1,940 
 WORCESTER STANDARD 0 0 0 978 978 
 ZULULAND OBSERVER 0 0 0 2,660 2,660 
 TOTAL 45,184 151,409 353,385 374,217 924,195 
 
Table 63: NNP Radio Advertising Expenditure (January 2004 - April 2004) 
 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 Jan-April 
2004 
HIGHVELD 94 7 0 0 108,859 59,906 168,765 
EAST COAST RADIO 0 0 162,600 96,930 259,530 
JACARANDA 94 2FM 0 0 159,780 113,000 272,780 
KFM 94 5 0 23,815 276,420 148,305 448,540 
5FM 0 0 46,104 21,030 67,134 
GOOD HOPE FM 0 0 76,731 30,150 106,881 
LOTUS FM 0 0 31,710 14,460 46,170 
RSG 0 0 110,310 105,450 215,760 
SAFM 0 0 58,947 43,350 102,297 
ALGOA 0 0 29,067 1,028 30,095 
OFM 0 0 35,940 4,634 40,574 
 TOTAL 0 23,815 1,096,468 638,243 1,758,526 
 
